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This book is about the politics of nature conservation in late New Order
and early Reformasi Indonesia. It approaches the subject through discourse
analysis. Understanding politics as a struggle for discourse hegemony it
analyses both processes of policy- and lawmaking in Jakarta and of imple-
mentation in national parks, and their outcomes, and addresses a number of
questions: Which discourses have dominated conservation policies and laws
throughout history? How did Ministers, members of Parliament, state offi-
cials, NGOs and residents of national parks try to decide debates on con-
servation in their advantage? Which unwritten rules helped or constrained
them in this effort? How did the struggle for discourse hegemony affect
policy and law, policy- and lawmaking and implementation?
Based on rich empirical case material the book argues that a multitude of
discourses have come to co-exist which enabled actors to use arguments
strategically, and that various actors have succeeded to mobilise discourses
enabling them to participate in the debate without obligations.
The results of this study go beyond participating in the debate on what 
element of sustainable development to focus on but link the policy debate
to the debate on governance and rule of law. By addressing the policy dis-
course and the discourses structuring policy- and lawmaking and imple-
mentation, the study wants to contribute not only to the field of nature
conservation but also to the field of Indonesian law and governance in
general.
‘This book represents a major advance in our understanding of nature 
conservation politics in Indonesia. It is both a theoretically sophisti-
cated application of discourse analysis to the process of policy formu-
lation and implementation in Indonesia and an empirically rich body
of work which ranges from the passion-filled corridors of power in
Jakarta to the on-the-ground reality in national parks.’
Robert Cribb (Australian National University, Canberra)
This is a volume in the ser ies of the E.M. Meijers Institute of Legal Studies of
Leiden University. This study is par t of the Law Schools’ research programme on
Securing the rule of law in a world of multilevel jur isdiction, subprogramme
‘Formation, implementation and improvement of law and governance in developing
countr ies’.
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Part I
Introduction and theoretical approach

1 Introduction
After the small orange bus finally left the booming industrial town of Bontang
and we passed the border of Kutai National Park, I could hardly believe what
I saw. I had been warned by various people in Samarinda, the capital of East
Kalimantan, and at the park’s office in Bontang, that the park – protected for
its biodiversity, especially the Dipterocarp trees – was not in good shape.
Extensive fires had destroyed large parts of the park in 1997, and after the
fall of the Soeharto regime in May 1998 a struggle for political control of the
park broke out. But what I saw from the bus exceeded all I could possibly
have expected. On both sides of the East Kalimantan Highway, which ran
through the park and was in good shape, highly trafficked by busses, cars,
trucks and motorbikes, there were hardly any trees to be seen. The forest
seemed to have moved back a long distance from the road. In its place, at the
roadside, was booming economic activity: small banana plantations, corn fields
and vegetable gardens ‘guarded’ by ‘no access’ boards, neatly painted houses
with colourful flowers in their front yard, buffaloes pulling huge tree trunks
from the forest to more open spaces where sunburned men sawed them into
smaller pieces, trucks waiting to be loadedwith logs, and people in the middle
of the construction of their new house. Occasionally, I saw wooden sticks
indicating the new self-made borders for chosen but not yet cultivated plots.
There was even a wooden sign advertising an overgrown and marshy plot
for sale from a man named Rasid who could be found in the vicinity of some
graveyard. In the middle of all this – sometimes hidden behind a new house,
and far less well maintained than the new residents’ homes – I discovered
remnants of billboards listing the visitor rules for national parks and several
ranger posts.
None of what I saw had anything in common with the images of tropical
rain forest in Kalimantan travel guides or with any national park I had ever
visited in Europe. Was this a national park at all?
Back home, when going throughmy field notes, interviews, and the policy
documents I had collected, I began reflecting on the question of what national
parks in Indonesia were actually about. How did theywork, why, and to what
end? This book describes the long and exciting journey I undertook to solve
this puzzle. At the same time it documents howmy own thinking on environ-
mental protection in Indonesia developed through the time of field research,
analysis and writing; how I moved away from looking at national parks from
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a purely nature-loving perspective towards one that allowed for various
alternative perspectives.
At the time I visited Kutai in 2000 I felt great sadness. I had come to
Indonesia to conductmy research and had hoped to contribute to the environ-
mental protection of this wonderful tropical country that had fascinated me
sincemy first visit in 1987. However, once in Kutai, I began towonder whether
I had come to the right place at the right time. There seemed not much left
to be protected and more people than not appeared indifferent towards this
situation. Back in the Netherlands, it had all seemed so relevant. I had joined
an Indonesian Dutch research project on ‘Environmental Law and the Decen-
tralization of Environmental Management in Indonesia’ (Indonesia Netherlands
Study on Environmental Law and Administration, abbr. INSELA) which had
been initiated in 1996 and gained some additional relevance after the enactment
of the 1997 Environmental Management Act. This project intended, among
other things, to gain ‘in-depth insight in the consistency of environmental law
and the effectiveness of environmental management in Indonesia’ as well as
to assess ‘the potential of decentralization for the formation and implementa-
tion of sustainable development policy at district level’. My part in the project
became to study processes of policy and lawmaking in the field of environ-
mental management. At that time I approached environmental protection in
a broad sense. I paid several visits to the Ministry for the Environment (In.
Kementerian Negara Lingkungan Hidup, henceforth KLH) and the Environmental
Impact Management Agency (In. Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan,
henceforth Bapedal) in Jakarta and collectedmaterials about policies, projects
and programmes. These focused on the need to raise an environmental aware-
ness among the population and to influence – in policy terms, to ‘co-ordinate
and integrate’ – all policymaking, including that of the sectoral departments
of Forestry,Mining and Industry, in such away that policies increasingly took
into account environmental considerations. So, one ofmy initial questions came
to be how effective KLH was in performing these core tasks. This question led
me to various departments and their regional agencies and to a giant co-
ordination meeting in Jakarta (which I describe in chapter 21).
However, once in the field, many people, including our Indonesian counter-
parts of the Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law (henceforth ICEL), tried
to convince me that it would be more fruitful and relevant to focus on the
implementation of policies and laws rather than on policymaking and
lawmaking. One day an official in Samarinda working for the regional Bapedal
office pointed to a large pile of documents and said:
‘In Indonesia we focus too much on the administration. We plan and ask money
to produce this policy and that report. Andwhenwe have done sowe are satisfied.
But in the end all this paper ends up here on this pile or on some shelf – unread.’1
1 Interview 10 July 2000.
Chapter 1 5
Indeed, I had seenmany of these piles of paper, and often, asking for a specific
regulation or policy, had surprised officials – and given them a headache since
they did not know where to search for it. If they found it at all, the paper
would often feel sticky and smell ofmould because of the humidity. Although
this seemingly useless paper production kept fascinating me I finally agreed
to turn my focus to the effectiveness of implementation.
At that time I had not yet decided whether to focus on nature destruction
(green), pollution (brown) or marine (blue) environmental problems. All I knew
was that I wanted to investigate how policies eventually played out in actual
projects. In my search for suitable case studies I first collected data about some
mangrove rehabilitation projects and developments in the field of coastal zone
management in, among others, the Bay of Jakarta where I was situated. In
the course of my investigations I paid a visit to Pulau Seribu, a small archi-
pelago 45 km north of Jakarta. This was to be my first encounter with
Indonesian national parks, which turned out to be an interesting field of
environmental policy where implementation differed enormously from the
theory behind policies and laws.
My new focus on the effectiveness of implementationwas also in line with
theoretical developments that had taken place from the 1970s onward. In that
time and ever since scholars of public administration and development admin-
istration argued that too much attentionwas exclusively given to policymaking.
This neglecting of implementation processes had its roots in the perception
that implementation was merely a matter of routine administrative activity
whereas policymakingwas about decisionmaking and politics.2 The emerging
countermovement in public administration, spearheaded by the seminal work
by Pressman and Wildavsky, argued that it was not wise to separate policy-
making from implementation as ‘[…] those seemingly routine questions of
implementation were the rocks on which the program [we investigated]
eventually foundered.’3
Keeping this inmind I chose two of Indonesia’s first national parks as case
studies: Pulau SeribuMarineNational Park andKutai. There, after some time,
I realised that the many people I spoke to about national parks told me the
same stories over and over again. Whereas some officials in Jakarta kept
repeating that the park was functioning well, among most people living in
the park area there seemed to be a consensus that the park did not work (In.
tidak jalan) or did not work as it should (In. tidak jalan seharusnya). Park officials
explained this to be the result of, among other issues, a persistent lack of
money and a local population that was not yet aware of the urge to conserve
nature in the park. Park residents, on the other hand, were less concerned
about the park and frequently argued that they had to fill their stomachs, that
the government constrained them in doing their work without providing any
2 See, for instance, Grindle 1990.
3 Pressman & Wildavsky 1973, p. 143.
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viable alternatives, and that they longed for more possibilities to participate
in decision making. These stories made me realize that there was a huge gap
between officials and residents and their respective ways of explaining the
same phenomenon: an ineffective national park policy. Realizing this also
remindedme in someway of the fact that the actors involved in policymaking
and policy documents alike often had explained ineffective policy with partly
the same and partly different stories: a lack of awareness among the popula-
tion, a lack of co-ordination and integration, and a lack of sufficiently qualified
human resources in the field. Strikingly, to whatever meeting, discussion or
office I went during my field work, I heard the same stories again and again,
phrased in the same words and using the same abbreviations. This made me
realize that they were more than just stories somehow linked to reality. They
seemed to possess some fundamental meaning of their own, all the more as
they seemed to play some role in avoiding the need to search for and provide
more considered explanations and in preventing actors from genuinely com-
municating with each other. So, I started to get the feeling that there was
something interesting about these stories that I needed to unravel.
As these dominant stories kept crossingmy research path in policymaking
and implementation alike, I decided to analyze their role in both these processes
and their outcomes. Again, theorists had already suggested looking at policy-
making and implementation in an integratedmanner in the 1980s. Two of them
are of particular interest for their respective argumentation: first, Barrett and
Fudge, who conceptualised policy and implementation as a continuum, the
so-called ‘policy/action continuum’. They argued that one can conceive of
this continuum either as action and policy that keep influencing each other
through a continuing sequence of actions and reactions or as a process inwhich
various actors keep negotiating about policy and action.4 Both of these
conceptualisations proved useful for interpreting my observations in the field.
The second author, Schaffer, is of interest for his attention to ‘escape routes’
in the field of public policy. In his view, focusing on either policymaking or
implementation reflects a conceptualisation of policy as a dichotomy. This
creates possibilities for politicians and bureaucrats alike to avoid responsibility
since they ‘can, and do […], blame those who, for the purpose of the game,
can be treated as being on the other side of the line.’5
The relevance of this argument becomes clear when we consider that not
only actors in the field blame each other but also that academic studies analyse
the ineffectiveness of policy in terms of ‘obstacles to implementation’, including
4 Barrett & Fudge 1981. See also Barrett 2004 for a retrospective discussion of this movement.
Lipsky worked this idea out in his study of street-level bureaucrats and their discretionary
policymaking authority during the implementation of policies (Lipsky 1979).
5 Schaffer 1984, p. 157. Also cited in Sutton 1999, p. 23. What Schaffer still neglected, though,
was that the same mechanism potentially applies to citizens as well. In his view, citizens
suffer from ‘actual problems’ (Schaffer 1984, p. 181).
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a lacking political will or sectoralism, as happens frequently in Indonesia. These
studies provide actors with arguments to explain and justify their behaviour,
and indeed, avoid responsibility. Schaffer concluded that only approaching
policy as a whole could prevent us from creating new escape hatches: ‘We
suggest that policy is looked at as a whole “regime of practices” (Foucault,
1981), not in an exclusive, dichotomous or reduced way.’6
Of course, using arguments from exclusive studies of either the policy-
making or the implementation process need not necessarily be a strategy to
avoid responsibility. Actors may indeed see the lack of sufficient resources
or of political will as the main obstacle to their effective performance. Still,
following Schaffer’s recommendation may help to better understand and
improve policy, law and practice.
Yet, most scholars still focus on either policymaking or implementation,
though since the 1980s more frequently on implementation than before. In
this study, however, I attempt to analyse nature conservation policy and law
as a whole: the processes of policy- and lawmaking and implementation and
their outcomes. I do so in order to gain as complete an insight as possible into
both of these, to find explanations for how actors negotiate policy, law and
practice in the field of nature conservation in Indonesia.
Because stories play an important role in these negotiations, they can best
be studied through a focus on language. Language forms the key to how we
construct the world around us.7 After all, we normally think in language and
all our interactions with others and interpretations of actions take the form
of language.8 To better understand how to analyse language in this study I
will first introduce various more specific concepts.
6 Schaffer 1984, p. 175. This is not to suggest we avoid differentiating between policy and
action for analytical purposes but rather for approaching both as an integrated research
object.
7 Following Berger and Luckmann, I do not argue that everything is socially constructed
or ‘nothing can exist unless it is socially constructed’ but rather that our interpretation and
experience of things, objects and events helps to construct our image of the world (Berger
& Luckmann 1966). See also Hacking 1999, p. 24-25.
8 Many who are used to non-positivist, interpretive or discourse approaches would go even
further and categorize actions as texts. What is meant by this is that we can construct any
expression as a text in order to analyse it or to react to it. As is the case with any book,
the reader then interprets what he reads. This interpretation can differ very much from
the original intention. For instance, throwing a bomb can be ‘read’ as ‘he wants to destroy
me’ or as ‘I claim this piece of territory’.

2 Theoretical Approach
2.1 DISCOURSE
Over the past twenty years discourse analysis has become popular in academia.
Scholars who engage in it have diverse backgrounds including linguistics,
psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, political sciences, law and the
study of public administration and policy.1 Due to this variety scholars define
and study discourse in very different ways. As my study is to be situated in
policy analysis I will limit the following introduction to discourse to earlier
discourse analyses in this field and only where necessary cite studies from
other disciplines.2
Even within the field of policy studies the definitions and studies of dis-
course differ.3 Foucault has inspired most scholars in this field.4 This is not
to say that he or his approach dominate the academic field of discourse ana-
lysis. We may differentiate between those scholars who, trying to adopt a
‘Foucauldian attitude’, try to replicate his work and those who use some
elements of his work.5 One scholar belonging to the second group is Maarten
Hajer who gained international recognition with his discourse analysis of the
politics of the Dutch and British acid-rain controversies in the second half of
the past century.6 He combined insights of Foucault with those of Davies and
1 For an overview see Van Dijk 1996.
2 For information on how this approach has developed and on what elements of earlier
approaches it is built see Fischer 2003 and Hajer 1995. In Indonesia, to my knowledge, a
limited number of discourse analyses have been undertaken so far. One has used Hajer’s
definition as well (Wittmer & Birner 2005). Others, often without a clear analytical frame-
work, include Ramage 1993, Li 1996, Persoon 2002, Arifin 2003, Dove 2003, Peluso 2003,
Znoj 2004, and Galudra & Sirait 2006.
3 For an overview of policy studies and discourse approaches see Fischer 2003; for a compara-
tive application of three different approaches see Ockwell 2001; for law and discourse
analysis see Black 2002 and Lange 2005.
4 He is well-known for his ‘genealogical’ or ‘archaeological’ studies in which he traced the
historical roots of specific concepts, such as ‘madness’ and ‘sexuality’ (Foucault 1975,
Foucault 1980; see also Foucault 1971 and Foucault 1972).
5 For a discussion of how various scholars struggle with Foucault’s work that comes to this
conclusion see Klemm & Glasze 2005.
6 Hajer found among others that the post-1970 emergence of the new concept of ecological
modernisation succeeded to bridge gaps between the economic and ecological discourse
(Hajer 1995).
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Harré, and Sabatier7 and created a theory that appeared both accessible, and
suitable as a point of departure for this study. He defined discourse as a
‘specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, repro-
duced and transformed in a particular set of practices and throughwhichmeaning
is given to physical and social realities.’8
There are three key elements in this definition: first, a specific ensemble of
ideas, concepts and categorizations, second the fact that these are being pro-
duced, reproduced and transformed in a set of practices, and third that we
make sense of what we see and experience through them.9
Remembering the above-mentioned importance of stories in the Indonesian
policy debate and the focus of policy and law on problems and solutions I
further searched the literature forwell-matching analytical sub-categories which
came to replace Hajer’s ‘ideas, concepts and categorizations’ as discourse-
markers. As I will elaborate below, in this study I will search for frames,
stories, arguments, and practices10 to identify discourses. With the help of
stories, arguments and practices we can reconstruct the frames which people
use to make sense of physical and social realities and analyse how they ex-
plicate and struggle for the dominance of their frame.
In the field of policy studies, using a discourse perspective means to
conceive of policy – and action in this study, as discussed above – as a political
struggle.11 Simply how a problem is defined determines who is causing a
problem and who is given the authority to solve it. In terms of power this
is crucial. The struggle is then about the power to dominate the discussion
in terms of the definition of problem and solution, about making a particular
discourse dominant or hegemonic. This is of particular relevance in a policy
field where several discourses meet. After all, there is not only an ecological
discourse which plays a role in a political field as environmental politics12
or more specifically nature conservation, but also an economic and a social
one, to mention but three.13
7 Hajer 1995, p. 42-72. See below.
8 Hajer 1995, p. 44.
9 Cf. Tennekes 2005, p. 15. Tennekes has used Hajer’s approach to analyse the discourse of
‘good governance’ in theDutch andGerman development co-operation in Africa. His clear
explanation of the approach is a valuable contribution to the literature. His attempt to
further develop the concept of ‘practices’ in Hajer’s definition, however, lacks this clarity.
10 See the second element of Hajer’s definition.
11 Fischer 2003.
12 Hajer 1995, p. 61. Hajer speaks of inter-discursivity.
13 Exactly which discourses an analyst identifies depends on his or her data and how he or
she makes sense of them. This is certainly not to say that discourse analysts will identify
different discourses from similar data. So far, there is one other study of Indonesian (and
Thai) protected areas that is based on Hajer’s discourse approach (Wittmer & Birner 2005).
The authors of that study identified a conservationist, an eco-populist and a development-
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Where actors actively engage in such a struggle their motivations can vary
from a want for power to proving that they and their ideas and convictions
are morally right.14 However, that this struggle is being fought is not some-
thing that actors are necessarily aware of. On the contrary, it is a way of
conceptualising and describing a social reality rather than the actual motives
of the actors.15 As such, discourse analysis is a frame – a way of making sense
of the world – in itself.
Where, then, does the struggle take place? The struggle for a dominant
discourse in the nature conservation policy in Indonesia takes place everywhere
people produce relevant texts or practices that can be read and interpreted
by others.16 This book forms part of this struggle, as do conversations in a
national park in Indonesia between fishermen and park rangers, a parlia-
mentary debate on the issue, the contributions of a nature conservation NGO,
repeated unlawful practices by park users and so forth. However, for a better
understanding of how to identify a discourse let us first turn to its four sub-
categories.
2.1.1 Frames
The first sub-category of discourse is ‘frame’. In order to make sense of the
social world around us, thus of the social phenomena we see, want to under-
stand and explain to others, we look through so-called ‘frames’.17 Such a
frame is informed by our present knowledge, beliefs and values. These have
been formed by ‘ideas, concepts and categorizations’18 of past experiences
that help us to interpret new events. However, frames do more than help us
make sense of the world. They also construct a reality by erecting walls beyond
which we don’t look.19 By doing so, they enable us to ‘select out some parts
of reality at the expense of others’ in our thinking and to ‘define problems,
alist discourse. I identified similar ones but because of the farther-reaching scope of my
study and the bigger amount of data I further differentiated these three discourses and
identified additional ones. In section 5.2 I describe themethodology I used in this research.
The fact that also scholars are not free of frames is discussed in chapter 3 and in appendix 1.
14 Cf. Tennekes 2005, p. 14.
15 Tennekes 2005, p. 14.
16 See also Yanow for the merits of interpretive analysis (Yanow 1993).
17 This concept was introduced by Goffman in 1974 (Fischer 2003, p. 144). Better known is
the application of the concept by Rein and Schön who used it to explain ‘intractable policy
controversies’ (Schön & Rein 1994).
18 See above for Hajer’s definition of discourse.
19 The choice for a certain frame implies the construction of a problem and definition. In this,
frames differ from the concept of various perspectives on the same problem: looking at
reality through a different framemeans that ‘the problem itself has changed’ (Fischer 2003,
p. 144-5 citing Rein and Schön).
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state a diagnosis, pass judgement, and reach a conclusion’.20 In other words,
we only see a part of the world around us: we miss everything that falls
beyond our frame. A person looking at a pile of logs on a boat on the Maha-
kam river in East Kalimantan, for instance, might see proof of forest destruc-
tion; looking through another frame someone else might see a source of
income; a third personmight see a reason for jealousy and anger since he lacks
access to this source of income. Each of these frames may instigate another
decision about what kind of action to take. As will become clear throughout
this book, interpreting logs as an issue of nature destruction is only one
possible interpretation among many. Other possibilities include interpreting
them as a symbol of creating order in the forest to increase its productivity,
as a symbol of economic opportunity since cutting the trees requires labour
and thus creates employment, or as an issue of unequal opportunities since
only a few people have access to the forest and its exploitation. We thus need
to realize that one and the same phenomenon can be interpreted in various
ways. One argument of this book is therefore that if we see something – in
this case, logs – we should ask whether our first reaction is the only possible
one or whether there are other ways to think about and debate it.
All the different frames construct different problems. In addition, they
position people in relation to other people and their environment.21 Is nature
a resource or something that needs our protection? Do we need managers or
a redistribution policy to make the problem disappear? The frames provide
different answers to questions like these and as such help to reinforce or
challenge existing social and power relationships for people and their environ-
ment.
Frames can be differentiated at various levels of abstraction. The most
abstract level is the scientific frame. Although a linguist, a biologist, a philo-
sopher and a political scientist are all scientists, they use different frames which
can be differentiated at a lower level of abstraction. Within these various
disciplines we can find different frames again. So, not all scientists automa-
tically use the same frame. However, some frames we use more regularly than
others as long as we are consciously or unconsciously convinced of their truth.
In addition, the context often determines which framewe use to look at reality.22
Since frames determine how we look at the world around us, the concept
of frames is also useful in the context of policies and laws and the actors
20 Fischer 2003, p. 144.
21 Fischer 2003, p. 83 citing Hajer. Hajer and Fischer link the issue of subject positioning to
stories (or ‘storylines’). Sluiter and also Tennekes (Tennekes 2005, p. 12 following Rein and
Schön), on the other hand, discuss positioning in the context of frames. Sluiter (Sluiter 2005,
p. 13) states, for instance, that oncewe have chosen a frame such aswar ‘we can immediate-
ly assign roles: there are clear enemies. This [positioning] allows for acts of violence against
them.’
22 Discourse analysts with a psychological background are primarily interested in these context
dependent varieties. See, for instance, Potter & Wetherell 1987.
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involved in their design and implementation.Wemay differentiate two levels.
At one level, policies and law reflect a certain frame in their definition of
problems and solutions. Such frames may include the assumption that policy
and laws are necessary instruments to effectively and efficiently solve problems
or that they belong to amodern state. At another level, policymakers and other
actors who engage in a policy debate consciously or unconsciously choose
a frame. By doing so, they choose to neglect other possible frames. Thus, the
frame they select determines what they consider to be ‘the facts’ on which
they will base their ‘normative prescriptions for action’.23 For instance, if an
official working in a national park chooses a common ‘development’ frame
to interpret his work situation he is likely to primarily see a shortage ofmoney
and the need to engage in more development projects to raise more. On the
other hand, a citizen may see the same situation in terms of laziness due to
a frame of governance, i.e. certain ideas about how government officials should
work. As a consequence hemay define the solution in terms of how to improve
the officials’ performance, and thus in terms of this very governance frame,
too.
Looking at these examples raises the question of what role interests play
in this context. Do citizens choose this particular frame because they have an
interest in good governance? Do officials choose a ‘development’ frame because
they have an interest in extra money? To some extent they do. They may use
these frames to promote their interests.24 But due to their constructive nature
frames also shape those interests: they determine what actors see as being in
their interest.25
These twomechanisms and the fact that frames are ‘usually tacit’26 – often
chosen unconsciously and therefore play no role in debates –make that frames
tend to be persistent: ‘It is, after all, very difficult “to think out of the box”,
so if the “box” is our “frame”, we tend to interpret future happenings in that
same light.’27
This is true primarily in the case of unconsciously chosen frames, though.
In the case that we consciously choose a frame (becausewe think that it makes
the most sense of what we see or as a strategy to pursue our interests) frames
do not need to be persistent. After all, they form a strategy and are only of
use to us as long as we think that they help us to achieve an end. In the event
that they no longer serve us we can exchange one strategic frame for another.
Even in the case of unconsciously chosen frames, we do not need to stick
to them until the end of our days. Hajer showed convincingly that the under-
lying beliefs and values are ‘vague’ and rather ‘unstable’ givens that can easily
23 Fischer 2003, p. 144.
24 Schön & Rein 1994, p. 29.
25 Schön & Rein 1994, p. 29.
26 Schön & Rein 1994, p. 23.
27 Sluiter 2005, p. 13.
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be influenced through language, for instance ‘new story-lines [which] create
new cognitions that may give people a new idea about their potential role
and the possibilities for change’.28 This is to say that we can at any time,
consciously or unconsciously, choose another frame that might overlap with
our former frame or even be completely different from it. However, in the
event that the new frame is compatible with a more abstract level of our old
frame it is likely that this happens sooner.
Taking over a new framemay happen unconsciously whenwe hear a new
story which ‘sounds right’29 or attractive to us, or consciously when we
‘reflect’ on our frames. In the latter case we must be aware of the fact that
there are other possible frames to look through which define problems differ-
ently and position us and others differently.30 According to Schön and Rein
this would be one way to resolve intractable policy controversies. A first step
towards such an awareness of frames would be to unravel and explicate the
different frames in a policy debate. One of the intentions of this study is to
do this for the field of nature conservation policy and law in Indonesia. Before
doing so, however, we need to consider more theoretical concepts: stories,
arguments and practices. It is through them that we explicate our frames.
2.1.2 Stories31
Stories form the second sub-category of discourse. While frames determine
what and how we see, stories serve to communicate our version of what ‘is’
or what ‘happened’ and why. As such they are often simplifications of a
complex reality. Another important aspect of stories is that they link the
present situation to the past as we ‘from infancy [...] learn how to interpret
and understand new narrative stories through older ones acquired in the
course of socialization and lived experience.’32 So we compare the stories
we hear or tell to earlier stories, including experiences that we carry with us
in the form of stories.
Stories can be long or short. Their most important elements are characters
and their actions and motivations. Stories may be complete with a beginning,
middle, and end and a plot that connects them.33 However, they may also
be incomplete and lack some of these elements. Theymay, in an extreme case,
consist of only oneword that is capable of invoking awhole, albeit not literally
28 Hajer 1995, p. 71.
29 Hajer 1995.
30 Schön & Rein 1994, p. 44.
31 There are various terms in use for stories, including ‘narratives’ (Fischer 2003 and Roe 1994)
and ‘story-lines’ (Hajer 1995, p. 56, 63).
32 Fischer 2003, p. 162.
33 Fischer 2003.
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the same, story for an audience.34 This is especially the case when stories get
accepted and repeated in public, and thus ‘get a ritual character’ and become
‘tropes’.35 For instance, saying ‘project’ wouldmakemany Indonesians imme-
diately think of some version of a story about corrupt government officials
who enrich themselves through development projects.
In the context of policy, stories and their interpretation by others serve
to construct and communicate what people see as the problem of a situation
and whom they hold responsible for it.
Reading this may suggest that stories inmost cases constrain actors as they
define them and their actions as problematic. However, one has to realise that
stories can be enabling as well.36 Often they are both. As this study will show,
the story of national parks in Indonesia was constraining for the parks’ inhabit-
ants who were defined as a problem, while it opened a great opportunity for
entrepreneurs who could suddenly exploit these areas for tourism and for
conservation NGOs that could position themselves as influential policy actors.
As stories also point to issues needing further thought or action37 they
form a link between problems and solutions, betweenwhat is andwhat ought
to be.38 Here arguments come into focus.
2.1.3 Arguments
Arguments, the third sub-category of discourse, have in commonwith stories
and frames that they position people in a certain way. However, as Fischer
notes, there is a major difference between stories (which he refers to as narra-
tives) and arguments:
‘Whereas a narrative ties together a story with a beginning, a middle, and an end
through the device of a plot, an argument is structured around premises designed
to logically lead to conclusions. The narrative, moreover, is a mode of explanation
designed to tell us what happened and what it means. While one can argue about
“what is”, especially in empirical argumentation, argumentation is the form
employed to persuade an audience that something “ought” to be the case: that
is, a particular action should – or should not – take place, that an event should
be interpreted in one way rather than another and so on. Put simply, narratives
are primarily designed to deal with an “is”, although they can include a moral
34 Cf. Hajer 1995, p. 62.
35 Hajer 1995, p. 63.
36 Cf. Hajer 1995, p. 64.
37 Fischer 2003, p. 163.
38 Fischer 2003, p. 145 citing Rein and Schön 1977.
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usually treated as a given. When it comes to making the case for an “ought”, we
offer arguments.’39
This difference between these two concepts is important. It helps in the analysis
to differentiate between descriptive and normative data. However, doing so
requires caution. Often, stories and arguments are built around each other
to make an audience draw certain conclusions or to prepare them to accept
a particular story or argument.40
Just like stories, arguments can take the form of a single word. ‘Develop-
ment’ or its Indonesian equivalent ‘pembangunan’ is themost important example
in the Indonesian context. Such words are often contested concepts which
nonetheless are presented as ‘consensual hurrah-words’.41
2.1.4 Practices
The fourth sub-category of discourse concerns practices. In Hajer’s definition,
the idea that what I have called stories and arguments, with their underlying
frames, are being produced, reproduced and transformed by a particular set
of practices takes a central position. Such practices can take the form of words
or actions. An example of practices belonging to a regional autonomy discourse
would be the unlawful building of houses in a national park and the silent
or explicit support for it by a regional government. It cannot be stressed
enough that this definition implies that discourse is more than words alone,
and discourse analysis, therefore, must be more than an analysis of words.
As do stories and arguments, practices reflect discourses. Not including them
in the analysis would mean neglecting a significant part of any situation.
Practices may sometimes tell us more than words about the frames people
use to make sense of reality and the struggle they have with others about it.
This is especially the case where routines rule the thinking and behaviour of
actors, i.e. where people act rather unconsciously and therefore struggle to
articulate their ideas. Practices can also tell us more than words when actors
feel that deeds are more convincing than words. In many cases, for instance,
actors feel unable to engage in a lingual discussion because of a strong feeling
of inferiority that can result from marked differences in education and a
cultural focus on hierarchy.
39 Fischer 2003, p. 181. Attention for arguments in policy analysis has become known as the
‘argumentative turn’. The seminal book in this tradition was by Fischer and Forester Fischer
& Forester 1993. They focused primarily on the argumentative role of policy analysts,
though. In this tradition, the focus is on normative statements, i.e. on arguments about
what ought to be.
40 Cf. Fischer 2003, p. 181.
41 Cornwall 2007, p. 472 citing Chandhoke. Cornwall herself uses the term ‘buzzwords’.
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Practices form part of the struggle for discourse hegemony in variousways.
They can be used as arguments, for instance, when people do not dare enter
the struggle with words. They can be used in support of arguments, for
instance, when people feel that their words alone are not strong enough. But
they can also become part of the struggle when others interpret them as
arguments to which they want or need to react, for instance, in cases where
no direct debate is taking place.
In addition, practices can inform us about the extent to which actors either
use a discourse strategically42 or have internalized it in their daily behaviour.
During my fieldwork I observed many situations in which actors said one
thing and did another. In addition I collected many statements from people
accusing others of this disconnect between words and deeds, using words
primarily to present themselves in an unrealistic normativeway, or to present
the norm as reality. One ranger in Pulau Seribu told me, for instance, that in
his subsection there were no problems at all. ‘Yes, in former times, 70% of
the fishermen used poison for fishing and it cost me much work to convince
them to stop using it, but in the end I succeeded!’43 Yet, many other people,
including other rangers and even fishermen, accused him of not speaking the
truth and of being concerned about his personal wealth rather than doing his
job. For them, his statement reflected that he did not consider it important
to speak the truth and that it was perfectly acceptable to say one thing and
do another. In my terminology, for them his statement reflected a practice of
‘keeping up appearances’.44 Presenting reality in a normative way is then
an example of a practice that takes the form of words but in combination with
other practices tells us more than the author would intend. In conclusion, in
order to judge about the dominance of a discourse it is important to consider
both words and deeds.
2.2 SPECIFIC AND UNSPECIFIC DISCOURSE
Before we get a deeper understanding of how the struggle for discourse
hegemony is being fought we need to return to frames and their relation to
discourse for a moment. Within one discourse several frames can coexist.45
So, within a policy field the political struggle does not only take place between
42 The finding that various actors in Indonesia do sowill form one of the red threads through-
out this book. It is supported by the study by Wittmer and Birch that discourses can
facilitate collective action and can be considered ‘a type of “political capital”’ as actors can
use it in a strategic way to improve their situation (Wittmer & Birner 2005).
43 Interview 29 November 2000.
44 I borrowed this term from Vickers (Vickers 2001). Cf. Riggs who observed ‘formalism’ to
be an important characteristic of societies developing from traditional intomore heterogenic
‘prismatic’ ones. (Riggs 1964).
45 Cf. my earlier remark on frames of a different level of abstraction.
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the subscribers of certain discourses but also within a discourse: between the
users of different frames. Here it is useful to differentiate between specific and
unspecific discourses: the number of frames within one discourse and the
extent to which a discourse forces its participants to use a particular frame
indicate its degree of specificity.46 We can thus conceptualise a discourse as
having more or fewer underlying frames47 with corresponding practices.
Tennekes explains this as follows: the more frames that exist and are allowed
in a discussion, the less specific48 a discourse is, and the less one should speak
of a discourse.49 On the other hand, the fewer frames that are accepted the
more specific a discourse is, and the more one can speak of discourse. In the
latter case, certain frames are more dominant over others than in the former
case. If there is only one frame that is accepted in a discussion, that frame is
hegemonic.50 In the struggle, proponents of an unspecific counter-discourse
may gain dominance over a particular discourse but then the struggle will
continue within a discourse community to make it more specific.
2.3 PERSONAL POWER AND DISCURSIVE STRUCTURES
What, then, determines the specificity of a discourse?Who orwhat determines
howmany andwhich frames (with their stories, arguments and practices) are
accepted in a discussion? Power plays a key role in this context. In this study,
different from the Foucauldian approach, power can be either personal or
impersonal.51 As there is always, in every context, a power structure, there
may also be powerful people who may want to force us, threaten us, or make
us think that it is in our interest to reproduce a certain frame52 or that no
alternative is available. Likewise, the one in power can exclude us if he fears
that we are unlikely to reproduce a particular frame. He can do so through
a formal exclusion from the discussion, for instance through a newspaper ban,
46 Hajer uses the term ‘structuration’ (Hajer 1995, p. 60). However, to keep the definition as
simple as possible I prefer to differentiate discourses in terms of their specificity. Hajer
neglects this aspect of his definition.
47 Cf. Tennekes 2005, p. 14.
48 Tennekes uses like Hajer the term ‘structured’.
49 In discourse analysis, for instance, many frames coexist and there is little structure in terms
of obligatory definitions andmethods. So, in this case one would speak of a weak discourse.
Legal discourse would be an example of a very specific discourse.
50 Tennekes 2005, p. 14. He also refers to Fischer 1995.
51 Cf. Tennekes 2005, p. 13.
52 Lukes called this the ‘third dimension of power’ which is muchmore hidden but also often
muchmore effective than force since it makes us think that we act in accordance with what
we want ourselves. As the ‘first dimension of power’ he sees the potential or actual power
to force a decision, as the second dimension the potential or actual power to force a non-
decision (Lukes 2005).
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or by defining the agenda and speech situation in a particular way,53 such
as in a governmental programme to raise awareness where the roles are such
that the government lectures and the people listen.
In addition to this personal form of power, there is the impersonal power
of discourse. This can be conceptualised as a kind of structure or set of rules,
inherent to a discourse, which influences our thinking54 and defines what
is and is not acceptable within the discourse. Such a structure can, for instance,
take the form of words or concepts that call to mind a picture of wanted or
unwanted behaviour or practices that can be powerful enough to influence
the process of discussing itself. A discursive structure can also take the form
of a limit on the vocabulary allowed in a discussion. Political correctness and
the prohibition to discriminate are examples of such rules.55 In addition, a
discursive structure can consist of rules about who is to be blamed and praised.
Here, discourse influences how we define problems and solutions. In sum,
discursive structures can determine what we say and how we say it, as well
as how we behave.
No matter whether powerful people or discursive structures determine
this, the more people reproduce one particular frame the more specific a
discourse, or an inter-discursive discussion, gets. Then, in a policy context,
the more specific a discourse gets the more likely that it will become institu-
tionalized in a policy, law, or certain practices. Hajer speaks then of ‘discourse
institutionalization’, which is, according to him, the second condition (next
to its specificity) a discourse must fulfil to become hegemonic.56
2.4 WHY ACTORS OBEY DISCURSIVE STRUCTURES: CREDIBILITY, ACCEPTABILITY
AND TRUST
Having said this, the question of what determines the power of discursive
structures arises.Why are the structures strong enough tomake people repro-
duce a discourse in one case but not in another?Hajer offers three explanations
for why actors reproduce a discourse: credibility, acceptability and trust.57
By credibility Hajer means that actors feel forced to reproduce a certain
frame in order to remain credible in a debate: if they did not they would risk
marginalisation. If, for instance, they did not obey the rules of political correct-
53 Tennekes 2005, p. 13 citing Van Dijk.
54 Cf. Rabinow 1991, p. 51-75.
55 Another structure not dealt with in this study would be including words into, what Laclau
has termed, a ‘chain of equivalence’. Such a chain serves to reduce meanings of a word
to those equivalent to other words in a chain. Combining conservation with state and
authority, for instance, structures discourse differently from conservation combined with
empowerment and human rights (Cornwall & Brock 2005, p. 1047).
56 Hajer 1995, p. 61.
57 Hajer 1995, p. 59-60.
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ness, they would place themselves outside the debate and make it easy for
others to accuse them of not using the correct frame. This concept refers then
to the relationship between an actor and others. One example for this would
be that Indonesian government officials feel forced to adopt the environmental
or human rights discourse in the international arena in order to keep the ear
of the international community.
Hajer’s second explanation, acceptability, refers to whether an actor can
accept the subject position a frame attributes to him, either because it is attract-
ive to or necessary for him to accept it. Here we can think of tribal peoples,
for instance, who reproduce a conservation discourse that portrays them as
better custodians of nature than their government. Reproducing such a frame
is, of course, attractive to them since it implies that they should have more
authority over the area they inhabit. Wemay add a third dimension to accept-
ability, i.e. the capacity of a discourse to ‘naturalise’ or hide an ideology, which
forms one of the major differences between the concepts of discourse and
ideology.58
Trust, finally, means that actors tend to reproduce a story or argument
if they have trust in its source. It
‘refers to the fact that doubt might be suppressed and inherent uncertainties might
be taken for granted if actors manage to secure confidence either in the author
(whether this is an institute or a person) e.g. by referring to its impeccable record,
or in the practice through which a given definition of reality was achieved, e.g.
by showing what sort of deliberations were the basis of a given claim.’59
Although these explanations of credibility, acceptability and trust could suggest
that reproduction is a conscious activity, this is only half of the story. Of
course, in some cases, we consciously reflect on the positioning the frame of
a discourse attributes to us and decide if it is in our strategic interest to repro-
duce it. In many other cases, however, reproduction of a story – and its accom-
58 Jaworski & Coupland 1999, p. 34 citing Fairclough. Fairclough is an important representative
of the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) School. This school is a reaction to discourse
studies that just describe ‘language in use’ (Jaworski & Coupland 1999, p. 33). It is primarily
concerned with the construction of ideology and propagates critical language awareness
(Jaworski & Coupland 1999, p. 34). However, not only CDA links discourse to ideology.
Fischer notes that the concept of political discourse ‘has been developed to escape the
problematic aspects of the concept of ideology, especially its relationship to the Marxist
concept of “false consciousness”.’ He adds that in the meantime the ‘relationship of dis-
course to ideology has become a complicated theoretical question’ (Fischer 2003, p. 77).
A parallel is undoubtedly the important role that ideas play in both discourse and ideology.
Especially where they serve an actor to justify policy or action, or both, we can speak of
ideology (cf. Otto 1987, p. 41). However, as said above, discourse is more than ideology
especially where it succeeds in hiding the latter.
59 Hajer 1995, p. 59-60.
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panying practices – will depend on whether ‘it sounds right’60 to us or not.
Reproductionwill then often take the form of a routine reaction. In these cases
we have internalized discursive structures in our routine behaviour. Themore
we have internalized them the more difficult to get them out of our system.
2.5 TRANSFORMING AND REJECTING DISCOURSE
Other than an increasing reproduction and an eventual institutionalisation
of a frame or discourse, there are two options that we may consciously or
unconsciously choose: transformation and rejection. The first, transformation,
is comparable to what Halliday has called ‘appropriation’.61 In the event that
we cannot accept a certain frame in a discussion because it is for whatever
reason not attractive to us, we may adopt the vocabulary of a dominant
discourse but interpret it differently or transform its vocabulary to make it
more acceptable. Here, stories, or single words that refer to a story, play an
important role.62
Consider, for instance, the word ‘Reformasi’. Originally, this word referred
to the story that the 32-year rule of General Soeharto and his New Order
regime had come to an end in 1998. It referred to the fact that the Indonesian
political system, characterised as an authoritarian regime because it attributed
much power to the President and his cronies, the military and bureaucracy,
and because it limited the freedoms of ordinary people, needed to be replaced
with a system based on democracy, transparency and accountability. Although
the discourse originated from an activist scene, soon enough bureaucrats and
politicians of the establishment and the masses adopted the story. However,
they interpreted the word differently from the activists. Although it started
as a story with a rather specific frame – against Soeharto, his rule and every-
thing that was associated with these two, including corruption, collusion and
nepotism – Reformasi soon was transformed into an unspecific discourse
allowing for a variety of frames, stories, arguments and practices.
Another examplewill serve to illustrate the secondmethod of transforma-
tion: when after the revolution in the early 1950s the Indonesian administration
tried to reorganise its control over the forests and other territories, bureaucrats
soon returned to the discourses that had dominated this field during the
colonial rule. However, to make this more acceptable, they had to transform
them into nationalist discourses and thus to change their vocabulary slightly.
As these two examples show, transformation can lead to various results: it
60 Hajer 1995, p. 63, 67. According to Hajer, whether something sounds right depends on
its plausibility, and the earlier mentioned acceptability and trust (Hajer 1995, p. 63). In this
case, however, these are no conscious considerations.
61 Halliday 2003, p. 136.
62 Cf. Hajer 1995, p. 62-64.
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can make a discourse more or less specific or it can adapt it to new circum-
stances.
The final choice we have in a discussion, next to reproducing or transform-
ing a frame or a discourse, is to reject it. A precondition for this is that we
are aware of alternatives, as we cannot think outside the boundaries of
language and earlier texts determine how andwhat we think. If we are aware
of alternatives we can choose between explicit and implicit rejection. In the
former case we explicate that we are not willing to accept a given discourse.
Wemay do so by using an alternative discourse and, if this is a rather common
one, actively enter the struggle about discourse hegemony. This is easier than
introducing rather unknown frames, stories and arguments (although these
in the end may be the most promising in terms of social change). Tennekes
lists three reasons why this may prove difficult: first, if one were to change
the frames, stories and arguments in a discussion individually, one would
not be understood by others; second, one can never be sure that others will
interpret one’s words as intended; and third, the way one acts in a discussion
is always linked to one’s identity.63 This again illustrates, on the one hand,
the impersonal power of discourse. Discourse forces us to stay within certain
boundaries. If we don’t, we exclude ourselves from the discussion. After all,
‘languaging’64 remains a kind of ‘collective action’65 that one cannot change
individually. On the other hand, it illustrates that in our communication we
depend on others and their interpretation of what we say and do. This has
important implications for our second choice: implicit rejection. If we implicitly
reject a discourse others may not understand or may not show that they
understand the rejection and then interpret our silence as acceptance. The final
reason Tennekes mentions refers to a situation in which a certain discourse
has long been accepted. If, in this case, a new story or discourse emerges it
may seem difficult to us to use it since we so firmly identify ourselves with
the old discourse. If our identity as a child, for instance, is linked to how our
parents define the world, it takes years for us to find a new identity with new
frames, stories and arguments as an independent adult. Still, as this example
shows, this choice is not a hypothetical one.
63 Tennekes 2005, p. 4-5.
64 Massier 2003, p. 30 citing Bakhtin. He introduced this term as an alternative for ‘language
use’ to indicate that people do not use language as an instrument but that people speak,
write, answer etc., thus perform language actions. This term fits neatly into discourse theory
since it underlines that language is not something we use but something that is and acts.
65 Tennekes 2005, p. 4.
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2.6 COALITIONS
Because it is very difficult to individually introduce an alternative frame, story
or argument, actors often have to search for partners. Together, they can
establish a coalition to stand stronger in the struggle for discourse hegemony.
Hajer defines such a discourse coalition as ‘an ensemble of (1) a set of story-
lines; (2) the actors that utter these story-lines; and (3) the practices in which
this discursive activity is based.’66 This concept, Hajer notes, differs from
Sabatier’s concept of advocacy coalitions: The main difference between the
two is that Sabatier’s concept assumes much more stability than does Hajer’s.
Sabatier argues that individuals engaging in a coalition share a belief system.
This is not necessarily the case in a discourse coalition since actors can interpret
a story differently and reproduce it for various reasons and with various
motivations. Theymay even formpart of a coalitionwith contradictory beliefs
or easily shift from one coalition to the other. In addition, Sabatier’s concept
attributes rather stable roles to individuals. In his terminology they are ‘advo-
cates’ or ‘brokers’ whereas in Hajer’s approach they position themselves or
are positioned as, for instance, advocates in one situation and as brokers in
another. In a discourse coalition approach, the emergence of a new story may
influence the values and beliefs of actors while in Sabatier’s theory people
would need to rationally reflect on what is happening to change their
insights.67
In sum, a discourse coalition is a loosely organised conscious or un-
conscious partnership around a particular story.68 Consider the following
example of a conscious discourse coalition. A tribal people have been forced
by the government to resettle outside the boundaries of a national park. The
people have moved back to the park since they regard the park area as their
home. It has taken some time before they realised that finding the right story
was an essential part of achieving their objective, i.e. to be allowed to stay
in the park area. In the past they used to tell a story of being the traditional
and thus rightful owner of the area, arguing for government recognition.
However, the government refused to listen to their story and argument.
Recently they heard a story from conservationists that they readily adopted
in the hope that it would add weight to their voice: tribal peoples are better
custodians of nature than governments. By reproducing this story they estab-
lish a discourse coalition with the conservationist movement and position
themselves no longer as victims of a new regime but as a promising saviour
of nature. In the end, what actors hope for those who consciously enter into
a discourse coalition in a particular policy field is that it will make their voices
66 Hajer 1995, p. 65.
67 Hajer 1995, p. 70-71.
68 In an unconscious coalition partners are not aware of it.
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heard and that their ideas, their definitions of problems and solutions will
institutionalise in policy and practice.
2.7 STORIES AND DISCOURSES
It has been said above that themore dominant a discourse or a frame becomes
the more likely it will be that it will become manifest in a policy, a law, a
practice, or a combination of these.
In other cases, it should be noted, it is a story that can institutionalise in
policy, law and practice, such as the story of sustainable development. Such
a story, whichmost probably is supported by a loose coalition of partners with
various frames, is not necessarily part of a specific discourse. On the contrary,
it is likely to be so unspecific that it appeals to many different people with
different frames.
After institutionalization, however, the struggle over the definition of
problems and solutions continues. This is the main reason I have chosen to
analyse both policymaking and implementation in this study. After all, the
existence of a nature conservation law or a departmental division for national
parks does not tell us much about how a national park works in practice. A
policy can be adapted to an emerging discourse without necessarily resulting
in new institutional practices in the implementation. As this study will show,
such a gap between policy and practice is especially likely to exist if the stories
necessary to a policy agreement are too open to various interpretations to
ensure specific practices or if discursive structures helped to prevent an open
debate in the first place.69
69 In his analysis, Hajer comes to a similar conclusion: although the policy discourse had
changed, the institutional practices did not. He presents some explanations for this pheno-
menon, including that the story-line of acid rain allowed for narrow andwide interpretations
and that certain ‘discursive structures’ helped to sustain existing institutions by preventing
an open debate in the first place (Hajer 1995, p. 268-269, 274-275).
3 Discourses reflected in the scholarly literature
on nature conservation policy, law and
practice in Indonesia
This study’s main concern is not the question which discourses are reflected
in scholarly literature on nature conservation in Indonesia. However, for two
reasons I will pay attention to them in this introduction.
The first is that every scholarly analysis is in fact a story and an argument
building on existing discourses and their underlying values. So is this study.
It not only builds on the theoretical insights discussed in the previous chapter,
but also uses the work of others who have studied nature conservation in
Indonesia. This section serves to categorise the work of these authors and to
thus position my own analysis.
The second reason is that few scholars explicate the values underlying their
work, implicitly supporting science’s claim to be value-free. This section
intends to provide insight into the values behind the work of the scholars
discussed in order to make clear how they have contributed to the debate on
nature conservation in Indonesia.
The literature dealing with conservation efforts in Indonesia is mainly
produced by biologists, geographers, foresters, anthropologists, political
scientists, and some legal scholars. Some of these are not merely independent
academics but also simultaneously practitioners or activists. Their discourses
overlap to some extent with those in favour of and against conservation in
Indonesia in its present form, which demonstrates their interconnectedness.1
Often, their values can be derived from how they present facts, make sense
of them, and which norms they prescribe. Others are scholars who above all
are concernedwith critical analysis: searching for nuanced explanations rather
than for simplifications and remedies.
Just as critics involved in policy- and lawmaking and implementation do,
most scholars agree on the persistent ineffectiveness of the Indonesian nature
conservation policy. However, they disagree on the importance or feasibility
of improving this situation.
There are three major – for this purpose rather idealised2 – groups, two
of which are normative coalitions. The first normative coalition argues in
favour of making the present conservation policy more effective. The second
strives for focusing on policy objectives other than conservation. Scholars
1 Cf. Lowe 2006.
2 The lines between the groups presented here are not as sharp in reality. Many authors
explain ineffective policy in terms of various causalities.
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belonging to the third group are above all concernedwith critical scholarship,
assessing the solutions proposed by the first group or exposing hidden agendas
of various actors involved in the making or implementation of Indonesia’s
nature conservation policy.
Many authors subscribing to the pro-conservation discourse agree on the
desirability of nature conservation, even at the expense of people. They label
changes in nature in negative terms, such as ‘destruction’ and ‘crisis’, specu-
lating that these will lead to various disasters, including hunger and irreversib-
ly destroying the possibility of finding new medicines. Their solutions seem
to be based on the assumption that state and societal actors are open to per-
suasion through education, money or rights. Basically, they produce one or
more of three main stories: that there is a lack of knowledge, a lack of
resources, or a lack of rights and justice for certain societal actors. The argu-
ment within the first story is that certain actors of state and society need to
be educated about natural processes and the disastrous effects of human
conduct on nature, thus becoming more ‘aware’ of the need to alter their
behaviour. Traditionally, many natural scientists use this argument. Interesting-
ly, there is a trend toward defining the scope of necessary knowledge more
broadly, beyond only environmental knowledge. Pet-Soede, for instance, pleads
for ‘presenting the economic picture’ of nature destruction to make state
resources for conservation available.3 In addition to these pleas to increase
the popular knowledge of the natural and economic value of conservation
one author has argued for viewing conservation areas as serving public values
such as spirituality, compassion and responsibility to differentiate them from
the existing categories of state land.4 The second story defines a lack of
resources as the main problem. Authors subscribing to this story usually see
some kind of development for certain actors,5 co-management and out-
sourcing,6 or re-centralisation7 as solutions. They argue that if only actors
were wealthy enough, or institutions strong, capable and wealthy enough,
conservation policy would become effective. The third story, finally, defines
a lack of rights and justice as themain problem of Indonesia’s nature conserva-
tion policy. Authors thinking along these lines argue that if only certain non-
state actors, either indigenous or all park residents, had more rights, ranging
from various kinds of participation to property rights, nature conservation
3 Pet-Soede, Cesar & Pet 1999; see also Cesar 1996, Burke, Selig & Spalding 2002 and Dutton
2005. The former Indonesian Minister for the Environment, Salim, also argued in this line.
See also Azis & Salim 2005.
4 Jepson 2002.
5 See, for instance, Brandon & Wells 1992, Wells 1989, and Wells & Brandon 1992. For a
general review of literature on Integrated Development and Conservation Programmes
see Hughes & Flintan 2001.
6 See, for instance, Clifton 2003 and Pet-Soede, Cesar & Pet 1999.
7 See, for instance, Oates 1999, Terborgh 1999, Marifa 2005.
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would become more successful.8 It deserves mentioning that among these
authors many struggle against the monopoly of the natural scientific knowl-
edge system in the debate, stating that indigenous peoples define, make sense
of and represent nature in ways different from natural scientists.9
The second group of authors, much smaller relative to the pro-conserva-
tionists, questions themorality of the goals of the Indonesian nature conserva-
tion policy, proposing alternative policy goals such as a focus on poverty and
food security, and access to clean water, food and air, instead.10
Writings of the third group above all reflect a discourse of ‘critical scholar-
ship’. Often not explicit about their preference for conservation or other policy
objectives, the authors fall into an optimist and a pessimist sub-group. Authors
belonging to the first sub-group critically analyse proposed solutions and
experiments in the field of nature conservation implementation, and comment,
for example, that community based natural resources management, co-manage-
ment and other proposed solutions have raised new issues deserving critical
assessment.11 Authors belonging to the second sub-group define the lack of
political will and the existence of hidden agendas of both governmental and
non-governmental actors as the major problems and therefore are pessimistic
about the possibility of persuading actors to change their behaviour in favour
of nature conservation. Basically, there are two versions: first, that extra-legal
structures, mostly some kind of powerful personal relations, or the desire for
power and money, or both, determine the conduct of actors;12 or second, that
conservation policy is a bureaucratic instrument that increases or maintains
power and serves tomakemoney.13 Authors writing about these issues appear
reluctant to propose specific solutions. Usually, they do not go farther than
recommending a general addressing of the issues of power and corruption.
Onemore specific recommendation in this context is to expose corrupt practices
and support certification schemes.14 Others again come to the conclusion that
making conservation work in Indonesia would require formulating and
agreeing on some kind of an ethical commitment.15
8 See, for instance, Alcorn 1993, Brechin, et al. 2002, Dove et al. 2005, Elliot, et al. 2001, Lynch
& Harwell 2002, and Safitri 2002.
9 See, for instance, Dove et al. 2005 and Zerner 2003.
10 See, for instance, Zerner 2000b.
11 See, for instance, Brosius et al. 1998, Brosius et al. 2005, Li 1996, Li 2000, Li 2001, Li 2002,
Borchers 2005, Persoon & Van Est 2003, and Persoon et al. 2003.
12 See, for instance, Laurance 2004, Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA)/Telapak
Indonesia 2002, McCarthy 2000, Obidzinski 2003,and Lowe 2006.
13 See, for instance, Peluso 1993a, Peluso & Vandergeest 2001, Galudra & Sirait 2006, Dove
1983 cited in Zerner 2000a, and Gellert 2005; compare also to the work of political eco-
nomists, for instance, Robison & Hadiz 2004.
14 Fuller et al. 2004.
15 See, for instance, Lowe 2006 and Henley 2007. See Achterberg 1993 for a similar argument
for the Netherlands.
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The major concern of the present study is to make the debate on nature
conservation policy, law and practice in Indonesia more transparent. Its ulti-
mate objective is to point out how such policy can perhaps be improved –
and in any case to clarify what will not work. The main value behind this
concern, unsurprisingly, is critical scholarship: I try to lay bare and understand
structures and strategies that determine the political struggle about nature
conservation and either constrain or enable actors, rather than to engage in
the debate on how to balance conservation, development and human rights.
The conviction behind this approach is that these three values are equally valid
and that it is not my task as an academic to prescribe anything, but rather
to help actors in Indonesia to satisfactorily balance them themselves. It is
prescriptive in its cautious optimism that ultimately a more specific discourse
on how to debate nature conservation in Indonesia will be helpful to achieve
such a balance.
4 Nature conservation: actors, policy, law and
processes
Before progressing with the actual analysis I need to define some more con-
cepts used in this book, to start with ‘nature conservation’. Nature conservation
is a term with a history, which – in some contexts more than in others – is
associated with a whole social movement and that propagates a particular
ideology (see part II). In this book I intend my references to ‘nature conserva-
tion policy’ or ‘conservation policy’ to be more neutral since they are the
common terms in this field.
This book aims to make the discussion about nature conservation policy,
law and practicemore transparent. It describes ideas behind policies and laws
regulating how citizens should treat nature. As part II will show, actors have
defined ‘nature’ and the effects of various forms of its treatment by humans,
differently.
In this context, speaking of ‘the state’, ‘the people’, etc. is problematic.
Various scholars have called for more attention to be paid to this, for instance,
the case of ‘indigenous people’.1 This study has taken this criticism into
account by zooming in on ‘the legislature’, ‘the state’, and ‘the people’ in the
various case studies. As a result it has found that officials working for the same
agency subscribed to different discourses, some of them striving for pro-
fessionalism and effective conservation while others being preoccupied with
realising their personal objectives.
‘Policy’, in this study, refers to an oral or written statement made by and
as a public authority about how to achieve a particular goal. This includes
written documents, speeches, laws and other regulations.
The fact that I treat laws as a kind of policy is mainly inspired by the
Indonesian case where the distinction between policies and laws has been
blurred. Under theNewOrder, the BroadGuidelines of State Policy (In.Garis-
Garis Besar Haluan Negara, abbr. GBHN), for instance, were situated in the legal
hierarchy below the constitution but above legal acts.2 Likewise, presidential
speeches were more often referred to in the policy- and lawmaking processes
than any legal act.3 Many Indonesian legal acts, on the other hand, continue
to show the characteristics of a policy: they are statements of goals rather than
detailed descriptions of rights and obligations. Policies often end up on a pile
1 See, among others, Eindhoven 2007 and Osseweijer 2001.
2 Ex MPRS Decree XX of 1966.
3 Cf. Bedner 2001, p. 29, footnote 112.
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of documents. To make them authoritative they are transformed into legis-
lation. Likewise, existing acts are ‘reinforced’ by issuing an implementing
government regulation, a presidential or ministerial decree or a circulaire.
Defining law as a kind of policy, or policy instrument, is of course not to
say that law is a synonym for policy. Treating them as almost equal is to deny
the fundamental differences between the two. It is true that laws and policies
are about goals and how to achieve them. But once a law has been enacted
it has become more than just a policy. It has become a legally binding docu-
ment which ideally attributes rights and obligations to actors andwhichmust
be complied with, enforced by the state and controlled by courts. As a con-
sequence its influence reaches much further than that of other policies since
any policies that follow – in theory – have to be based on the existing law.
What makes laws different from policies is, most importantly, that they
form part of a system that at its core serves to regulate the behaviour of non-
state and state actors. In the latter case they are intended not only to strive
for policy goals but also to ‘curb arbitrary and unjust use of state power’:4
they form part of the rule of law.
Entering the domain of the rule of law has consequences for what onemay
expect in terms of quality from such a special kind of policy. A discussion
of the quality of lawmaking and legislation is relevant for the present case
as Indonesia, claiming to be a rechtsstaat (In. negara hukum), has officially
subscribed to the rule of law. Four groups that participate in legal discourse
– legal theorists, socio-legal scholars, practitioners and scholars studying
governmental policies on legislative quality – have argued for legislative
quality and the necessity to define criteria for it.5 The criteria proposed by
these different groups vary. Legal theorists have primarily focused on legality,
such as Fuller who has stressed that laws should be general, clear, consistent,
accessible and never retroactive.6 Socio-legal scholars, on the other hand, have
stressed that laws must be designed in such a way that they can effectively
influence human behaviour7 and that rules should not only be clear and
accessible but also realistic in a way that reduces the gap between the norms
and reality to create the preconditions for ‘realistic legal certainty’.8 Prac-
4 Bedner 2004, p. 1.
5 Van Rooij 2006, p. 33. Van Rooij provides a useful overview of the literature on legislative
quality and discusses its relevance for enforcement and compliance. He argues that ade-
quacy, feasibility, certainty and adaptability form the fourmajor criteria for implementable
legislation (Van Rooij 2006, p. 34-43). All authors cited here are also cited in Van Rooij 2006.
6 Fuller 1976, p. 41-43.
7 Seidmann 1978, Seidmann & Seidmann 1994, Seidmann et al. 1999, Seidmann et al. 2001,
and Seidmann & Seidmann 2003.
8 Otto 2004, and Otto et al. 2004. As the other preconditions for realistic legal certainty Otto
mentions that ‘the administration follows these rules and induces citizens to do the same’,
that ‘the majority of people accept these rules, in principle, as just’, that ‘serious conflicts
are regularly brought before independent and impartial judges who decide cases in accord-
ancewith those rules’ and that ‘these decisions are actually compliedwith’ (Otto et al. 2004,
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titioners in the Netherlands and the European Community, for instance, have
developed policies on the quality criteria legislation should meet.9 Veerman,
as a result of his study of such policies, has argued, however, there is no
absolute quality standard for legislation.Whether or not the various producers
and users of a law regard it as of good or poor quality depends on their
respective expectations.10 Eijlander and Voermans have listed a number of
basic expectations11 reflecting the rule of law discourse. These include that
citizens expect an act to create clarity about rights and obligations, that govern-
ments expect an act to formulate the rules on the basis of which they can
rightfully and authoritatively govern and that judges expect an act to enable
them to decide disputes. These expectations in their turn can tell us much
about how actors conceive of law and the rechtsstaat. What should a law, in
their opinion, do? Should it merely create the preconditions to achieve a certain
objective? Do they, for instance, conceive of it merely as a policy instrument?
Or do they, to mention another example, conceive of law as a precondition
for liberty and justice, meaning that law should ‘constrain Leviathan’.12 And
what do they expect law can do? Do they expect that law can effectively alter
behaviour or do they havemore symbolic functions in mind, including claim-
ing authority, making a gesture, and rationalizing existing inequalities?13
p. 123). In Indonesia, Satjipto Rahardjo is an important advocate for ‘hukum progresif’, a
more realistic approach towards law. See, for instance, Rahardjo 2007.
9 See, for instance, Bracke 1996, Veerman 2004, and Voermans, et al. 2000.
10 Veerman 2004, p. 13. This conclusion is similar to Tamanaha’s ‘non-essentialism’ which
argues that one cannot define concepts such as law, or - by analogy - legislative quality,
in terms of its essence and therefore, one needs to analyse how various actors define it
(Tamanaha 2000). Nevertheless, Veerman cites a number of legal, administrative and
technical quality criteria of the Dutch policy on good legislation, including legality, effective-
ness and efficiency, implementability and enforceability, simplicity, clarity and accessibility
(Veerman 2004, p. 16). Recent research on the advice practices of the Dutch Raad van State
revealed that compliability is another such criteria (Broeksteeg, et al. 2005, p. 531). The
existence of these criteria has urged ministries to develop a number of protocols, tests and
‘quickscans’ (Veerman 2004, p. 33). However, these do not weigh up against the fact that
the criteria are vague and sometimes conflicting, depend very much on forecasts and hide
the diverging interests and rationalities of producers and users (Veerman 2004, p. 35).
Another problem is that although lawmaking is a political act the control of legislative
quality in the Netherlands is not so much seen as a political duty but left to the ministers
(Florijn 2008, p. 3).
11 Eijlander & Voermans 2000, p. 17-18.
12 Radin 1992, p. 130. Hobbes used the name of this biblical monster for the absolute ruler
he proposed to submit to in order to prevent chaos and anarchy. In this kind of thinking,
law is thus conceived of as a system that should define limits to absolute power.
13 Edelman 1977 and Edelman 1987. Similarly, Cohn points at the possibility that ‘legislation
may be a political show of power in response to crises or issues that attract strong pro-
legislation forces’ (Cohn 2001, p. 480). Veerman differentiates between an instrumentalist,
astounding, problem displacing, symbolic and value expressing and consolidating function
of a law (Veerman 2004, p. 19-20). See also Schuyt who argues that since legislation fulfils
many more roles than just an instrumental one and that the effectiveness approach is by
definition of a limited value (Schuyt 1983, p. 178).
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Mattei’s differentiation between countries with a predominant rule of
professional, political, and traditional law14 may help to categorise the expecta-
tions different actors in Indonesia have of the rechtsstaat, law and policy. There
is no country exclusively ruled by one of these patterns. In countries with a
predominant rule of professional law legal procedure is binding on the govern-
ment, and lawyers enjoy a high status. Aspects of political and traditional
patterns of law are considered a ‘pathology’ and rejected. A predominant rule
of political law is, among others things, characterised by decision-making that
is determined by a final goal such as development, a weak judiciary and a
strong police, and continuous legal reformwithmany transplants. In addition,
as many state decisions depend on who one is rather than on formal rules,
many people invest in building relations with powerful actors rather than
exclusively seeking justice in court. Countries with a predominant rule of
traditional law, finally, are described as possessing a structure of religious
or customary law parallel to a techno legal structure. This means a reduced
role for lawyers, as many other actors, such as wise men, are also entrusted
with dispute resolution and decision-making. Furthermore, hierarchy and
harmony are highly valued and sometimes legitimisation is sought in the
super-natural.
That the expectations of various actors can and normally do differ is, of
course, not to say that legal, technical or policy-related quality criteria are of
no use at all.15 It is good for any state to think about such criteria and to
develop and implement a policy on law and lawmaking since such criteria
can help to rationalise lawmaking and to improve its outcome or at least to
explicate implicit standards.
The special characteristics of lawmean not only that law differs from policy
but also that lawmaking differs from other policymaking processes. It is the
chosenmembers of parliament that deliberate about the goals and instruments
to be included in an act. They represent the various interests in society and
are entitled to weigh these interests and look for compromises. Due to the
fact that an act has much more severe consequences for citizens and the state
than a non-legal policy citizensmay expect evenmore scrutiny, precision, and
transparency from those involved in lawmaking than from those involved in
other policymaking processes.
To ensure this scrutiny, precision and transparency lawmaking should meet
the conditions of what I will call the ‘good lawmaking standard’ (henceforth:
GLS). This standard builds on two of the few existing normative theories on
lawmaking that are based on empirical research. The first one is the problem-
14 Mattei 1997. The following section is based on this article.
15 Veerman 2004, p. 23.
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solving methodology developed by Seidman and Seidman.16 These researchers
have focused their attention first on the legal drafters and then on legislators.
In their view, drafters and legislators need to adopt a methodology that is
‘based on reason’ and ‘informed by experience’. This means that drafters
should accompany their draft with a research report to justify why they chose
a certain approach and solution. Such a report should identify the difficulty
at handwith a special focus on the causal actors and their behaviour, and offer
a strategy to change their behaviour.17
Where the Seidman theory aims for legal effectiveness the second building
block of the GLS problematises this very concept. Research by Aubert, later
followed byAalders,18 has differentiated three types of effectiveness: political,
substantive and formal. Legislation can be politically and formally effective
without satisfying the demand of being substantively effective, meaning that
legislation succeeds to achieve the intended objectives. Combining these two
theories, my good lawmaking standard prescribes that lawmaking should be
based on reason, informed by experience, and aim for substantive effectiveness.
To understand what conservation policy, law and action in Indonesia are
about and how actors have been trying to maintain or change it, the object
of this study is threefold: policies and law, policy- and lawmaking, and imple-
mentation. Consciously, the discussion in these three parts of the study has
included both policy and governance discourses. Those related to policy,
debate, for example, who causes nature destruction and who can and should
prevent it, and include practices ranging from rangers patrolling an area to
settlers constructing houses in a national park. By contrast, the governance
discourses argue about who should participate in policy- and lawmaking and
16 Seidmann & Seidmann 1994, Seidmann et al. 2001, and Seidmann et al. 1999. The other
theories on lawmaking, and those on policymaking that are applied to the lawmaking
process, aim to analyse and explain the process and its outcome. Luhmann, for instance,
has argued that it is not somuch the result of a process but the process itself that determines
whether or not actors accept the result of a process (Luhmann 1969). Applied to lawmaking
this would mean that as long as there were acceptable rules on lawmaking and legislators
kept to these they could make whatever law without having to fear non-acceptance by the
broader public. Lindblomwith his theory of ‘muddling through’ (Lindblom&Woodhouse
1993) and Kingdon with his application of the garbage can theory to policymaking (Kingdon
1984) have attempted to explain outcomes by pointing either at the role that existing policies
and negotiation play or at the possibility that solutions often look for problems. Snellen
has argued that there is not one rationality that determines a process of policymaking but
four, i.e. a political, economic, legal, and scientific rationality (Snellen 1987). For an overview
of theories on policymaking and lawmaking and their applicability for law and development
projects see Otto et al. 2004. For a discussion of such theories of lawmaking and their
relevance for the Chinese context see Van Rooij 2006.
17 Veerman has supported it by arguing that ‘most problems with legislation stem from a
lack of knowledge and good ‘policy theories’ (Veerman 2004, p. 31) which are defined as
the arguments and underlying knowledge for defining a problem and a solution (Van der
Graaf & Hoppe 1996, p. 70). For an more elaborate overview of existing legislative theories
and the argument to combine them see Otto et al. 2004.
18 Aubert 1967 and Aalders 1984.
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implementation and how state officials should perform their tasks. Combining
the study of both policy and governance discourses led to the discovery of
patterns across two fields of study and linked the policy debate to the one
on governance and the rule of law.
5 Main research questions, methodology and
structure of the book
5.1 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study maps with a clear analytical framework historical and present
discourses dominating the processes and outcomes of the policy field of nature
conservation in Indonesia. From what has been said about discourse above
follows that we have to search for explanations of discourse dominance in
two directions: first, in the direction of actors; and second, in the direction
of discursive structures. This leads to the following research questions:
1 Which dominant discourses can be reconstructed from policies and laws
in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Indonesia on the human treat-
ment of nature?
2 How, i.e. with which stories, arguments and strategies, do relevant actors
involved in themaking and implementation of nature conservation policy
and law in Indonesia struggle for discourse hegemony?
3 Which discursive structures constrain or enable actors in their struggle
for discourse hegemony?
4 How does the struggle for discourse hegemony affect policy and law,
policy- and lawmaking and implementation?
5.2 METHODOLOGY
To present as complete an overview of discourses as possible, while also
intending to bridge disciplinary discourses, this analysis draws on studies from
various disciplines including history, sociology of law, policy studies, political
science, anthropology, geography, and conservation biology.
I collected scholarly articles and books about the pre-colonial times and
policy documents and legal regulations, as well as all kinds of information
about the debates about such policies and regulations and scholarly analyses
about the colonial times and the era of independent Indonesia. I read these
sources over and over again focusing especially on information about the
conceptualisation of nature and on arguments about how humans should treat
nature. Whenever I came across new arguments I kept looking for repetition
in order to determinewhether this indicated the emergence of a new discourse
or the transformation of an existing discourse. During the course of my study
I also kept reading newspaper articles on environmental issuesmade available
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through an Indonesian clipping service and later on the weekly ‘Indonesian
Nature Conservation Newsletter’1 initiated and distributed by Ed Colijn. These
turned out to form a valuable additional source for the discourse analysis.
During my fieldwork in 1999 (six weeks), 2000-2001 (10 months), 2001 (four
weeks) and 2005 (two weeks) I gathered policy and legal documents and the
minutes of the parliamentary debates on the Biodiversity Conservation Act
of 1990, attended many of the mushrooming stakeholder meetings and dis-
cussions, and interviewed officials at the Ministry for the Environment, the
environmental impact management agency, planning agency and Forestry
Department in Jakarta and their regional agencies in Jakarta, Samarinda,
Bontang and Sangatta. I visited the offices of Pulau Seribu Marine National
Park and Kutai National Park in Jakarta and Bontang and the parks them-
selves. There I interviewed in formal and informal ways as many people as
I could (due to time limitations in Pulau Seribu more extensively than in
Kutai), including residents, park officials, officials of other agencies active in
the parks, entrepreneurs, employees and guests, until I had the feeling that
I heard only repetitions and thus had reached data saturation.2 In addition,
I observed what was going on in the parks and in the offices of the park
authorities to see where interviews differed from observable practices. This
information was again useful in follow-up interviews. All notes and material
gathered in the field I treated as described above: I read and kept re-reading
them in search of patterns of repetition of stories, arguments and practices.
From these I constructed discourses. With regards to policy in this material
from the field I often came across the same discourses that I had distilled from
other sources. However, as the field data contained not only information on
policy discourses but also on policy- and lawmaking and implementation and
as I realised that integrating this material into my analysis would have much
explanatory value I widened my scope of analysis to these discourses as well.
5.3 STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
In order to find out which discourses dominate policy and law, policy- and
lawmaking and implementation I have divided this study into three main parts,
not including this introduction and the conclusion.
To answer the first research question I start by describing themain govern-
ment policies, regulations and institutional arrangements regulating the treat-
ment of nature from pre-colonial times until 2005 (part II). For each period
of time, I first distil the main stories and arguments from the policies, laws
and institutional arrangements. On the basis of these stories and arguments
I construct seven discourses. Here, I pay special attention to the fact that stories
1 This may be subscribed to via incl.contact@gmail.com.
2 Guest et al. 2006.
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have constructed nature as being in crisis only from colonial times onwards.
Reasons for issuing rules about the treatment of nature have ranged from
protecting resource claims to protecting nature against human action. Then
I analyse the implications of the discourses for the positioning of various actors,
i.e. their dependency on others, their roles, rights and obligations. Finally,
I reflect as far as available sources allow onwhy and how people reproduced,
transformed or rejected the arguments of the dominant discourses.
To trace the origins of conservation policy and law in the Indonesian
archipelago I start my investigation in pre-colonial times (chapters 7 and 8).
The fact that primary and secondary sources about howpeople conceptualised
human-nature relations in this period are scarce makes this to some degree
a dangerous endeavour. After all, inmany cases, sources do not cover awhole
region but give only a very local account of how people made sense of the
world. Moreover, many sources are reconstructions themselves so one may
wonder about their historicity or, in other words, to what extent they are
constructs of the present. Nonetheless, used with a necessary caution they
contribute to our understanding of what ideas and concepts dominated the
thinking of at least the people that we know of. In chapters 9, 10 and 11, I
proceed with an analysis of selected VOC3 and colonial policies regarding the
treatment of nature and the corresponding institutional arrangements. Chapters
12, 13, 14 and 15 deal with the discourses dominating the Indonesian policies
and institutional arrangements, from the revolution in 1945 until the end of
Indonesia’s first President’s Old Order in 1966, the New Order policies from
1966 until 1998, and the first years of the post-1998 Reformasi.
Where possible I used the policies as primary sources to reconstruct the
discourses that dominated them. In many other cases, however, I relied on
secondary sources regarding policies and the circumstances that produced
them. Analysing the debates for all the policies and laws described in the
historical overview on the basis of primary sources could have filled a number
of books.4
The historical overview demonstrates that dominant ideas in policy and
law about nature, its functions, problems and solutions have changed through-
out time and have long been contested. At least from colonial times onwards
the arguments of both the proponents and opponents of such policies and laws
have remained nearly unchanged. The debate therefore has long been in
‘deadlock’ and thus earns the label of a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, in which all
stakeholders talk without listening and put forward fundamentally different
3 The United East India Company (Dutch ‘VereenigdeOostindische Compagnie’) established
in 1602 to reduce the competition between Dutch traders in the Indonesian archipelago
(see, for instance, Ricklefs 1981, p. 24-25).
4 As an analysis of primary sourcesmay reveal very different insights plead formore studies
of this kind. Such studies could provide us with insights about policy and governance
related discourses in these various periods as well.
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but equally valid arguments.5 An additional problem is that discourses about
human treatment of nature have been used to claim resources, to show that
one is in control of life, and only sometimes to solve problems. This illustrates
the need for a thorough debate about the definition of problems and solutions
and for the government to generate trust in its willingness to solve problems
through policies and laws.
Research questions two, three and four are answered in both part III and IV.
In part III, I analyse the primary sources of selected cases of policy- and
lawmaking in recent history. The analysis of these cases enabled me to gain
insight into the precise arguments and discursive structures that dominated
the debate preceding a certain policy or act. I selected one case of New Order
lawmaking, one case of Reformasi policymaking, and one case of Reformasi
lawmaking. The New Order case (chapters 18-20), the parliamentary debates
on the Indonesian Biodiversity Conservation bill (In. Rancangan Undang-Undang
Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam dan Ekosistemnya) in 1990, is a logical choice since
the act resulting from these debates has been forming the legal basis for
national parks and other nature reserves in Indonesia. On the basis of the
complete minutes I investigate stories and arguments related to policy, policy-
making and implementation and the practices that dominated the process and
in the end influenced the result, i.e. the act. The second case (chapter 21) is
of another order. It is a national co-ordination meeting (In. Rapat Koordinasi
Nasional, abbr. Rakornas) organised by the Ministry for the Environment in
1999, the very beginning of the Reformasi period after the fall of Soeharto’s
New Order, to discuss the past and make plans for the future. One of its
purposes was to formulate a national environmental policy document that
was to serve as input for the formulation of the Broad Guidelines of State
Policy by the Indonesian People’s Consultative Congress (MPR). I selected this
case because it enabled me to compare two cases of policy- and lawmaking
from two very different periods. In this book, this second case thus serves
primarily to examine inwhat waysReformasi policymaking differed fromNew
Order lawmaking, or, in other words, what influence Reformasi discourse had
on policymaking practices. The third case (chapter 22), finally, based on semi-
structured interviews and secondary sources, is about the process of producing
the new Natural Resources Management bill (In. Rancangan Undang-Undang
Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam). This case is interesting because it shows the
emergence of new lawmaking practices before a bill has been sent to parlia-
ment. The parliamentary debates have been postponed several times andwill
thus need to be analysed at a later stage.
Finally, I investigate processes of implementation in selected conventional
national parks and national parks funded and influenced by donors just before
and after the beginning of Reformasi (part IV). The first case, Pulau Seribu
5 Van Eeten 1999, p. 2.
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Marine National Park (chapter 25), forms the most comprehensive case study
of the section. On the basis of interviews, informal conversations, document
analysis and observations collected in two periods of fieldwork in 2000 and
2001 and a short visit in 2005, as well as available secondary sources, the case
describes the park residents’ increasing lack of trust in the government from
its establishment in 1982 onwards and the park agency’s difficulties in building
partnerships with other actors. The case study of Kutai National Park (chap-
ter 26) is also based on a short fieldwork in 2001 and on available secondary
sources, including academic studies and newspaper articles. The struggle
described in this chapter is of amuchmore visible nature than in Pulau Seribu
as it examines whether the central or the regional government should be in
charge of the national park. For the donor parks – Komodo, Bunaken, Lore
Lindu, and Siberut – I focus on the fragility and exclusiveness of discourse
coalitions between conservationists and indigenous communities and the
struggle over the precise definition of co-management.
The analysis of various communication processes from 1990 to the present
in parts III and IV reveals the persistent power of the pembangunan discourse’s
emphasis on harmony in Indonesia. The tendency of many actors involved
in or affected by nature conservation policy to use discourse in a strategic way
and to avoid arguing for problem-solving illustrates that the debate on nature
conservation in Indonesia until 2005 was a debate without obligations. Expli-
cating discrepancies between the words and deeds of actors and designing
rules for more ‘responsible’ policymaking, lawmaking and implementation
can help to make the debate more transparent and actors more accountable,
and to increase the attention of all relevant actors for substantive effectiveness.

Part II
Dominant discourses reflected in policies and
laws from pre-colonial times to the present

6 Introduction
‘From early history, the Indonesian peoples have always been practicing
conservation. There have always been conservation rules, for instance, about
not building houses or sawahs close to rivers. Konservasi is thus not an idea
from the outside.’ The retired former director of nature protection, Lukito
Daryadi, looked out of the window of the gigantic complex known as
ManggalaWanabakti, home to the ForestryDepartment. ‘Only in 1972 a global
idea has been added to that’, he resumed. ‘So all we had to do in Indonesia
was to combine (In. mengawinkan) the ideas from within with the ideas from
the outside. Actually that was not difficult.’ Then Lukito turned around again
and looked at me. ‘Only the term konservasi is not known to many people in
Indonesia. We need to socialise it. Especially in the regions there are not yet
many people who know the term and its relevance.’ – ‘You know’, he con-
tinued after a while, ‘the biggest difference with the NewOrder period is that
the government is no longer allowed to exert pressure on the people. Konservasi
therefore now has to come from the people themselves. And yes, the people
know its importance for if their house breaks down since the ground is eroding
or something, they know. Maybe’, the retired official went on, ‘maybe we just
listen too little to the old generation. The young people want to be modern,
they don’t ask advice from their parents and grandparents. So, a lot of know-
ledge gets lost. There is a generation-gap.’1
Lukito thus suggested that there were two major explanations for the fact
that conservation policies in Indonesia did not have the desired effects. One,
old indigenous knowledge about conservation had gotten lost. And two, after
the fall of the New Order the government was no longer allowed to force
people to abide by rules that would make conservation policies successful.
However, Lukito’s story also raisedmany questions.What exactly did hemean
by ‘practicing conservation’? What did he associate with the term ‘konservasi’?
And if Lukito was right about the young people wanting to be modern and
thus not being interested in old ideas about conservation what role had the
Indonesian governments played in this? Had they tried to base their policy
and rules on this old knowledge to reverse this trend? Exactly which ideas
did they try to combine andwhat exactlywere they socialising as themeaning
of konservasi?
1 Interview 9 May 2001.
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Finding answers to these questions requires a historical approach, and the
conversation with Lukito had made it clear that there was not one
conceptualisation of conservation that had existed from the early history to
the present, shared by all people. Rather, as we will see, throughout history
there have been various, often conflicting ways to make sense of natural
phenomena that have led to an ongoing debate among various actors.
To create a better understanding of this debate, this part serves threemain
purposes. First, it presents a concise history of policies, law and institutions
in the field of nature conservation for the Indonesian archipelago. Second, it
introduces the main actors in the field of nature conservation policy and law
in the area. Third, it describes and analyses the dominant thinking and argu-
mentation of, above all, the ruling elites of the various periods in history about
nature and how humans should treat it, thus answering the first research
question of which dominant discourses on the human treatment of nature can
be reconstructed from policies and laws in pre-colonial, colonial and inde-
pendent Indonesia. Apart from this it provides background information
necessary for part III on policy- and lawmaking and part IV on implementation
which will do what this part can only do at the surface: analyse where and
why actors reproduced, transformed or rejected a particular discourse (research
question 2), with which stories, arguments and strategies various actors
involved in themaking and implementation of nature conservation policy and
law have been struggling for discourse hegemony (research question 3) and
in what way discursive structures have been enabling or constraining them
in their struggle (research question 4).
As discussed in part I, the methodology for this part of the study has been
to first collect information on policies and laws. For the pre-colonial times this
was more challenging than for the later periods, as there obviously existed
hardly any formal law and policy. Therefore, they had to be reconstructed.
Anthropological studies from the colonial and post-colonial times and historical
ones provided important sources. They have formed the basis for a reconstruc-
tion of objectives and arguments about rules in support of achieving these
objectives. These studies describe which norms and practices of present and
past times members of the communities under investigation constructed as
inherited from their ancestors. Studies of one and the same region show that
the norms and practices could vary from settlement to settlement, from com-
munity to community. Yet, there are certain characteristics that allow for
generalisation.
After constructing, or, for the later periods, describing the policies and laws,
the second step of the analysis was to distil and analyse the main stories,
arguments and, where possible, practices, in order to formulate dominant
discourses. Finally, where possible, information was collected on which actors
in what ways produced, reproduced, transformed or rejected the dominant
discourses.
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As noted above, throughout history the policies and laws differed both
in terms of objectives and in terms of the arguments that were used to justify
them. The historical overview will show that stories and arguments were
transformed or replaced by new ones especially when new political actors
with major power claims entered the scene.
Before starting the actual analysis, however, some general remarks about
how in the Indonesian archipelago the transition was made from adat, i.e. the
‘local law ways’2 or sets of local norms for human behaviour, to state law3
are necessary.
The first category of policies and rules we know of are those based on
animist beliefs that ruled the life of small communities that lived spread over
the archipelago. These communities consisted of hunters and gatherers, some
of whom, later on, temporarily or continuously settled in a certain area and
started to cultivate land. Van Vollenhoven, the Dutch legal scholar who ‘dis-
covered’ the adat law4 in Indonesia, estimated that only from the eighth cen-
tury onwards – three centuries after its arrival in the archipelago – a major
institutionalised religion, Hinduism, started to influence the policies and laws
in some parts of Indonesia.5 Islam on the other handwould not gain influence
before the fourteenth century. Importantly, the arrival and increasing influence
of these and other world religions did not mean that animist beliefs dis-
appeared. On the contrary, many Indonesians who converted more or less
adopted the new beliefs and practices in a way that came to co-exist with older
beliefs and practices. In line with that, Van Vollenhoven observed and empha-
2 This notion is borrowed fromKolff 1992, p. 205. Kolff defines local lawways for pre-colonial
India as ‘different authorities (councils, individuals) presiding over different sets or relations,
mainlywithin the village or the endogamous group, and using different sanctions: down-to-
earth ones like fining, beating, and public shaming; and supernatural ones such as ritual
expiation or, perhaps most effectively, as it entails stoppage to a family’s marriage prospects,
outcasting.’
3 See also on this matter Sonius 1993.
4 For the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch legal scholar Van Vollenhoven has studied and
compiled local rules, or ‘adat law’ as he would call them. Adat law or customary law is
contested in terms of concept andmethodology. It has proven hard to draw a line between
custom and law. Still, among social scientists the dominant view has becomeMalinowski’s
who argued that every society has law in order to maintain order (Ubink 2008, p. 24).
Among lawyers a narrower definition of law is common, reducing it to law enforceable
through state institutions. Consequently, scholars have debated how to study customary
law. Ter Haar argued that it should be studied through ‘the decisions by the group’s
authorities, in situations of conflict’ (Sonius 1993, p. 27). Holleman and Van Vollenhoven
argued that adat law comprised of social norms with sanctions attached to them. For the
debate between Llewellyn and Hoebel and their followers and Holleman whether one
should concentrate on trouble-cases or also on trouble-less cases in one’s analysis of
customary law see Slaats & Portier 1992, p. 10-11 and Ubink 2008, p. 25-26. However, for
our discussion, the debate about whether or not adat law is law is of a minor importance.
Regarding the methodology, the authors of my sources seem to have taken the latter
approach, thus including trouble-less cases as well.
5 Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 4.
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sized that converts did not, or not necessarily, abandon their adat in favour
of Hindu or Islamic laws.6 It is more likely that people attempted to combine
rules from various normative systems. Wilken, for instance, mentions that in
a Javanese village once a year the same people made offerings to Islamic saints
and local spirits, including the spirit of the first cultivator of the ground.7
This is not to deny that new religions influenced policies and laws on the
human treatment of nature. But these new beliefs were more vivid among
ruling elites or those who used them to challenge the existing elite than among
people without such power claims. According to Van Vollenhoven, indigenous
– and, one might add, colonial rulers – issued new rules whenever they
disliked local rules and practices.8 Apparently, local people often protested
against such new rules, claiming that they conflicted with their adat. However,
Van Vollenhoven notes that sometimes they also protested in situations where
that was not the case,9 and thus attempted to use their adat as an argument
against the legitimacy of their rulers.
The most notable difference with many of the rules that followed these
early local laws was that they were increasingly less locally grown and
enforced. Therefore the ruling elites of the early states, the colonial state and
the independent Indonesian state that issued themhad to putmuchmore effort
into persuading the local peoples to comply with these new rules. New rules
were imported or imposed, or both, and designed as rules for a larger territory,
the whole colony or, later, the independent state.
Another difference was that imported rules also had to be written down.
This is not to say that local rules were never written down. But according to
the prominent colonial Dutch scholar of Islam, SnouckHurgronje, writing local
rules down was often a symptom of their decreasing acceptance. After all,
‘law that everybody knows and respects, why should that be codified in a
small community?’10
On the whole, this part of the study identifies seven discourses that have
dominated conservation policy and law in the Indonesian archipelago through-
out history. The chapters will present their main conceptualisation of nature
and man-nature relations, their main stories and arguments, policies and
regulations, and data about which actors reproduced, transformed or rejected
it. The conclusion will display clear patterns of continuity and change in the
arguments and strategies that the various actors have used when debating
nature conservation. As several discourses soon came to co-exist, actors have
been able to ‘shop’, i.e. to use arguments for strategic objectives without
6 Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 15-16.
7 Van Ossenbruggen 1912, p. 221. This phenomenon of absorbing and merging all kinds of
outside influences is normally indicated with ‘syncretism’. See also for the mixing of Islam
with local religions on Java, Madura, Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Sulawesi Brakel 2004.
8 Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 112.
9 Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 112.
10 Cited in Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 93.
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necessarily being convinced of their truth. Others, like Lukito, the former
director of nature protection cited above, have tended to reproduce certain
elements of transformed discourses that sounded appealing to them, but
perhaps without being fully aware of their histories. Both uses of discourse
make clear that evidence has not been the determinant factor for discourse
reproduction or transformation. In rejecting a discourse, on the other hand,
evidence-based arguments have played the main part.

7 Spiritualist discourse
In pre-colonial times, policies – defined in this book as objectives and the
instruments to achieve them – and rules regarding the human treatment of
nature were largely unwritten and local. Examples of such policies and rules
are those of groups of shifting cultivators or of settlerswho started to cultivate
a certain area. The first Austronesian inhabitants are believed to have come
to the archipelago around 6000 BC. From what time onwards and how they
developed policies and rules on nature is unknown. However, once they did
come into existence, they were passed on from generation to generation,
sometimes until the present. As a result, the text below builds on examples
from both past and present.
7.1 POLICY
The policy underlying the earliest rules we know of in the Indonesian archi-
pelago, prescribing a particular treatment of nature, primarily aimed at keeping
the spirits who owned and inhabited the land that was used for hunting or
cultivation favourably disposed to them.
7.2 RULES
In order to achieve this aim the communities constructed rules on the treatment
of nature. These rules have formed and in some contexts continued to form
part of the local adat. They can be subdivided into two categories: the early
rules that had their origin in animist beliefs and were directly related to
relations between humans and spirits, and the later rules that still used the
same spiritualist arguments but aimed to regulate inter-human relations.
Rules belonging to the first category were about respecting the habitat of
spirits. These rules included that old inhabited trees were not to be cut and
that dark forests and certain mountains were not to be visited.1 In some areas
such old beliefs have continued to exist. In Kerinci, an area in West Sumatra,
for instance, communities told Bakels that their ancestors had laid down in
1 Van Ossenbruggen 1912, p. 219.
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a ‘pact’ that ‘bound the people to the gods (now the Islamic god), to each other,
to the spirits of the forest, and to the wild animals’,2 that access to forests was
bound to rules, such as putting a leaf behind one’s ear. Schefold mentions for
Mentawai that access to and hunting in the spirits’ habitat was allowed but
that the spirits in a meeting with a representative of the human community
had demanded a small part of the prey for themselves.3 Osseweijer observed
customary rules in Aru, such as behaving respectfully when gathering
resources at sea.4 On Java, some rules prohibited any human access what-
soever to forests that were regarded as ‘sacred’ (Ja. angker, In. keramat).5 On
Borneo, particular species of birds could not usually be hunted. They were
seen as important omen birds.6
Rules belonging to the second category aimed for a peaceful and har-
monious life in the village and at sea. Often they regulated the access to and
exploitation of certain resources, such as the Moluccan sasi, which could be
harvested only during limited open seasons.7 Others protected a particular
tree, such as the ‘Koompassia excelsa, known variously as tapang, sialang or
tualang, which hosted the giant bee’.8 Such rules intended to reserve a resource
or forest for a community or individual. Van Vollenhovenmentions, in Borneo,
Timor and Papua for instance, the habit of people of signing trees as reserved.9
The right to reserve land, sea or resources was closely linked to what Van
Vollenhoven coined ‘beschikkingsrecht’, usually translated as communal ‘right
of avail’ or ‘right to dispose’.10 This right, possibly obtained through a contract
with the local spirits as mentioned above, grants a community or its represent-
ative the authority to decide what ought to be done with a piece of land, sea
or resources in an area and bywhom. It differs from the concept of ownership
that was or continues to be believed rests with spirits and deities.11 As the
rules of this second category were also linked to spiritualist sanctions, such
as illness (see further below), we may regard them as a transformation of the
early spiritualist discourse.
2 Bakels 2003, p. 74; cf. Lehman 2003.
3 Schefold 1985, p. 376.
4 Osseweijer 2000, p. 68.
5 Boomgaard 1992, p. 46. Sacred forests are alsomentioned in Suwarno, Simarmata &Ahmad
n.y., p. 261-266 forWest Java, South Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and East Nusa Tenggara.
6 Hose & McDougall 1993, p. 57.
7 Harkes 2005, Kissya 1993, Osseweijer 2001, p. 114-115, Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 418, Volker
1921, p. 293-295, Zerner 1998, p. 537.
8 Kathirithamby-Wells 1998, p. 928.
9 Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 9, 324, 418, 430, 454.
10 Van Vollenhoven 1925, p. 9-10.
11 Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 485.
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7.2 RECONSTRUCTING DISCOURSE: STORIES, ARGUMENTS, AND PRACTICES
What can such rules tell us about the spiritualist discourse that may have
existed and to some extent have dominated the pre-colonial times? First, there
were the stories about how to make sense of the world. Such stories, later
collected by cultural anthropologists in their areas of research, dealt for
instance with the origins of ethnic groups and the founding of a particular
village or community. Although these stories may have changed through the
course of history wemay assume that they provide us with some information
about how hunter and gatherer societies used to make sense of the world. For
the case of Aru, Osseweijer reports that Aruese believe that their ancestors
had to flee Enu, their island of origin, in boats and that those who could not
flee became fish, dolphins, and sharks, who are now the keepers of themarine
resources.12 Schefold wrote down Mentawaian stories that tell about the cos-
mos consisting of two separate domains: one belonging to human beings, the
other to the spirits. The latter is invisible to humans. It forms a ‘special world,
hidden from men, a culture of the beyond’.13 Likewise, Aragon described
for Central Sulawesi that this other world is inhabited by powerful ‘unseen
guardian deities, often referred to as ‘“owners” or “lords”, of an area’.14 In
many regions, including Toraja (Sulawesi) and Bali,15 communities thus
believed or continue to believe that all land is owned by local spirits or gods.
Another important kind of story was about the link between a human and
a tree, plant or animal. The soul of a human being was believed to be able
to be transferred to a tree, plant or animal for the protection of the person’s
life. Whenever something happened to the tree, plant or animal the life of the
person was in danger.16
With the help of such stories about a spiritual world people have long been
making sense of natural phenomena: fish that were at times abundant and
then at others not, deer that sometimes hid and sometimes were easy to find,
aggressive attacks by wild animals, fires, volcanic eruptions, or the sudden
death of a person.
Not surprisingly, such stories were interwovenwith arguments about how
to treat spirits and deities. One such argument spoke of the necessity for
anyone who wanted to settle in a particular area to negotiate with the land-
lords of the area an agreement about the land’s initial clearing and its transfer
from the ‘“wild” to the human domain’.17 In many cases such an agreement
was sealed with the marriage between a founding father of a community and
12 Osseweijer 2000, p. 76.
13 Schefold 1992. The various meanings of the Indonesian word for Nature, alam, support
this idea. It is used to describe concepts as diverse as world, kingdom, region, and hereafter.
14 Aragon 2003, p. 115.
15 Van Vollenhoven 1918, p. 363,485.
16 Van Ossenbruggen 1912, p. 296-298.
17 Aragon 2003, p. 116.
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a local spirit.18 In either case, the arguments served to make it clear to people
from the outside that they could not just settle in that particular region because
the landlords had already reached an agreement with the sitting settlers. As
such, such stories also served other purposes, most importantly, to legitimise
resource and power claims.
A second argument suggested compliance with the rules as a symbol of
respectful treatment of the deities and spirits19 and their world in the time
that followed the initial settlement. If people complied with the above-men-
tioned rules and brought regular offerings20 they would, for instance, be
granted fertility for their land and themselves in return. On the Mentawai
Islands people believed that the spirits would send certain ‘streams of blessing’
to those who complied with the rules.21 What form this blessing took could
vary from person to person: good health, material and spiritual welfare, or
power. In addition, Lehman found that compliance with these rules ‘ensured
that there would continue to be communication between the two parties’ that
would eventually serve to keep things under control and to help avoid chaos
and violence.22 Wilken mentions that spirits were expected to provide the
villagers with advice, help against other humans and evil spirits, and blessings
for various activities such as hunting, fishing and agriculture.23 Broch notes
that in the case of the island Timpaus compliance has been seen as necessary
to keep the cosmos in balance. But this is not to say that everything needed
to remain untouched:
‘Balance can also be obtained by replacing old species with new ones. The balance
does not require stability in the sense that no changes in the ecological composition
can take place. […] balance is based on an equilibrium of good and evil forces.’24
This same idea was found by Osseweijer in Aru: there, people did not believe
that marine resources could ever become truly extinct. At the most, the
18 For an overview of founders’ cults in Southeast Asia see Tannenbaum & Kammerer 2003.
Cf. Bakels 2003, p. 73.
19 Aragon describes that the transfer from the spiritual world to the human world often, if
not always, resulted in the emergence of a new type of spirit, the so-called ancestral spirits
of those individuals ‘who made successful agreements with the guardian deities’ Aragon
2003, p. 116. These then came to share in reigning over the spiritual world together with
the guardian spirits and had, just like the deities, to be treated with respect.
20 Kammerer & Tannenbaum 2003, p. 3.
21 Bakels 2000, p. 31 citing Bloch, 1986 and Schefold 2000.
22 Lehman 2003, p. 16.
23 Van Ossenbruggen 1912, p. 220.
24 Broch 1998, p. 211-212. This observation is important since many ecological philosophers
tend to idealise Asian attitudes towards nature claiming that these are conservationist in
nature. See, for instance, Kalland & Persoon 1998, p. 1-6. See also what has been said about
the myth of the ‘noble savage’.
Chapter 7 53
ancestors’ annexmanagers of the resources could temporarily hold them back
or bring them to other areas.25
The other side of this coin was that non-compliance could have disastrous
effects. As Zerner learnt on the Moluccas,
‘[w]atchful spirits listen, see and respond to the everyday practices as well as the
ceremonial performances of the community. A fisherman’s fate, as well as his luck
in fishing – whether fish cluster about his net or disappear from sight – depends
upon his relationship to these fractious spirits of the place’.26
Moreover, in other cases, people believed and sometimes continue to believe
that non-compliance could result in disappearance, illness or even death.27
In Pulau Seribu, for instance, a man told me in 1999 that people who went
to the most northern part of the small archipelago did not return because the
tiger spirit (In. roh macan or macan halus) living there prevented them from
finding their way back out of the mangroves. Likewise, Volker has described
a more historical case of the Moluccas where a boat carrying women dis-
appeared without a trace. The people linked this disappearance to the local
spirits. To grant these spirits a nice time with the women that they had kid-
napped and to make them favourably disposed for the future the people
decided to close the port at the foot of the mountain where the spirits were
supposed to live for three months.28 It is likely that the idea that non-compli-
ance could lead to personal or natural disasters served to provide people with
a sense of control where untamed nature was or continues to be perceived
as omnipresent and powerful. They could try to reduce the occurrence of
illness and the like by becoming ‘better persons’ who complied with the rules
of the spiritualist discourse.
However, there were also exceptions to the rules on human treatment of
nature. When animals, which according to adat rules were to be respected,
attacked humans or their domestic animals, humans were allowed to kill them.
In this case, according to the Dayaks in Borneo, the animal had shown to
belong to a lower class and not to be worth being respected.29
In addition in these caseswhere rules did not apply, there existed possibil-
ities to ask for exceptions, a traditional kind of ‘license’. This had to be accom-
panied by certain rituals30 to appease the spirits, which we may interpret
as a form of discourse institutionalisation. These rituals were often only known
25 Osseweijer 2000, p. 73-74.
26 Zerner 1998, p. 557.
27 Cf. Boomgaard 1992, p. 46.
28 Volker 1921, p. 295.
29 Hose & McDougall 1993, p. 57. Cf. the case of Kerinci where tigers had to pay with their
life for entering the human domain and thus breaking the contract (Bakels 2000, p. 274).
30 Rituals often symbolise a re-creation of the natural world in the hope tomaintain the natural
order see for exampleDemaine 1978, p. 50.
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to a group of experts, the dukuns, who thus needed to be consulted to mediate
between their world and that of the spirits. Their successful performance of
the required rituals would ‘attract […] the positive forces of luck, health and
prosperity.’31 However, not even the dukunswere obligatory. AsMcVey notes,
the mediation of experts ‘enhances rather than monopolizes contact with the
world of the ancestors which is available to all.’32 Often, therefore, even or-
dinary men could perform appeasing rituals, such as in Kerinci (see above),
to indicate that they would ‘behave respectfully’ in the forest, and ‘ask[ing]
the forest spirits to give them some of their “cattle” [wild deer]’.33
In this case, treating the spirits politely therefore seemed sufficient to obtain
the key to otherwise restricted areas or unavailable resources. That rules were
interpreted loosely is also reflected in practices where actors more or less
openly deceived spirits. Hose describes this, for instance, for some Dayak
communities in Borneo that speak as little as possible about their intention
to go hunting or fishing or use indirect language such as ‘there are many leaves
floating here’ to mean that there are plenty of fish in the water. They do this
in order to prevent the spirits from informing their prey of their intentions.34
In his discussion of Van Vollenhoven’s work Sonius has characterised adat
rules as ‘directed towards harmony in the basic communities and […] adverse
to conflict’, ‘unwritten’, and ‘based on age-old traditions’.35 This label,
‘directed towards harmony’, has often been interpreted to mean there was
a general consensus on and thus no conflict about rules. One of the most
prominent examples in this respect is the New Order government under
Soeharto that attempted to ban ideological conflicts from politics by formu-
lating harmony as a normative requirement for any process of decision-making
(see part III). Likewise, proponents of customary law have in their struggle
for its recognition portrayed it in such a way as to qualify it as an alternative
to state law. However, as scholars of customary law have pointed out we
cannot assume that adat rules were by definition acceptable to and accepted
by all people concerned. Chanock, for instance, has noted for Africa that
proponents of customary law construct it as the opposite of state law and thus
as ‘long-lived, […] acceptable and right practice’ despite the fact that the
content of customary law is contested within local communities as well.36
31 Schefold on Mentawai in Nas & Persoon 2003, p. 2. According to Schefold, ‘this explains
why people are so dedicated to the rituals for which they work hard and make a special
effort, whereas they generally prefer to be easygoing.’
32 McVey 1993, p. 6.
33 Bakels 2003, p. 74.
34 Hose & McDougall 1993, p. 101.
35 Sonius 1993, p. 52-53.
36 Chanock 1989, p. 173, (also cited in Ubink 2008); see also Oomen 2002 for the case of South
Africa. For recent cases in Indonesia see, for instance, Tsing 1999, Li 2000, Li 2007, and
Bakker forthcoming.
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What probably made them more acceptable than non-adat rules was the
fact that they were unwritten and thus flexible to some extent. As Slaats and
Portier note, one may wonder whether such rules had functions comparable
to those of later, written rules: ‘More often than not what seems to be a rule
turns out to have the character of a principle or even only a general guideline
for behaviour.’37 Here, we also need to differentiate between communities
with a simple social organization and more complex ones. The simple ones
lack all kinds of institutions, such as priests, dukuns or adat councils that can
define rules.Members of a simple community, therefore, can have very differ-
ent ideas about the world and how to behave in it, even to the extent that they
‘freely contradict [their] own statements’.38 In communities with a more com-
plex social organisation, on the other hand, there existed institutions specifically
intended to formulate specific ideas. In terms of discourse we can see such
institutions in twoways. First, they were the institutionalisation of a particular
discourse, for instance a discourse on the relations between humans and spirits
and how to uphold them. Second, once established these institutions played
an important role inmaintaining and guarding the discourse. They formulated
specific ideas about concepts, policies and rules. As such they helped make
the discourse more specific.
Yet, even in more complex communities the rules about human treatment
of nature allowed for negotiations. This possibility was institutionalised in
practices such as musyawarah,39 begundem40 or runggun.41 We may assume
that in the event that a person was accused of non-compliance with a rule
regarding the human treatment of nature and so bore the responsibility for
a consequent natural disaster he could defend himself or attempt to justify
his behaviour in such a forum. The major aim of the process of deliberation
was then to make sense of what had happened, to formulate a solution that
was acceptable to all stakeholders, to restore harmony in the community42
and to find a new balance in inter-human and man-spirit relations. In this,
such institutions differed from theWestern-type courts, which apply law and
are based on the legal principle that similar cases require similar outcomes.43
So far, the analysis of the spiritualist discourse has shown that its main,
fundamental idea was that nature was inhabited by spirits. These spirits had
37 Slaats & Portier 1992, p. 6.
38 Hose makes this point in a more specific way about communities with and without priest-
hoods Hose & McDougall 1993, p. 74.
39 For instance, among the Minangkabau in West-Sumatra as described in Von Benda-Beck-
mann 1984.
40 Among the Sasak on Lombok as described by Koesnoe 1979.
41 Sonius 1993, p. 33. Such institutions existed not only for dispute settlement but for all
important moments in a person’s life as Slaats and Portier have noted for runggun among
the Karo Batak in North Sumatra (Slaats & Portier 1981, p. 189).
42 Slaats & Portier 1992, p. 17.
43 Slaats & Portier 1992, p. 17.
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authority over resources and thus the well-being of humans. Treated in the
right way, the spirits were inclined to help humans in their struggle of life.
At the basis of this discourse was thus a reciproque conceptualisation of man-
spirit relations.
What ‘treating the spirits in the right way’ meant was locally defined. If
rules existed, theywere generally not rigid. There were exceptions and rituals
to circumvent them. In other cases, it was common practice to deceive spirits.
What made the rules flexible was the belief that people had the option of
making excuses forwrong behaviour.Whatmade the rules attractivewas that
they provided people with a sense of control. Modern conservationists’ idea
that resources can become extinct has not been a part of the spiritualist dis-
course.
Contrary to the ideas of some modern conservationists, the spiritualist
discourse with its rules on the treatment of nature was not a discourse prob-
lematising human exploitation of nature. Rather, it was mainly a discourse
that served to explain natural phenomena, to ask spirits and deities for spiritual
and material blessing, and to claim and legitimise the access to nature for a
certain community. The conservationist benefits that may have been occurring
as a result of the spiritualist discourse have thus been accidental rather than
intended.44
In order to make sense of natural phenomena it is likely that people some-
times accused others or a whole community of ‘wrong behaviour’. However,
how such an accusation was debated and negotiated very much depended
on the local context and power configuration. Imagining a situation in which
the causes of a natural disaster were debated, three main options come to
mind: there was no disagreement at all, different stories were allowed to be
told by different people or there was a power holder or group of power
holders whose version could dominate the discussion.
It is unknown whether all communities in the archipelago had rules as
described in this chapter. If they did, there are many examples of communities
or members of communities who eventually forgot about them or developed
other ideas about nature and man-nature relations. Nowadays we therefore
find many communities in which the proponents of the spiritual discourse
have to compete with proponents of other discourses. Osseweijer describes
this, for instance, among the people in Aru, where at present many people
do not behave according to the old rules. According to one tradition-minded
informant ‘they just go and see whether they are lucky in bringing back a good
catch; they never tell you that bad behaviour, on the tidal flats and in the
village, is sanctioned by the ancestors in the form of disappointing harvest,
sudden bad weather, encounters with ancestral sharks […] different people
have different ideas.’45
44 Cf. LeBlanc 2003, p. 25.
45 Osseweijer 2000, p. 69.
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Those who still reproduce stories and arguments belonging to the spiritual
discourse may do so for various reasons. One reason may be that people still
believe in the ideas that form the basis for this discourse. Another reasonmay
be that the modern conservationist movement in the 1980s started to portray
indigenous peoples as traditional conservationists. As later chapters and part IV
will show, tribal communities have readily reproduced such stories in an
attempt to gainmore access and authority over the increasingly scarce natural
resources. In many cases this meant they had to adjust the spiritual discourse
to fit new requirements.
Another case of reproduction involved institutions related to this discourse
more than the discourse itself. Also from the 1980s onward, the Indonesian
Ministry for the Environment has attempted to ‘revitalise’ the Moluccan sasi
as a conservationist institution,46 actually transforming it, despite the fact
that sasi originally had no such background.47
However, many more developments and struggles have taken place in
the Indonesian archipelago between the period that the spiritual discourse
dominated the thinking of the people and these recent cases of discourse
reproduction and transformation.
The first ideas that came to challenge the spiritual discourse were based
on Hindu beliefs that increasingly influenced the region. That this religion
producedmore ideas onman-nature relations than Islam andChristianity need
not surprise us considering that Hinduism originated from India, a country
with a nature as comparably rich as Indonesia’s. Even today, Indonesian
leaders of Islam and Christianity are no active proponents of conservationist
discourses (although conservationists have made several efforts to pull them
into their camp). Discussions on conservation and the role of religion have
resulted in supportive declarations48 rather than in religious leaders actively
spreading conservationist arguments. Among the imported religions, Hinduism
takes thus a privileged position in this study. The next chapter will show that
ideas that had their origin in Hinduism were increasingly used in contexts
where the rather simple communities discussed above becamemore complex
and were eventually incorporated into larger polities. Rulers of both small
and large Hindu kingdoms, as well as persons who wanted to challenge the
power of other local rulers, attempted to either spread new stories or adjust
the existing local stories to their needs.
46 Kissya 1993.
47 Zerner 1994.
48 For an article listing the attempts of former Indonesian Minister for the Environment Emil
Salim and of LIPI in co-operation with the Worldbank see Mangunjaya 2008.
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Hinduism came to the archipelago in the fifth century, while Buddhism came
in the eighth. Hindu kingdoms ruled over Java from the fifth until the fifteenth
century, starting with Tarumanegara in West Java, then Mataram in Central
Java and finallyMajapahit in East Java. In Sumatra, Sriwijayawas an important
Hindu empire. But Bali is the only island of the Indonesian archipelago that
has remained predominantly Hindu. Pre-colonial states in the Indonesian
archipelago emerged in various forms and sizes. Most of them were small
kingdoms that lasted only for ‘the lifetime of one strong man’, and few others
were large enough to succeed in establishing a dynasty.1 Kings tried to main-
tain authority by granting regional overlords considerable autonomy, building
a personal cultus of glory and throughmilitary power.2 An additional strategy
kings used was to adopt loyal supporters as their children to cement loyalty
in family relations.3 The frequency of conflicts among followers of a kingdom
shows that these strategies were not always successful. In general, we have
to imagine a pre-colonial Indonesian Hindu kingdom as a patrimonial rather
than feudal4 state, led by a strong and smart leader whomanaged to temporar-
ily5 bind an ‘entourage of followers’ to him who in turn had followers with
followers. Supported by these circles of followers a king could attack, incor-
porate or destroy other strong men with power claims.6 In return for their
support and loyalty a king would have to ensure the well-being of his fol-
lowers. He would have to visit his followers over and over again and earn
his legitimacy by demonstrating to them the benefits of his rule .7
The stories that formed the basis for the second discourse I want to discuss
had to show that the rulers had a special connection to nature and thus to
the spiritual – and increasingly the divine – and that they were therefore the
ones to mediate between the divine and the human sphere. As McVey writes
about early states in the Indonesian archipelago, the
1 Schulte Nordholt 1986, p. 11 citing Locher.
2 Ricklefs 1981, p. 15-16.
3 Schulte Nordholt 1988, p. 33.
4 For definitions of both concepts see Weber 1976. For a discussion of these - contested -
terms in the context of Java and arguments in favour of patrimonialism rather than feudal-
ism see Holtzappel 1986.
5 Ricklefs 1981, p. 15, Schulte Nordholt 1988, p. 32.
6 Schulte Nordholt 1986, p. 11.
7 Schulte Nordholt 1988, p. 40.
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‘central image was that of divine power, conveyed through the king, radiating with
diminishing force out from the capital and down the social hierarchy. Population
accumulated around centres of power; cities were points of light in the darkness
of human ignorance, sources of entry for the divine into the lower world of man.
Raw nature is wilderness, the dangerous space beyond the light, which man
traverses only with peril. People that live close to nature are of a lesser order,
responding to the disorderly, animal aspect of humanity rather than the hierarchical
discipline of civilization, man’s reflection of the divine. Rural hinterlands are
touched by order flowing from urban power centres, but to varying degrees; the
more distant geographically and socially from the centre people are, the more they
are children of darkness. The ruler’s task is to preserve his alignment with the
cosmic order and to cast his civilizing light upon his people, whose is to be
instructed and obey.’8
This image differed, of course, from that at the core of the stories of the past.
It reflects a strong Indian influence in the relation it established between power
and some centre. In the Indian case, the centre of the cosmos was believed
to be Mount Meru with the city of gods at its summit.9 In its place, in Indian
influenced areas in Indonesia, local mountains (but also increasingly cities and
royal courts) served as a centre. In any such case, there emerged a difference
between high, divine, light places and low, dark and wild places in nature.10
The divine places were believed to not only possess an enormous power but
also a certain order which humans tried to imitate in their cities. Any civilizing
act was thus an attempt to come closer to the divine order. On the other hand,
subjugatingwilderness was believed to represent a coming closer to the divine
and leaving the animal aspects of humanity and spirit-inhabiting nature
behind. Not surprisingly, the new stories dealt then with this very subjugation
of nature. Examples are stories that, under the influence of the Indian epic
Mahabharata, described rulers as having conquered nature, for instance, in
the form of killing wild animals. This was to show a person’s power since
uncultivated territories
8 McVey 1993, p. 10.
9 Heine-Geldern 1963, p. 1-3.
10 McVey 1993, p. 10. Making this difference means something other than establishing a
dichotomy of nature and culture; rather, nature has both dark and bright sides. It can be
domesticated or remain untouched wilderness. Cf. Kalland & Persoon who state that in
present day Japan, for instance, the same dichotomy can be observed. The Japanese tend
to like the domesticated form of nature much more than nature in its wild form (Kalland
& Persoon 1998, p. 5).
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‘were filled with [anarchic, chaotic, primeval] power […] only a person who was
extremely “central”11 [and thus powerful] in himself could, by mediation and self-
discipline subdue the […] forces [living in them]’.12
These stories were thus to demonstrate a ruler’s strength and – again – to
legitimise his rule, which was of essential importance to mobilise manpower,
and claim certain natural resources: Once a person had proven able to sub-
jugate nature and the spirits inhabiting it he had shown his ‘ability and right
[…] to rule as king.’13 But he would have to demonstrate this ability over
and over again in order to stay in power.
8.1 POLICY
The kings or aspirant rulers that used Hindu stories in support of their power
claim spread with these stories a new kind of policy on man-nature relations.
This policy aimed at subjugating nature (and the spirits inhabiting it) in order
to restyle it into something ‘more civilised’ and ‘more valuable’: a resemblance
of the city of gods. Imitating the divine order was believed to, or at least
portrayed as if it could, please the deities, which would reward inhabitants
with material and spiritual blessing in return.
8.2 RULES
Of course, the emergence of states and kings went along with the issuance
of new rules, including those regulating the treatment of nature. The most
important ones in this respect were those that reserved nature for the royalty
by granting it monopolies on certain forests or forest products.14 Other rules
prohibited the commercial trade of certain resources, while allowing sub-
11 Gesick uses ‘central’ as a synonym for power based on the conviction in Southeast Asian
polities ‘that living beings were ordered along a continuum from the bestial to the sacred,
[…] a circular conception of space inwhich potently charged centerswere thought to radiate
power outward and downward toward less-charged peripheries. […] higher-status people
were found in centers – were in fact conceived to be centers – and were surrounded by
people declining in proximity to power and hence in status as onemoved outward.’ (Gesick
1983, p. 2).
12 Gesick 1983, p. 2.
13 Haynes 1998, p. 736; although called a ‘king’, or raja, such a leader was often no more than
a chief and only gradually developed into a person of royalty with a court and bureaucracy
(McVey 1993, p. 8). According to Bakels, rulers seem to have liked to demonstrate their
power by demonstrating their superiority to tigers and other dangerous animals. Examples
are the Javanese Kraton, but also former president Soeharto and some high generals liked
to be portrayed in front of stuffed tigers (Bakels 2000, p. 16).
14 See, for instance, Kathirithamby-Wells 1998, p. 928 and Henley, 2005.
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ordinates of the king to yield as much as they needed for themselves, often
on the condition that a certain percentage of the yield was paid to the king
as taxes.15 Except for the royal reserves, there existed no prohibitions to clear
forests. On the contrary, kings encouraged forest clearance and subsequent
cultivation.
8.3 RECONSTRUCTING DISCOURSE: STORIES, ARGUMENTS, AND PRACTICES
We need to realise that issuing rules was, at least in the beginning phase of
a state, nothing more than making claims. After all, in the beginning a king
generally lacked the economic resources to keep his followers satisfied, to
consolidate his power and to build up the infrastructure necessary for enforce-
ment. So he had to try to influence his subordinates through belief.16 One
strategy was to present a story which still had some of the elements of the
old stories in it, for instance, a story that presented nature not only as dark,
wild and uncivilised but at the same time as a source of spiritual strength.17
Another strategy was to delegitimize the old religions, and in particular their
egalitarian elements, as superstition.18
If we turn our focus to the arguments inherent in the Indian stories, the
first thing that catches our eye is that nature had become distinct from spirit-
uality to some extent. Although nature still served as a source for spiritual
power, it also had to be subjugated to the ideal that had come in its place:
the city of gods with its own light, beauty and order. And it was from this
divine city, not from the spirits who resided in nature next door, that the
believers of this new story now had to expect material and spiritual blessing,.
As a consequence, they had to please these deities by imitating their order
in the human world. In this sense, it was thus a ‘divine will’19 to strive for
civilisation which was to come in the place of the dark wilderness. This argu-
ment we can understand easily: as peasants, especially those living far from
the centre and close to the forest, viewed the forest as potentially dangerous
but also as a refuge from state power,20 kings would, of course, try to con-
vince them that forests were something to be subdued or feared, rather than
to be used as a shelter.
It is likely that kings also increasingly began to portray themselves, rather
than distant deities, as the ones to take care of the material well-being of their
subordinates. In this case, a royal monopoly was no longer necessarily some-
15 Henley 2005, p. 241 citing Schrader; Boomgaard 2005, p. 227.
16 McVey 1993, p. 8-9.
17 McVey 1993, p. 11.
18 McVey 1993, p. 9.
19 McVey 1993, p. 11.
20 McVey 1993, p. 11.
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thing that a king possessed because of his extraordinary relations to some deity
and reserved for his own, and only indirectly for the community’s benefit.
It became a reserve for times of scarcity as the king had to ensure that every-
one had enough to eat at all times.21
What practices and institutional arrangements resulted from this argument
in favour of subjugating and turning away from nature and towards the capital
of one or another ruler? First, it is likely that some of the old rules were
maintained and others were not: in some cases it was to the advantage of a
ruler to claim exclusive access to certain resources on the basis of existing
restrictions, while in others he had to place new restrictions. Both led to the
emergence of new institutions, including officials who had to guard the royal
monopolies and officials who had to make sure that people paid their taxes.22
In others, it was in a king’s interest to get rid of old rules and to delegitimize
old belief systems. Second, at least for Java, there is some evidence that rulers
between the beginning of the 14th and 16th century had teak and other trees
planted that were considered useful, including those producing pigments and
tan.23 This we might interpret as not only serving economic interests but also
imitating the divine order as the trees were planted in rows with regular
distances in between. According to Altona, there were also officials whowere
responsible for the forests. He cites old scripts kept in the office ‘Sriwedari’
in Solo that mention, at least from 900 onward, the existence of a ‘toea boeroe’
(En. chief hunter), a ‘djoeroe wanan’ (En. chief of the people living in the forests)
who was also responsible for the wood supply, and several ‘pangasalan’ who
were responsible for guarding the forests and taking care of roads and
bridges.24 Third, to demonstrate his power, a king would travel every year
throughout his kingdom, including the forested areas.25 Related to this was
the emergence of a hunting tradition by the royal class to demonstrate the
legitimacy of royal claims to rule. In the Javanese kingdom of Mataram, for
instance, kings would publicly hunt tigers to rid the country of these animals
and to show their ‘prowess’.26 Fourth, it resulted in a new class of religious
teachers who on behalf of a ruler had to convince people in the hinterlands
of a capital to adhere to the new belief and the new ruler. Fifth, among
believers it resulted in new loyalties. After all, the new belief placed them at
a distance from nature given that despite its spiritual inhabitants it no longer
21 Henley, for instance, cites an anthropological study which documents that the sago stands
of Buol in Sulawesi were reserved for such ends (Henley 2005, p. 240).
22 See, for instance, Boomgaard who mentions, among others, ‘forest overseers’ (‘mantri
pengalasan’) working for the court of Sultan Agung of Mataram (Boomgaard 2005, p. 227).
23 Altona 1927, Altona 1922, p. 465, 483-484, 506; cf. Boomgaard 2005, p. 227 and Boomgaard
1988, p. 62 citing Altona.
24 Altona 1922, p. 479.
25 Peluso 1992, p. 33 citing Pigeaud.
26 Boomgaard 2001, p. 109. In this book Boomgaard discusses in more detail the beginnings
of these hunts on Java and their increasing ritual character.
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secured their material and spiritual blessings. This was now the work of more
distant deities and their earthly representatives, the kings. As a consequence,
those who accepted a king no longer negotiated agreements with the spirits
about access to nature but turned to their king instead and called on him for
protection and welfare.27 These new loyalties had as a further consequence
that no one working for a king needed to be afraid to cut forests that had been
seen as reserved for the spirits:28 after all, as long as the king had ordered
the cutting the responsibility for any consequences fell automatically upon
his shoulders.29 And while this trade of direct access to the divine to avoid
direct responsibility for any consequences could have been experienced as
an advantage, a sixth new practice was certainly not: according to Lehman,
rulers now tended to limit the popular access to land to create an ‘artificial
scarcity of land [in order] to keep people where they [we]re’.30 As such they
established restricted areas to ‘fix […]manpower in place’ in a sparsely popu-
lated area.31 It is, however, doubtful that a ruler would succeed with such
a strategy since he would have required an army to guard these territories.32
In some cases, we know of kings that made their slaves or state officials
safeguard their reserves.33 Since a king had tomake sure that people neverthe-
less stayedwithin his sphere of influence hewould show ‘material generosity’
in return by offering ‘“feasts of merit.” These sometimes involving the distribu-
tion of valuable import goods as well as food, drink and entertainment’, food
27 People who thought that he failed to take care of their material and spiritual welfare would
replace or abandon him (Gesick 1983). Compare also for Moore 1978, p. 125, Scott 1985,
p. 245, Kathirithamby-Wells 1996, p. 27, Kammerer & Tannenbaum 2003, p. 6, and Gesick
1983, p. 2. In Java, rulers needed ‘to act without selfish motives, or pamrih’. Passion and
greed were thought to reduce the ruler’s power (Christie 1983, p. 31 citing Anderson, 1972.
It seems important to note in this context that often vertical ties between patrons and their
clients dominated the scene (Schulte Nordholt 1991, p. 8). The fact that in such cases a ruler
had to compete with other rulers in the same territory made it rather easy to turn away
from the one to the other ruler.
28 On Java, for example, the swidden cultivators Kalang functioned as royal wood cutters
(Kathirithamby-Wells 1998, p. 928).
29 Boomgaard 1992, p. 46.
30 Lehman 2003, p. 18.
31 Sources at the end of the first millennium A.D. though describe Java as ‘relatively heavily
populated’ based on central Javanese inscriptions naming hundreds of villages (Christie
1983, p. 10). According to Ricklefs, the precise size of the population in pre-colonial times
is still unknown. For the end of the eighteenth century it is estimated at around threemillion
(Ricklefs 1981, p. 14). Reid estimates that in 1600 Java had a population of 3,4 million with
a density of 25,7 people per square kilometre (Reid 1984, p. 152). For the argument that
ruling in these times primarily meant control of manpower see also Schulte Nordholt 1988
and Schulte Nordholt 1991, p. 7-8
32 Cf. Poffenberger 1990, p. 9-10 who notes that there is ‘little evidence to suggest these
kingdoms ever effectively controlled much of the land they claimed’.
33 See, for instance, Henley 2005, p. 237,239.
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for the hungry34 and protection against violence, corruption, overly high taxes
or labour demands.35
While this latter strategywas probably rather successful – the better a king
took care of his subordinates and slaves the more compliance with the new
rules -,36 the former strategy of binding subjects to a king with new stories
about a new belief failed regularly: especially in the margins of an emerging
state
‘common folk generally would cling to the old ideas as both familiar and allowing
themselves a much more direct role in the cosmos than that mediated by the
king.’37
Even where people formally accepted new stories and thus converted to a
new belief, including variations of Islam and Christianity, they would not
necessarily change their behaviour. That was especially the casewhere people
were left free to transform the new belief in such a way that the Islamic or
Christian god could take over the position of the local gods.38 In these cases,
the extent to which people complied with the rules about how to treat nature
depended on the pre-existing arrangements they had hadwith the local spirits
and gods. In other cases, a new belief helped to reduce the fear people had
had of the old spirits. Boomgaard notes that ‘under the influence of more
orthodox Muslim preachers the fear for the “old” spirits [possibly] gradually
decreased’.39
In sum, the core idea of the Hindu inspired subjugate-and-rule discourse
was that a person who could subjugate both men and nature had the right
to rule. With this right, he also had the right to hold certain resource mono-
polies. But he also desperately needed to provide for the well-being of his
followers in order to keep them tied to him.
All people were encouraged to permanently cultivate nature. This was an
important shift from the reciproque spiritualist discourse of a respectful treat-
ment of the spirits and their habitat in nature towards a discourse of the
subjugation of nature. The latter had spirits living within nature and people
who saw an explicit difference between a wild, dangerous and dark nature
and a domesticated and restyled one and who had an outspoken preference
for the latter. This meant, according to the stories belonging to this discourse,
34 Henley 2005, p. 238.
35 Adas 1981, p. 229.
36 Schulte Nordholt 1986, p. 11; see for a discussion of peasant protests in pre-colonial Java
Adas 1981.
37 McVey 1993, p. 9.
38 Cf., among others, Christie 1983, p. 31 and Bakels 2003, p. 74. In colonial times the Dutch
missionaries would sometimes formulate criteria for real Christianity and prohibit certain
pagan elements (McVey 1993, p. 21 footnote 33).
39 Boomgaard 2003, p. 308-309.
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that when accessing nature people did not have to perform rituals and could
forget about the taboos that had existed on certain species. This change must
have resulted in a decrease of the protection of forest, sea and their species
that had existed unintentionally before. Only the royal reserves were prohibited
areas, limited to those people whom the king ordered to work there.
Whatmade this newdiscourse unattractive to peoplewho had had relative-
ly free access to natural resources and had been working for themselves and
their community was that it was in fact a discourse used to legitimise com-
peting claims for resources, manpower and power. Kings attempted to position
themselves as the representatives of the ‘real’ deities and declare proponents
of the spiritual discourse as superstitious. In exchange for allegiance a king
would provide for the well-being of his subordinates, either as the mediator
between the people and their deities or as a king and patron. The price that
people had to pay for this was high: they had to pay the king taxes or work
for him, or both.
However successful in some areas, the new discourse came to co-exist with
older stories and arguments. Towhat extent people used spiritualist arguments
strategically or had internalised the ideas of either of these beliefs, and to what
extent this influenced their behaviour is difficult to say. Most likely, the sub-
jugate-and-rule discourse was strongest close to the capital of a kingdom.
There, wemay conclude, the new rules regarding the treatment of nature were
complied with the most.
In any case, the increasing number of competing stories and the accom-
panying norms in the archipelago together with the possibility to move to
another area enabled various actors to ‘shop’, i.e. to search for a patron or
environment that served their needs the best: the better a ruler succeeded in
convincing people that he took good care of them, for instance in terms of
food supply in times of scarcity or not asking too much labour in return for
cultivation rights, the more people were inclined to stay under his influence.
If a king succeeded in convincing people of his benevolence, he had partly
taken over the role of the old spirits and thus entered into a new relation of
reciprocity with his followers. After all, people were willing to respect him
in return for material – and maybe also spiritual – blessings just as they had
been in their relationship with the old spirits. A key difference, however, is
that showing respect to the king meant to work for him whereas showing
respect to the spirits had primarily meant performing rituals.
Another difference between the two discourses was that under the spiritual-
ist discourse, people had been able to circumvent rules as long as the commun-
ity had tolerated it and as long as no natural disaster had been interpreted
as caused by their non-compliance. Under the subjugate-and-rule discourse
there were less restrictive rules concerning the human treatment of nature,
but in their place more rules concerning the obligations to serve the king
restricted people’s freedom in another way.
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The next chapter will introduce new policy and rules that were built on
completely different stories and arguments, ones that contained a hitherto
unknown sense of crisis. The main actors that produced, reproduced and
transformed them were also new: from the mid-seventeenth century to the
end of the eighteenth century Dutch merchants organised in the East India
Company (Du. Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, hereafter VOC), and from
1800 onward the Dutch colonial state, and the natural scientists who were to
become themain source of the knowledge onwhich the new policies and rules
were based.

9 Rational forestry discourse
The rational forestry discourse was in part about themes that had been im-
portant for both previous dominant discourses: the bringing or keeping nature
under human control and that blessings were expected to flow from nature
to humans. Yet, at the core of the rational forest discourse lies another story
about an ever unfolding production process and – simultaneously – a possible
future crisis of resource supply which would need to be prevented through
some kind of ‘management’ (Du. beheer). This story goes beyond the fear for
possible food shortages discussed earlier and includes resources such as wood
that were increasingly needed for construction. Different from the spiritual
and the subjugate-and-rule discourse, the rational forestry discoursewas thus
about what we would nowadays call sustaining the exploitation of natural
resources. Although indigenous kings and communities possibly managed
their monopolies in some way, the sources on such pre-colonial practices are
not precise about the arguments that underlay them. Nevertheless some
present-day authors tend to reinterpret past practices in terms of sustainable
management despite lacking evidence for such claims: Kathirithamby-Wells
writes, for instance, that ‘tribal mores regulated economic activity to guarantee
sustainable yields till well into this century [my emphasis, JA]’.1
The question that is at stake here is whether indigenous knowledge was
deliberately used to attempt and achieve sustainability. As the first chapter
has shown, although such practicesmay have been conducive to sustainability
at times, it is unlikely that people were driven by a fear that resources could
become depleted and thus aimed for sustainable management. Even in the
case of the Hindu period in which rulers had teak and other trees planted
it is questionable if they did so because they feared the end of wood supply
and therefore employed management strategies or simply to restyle nature
in a more ordered that made exploitation easier. One exception in this respect
was the habit of maintaining or even planting trees in the vicinity of water
sources that people in the same Hindu period apparently attempted as a way
to sustain and protect them.2 – But if management of or protection for any-
thing other than this water source existed at all it in any case was not con-
tinued until the arrival of the VOC. Therefore, I situate the emergence of the
1 Kathirithamby-Wells 1992, p. 27 citing Lian.
2 Altona 1922, p. 471.
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rational forestry discourse in the Indonesian archipelago in the eighteenth
century.
9.1 POLICY
The policy that the rational forestry discourse institutionalised was that cutting
teak trees (and later, other types) was to be bound to scientific management
rules to improve their productivity and to ensure that the supply was to
survive the growing demand, that the ‘Dutch Indian government sustainably
[original emphasis, JA] could be assured of the benefits that this precious
possession [of teak forests, JA] could produce’.3
9.2 LAW
The VOCmainly regulated the felling of trees, including instructions concerning
a ‘fixed minimum dimension of the beams to be delivered’.4 Prior to 1777
there were specific ‘forest ranges’5 being exploited in this selective way. From
1777 onwards the VOC instructed the overseers to spread exploitation of the
oldest and largest trees over all forests in a region. In 1808 a new instruction
of the colonial administration of the Dutch East Indies introduced the idea
of dividing a forest into parcels and clear cutting one parcel a year.6
A totally different kind of regulation concerned the closure of forests. In
1722, the company for the first time closed a forest in West Java. After that,
the VOC closed more cleared teak forests for fifteen or thirty years, sometimes
even longer.7
In addition, the VOC and later the colonial state attempted to increase the
teak supply by stimulating the replanting or sowing of teak: in at least one
case Boomgaard found evidence of an instruction to plant teak instead of other
crops in empty forest spaces.8 From at least 1795 onwards he found evidence
for teak plantations.9
3 Draaisma 1927, p. 156.
4 Boomgaard 1988, p. 69.
5 Boomgaard 1988, p. 69.
6 Boomgaard 1988, p. 69-71.
7 Boomgaard 1988, p. 72-73. According to Boomgaard, this kind of closure was more effective
than the later colonial instruments developed for forestry management.
8 Boomgaard 1988, p. 72.
9 Boomgaard 1988, p. 72.
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A regulation of 1857 prohibited the burning of the remnants of cleared
forests since European foresters feared for fires.10
As later regulations servedmore than only rational forestry purposes, they
will be discussed below.
9.3 RECONSTRUCTING DISCOURSE: STORIES, ARGUMENTS, AND PRACTICES
The policy and rules mentioned above correspond to a set of stories, arguments
and practices with an underlying set of ideas, concepts and categorisations.
An analysis of the ways this discourse differed from its predecessors first
shows that its proponents conceptualised nature differently from the pro-
ponents of the spiritualist and subjugate-and-rule discourse. For them, nature
did not need to be subjugated to demonstrate power over it and to legitimise
rule. It is also no longer considered a place to live, a habitat.11 Instead, it is
purely considered as a resource for the benefit of the VOC (and later the colonial
state) and judged according to its economic value,12 which is reflected in
phrases like ‘clearing’ (Du. opruiming) of the ‘stock’ (Du. voorraad) of forests.13
In away, nature is still conceptualised as the opposite of civilisation. However,
the difference with the subjugate-and-rule discourse is that here nature does
not need to be subjugated and restyled in order to gain power but only needs
human help to maintain and even improve its performance. This conception
reduced forests to the parts that were of direct use for the VOC and later the
colonial state.14 The 1777 decree mentioned above reflects this conception
as it applied only to teak and not to other kinds of trees ‘from the destruction
of which nobody suffers.’15 Destruction of economically less interesting tree
species was thus nothing to be concerned about. Scott has argued that the new
reductionist conceptualisation resulted in a simplification of nature and a
subsequent reduction of its elements and former practical uses:
10 This Javanese custom was being practiced for a variety of reasons, including to scare off
dangerous animals, to make the ground more fertile and to help the teak to regenerate,
as teak was ‘supposed to sprout more easily if heated before being sown or planted’
(Boomgaard 1988, p. 71-72). The fact that burning was only prohibited in 1857 despite the
debate that had been going on over the pros and cons prior to this date (Boomgaard 1988,
p. 72) may be related to the fact that in 1849 the first German foresters were brought to
the archipelago (Peluso 1990, p. 34).
11 Scott 1998, p. 13.
12 Again, this is thus not to say that nature was not being considered a resource before. After
all, kings and ordinary people had been exploiting nature for their own needs and for trade.
However, the proponents of the rational forestry discourse told different stories about nature
and argued in favour of another treatment of nature.
13 See, for instance, Van Deventer 1908, p. 280.
14 Cf. Scott 1998, p. 12.
15 Boomgaard 1988, p. 61.
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‘From a naturalist’s perspective, nearly everything was missing from the state’s
narrow frame of reference. Gone was the vast majority of flora: grasses, flowers,
lichens, ferns,mosses, shrubs, and vines. Gone, too, were reptiles, birds, amphibians,
and innumerable species of insects. Gone were most species of fauna, except those
that interested the crown’s gatekeepers.’16
This new frame of nature was accompanied by new stories. One story that
comes to the fore is that the demand for teak was increasing – timber was
not only one of the most important construction materials for, among other
things, building ships, offices, fortifications and warehouses,17 – and that
production therefore needed to increase as well. In order to achieve such an
increase in production the VOC sought solutions in a shift from exploitation
of ranges to entire forests, from selective felling to clear cutting, and in the
establishment of teak plantations.
Another related story narrates the worst case scenario, the end of the
supply of teak. One fact that fuelled this story was that by the end of the 17th
century the north coast of Java – and probably also other parts – was, in
present-day discourse, ‘badly deforested’.18 It seemed that forests were cut
at a faster rate than they were able to recover or to be grown at plantations.
That caused the VOC to temporarily close forests.
When teak forests could no longer satisfy all demand for timber, since
timberwas increasingly also needed as an energy source for other actors, such
as the mining industry and the railways,19 even reserves of wildwood were
established. Those in the lowlands were especially meant to ‘guarantee a
sustainable supply in the needs of wood and other forest products’.20 Those
in the more mountainous regions were attributed other functions as well and
will be discussed in the following chapter.
Later on, from the second half of the 19th century onward, the solution for
overexploitation was sought for in scientific forest management, introduced
to the archipelago by German foresters. The colonial government had invited
them there in 1849 because it was in their country that the new science of
16 Scott 1998, p. 12-13. Although Scott describes the consequences of the introduction of
scientific forestry in Europe (from 1765-1800), which was - as we will see - imported to
the Indonesian archipelago only at a later stage in the form of German foresters, the same
ideas underlying this new discipline are reflected already in these early VOC regulations
and practices. Apparently, the conceptualization of nature as resources and the sense of
a crisis of wood shortage gained dominance in Europe and the archipelago around the
same time.
17 Kartasubrata 1985, p. 168.
18 Ricklefs 1981, p. 83.
19 Te Wechel 1931, p. 698-703.
20 Fokkinga 1934, p. 150.
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forestry had been developed from 1787 onward.21 One of the promises of
their new science was that managing forests in a controlled scientific way
would ‘help nature’22 in order to sustain yields and thus economic profits
from them. Moreover, it promised, if applied correctly, to increase the pro-
duction and productivity of forests by, among other things, standardising the
distance between trees and tidying the forest up by removing old, deformed
trunks (Du. zuiveren, verwijderen van afgeleefde en misvormde stammen). The goal
of forestry was to manipulate and eventually improve forests in the human
interest by simplifying them. The colonial administration embraced scientific
forest management as it seemed to provide the tools and knowledge required
to achieve the goal of sustainable yields. ,23
The introduction of scientific forest management also resulted in new
categories. At first, of course, there were the categories of ‘valuable’ teak (In./
Du. djati) and ‘worthless’ other trees, collectively stamped as ‘jungle wood’24
(Du.wildhout). Later on, the concept ofmanagementmade it necessary to create
new subcategories, such as ‘production forest’, ‘forest reserve’, ‘wasteland’,
and later, ‘protection forest’, which made it possible to regulate allocation of
forests for various purposes.Wastelands, for example in south and east Borneo,
became ‘available for allocation to foreign capitalists for development ofmines
or cash crops’.25
Forests from this point on were places in need of scientific management
based onworking plans for cutting and replantingwhich, in its turn, required
prior mapping and classification.
The introduction of concepts, categories and the like did not, however,
mean that the rational forestry discourse was dominant in all forest affairs.
The history of the Forest Service (Du. Dienst van het Boschwezen) illustrates
this. Eventually this would become the most important organisation in the
field of nature management as in these days the term nature usually meant
forests. In its beginnings, however, it was far from stable or powerful. It was
first established in 1808 on the initiative of Governor General Daendels. Raffles,
during the British interregnum, however, considered it too ‘expensive and
unnecessary’.26 The second attempt to build up the organisation lasted from
1816 to 1826. After the Java War from 1825-1830 and the subsequent intro-
21 Peluso 1992, p. 7 citing Mantel; see also Scott 1998. Scientific forest management was thus
practiced in Indonesia earlier than, for instance, in the United States of America where
it was introduced only from the 1890s onwards (Hays 1959, p. 28).
22 Van Deventer 1908, p. 283.
23 As Scott has argued, scientific forest management did more than that: it entailed a by-
product which was very attractive to states: as it made yields predictable it also enabled
the state to raise taxes on harvests Scott 1998, p. 11.
24 I borrow the term ‘junglewood’ from Boomgaard.
25 Potter 1988, p. 127-128.
26 Peluso 1992, p. 47.
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duction of the cultivation system27 forest control was transferred to a decon-
centrated rule by ‘residents’,28 which led to a variety of local regulations. Only
from 1865 onward did the Forest Service come to hold the power to centrally
regulate and manage nature.29 Still, its officials remained critical of the re-
luctance with which the colonial government allocated funds and personnel
for forest management. According to Draaisma, especially prior to 1897 the
lack ofmoney andmanpowermade ‘goodmanagement’ (Du. behoorlijk beheer)
impossible: the Forestry Service did not have reliable maps, the resorts were
too big with too few foresters and the forests were not accessible enough.
Draaisma therefore concluded that there was too little money being allocated
for ‘feeding the chicken that was supposed to produce golden eggs’.30 Its main
task was and remained until the end of the colonial rule the exploitation of
forests. As the following chapters will show, this was reflected in, for example,
its lobbying for wildlife reserves (in which logging was allowed) instead of
for nature reserves (in which logging was prohibited).
What made it difficult to institutionalise the rational forestry discourse
was that the countervailing forces to any management approach were many.
Those in favour of an unbridled exploitation, who either did not think about
possible consequences or perceived short term profit as more important than
long term supply, were to be found among entrepreneurs as well as within
the colonial bureaucracy. At least between 1810 and 1865 they definitely
dominated the decision-making. In 1799, the VOCwent bankrupt due to corrup-
tion and mismanagement and transferred its affairs to the Dutch state. Then,
from 1811-1815 the British ruled over the region. Sir Raffles issued licenses
to private entrepreneurs for unlimited timber extraction.31 It was an inter-
regnum inwhich only one story seems to have dominated: the forests are here
for our benefit so whoever wants and is able to exploit them may do so as
long as he has asked for a license. Since there was no longer attention paid
to the issue of a possible over-exploitation and a subsequent shortage in
supply, wemay interpret the interregnum as one inwhich the rational forestry
discourse was not yet sufficiently institutionalised and lost its influence. The
ones who had spread such rational forestry stories were no longer in a power-
ful position to reproduce them and those that may have reproduced them did
27 This systemwas designed to cure theDutch economy by obliging Javanese farmers to plant
certain cultures such as sugar and coffee. For a good introduction see Fasseur 1992.
28 Boomgaard 1988, p. 76, Peluso 1992, p. 48. This was in line with a more general strengthen-
ing of the position of residents who became important actors in the implementation of the
cultivation system (1830-1870).
29 Boomgaard 1999, p. 261. This needs to be seen in the context of a no longer sufficient teak
supply and of the take-over of the liberal party in the Dutch parliament in 1862 and the
end of the cultivation system this party favoured. Apparently, the liberals wanted a central
organisation to regulate the distribution of access to land.
30 Draaisma 1927, p. 157-158.
31 Boomgaard 1988, p. 75.
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not influence the thinking of the ruling elite. Instead, the new discourse entirely
shaped and later reflected the interests of plantations owners: of course, the
ability to easily obtain a license for unbridled exploitation made many entre-
preneurs apply for one. Later, after the establishment of their logging and
plantation enterprises, these entrepreneurs reproduced the discourse of
unbridled exploitation to defend their interests.
The same discourse dominated the period of Dutch colonial rule that
followed the British interregnum. Stories about the Indies portrayed the colony
primarily as a paradise in which one could make fast money and which was
fertile and large enough to produce all kinds of sought after products: spices,
coffee, tea, sugar etc. The discourse thus favoured exploiting nature and
simultaneously turning it into a production site for cash crops. To increase
the production of cash crops the authorities in 1830 issued rules that obliged
all peasants to produce exportable cash crops on one-fifth of their land and
to sell these at fixed prices. When the colonial government became convinced
that the cultivation system resulted in too much hardship for the indigenous
population and thus should be abolished, a liberal period began. But this still
focused on exploitation rather than on any kind of management to prevent
overexploitation. Only the revitalization of the story about the increasing
demand for wood and the possible end of its supply, and a new story about
a possible crisis would eventually lead to the dominance of scientific forest
management from 1865 onward and a new discourse on the human treatment
of nature.

10 Protection against disaster discourse
This story about a possible crisis originated from scientists of diverse dis-
ciplines.1 Beginning in the 1840s, they claimed that cutting forests inmountain-
ous areas would have disastrous effects on the climate and hydrology. To
illustrate this, examples from floods and other natural disasters not only in
Java but also in Greece, Northern Africa, France and Switzerland and other
places were reported.2 There were two theories, the ‘sponge’ theory and the
‘desiccation’ theory. To keep it simple: these theories held that cutting forests
in mountainous areas would either result in floods or droughts.3 Thus, to
prevent both such disastrous situations, the scientists argued, forests covering
the slopes of mountains needed to be protected and deforested areas needed
to be reforested – at the expense of competing resource claimants, most notably
cash crop producers and swidden farmers. What was new about these argu-
ments was that they pleaded for protecting nature not for sustaining its direct
exploitation (as had been the case with the teak forests) but rather for its
capacity to protect humanity from disaster. The wild wood forests previously
portrayed as ‘worthless’ were thus attributed a new role as part of public
interest that had to be more valuable than the private interests of certain
groups of resource users. For example, forestry inspector Ham – andwith him
many other foresters – put to the fore that it was in the ‘public long-term
interest’ to protect forests not only for climatological and hydrological reasons
but also for a sustainable timber production.4 Private interests were, in Ham’s
opinion, neither a warrant for forest preservation nor for establishing a ‘decent
cultivation’ (Du. behoorlijk gedreven landbouw) in its place.5 The value of forests
was thus redefined from serving as timber in times of wood scarcity to serving
as protector. Their new destiny was therefore not to be logged but to be left
alone.
As floods and droughts were natural phenomena that were known to and
feared by various groups of actors, the scientists adjusted their arguments to
1 Boomgaard mentions the ‘naturalist’ F.W. Junghuhn, ‘professor’ W.H. de Vriese, and the
‘agricultural chemist’ P.H. Fromberg (Boomgaard 1994, p. 128).
2 Fokkinga 1934, p. 145-146.
3 Potter 1988, p. 32. For summaries of hydrological arguments see, for instance, Donner 1987,
p. 142-147 and Galudra & Sirait 2006.
4 Ham 1908, p. 130,132.
5 Ham 1908, p. 133.
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the respective needs of these actors. They argued, for instance, to convince
farmers and cash crop producers that protection forests (Du. schermbossen) were
needed to protect all cultivation areas in the lower regions, including irrigated
agriculture and cash crop plantations.6
A final idea belonging to this discourse was that, just as in the case of
rational forestry from 1850 onward, it was the forestry scientists who held
the only valid knowledge about causes and remedies.
10.1 POLICY
The policy reflecting this newdiscourse thus aimed at protectingmountainous
forests in order to protect humans from otherwise inevitable natural disasters.
10.2 LAW
The rules that were issued to achieve this goal reflect that the protection
against disaster discourse did not gain dominance above exploitation or
rational forestry arguments.
A first minor change with regard to non-teak forests was a new forest
regulation for Java and Madura in 18657 that required the permission from
the local authorities for the felling of even non-teak forests. We may interpret
this regulation as a response to stories belonging to the new discourse. How-
ever, it seems to have been motivated instead by rational forestry considera-
tions as the demand for wood exceeded the supply of the teak forests.
In 1874, a revised regulation gave the Governor General the authority to
decide whether or not to preserve ‘wildwood’ forests.8 However, only ten
years later an ordinance specifiedwhich categories could be reserved, namely
all forests above 5000 feet in West Java and above 4000 feet in Central and
East Java. Their goals were defined in terms of protection against disaster and
in terms of agricultural needs: to prevent flooding and to ensure a continuous
water supply for irrigation. Likewise, forests on lower tops of lessmountainous
areas and areas around water sources and lakes could be reserved for climat-
ological reasons.9 Still, even after issuing this ordinance it would take another
six years until the establishment of the first so-called ‘protection forest’ (Du.
6 Fokkinga 1934, p. 150.
7 Art. 44 Indisch Staatsblad 1865: 96 (Reglement voor het beheer en de exploitatie der houtbosschen
van den lande op Java en Madoera); 10-9-1865; came into force 1-1-1866.
8 Art. 30 Indisch Staatsblad 1874: 110 (Reglement voor het beheer en de exploitatie der bosschen
op Java en Madoera); 14-4-1874. People had from now on also to pay for wood taken from
the wildwood forests. Art. 33 Indisch Staatsblad 1874: 110.
9 Boomgaard 1999, p. 262; Fokkinga 1934, p. 151.
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schermbos).10 Foresters judged this ordinance of 1890 as insufficient since it
had a mainly symbolic character.11 As forester and future forestry inspector
and lecturer Ham observed:
‘Idealists probably were satisfied that according to them much was done in terms
of the oh so necessary forest protection; more practical people probably regarded
it as rather innocent since it, except for limiting the establishment and expansion
of kina and coffee plantations situated high up in the mountains, did not hinder
anyone, and thus barely mattered and as it – above all – did not cost anything.’12
Contrary to these idealists and pragmatists, Ham and other realists with ideals
were obviously of the opinion that forest protection was not to be achieved
for free and that it was important enough to demand sacrifices.
An 1879 circular for the outer islands13 followed by an 1897 ordinance
for Java and Madura regulated the cutting of wildwood forests as well. Both
also stressed the indirect economic benefits of forest protection, for example
to the government’s coffee cultivation and local or state industries.14 This
suggests that economic arguments were either the most convincing to the
government or at least thought of as necessary to find support for these new
measures among their targets.
In sum, we can say that on average these regulations aimed at giving the
colonial government the control over an increasing amount of forest land and
the authority to decide what should be protected and how. The most interest-
ing regulation in terms of protection against disaster was the one of 1874.
However, its slow implementation suggests that the protection against disaster
discourse was not dominant at all and that as a result other arguments were
decisive for issuing the regulations mentioned above.
10.3 DISCOURSE REPRODUCTION, TRANSFORMATION AND REJECTION
The protection against disaster discourse was contested in many ways. First,
there were actors that questioned the underlying analysis of the problem.
Among them were the most outspoken opponents to the protection against
disaster discourse, i.e. those actors with stakes in the cash crop production,
who were mainly interested in their short-term profit, and their advocates in
the colonial administration and parliament. They argued that cash crops were
10 Boomgaard 1994, p. 128-129.
11 Aubert 1967.
12 De Haan 1936a, p. 75-76.
13 Circulaire No. 28 published in Bijblad No. 3156, 8 April 1879. Before that, efforts in these
regions were aimedmerely at the economically valuable trees (e.g. gum and camphortrees).
See, for example, circulaire No. 1830 published in Bijblad No. 3452, 7 November 1878.
14 Art. 3 (2) Indisch Staatsblad 1897: 61 (Boschreglement); 9-2-1897; came into force 1-7-1897.
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ofmore value than thewildwood forests. Even as late as 1934, when arguments
in favour of forest reservation for the protection against disaster had gained
more support in the Dutch Indies, members of the Volksraad protested on
the planters’ behalf that reserving forests created an obstacle for the trans-
migration of labour to places in the vicinity of their plantations.15 The govern-
ment replied that research had shown that there were other suitably sufficient
areas left for this purpose.16 Among the actors who questioned the urgency
of the problem were also swidden farmers and their advocates. A resident
of Palembang, for instance, argued that his observations could not confirm
that shifting cultivation destroyed the forest.17 Surprisingly, there were also
some forestry scientists who, after a while, began to question the ideas that
formed the basis of the forest reservation policy. One prominent example is
forester B.W.P. Roessel who in 1927 and 1928 published articles in the forestry
journal Tectona in which he argued that it was not the forest cover of a moun-
tain that was determinant for the water supply of a region but rather its
geological formation.18 He backed his argument with quantitative data argu-
ing that forestry science needed scientific argumentation instead of ‘confessions
of faith’ (Du. geloofsbelijdenis).19 This rebellious argument was not readily
accepted by other foresters.20 De Haan wrote in 1936 in retrospect that ‘what
Roessel wrote was not liked in our circles’. After all, there was a strong ‘feel-
ing’ backed by subjective observations and through frequent repetition a
‘communis opinio’ that forests were indispensable for a region’s water
supply.21 Still, critics agreed with him that methods needed to be improved
to back up the hydrological hypotheses. Zwart, for instance, wrote that
‘the article by Roessel will not change our protection forest policy in the short run.
In this regard it is wise to be conservative since one usually only starts to appreciate
forests when they are gone and one needs to be careful with scientific theories.
What seems rationally plausible often appears to be wrong in practice. However,
that does not take away from us the obligation to collect data considering that the
economic interests at stake are very big.’22
Although agreeing with the methodological point made by Roessel, Zwart
called for collecting further evidence before changing policies. As Galudra
and Sirait have shown there were scholars who after some time accepted
15 Volksraad 1934, p. 649.
16 Volksraad 1934, p. 651.
17 Galudra & Sirait 2006 citing Van Setten 1922.
18 For instance, Roessel 1927.
19 De Haan 1936b, p. 79.
20 De Haan 1936b, p. 79; Galudra & Sirait 2006.
21 De Haan 1936b, p. 80.
22 Zwart 1927, p. 1027.
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Roessel’s thesis and others who kept rejecting it.23 I will return to this point
and Galudra and Sirait’s argument that foresters deliberately refused to accept
Roessel’s argument for political reasons at a later stage.
Second, next to thosewho contested the foresters’ analysis of the problem,
there were actors that had doubts about the solution that the foresters had
formulated.Members of the Volksraad, for instance, argued that forest reserves
formed a threat for indigenous communities living in the forests on the Outer
Islands since a shortage of agricultural land was to be expected.24 The govern-
ment replied that it could not agree with this alleged crisis for the indigenous
people and ‘that reserving the forests which need to be protected was con-
sidered too important – in the first instance for the indigenous population
itself – that we could tolerate the destruction of the forests that need to be
protected’.25 The government thus denied that its protection policy was caus-
ing problems for the population. It argued that, on the contrary, it was re-
serving the forests in the population’s interest. The above-mentioned argument
against forest reservation at the expense of land for transmigration offers
another example of protest against the foresters’ plea and in favour of pro-
tection forests. Likewise, regarding the best instrument for protection against
disaster there was some debate going on between experts of forestry and
agriculture. The latter argued that agricultural land use was as good a pro-
tection for soil as forest cover. Apparently, the foresters won this battle since
protection against disaster remained under their jurisdiction. Last, but not least,
therewas an argument beingmade aboutwho should be granted the authority
to protect forests. Basically, there were three opinions about this matter. On
the one hand, foresters were convinced that ‘good’ (Du. deugdelijk) forest
management required forestry knowledge26 and therefore liked to portray
anyone lacking such knowledge as a ‘layman’ (Du. leek).27 On the other hand,
a commission that had been formed to advise the colonial government on the
question of whether it was desirable to let go of the so-called domein-principle
– that all land that was not claimed otherwise was to be regarded as state
land – argued that indigenous communities should be given the authority over
most forests according to the indigenous beschikkingsrecht, which had been
ignored by the introduction of theDomeinverklaring in 1870.28 The commission
concluded ‘that maintaining the domein principle will permanently threaten
(Du. bedreigen) the Indonesian land law and that abandoning it is therefore
desirable’.29 Logemann, a member of the commission, argued in an article
in theDutch Indies’ foresters’ journalTectona that ignoring the beschikkingsrecht
23 Galudra & Sirait 2006.
24 Volksraad 1934, p. 649.
25 Volksraad 1934, p. 652.
26 For instance, Gonggrijp 1932, p. 268.
27 For instance, Bruinier 1924, p. 13.
28 Advies Agrarische Commissie 1930, p. 10.
29 Advies Agrarische Commissie 1930, p. 84.
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would mean continuing to deny the existence of law ‘at both sides’ and en-
danger the ‘livelihood’ (Du. levenszekerheid) of indigenous peoples.30 Amodest
middle positionwas formulated by, among others, forester Japing. He argued
that acknowledging the population’s rights on land would oblige the govern-
ment to let the indigenous legal communities participate in all debates on ‘all
agrarian issues, including those that were for the time being above their ability
to understand (Du. bevattingsvermogen).’31 He therefore pleaded for a ‘limited
marga forest management’ (Du. beperkt margaboschbeheer), meaning that indi-
genous communities should be given the right to manage forests that served
local interests such as timber supply and that played a role as agricultural
land reserve, but the Forest Service should be granted the authority over all
forests serving a more public interest, thus including the protection forest
reserves. After all, only the governmentwouldwant to invest in their mainten-
ance and improvement.32 ‘Limited’, he emphasised, was thus neither related
to the size of the area nor the financial gain that was to be expected from the
area. Instead, we may conclude, ‘limited’ was related to the question of what
interest a forest served. Furthermore, he argued that knowledge played a role
but acknowledged the possibility of giving indigenous communities this
knowledge. Transfer of authority for forest management therefore needed to
be ‘prepared’: the government needed to formulate ‘general guidelines for
management’ and needed to monitor (Du. behoorlijk toezicht) management
performance.33
In addition to criticism of the definition of problem and solution, there
was finally the criticism that focused on the implementation of the protection
against disaster policy. The main argument in this context was about discrim-
ination. On the one hand, critics argued, the government kept listening to
planters and their interests. It determinedwhich forests needed to be protected
while keeping in mind the maximum altitude for coffee plantations. Only
forests above that altitude were to be protected.34 In addition, the government
did not stop leasing land in the mountains to cash crop producers and still
portrayed Dutch entrepreneurs clearing wildwood as ‘pioneers’.35 On the
other hand, it portrayed the swidden farmers as ‘robber farmers’36 and
30 Logemann 1932, p. 509-510. It is important to note that he, in the long term, wished an
end to the existence of beschikkingsrecht but considered ignoring it at thatmoment not ‘wise’
(Du. verantwoord). He also argued for limiting the beschikkingsrecht where the public interest
demanded it, after deliberation and reaching an agreement with the local population about
a compensation (Logemann 1932, p. 511-512).
31 Japing 1932a, p. 542.
32 Japing 1932b, p. 1585.
33 Japing 1932a, p. 545-546.
34 Fokkinga 1934, p. 151 citing Brascamp.
35 Potter 2003, p. 32.
36 A more nuanced perception was that only swidden farmers who opened new ‘original’
(Du. oorspronkelijk) forest areas in an unlimited way rather than returning to their old
ladangs after a while were to be seen as robber farmers (Kools 1935, p. 26).
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farmers whomade their cattle graze in forests as equally harmful. Both groups
were to be blamed for their allegedly detrimental effects on the ecology of
the country.37 This discrimination undermined the belief in the good in-
tentions that the government claimed to possess. The Resident of Palembang,
for instance, argued that if the forest reservation was in the people’s interest
the government should be consistent and not grant the same forests to Euro-
peans involved in cash crop plantations or timber extraction.38 The reason
for this discrimination may have been either that the colonial government was
not entirely convinced of the future crisis described in the protection against
disaster discourse (see above)39 or that the government considered European
planters to be ‘rational’ whereas the indigenous farmers were seen as ‘care-
less’40 (Du. zorgeloos) and thus ‘irrational’ or ‘not yet able to understand’ (see
above). Even most of those participating in the debate on forest protection
whoweremore positive about indigenous land use thought that ladang farmers
lacked the appropriate knowledge for forest and forest soil protection and
feared that it was not possible to convince them to take good care of mountain
slopes. Since they at the same time did not think that enforcing possible
regulations to keep the land covered with plants was possible even they
pleaded for establishingwildwood forest reserves at the expense of agricultural
land for swidden farmers.41
In addition to making arguments against the implementation of the pro-
tection against disaster policy there were also communities that stood up
against being forced to leave what they claimed to be the land of their an-
cestors.42 Peluso has described this for a Dayak community: When the Dutch
in the early 1920s began to establish a watershed reserve at the upper slopes
of the Raya Pasi Mountain in Bagak, West Kalimantan,43 they forced the
people to move and prohibited them from entering the area any longer. This
meant that the Dayak living in the area had to abandon their fruit trees and
give up their rights to cultivate the land they claimed had belonged to their
ancestors. This, however, they would not do voluntarily. It was twenty years
before the colonial authorities succeeded in convincing them of the necessity
to move, and even then it was only the threat of imprisonment that made the
last families give up their resistance.44 Not surprisingly, after the Dutch had
37 Potter 2003, p. 38; Galudra & Sirait 2006 citing Van Eck.
38 Galudra & Sirait 2006 citing Van Setten 1922.
39 Cf. Boomgaard 1994, p. 128.
40 Fokkinga 1934, p. 177 describing a situation in the Cilutung river area, West Java.
41 Fokkinga 1934, p. 155 citing deHaan. Fokkinga was an exception in this respect. He pleaded
for obliging indigenous and European landusers alike to plant bamboo and other perennials
‘which come close to fulfilling the functions of forest’ in regions which were not suitable
for reforestation (Fokkinga 1934, p. 159).
42 Peluso 1993b, p. 30.
43 Officially established in 1932.
44 After negotiationswith the Dutch the Dayak succeeded eventually tomove the boundaries
up the mountain, closer to the actual water catchment area (Peluso 1993b, p. 31).
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left the area during the Second World War, the local people made new
swiddens within the reserve.45 But the effective threat or use of state violence
made it in this case necessary for the Dayak community to obey the new rules.
In the words of a former Dutch forestry official, by the way, a comparable
story sounds very different:
‘For the benefit of a protection forest the Dutch had established reserves for the
Dayak with the idea that these would protect the Dayak against the advancing
flood [oprukkende vloed] of Malay people. That was a beautiful idea but the Dayak
were smart guys [slimme jongens], too. They sold timber from the reserves to the
Malay people. They themselves therefore increasingly moved upwards the slopes
of the mountain. There they saw that things they had just planted were washed
away by the first rainfall. So, in principle they were motivated to do something
about it but then the Dutch had to leave…’46
In this story, the Dutch thought to have found a solution that was beneficial
for both the Forestry Service and the Dayak community. However, they
conceptualised the Dayak and their needs in a way too static and ‘traditional’
without taking into account that the arrival of the Malay people could create
new behaviour in the Dayak. Furthermore, this story indicates that the Dutch,
at least in some cases, did indeed try to transfer knowledge and that the Dayak
were not opposed to protection arguments once they experienced erosion.
Also in other cases the local population readily accepted the discourse.
Japing mentions, for instance, the Eastern coast of Sumatra where ‘margas
establishedmany reserves (In. rimba larangan, hutan larangan) after the govern-
ment had explained their importance to them’.47 According to Japing, accept-
ance depended very much on how seriously the government took the
people.48 In this respect he criticised the Forestry Service for toomuch arguing
in terms of ‘you guys make a mess of forest management, so stay away from
our [original emphasis, JA] forests.’49 In his eyes, it was the arrogance of the
foresters rather than the unwillingness of the indigenous people that deter-
mined whether the latter would accept forestry arguments or not.
On the whole, whenwe consider which arguments were successfully made
in favour of forest protection outside forestry circles, it seems that sustaining
economic production and profit formed the major motivation for the institu-
tionalisation of the protection against disaster discourse as it had in the case
of the rational forestry discourse.
A new challenge for these economic arguments emerged when the last
discourse that was going to result in new regulations on the treatment of
45 Peluso 1993b, p. 31.
46 Personal communication, W.M. Otto, 3 July 2003.
47 Japing 1932a, p. 545.
48 Japing 1932a, p. 545.
49 Japing 1932a, p. 545.
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nature in the Dutch East Indies brought two new values into the debate: pure
science and romanticism.

11 Nature Protection discourse
From the beginning of the 19th century onwards bio geographers and medical
surgeons became increasingly interested in the Indonesian archipelago. Bio
geographers described tropical island environments and developed scientific
evidence that the natural resources were limited.1 Medical surgeons had a
primary interest in tropical medicinal plants which led to the establishment
of Botanical Gardens all around the world. This served to assess and classify
the world ‘globally and in terms of the Hippocratic agenda’.2
These scientists increasingly perceived tropical nature as a ‘window to an
ancient world’, somethingwhichwas still in a virgin state and therefore could
‘provid[e] clues to the evolution of life itself’.3 Although they were familiar
with evolutionary theory and consequently aware of the fact that nature was
changing all the time, these scientists attempted to study it in a static setting.
For that purpose they pleaded for preserving at least parts of nature in its
‘original’ state.
By publicly introducing the idea of nature as a source of scientific know-
ledge from the end of the 19th century onwards they added a scientific value
to the debate on how to treat nature. They did not define nature merely as
something to exploit but as something to close for the broader public, to study
in its original state, and to preserve for future generations.4
The scientists established a number of scientific institutions, such as botan-
ical gardens, a Herbarium, the Zoological Museum, and the Laboratory for
marine research.5 However, these institutions, which reflected and reproduced
the nature protection discourse, were of much less importance than the Forest
Service. All that these scientific institutions got was an advisory role, which
underlines the dominance of the rational forestry discourse. If the colonial
administration had taken nature protection more seriously it could have
strengthened the role of these scientists by making sufficient manpower and
funds available for the Gardens to manage reserves in practice. Instead, in
1937, it appointed only one (!) civil servant to the Botanical Gardens for pro-
1 Grove 1996, p. 6.
2 Grove 1996, p. 13.
3 Arnold 2000, p. 11.
4 Cribb 1997a, p. 403.
5 Dammerman 1950, p. 87. The oldest botanical garden had been established in 1817 at
Buitenzorg (now Bogor).
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tection against disaster and for nature protection. He had the job ofmonitoring
the reserves, promoting the regulations on animal protection and, where
possible, starting investigations.6
About the same time as the scientific movement for nature protection, a
movement that promoted viewing nature from a romantic angle entered into
the debate. In reaction to the industrialisation taking place in Western Euro-
pean countries members of this movement primarily aimed at re-valuing
emotion. They did so to formulate a counter-argument to rationality, punc-
tuality, productivity, technology and the like. In their counter-arguments nature
came to play an important role. They portrayed nature as something to be
admired and enjoyed and simultaneously as a source of moral improvement
and inspiration.7 These functions of nature, in the romantics’ thinking, justified
reserving certain natural areas for recreation: people should be allowed to enter
nature not for exploitation but to be inspired, to enjoy and admire nature’s
beauty..
Some people, among them both scientists and romantics, even portrayed
nature in feminist8 terms: they pleaded to reserve nature in its ‘virgin’ form,
and described it as ‘fragile’9 and thus in urgent need of protection.10
The romantics, who often had a scientific background too, organised
themselves in non-governmental organisations (henceforth NGOs). The most
prominent among these in the Dutch East Indies was the Netherlands Indies
Society for the Protection of Nature (Du. Nederlandsch-Indische Vereeniging tot
Natuurbescherming). It was established in July 191211 and played a major role
in lobbying for the creation of nature reserves.12 Its membersmainly belonged
to the European elite and often worked for the Forest Service or the Botanical
Gardens.13 The reason for the very low percentage of Javanese members was
not so much a socio-economic one – the membership contribution was very
low14 – but rather political: if nationalists cared for the protection of nature
at all they perceived the proposed and enacted conservationist regulations
as another way of oppressing the indigenous population.15 In addition, since
conservationism was a new social movement, even under the Europeans the
6 Dammerman 1950, p. 87-88.
7 See, for instance, Rousseau et al. 1997.
8 Arnold 2000, p. 12, Sawyer & Agrawal 2000, p. 5-13.
9 Peluso & Vandergeest 2001, p. 783.
10 According to eco-feminists, the use of metaphors such as ‘virgin’ underline the parallel
to the patriarchal claim to need to protect their virgin daughters against reckless, irrespons-
ible (often non-white) (Sawyer & Agrawal 2000, p. 15-21) males. ‘Mother’, ‘birth’, and
‘nursery’ are other metaphors supporting the feminisation of nature (Sawyer & Agrawal
2000, p. 21).
11 Recognized in February 1913.
12 Dammerman 1929, p. 22.
13 Dammerman 1950, p. 89.
14 Dammerman 1950, p. 81.
15 Cribb 1988a, p. 343.
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attention for conservation was very low. As a consequence of these two factors,
the Association’s membership never reached the 1000 mark.16 As a result the
organisation had even less influence on policy than the scientific institutions.
Although it applied for the lease of various pieces of land in order to protect
them as nature reserves, the government did not regard it as ‘strong enough’
for this task.17 Consequently, the society only got the right to manage a 6
ha reserve in Depok.18 That it was still successful in promoting nature pro-
tection to some extent was mainly due to the fact that the colonial state was
open to scientific arguments developed in response to problems encountered
in the tropics19 and, to a lesser extent, to support from NGOs outside the area.
They began to form a network and to attempt to build international support20
for the new discourse. In 1929 for instance, the Netherlands Indies Society
for the Protection of Nature together with the Dutch Committee for Inter-
national Protection of Nature21 lobbied for the assignment of nature reserves
in Aceh, North-Sumatra, West-Sumatra, Palembang and West Borneo.22
For many of those who reproduced the nature protection discourse, the
survival of humanity was the main motive behind reserving nature, whether
speaking medically (as for the medical surgeons), economically (as for the bio
geographers and other natural scientists) or emotionally (as for the romantics).
Based on their respective ideas they strove to find medicines to cure diseases,
to discover the secrets of nature which could be manipulated in the interest
of economic production, and to reserve nature as a source of emotional inspira-
tion.
In addition, another argument also gained importance: that the survival
of certain animals was important too. This was also backed by a broad range
16 Dammerman 1950, p. 88.
17 Dammerman 1929, p. 23.
18 Dammerman 1929, p. 24.
19 Grove 1996, p. 475.
20 This was possible since conservationist NGOs began to mushroom all over the Western
world. In America the Boone & Crockett Club was founded in 1887 by, among others,
Theodore Roosevelt, President of the United States from 1901-1909 (Jepson 2002, Jepson
&Whittaker 2002. In Germany, the first associations with the aim of nature protection had
been established from 1875 onwards (Keiser 1949, p. 17). In England, even in 1865 the first
of such associations was established (Keiser 1949, p. 19). In America it was the states that
started nature conservation, for example with the establishment of state (the first in 1820)
and national parks (the first being Yellowstone in 1872). Only in 1891 the first association
was established (Keiser 1949, p. 19). The first Dutch association was only established in
1898. In 1905 the Vereniging tot Behoud van Natuurmonumenten followed (Keiser 1949, p.
22, 25). This happened in reaction to a lecture in Amsterdam given by a German forester,
Hugo Conwentz, who toured Europe to promote ‘his concept and vision ofNaturdenkmal’ -
a concept which applied the protection of cultural heritage for the first time to nature and
which combined it with patriotism - and which coincided with a conflict about the future
of the Naarder lake (Jepson & Whittaker 2002, p. 136). See also Boomgaard 1999.
21 Established in 1925.
22 Dammerman 1929, p. 26-27.
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of stories and related economic, cultural and emotional arguments. One rather
new – and again romantic – story at the time was, for instance, that humans
and some animals, especially the great apes, were possibly each other’s kin
and that preserving ecosystems could help to discover the missing link between
the two.23 This resulted for some in an ‘obsession’ to address ‘the threat of
innate animal instincts to the dignity and uniqueness of humanity’ and to
ensure ‘the maintenance of morality and civilization’.24 The position at the
other extreme held that certain animals needed to be protected from over-
exploitation to sustain the trade of them.
Finally, a story about increasing plant diseases caused by various insects
provided an additional argument for protecting birds that were believed to
be their natural enemies.25
The nature protectors had a clear picture of which activities posed a threat
to achieving their goal. Among them were hunting activities,26 agriculture
and ‘other forms of cultivation’.27 In this, they thus differed from the pro-
ponents of the rational forestry discourse who, as we saw above, had enduring
cultivation as their aim and maintained a discourse coalition with the cult-
ivators. This attitude against cultivation and in favour of nature in isolation
of human activities turned all persons involved in such activities into potential
enemies.
Whenever such persons tried to make an argument against nature pro-
tection or in favour of exceptions, nature protectors would turn to scientific
arguments to help defend themselves. If such persons then tried to base their
own arguments on scientific knowledge, nature protectors would try to posi-
tion them as untrustworthy. An example is the debate between those in favour
of hunting and trading birds-of-paradise and those opposed to it. Cribb notes
that hunters produced technical arguments that claimed ‘even if all the males
in their prime were removed from a local population by hunting […] the
species could still reproduce itself.’ To this they added ‘that males began to
breed at one year of age, but did not attain their full splendour until at least
four. If this were so, then, the future of the species was not at risk.’28 Nature
protectors argued on their turn that ‘not enoughwas known of the distribution
or population biology of the birds to assert that hunting did not damage the
species’. The observations made by hunters they labelled as ‘uncommon’ and
as not applicable in this very case.29
23 Cribb 2005, p. 15.
24 Jepson & Whittaker 2002 citing Thomas 1984, Lowe 1983, Burrow 1966, Persall 1969 and
Turner 1980.
25 Cribb 2005, p. 4 citing Leefmans; Dammerman 1919, p. 296.
26 See, for instance, the debate on the hunt of the birds-of-paradise as described in Cribb 1997a.
27 McCarthy 2000, p. 113 citing Dammerman 1929.
28 Cribb 1997a, p. 401.
29 Cribb 1997a, p. 401.
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Likewise, cultural and developmentalist arguments that hunting, or forms
of cultivation, would bring civilisation and development to hitherto uncivilised
regions and their primitive inhabitants, were countered by disqualifying those
making such arguments as an inappropriate civilisation force. Cribb cites an
assistant resident as follows: ‘The fact that there are any people left in New
Guinea is certainly no thanks to the bird trade.’30
The colonial administration opted to search for a balanced policy, one that
acknowledged scientific evidence about threats to nature but that tried to
accommodate economic interests aswell. Officials therefore tended to portray
the various values of nature as not opposing each other but as rather comple-
mentary. In 1931 the chief inspector of the Forest Service, Ten Oever, stated
for instance that the forests had been redefined from a ‘winstbedrijf’ (En.
enterprise aimed at economic profit) to a ‘bedrijfsobject’ (En. economic object),
which included the hydrological, climatological and romantic functions of
forests.31
What helped to integrate various objectives and to find allies was referring
to the notion of ‘progress’.32 This notion was an essential part of all discourses
in the colonial period. It was thus a story in which all people from the West
had a place and which was therefore conducive to coalition formation. After
all, no one could be opposed to progress, and progress could be interpreted
in various ways. For those striving for fast economic profit progress would
mean an increase in productivity; for those in favour of rational forestry
arguments progress would mean, among other things, to introduce manage-
ment techniques to the field of teak exploitation; for proponents of the pro-
tection against disaster discourse the concept of progress would bring pro-
tection forests to mind (they argued that only when the forests in the
mountains were protected nature would they not remain an obstacle to the
region’s progress and civilisation but become one of their main catalysts;33
and finally, for people favouring nature protection progress would mean
showing that one was not only interested in economic profit but also in moral
30 Cribb 1997a, p. 401 citing Westermann; see for more details on the debate about whether
or not to preserve primitive peoples in their original state and protect them from the outside
world (Cribb 2005). In this paper, Cribb argues that themotivation for the Dutch to preserve
the Papuans in their original state was to ‘justify their indefinite presence in the Indonesian
archipelago and [to] refute the nationalist claims that there was a single national identity’
(Cribb 2005, p. 16).
31 Ten Oever 1931, p. 742-743.
32 This general concept also formed part of the discourse of the Ethical Policy, or ethische
politiek. This policy was based on the feeling of a moral obligation to bring modernity to
the people in the colony and economic interests to raise their welfare to create a better
working force and a newmarket. It consisted of three main pillars: the protection of, mainly
pitoresque, elements of the culture of traditional communities against modernization and
capitalism, the expansion of education for Indonesians andwelfare services for the ‘strong’
parts of the Javanese society (Cribb 1993, p. 226-234).
33 Arnold 2000, p. 15.
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issues of preserving certain elements of nature for future generations for
aesthetic or scientific reasons.34
This emphasis on progress, however, contained – from our present per-
spective – a patronising or even racist element. In pressing tomake ‘the tropics
truly productive, to meet the world’s (i.e. the north’s) expanding needs for
raw materials’35 the Europeans judged that the productivity was far below
what was possible. In their eyes ‘there [was] a very big disproportion between
the number of the indigenous people and the size of the areas [used by them]’,
leading to the claim that ‘the West with its culture and techniques could [and
was obliged to] teach the indigenous people how to live a better and easier
life on less land’ and that ‘a part of the land [needed to be] allocated to a
rational land exploitation under Western direction’.36 In other words, the
Europeans were convinced that what the land needed was them and their
progress, order, and civilisation, all based on higher productivity, Western
technology and scientific rationality. After all, ‘no progress […] need[ed] to
be expected from the present [indigenous] inhabitants’.37 Whatever the word
‘progress’ meant to people, it left those who used it in the position to define
their ideas as the best available at that time.38 This legitimised all kinds of
claims about defining objectives and the instruments to achieve them.
11.1 POLICY
Nature protection policy aimed for protecting certain territories for scientific
and recreational purposes and certain species to prevent them from becoming
extinct.
11.2 LAW
The rules that reflected the emergence of the nature protection discourse
concerned the protection of animals and the establishment of reserves.
Regulating animal protection in the beginning was closely linked to the
regulation of hunting activities. Regulations of this kind had their roots in,
34 Cf. Cribb 1997a, p. 395.
35 Arnold 2000, p. 15.
36 ’s Jacob 1945, p. xiii. This was a general perspective among colonizing nations (Agrawal,
1997). Cf. the expression of the ‘white man’s burden’ (Van Nederpelt 1993, p. 31) and the
later ‘Ethical Policy’ (Du. Ethische Politiek). See, for instance, Cribb 1993 and Fasseur 2000.
37 Arnold 2000, p. 14 citing Belt 1888. The general opinionwas that the tropical nature created
conditions for an ‘easy, year-round subsistence in return for minimal labour’ which caused
‘indolence’ and ‘torpor’ and a lack of any stimulus for technical innovation (Arnold 2000,
p. 6-7).
38 Cf. Shanin 1997, p. 66-68.
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among other things, a warning given in 1890 by the former resident of Ternate,
F.S.A. de Clercq and in 1895 by an official of the colonial department of Justice
and ‘amateur entomologist’, M.C. Piepers, that birds-of-paradise were close
to extinction.39 Considering that, for instance, feathers of these birds were
popular all over the world and that they were thus valuable, the colonial
administration decided that something should be done to prevent such animals
from extinction. However, the debate about what this ‘something’ should be
took about a decade! Cribb described in his analysis of relevant materials in
the colonial archives that scientific uncertainty about the degree of urgency
and administrative considerations40 formed the major obstacles for taking
quick measures. Likewise, arguments in favour of protecting insect-eating birds
and killing those that were harmful to farming efforts,41 and in favour of the
economic development of New Guinea42 contributed to the slow pace of
policymaking. Due to the long debate the first real measures had a very local
character: in 1905 the resident of Ternate was advised to raise a bird tax and
use his authority to limit the hunt by requiring a license for carrying fire-
arms.43 Cribb notes that in practice these measures intensified rather than
reduced the hunting of the protected birds since the actual hunters had to hire
equipment from license holders and to pay them back in pelts.
In 1909, at the initiative of the director of the zoological museum,44 a much
farther-reaching regulation was issued that much more clearly reflected that
the nature protection discourse was – at least in terms of institutionalisation
in regulations – gaining ground: the Ordinance for the Protection of Certain
Wild Mammals and Birds.45 This ordinance aimed at protecting all wild
animals and birds in the colonial area.
Due to the opposition of hunters, farmers and plantation owners,46 and
probably also the realism of nature lovers themselves, the romantic perception
of nature was, however, limited to its attractive aspects. Consequently, animals
considered as dangerous or harmful were excluded from protection.47 Two
major exceptions weremade: dangerous animals, including those that damaged
crops, such as monkeys, and predators, such as tigers, and those that were
considered not in need of protection were first. Traditional game and certain
animals that required the permission of regional heads for hunting (such as
39 Cribb 1997a, p. 388-389.
40 The colonial administration was not yet present in the western part of New Guinea which
would make enforcement of any regulations unfeasible (Cribb 1997a, p. 389-390).
41 As promoted by the Botanic Garden’s agricultural zoologist Koningsberger (Cribb 1997a,
p. 391).
42 Cribb 1997a, p. 395.
43 Cribb 1997a, p. 393.
44 Dammerman 1950, p. 82.
45 Indisch Staatsblad 1909 nos 497 and 594, issued on 14 October 1909, came into effect on
1 January 1910.
46 Peluso & Vandergeest 2001, p. 785.
47 Boomgaard 1999, p. 285.
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elephants and birds-of-paradise) formed the second exception. It is therefore
no surprise that foresters could still report about how pleasant, for instance,
a place like Palembang was for hunters since there were still many elephants,
rhinoceros and tigers, ‘the meat of which are regularly sold on the market of
Palembang’.48
Another context that was completely closed for nature protection arguments
was that of nature-caused human diseases such as malaria. In this context it
was clear that nature was considered dangerous and thus definitely not in
need of protection, as Dinger in his oration in 1935 at the Geneeskundige
Hoogeschool in Batavia stressed:
‘if one tries to gain insight into the nature of living nature, not from an optimist-
ically coloured poetic view but from a critical perspective of a natural scientist,
one sees that under the cover of apparent peace and harmony a struggle is taking
place. […] Seen this way we should not see nature as a harmonious whole with
love as the binding factor, but as an entity of opposites, contesting and balancing
each other, a society with the need for armouring, not disarmament.’49
This approach towards nature was definitely free from any romanticism.
A further ordinance issued in 191150 introduced for the first time a closed
hunting season in the archipelago for the birds-of-paradise for five months
per year and a higher fee for hunting licenses. Firearms also had to be returned
at the end of the season.51 In 1914, the resident of Ternate limited the hunt
to six, and in 1922 even to two sorts of birds.52
Driven by the realisation that with a weak police apparatus it was im-
possible and unrealistic to protect all wild animals53 in 1924 a new or-
dinance54 took different approach from the 1909 ordinance. It named all those
animals that were to be protected instead of granting exceptions to a rule of
overall protection. The ordinance listed 61 species for the whole area, and two
for Java and Madura.55 Furthermore, it limited the hunting season for certain
species to a few months per year. And again, hunters were obliged to buy
licences.56
48 Claasen 1908, p. 402.
49 Dinger 1935.
50 Indisch Staatsblad 1911 no. 473; went into effect on 1 January 1912. This ordinance deter-
mined that the regulations issued in the 1909 Ordinancewere now also applicable to North
and West New Guinea.
51 Cribb 1997a, p. 397.
52 Cribb 1997b, p. 460.
53 Dammerman 1929, p. 2-3.
54 Indisch Staatsblad 1924: 234 (“Jachtordonnantie”), 17-5-1924, came into effect on 1 July 1924
on Java and Madura.
55 Indisch Staatsblad 1925: 566.
56 Cf.Dammerman 1929, p. 3.
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The next set of regulations, issued in 1931,57 showed that the nature pro-
tection discourse was still gaining influence. They attempted to differentiate
between hunting and animal protection58 and prohibited the export of pro-
tected animals and productsmade from them. In all areas custom officers were
to see to the enforcement of these regulations. Their list of protected species
was limited to those that were threatened with extinction.59
In 1935, 36 species were added to this list.60 Surprisingly, although they
were seen as the most effective tool of animal protection,61 the export pro-
hibitions for certain species were not maintained.62 This suggests that nature
protectionwas for the first time losing ground again due to the economic crisis
at the time.
I am not sure whether or not this was also the reason for introducing the
category of ‘harmful’ game in the hunting ordinance of 1939.63 In the imple-
menting regulation64 it became clear that this category included, among other
animals, tigers, wild boar, and crocodiles. In any case, the other novelty
introduced by this ordinancewas certainlymotivated by economic arguments.
From now on, hunters had to buy licenses for hunting these dangerous animals
and it became possible to lease hunting grounds for a maximum of ten
years.65
The second type of regulations driven by the nature protection discourse
was that regulating reserves.66 These regulations began to emerge in 1916
on the initiative of a growing lobby of nature protectors for the creation of
nature reserves in the Netherlands Indies.67 Such reserves were seen as a way
57 Indisch Staatsblad 1931: 133, 134, 265 and 266 (“Jachtordonnantie 1931”, “Dierenbescher-
mingsverordening 1931”, “Jachtverordening” and “Dierenbeschermingsverordening 1931”),
25-6-1931 and 1-6-1931; came into effect on 1 July 1931 (133 and 265 only on Java and
Madura).
58 Dammerman 1929, p. 4.
59 Dammerman 1929, p. 5-6.
60 Indisch Staatsblad 1935: 513 ( ‘Aanvulling van de “Dierenbeschermingsverordening 1931”’),
21-10-1935; came into effect on 1 November 1935.
61 Boomgaard 1999, p. 285.
62 Dammerman 1950, p. 90.
63 Indisch Staatsblad 1939: 733, 29-12-1939, came into effect 1 July 1940.
64 Indisch Staatsblad 1940: 247.
65 Dammerman 1950, p. 89.
66 This discussion will not cover the game reserves. These did not form a part of the nature
protection discourse but were primarily created for pastime hunting of the indigenous
hunting nobility and for European hunters. For details on hunting traditions of these groups
see, for instance, Boomgaard 2001.
67 This development runs parallel to the developments in theNetherlands, where special areas
(Du. natuurhistorisch merkwaardige terreinen) were created for the protection of birds and
other animals. Later on, rivers and hills were included. Later again, forests as such were
‘admired’, after that also dunes and other wild territories. Traditionally natural beauty (Du.
natuurschoon) meant forest in Holland (Keiser 1949, p. 16). It should be noted, however,
that preserving nature in the Netherlands started later than in the Netherlands Indies
(Boomgaard 1999, p. 284).
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to protect animals and plants, on the one hand, and to protect sites for their
own sake, on the other. Science aswell as recreation served from the beginning
to justify their establishment.68 Another reason was that primeval forests on
Java and Sumatrawere disappearing at a high speed,mainly due to European
planters.69
The first ordinance70 with the title ‘nature monuments’ (Du. natuurmonu-
menten) reflects both the scientific and romantic elements of the discourse. It
stipulated that the Governor General could allocate areas of the state land for
reservation for their ‘special scientific and aesthetic value’.71 They could con-
sist of a single tree, of areas assigned for the protection of a single or a few
species, of areas assigned for the protection of the overall local flora and fauna,
or of areas assigned because of the special landscape and their beauty such
as crater-lakes, hot springs, volcanoes etc.72 In fact, the first one of these
reserveswas reserved long before the enactment of the 1916Ordinance. It was
a small piece of land in the south of Jakarta, in Depok. On March 13, 1714,
a member of the Raad van Indië, C. Chastelein, gave freedom to his Christian
serfs. He also gave some 6 ha of land to them, but under the condition that
they should never fell all the trees to use the land for building. In 1913 this
reserve was placed under the management of the Netherlands Indies Asso-
ciation for Nature Protection.73 The next reserve, also before the 1916 regula-
tion, was established in 1889. 240 ha of forests at theMount Gedewere chosen
to become a reserve for research.74 However, there were no signs that this
was the planned start of a network of nature protection areas.75 It was rather
‘an extension of the Botanical Gardens at Buitenzorg’.76 The 1916 Ordinance
changed this. Only three years after its issuance, there were already 33 nature
monuments, and ten years later 76 nature reserves, 55 of which were on
Java.77
The regulation clearly mirrored the conviction that nature needed to be
maintained in its original state as it prohibited every activity that could cause
change to the situation of the area, including collecting plants and catching
or killing animals.78 Until the present, this prohibition of ‘change’ has
remained central for nature reserves. Another stipulation that has survived
68 Dammerman 1929, p. 21.
69 Dammerman 1929, p. 21.
70 Indisch Staatsblad 1916: 278 (“Natuurmonumenten”), 18-3-1916.
71 Art. 1 Indisch Staatsblad 1916: 278. See Jepson &Whittaker 2002 for a discussion on nature
monuments.
72 Dammerman 1929, p. 28-31.
73 Dammerman 1950, p. 80.
74 Boomgaard 1999, p. 263.
75 Dammerman 1950, p. 80.
76 Dammerman 1950, p. 80.
77 Dammerman 1929, p. 24.
78 Art. 3 (1) Indisch Staatsblad 1916: 278.
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until now is the possibility to obtain the permission to conduct scientific
research within such an area.79
In 1932 a new ordinance80 added one reason for the establishment of
nature reserves, i.e. the existence of animals and plants in such areas that were
considered valuable enough for protection.81 Linked to this, on the initiative
of the Forest Service,82 it introduced, a distinction between nature reserves
and wildlife reserves (Du. wildreservaten). The latter were areas that were to
be reserved only for the protection of wild animals in the area.83 The pro-
hibitions remained the same, although the new ordinance explicitly mentioned
more examples, such as agricultural activities.84 In wildlife reserves, catching,
wounding or killing animals, as well as collecting their eggs was forbidden.
However, forest exploitation was not prohibited as long as it followed the
previously approved exploitation plans.85 Entrepreneurs in the forestry sector
thus had succeeded in safeguarding their access to at least part of the reserved
areas under the condition that they adhered to forestry management. With
this the natural resources management discourse had regained some ground
from nature protection.
The last colonial ordinance on reserves was issued in 194186 but never
implemented87 due to the beginning of the SecondWorldWar and the follow-
ing struggle for independence. It introduced new names for the former nature
monuments and wildlife reserves, which were now called ‘nature reserves’
(Du. natuurreservaten) and ‘nature parks’ (Du. natuurparken). Another change
was that even the former wildlife reserves could now be protected for their
‘fauna, flora or the beauty of nature’ in case they were considered valuable
enough for protection.88 Thismeant a small symbolic victory for the romantics
– symbolic because it changed nothing about the fact that the exploitation of
these areas was permitted. While in nature reserves ‘untouched preservation’
(Du. ongerepte instandhouding) was defined as the goal, in nature parks it was
‘protection’.89 This meant that ‘change’ remained the core prohibition for
nature reserves while for nature parks it was ‘damage’.90 Closely linked to
79 Art. 3 (2) Indisch Staatsblad 1916: 278.
80 Indisch Staatsblad 1932: 17 (‘Natuurmonumenten- enWildreservatenordonnantie’), 11-1-1932;
came into effect on 1 February 1932.
81 Art. 1 (a) Indisch Staatsblad 1932: 17.
82 Dammerman 1950, p. 86.
83 Art. 1 (b) Indisch Staatsblad 1932: 17.
84 Art. 3 (1) Indisch Staatsblad 1932: 17.
85 Art. 3 (4) Indisch Staatsblad 1932: 17. This article constitutes an interesting parallel with
the present regulations on certain zones of national parks in which tourism enterprises
have to work in conformity with approved exploitation plans. See part III.
86 Indisch Staatsblad 1941: 167 (‘Natuurbeschermingsordonnantie’), 6-6-1941.
87 Dammerman 1950, p. 89.
88 Art. 2 (1) Indisch Staatsblad 1941: 167.
89 Art. 2 (2) Indisch Staatsblad 1941: 167.
90 Art. 5 (1) and (2) Indisch Staatsblad 1941: 167.
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this, another major difference between the two kinds of reserves was that the
nature reserves, in principle, were closed areas whereas the parks were access-
ible for the public.91
Another symbolic victory for the nature protectors was that the ordinance
made it possible to not only reserve areas belonging to the ‘state area’ but also
other areas, after reaching an agreement with those who could lay claims on
it.92 This would, for instance, have made it possible to protect coral reefs that
formed fishing grounds for certain communities.93
11.3 DISCOURSE REPRODUCTION, TRANSFORMATION AND REJECTION
When we look at the documented, European part of the debate on nature
protection in the Dutch East Indies we find two extreme positions: one, in
favour of nature protection and arguing that the government needed to do
more, more quickly and with more dedication; the other, regarding nature
protection as a kind of luxury which the government could turn to when
everything else was taken care of and that could easily be abandoned in times
of economic crisis.
A struggle in terms of arguments mainly took place among the various
Europeans. Sometimes the issue waswhat goal the government should pursue.
Plantation holders pleaded to paymore attention to their safety and economic
success rather than to nature protection. They had to struggle to rid their land
of harmful animals before they could cultivate it.94 Even then, their struggle
against nature seldom ended since their crops were vulnerable to all kinds
of parasites and diseases. Therefore, in their eyes it was useful to protect only
certain parts of nature such as panthers,95 birds of prey, other rat-eating
animals, and birds that could control insects.96 They considered it counter-
productive to protect all nature since such protected areas created space for
harmful animals to hide, as for example Zondag stated:
‘The forest should not become a sanctuary for harmful animals. The forester should
receive the authority to hunt and have others hunt certain sorts wherever this deems
necessary to him.’97
91 Art. 4 (1) and (2) Indisch Staatsblad 1941: 167.
92 The 1870 Agrarian Act had defined private and communal land as land under cultivation.
It had prohibited Inlanders to sell their land to non-natives.
93 Dammerman 1950, p. 89.
94 Boomgaard 2001, p. 136.
95 Zondag 1928, p. 342.
96 Dammerman 1919, p. 11.
97 Zondag 1928, p. 341-342.
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To people arguing this way, naturewas thus primarily dangerous and harmful.
In this, we find a reproduction of elements of the subjugate-and-rule dis-
course.98 Planters and their supporters regarded plantations as a form of
civilisation that was to be preferred to undomesticated nature. And, they, too,
focused on the dangers of nature and how to subjugate and control them.
Even if indigenous peasants had had the chance to participate in such
policy debates they would – with the exception of those who had internalised
the subjugate-and-rule discourse, and with the exception of the question of
nature reservation – probably not have done so because their stories and
subsequent arguments differed very much from the scientific ones. As
Dammerman observed in 1919, the indigenous peasants at least until the first
half of the 20th century perceived nature still in spiritualist terms:
‘Many farmers are still convinced, although they do not often say so, that diseases
and plagues are sanctions of spirits who rule the plants and have been annoyed.
Therefore it should not surprise that they tend to appease, for instance, rats that
damage their crops with cookies rather than to exterminate them. Even if this is
an exception, people in general think that diseases and plagues belong to cultivation
like storm and rain belong to the climate, which is inconvenient, too, but in-
evitable.’99
For people who conceived of nature in such a spiritualist terms the scientific
arguments in favour of nature protection, protection against disaster and
rational forestry, must have sounded quite absurd.
Those Europeans who wholeheartedly promoted nature protection
countered any arguments against it by arguing that although nature protection
might seem almost ‘a matter of fashion’ (Du. modeziekte) it was very well
necessary from a ‘moral-scientific and human perspective’ (Du. moreel weten-
schappelijk en algemeen menselijk oogpunt) and that most stories about damaged
‘crops’ (Du. aanplant) were very much exaggerated.100 With such statements,
nature protectors not only tried to position themselves as morally better than
their opponents but also tried to raise doubts about their trustworthiness.
In other cases, criticism focused on the implementation of the nature
protection policies and laws. Appelman, for instance, claimed that the nature
reserves were nothing more than ‘paper-reserves lacking any real protection’
(Du. staatsbladen zonder eenige nadere bewaking), which resulted in massive
poaching and even the unnoticed construction of a road!101 In his opinion,
the authorities were just not serious enough about implementation.
98 With the evident difference that planters, of course, did not subjugate nature in order to
demonstrate their power.
99 Dammerman 1919, p. 2.
100 Appelman 1930, p. 593,596.
101 Appelman 1930, p. 593. Compare also for Te Wechel 1931, p. 692. As we will see later on
in part IV, these are striking parallels with the situation in present times.
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In line with this argument were complaints of a forester about the con-
ditions under which the forest police had to work:
‘[Forest] policemen are not educated or trained as other policemen. Their only
teaching material is the daily practice and directions given by their superiors. No
wonder that many stumble, complain and resign. Not to mention the issue of very
low salaries and related corruption, a complaint that has been made for years and
is still valid.’102
To some extent this complaint may sound very familiar to people who have
spoken to forestry policemen in more recent times.
Obviously, Appelman did not think that the government would ever extract
sufficient money for nature protection. In a later publication he therefore urged
that nature protection institutions become self-sufficient – which may sound
familiar to present-day conservationists – since he still feared that in this case
wildlife reserves yet to be createdwould remain a ‘paper measure’ (Du. zuiver
papieren maatregel) since many would argue that having such reserves was a
‘luxury’.103 In his eyes a successful wildlife reserve would require, among
other things, a leadership that was dedicated to this job, authoritative, and
interested in biology and hunting issues; capable guards who needed to be
well organised; simple paths and log cabins (Du. jachthutten) for visitors;
regular cutting of secondary forest plants to ensure that visitors could enjoy
the view of game and wild animals; and keeping the population of a reserve
in ‘balance’. Fulfilling these conditionswouldmake it possible to ask financial
contributions for forest exploitation, visiting a reserve, using the log cabins,
shooting films about the wildlife, catching animals for scientific purposes, and
for hunting.104 Such financial contributions could, in Appelman’s eyes, make
reserves self-sufficient.
Appelmanwas not the only onewho did not have confidence in the Forest
Service when it came to nature protection. Dammerman, for instance, warned
against giving the Forest Service far-reaching powers in the field of nature
protection. In his eyes, this was inadequate because many reserves by definition
were not productive, which made them unimportant to the Forest Service.
He lobbied therefore for transferring this authority to scientific institutions,
such as the Botanical Gardens.105
To sum up my argument so far, we can say that the natural scientific
discourses defined the relationship between man and nature differently than
the spiritualist and the subjugate-and-rule discourse. They denied the spirits
and deities their position of control of the ‘streams of blessings’ of nature. This
102 V.d.L. 1934, p. 635-636.
103 Appelman 1934, p. 500-501; cf. Boomgaard 1994, p. 131.
104 Appelman 1934, p. 502-506.
105 Dammerman 1950, p. 87.
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construction was replaced by a new one that despiritualised and rationalised
nature.106 While it had, in the past, been necessary to negotiate with spirits
or deities about these streams without certainty about the outcome, now
humanity could control and even improve nature. It only needed to discover
nature’s secrets through scientific observation and reason. This enabled humans
to ensure that these streamswould keep flowing and increase in their intensity
as long as they followed the rules science had laid bare.
The natural scientific discourses were similar to the subjugate-and-rule
discourse in that they attributed to the state the authority to close or open areas
for ordinary people and to define other rules for the treatment of nature.
However, where the pre-colonial rulers were still seen as primus inter pares,
the colonial government saw itself as a real superior power holder. Conse-
quently, the pre-colonial and colonial rulers also used different means to
legitimise their rule. The pre-colonial rulers subjugated nature to demonstrate
their power and subsequently hold on to their followers by concretely pro-
viding for their well-being. The colonial government, on the other hand,
directly provided for the well-being of indigenous rulers who agreed to ack-
nowledge the new rule. For the ordinary people it only formulated abstract
welfare policies. In cases of non-compliance with the colonial regulations –
for example that regarding forest and nature reserves – the colonial govern-
ment even used force or the threat of violence as an enforcement strategy.
Due to the increasing importance of scientific knowledge scientists gained
power since they were the ones to create categories and to define ‘good
management’, how to protect against disaster, and to preserve nature in its
original state. They were the ones to define which animals, plants and sites
should be protected and thus, in a way, to define the present and future of
nature. Therefore, it is not a surprise that theywere granted exclusionary access
to certain areas under protection.
The emergence of this new group of professionals who were all imported
from outside the region had great implications for the colonial perception of
Indonesian peoples: it made the colonial administration feel, or reinforced the
feeling, that the latter were irrational or superstitious and therefore incapable
of (autonomously)managing the land they depended on. Thus, theywere seen
as backwards, uncivilised, stupid, and in the need of help. The Dutch not only
characterised the Indonesians as incapable of achieving progress, innovation
106 This is, of course, not to say that divinity had disappeared from the mind of the people
using these discourses. However, in the Christian belief it had moved to a place far away
(heaven); much farther than any place one could see or was confronted with in daily life.
Likewise, the direct confrontationwith divinity was postponed to some unknownmoment
in the far future when all men were to be judged (Judgement Day). This shift in time and
place perspectives on the relation between man and divinity created space and power for
humanity. Humans were not as directly dependent on and accountable to God as under
the spiritualist discourse.
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and civilisation on their own at the time, but also denied them the potential
to ever become capable of doing so. As a consequence they were to be
preached to, not listened to. It is important to realise that such – from our
current perspective quite arrogant – arguments laid the foundation for a
perceived dependency on white intelligence for solutions to any kind of
problem, which is still present in present-day Indonesia.
Later on, an increasing number of the Dutch felt disappointed about the
fact that their ethical policies to ‘raise’ the indigenous population of, primarily,
Java somehow did not have the desired effects.107 The following extract from
a speech given in 1930 to members of the Forest Service demonstrates this
disappointment well:
‘The indigenous, uneducated (Du. onontwikkelde) population kills each animal it
can get hold of, for consumption, for fun or inconsiderately, or for reasons of
superstition. This population has much time for hunting andmany people are very
capable of tracing and trapping. All of them are possessed by the idea of abundance
(typical for a tropical people) while lacking any knowledge of the biology and
reproduction of animals. In addition, they are only interested in quantity and not
in quality. They will always try to get hold of as many things as possible even if
this exceeds their present need (for instance, turtle eggs: not even one nest is left
intact for reproduction). The situation gets worse as the population, as a result of
the dominant slash-and-burn system on dry paddies, occupies much more land
than necessary with a more rational method. As a consequence, the habitat of wild
animals is cultivated and reduced at a completely unnecessary rapid pace.’108
The alleged ‘mindlessness’ of the indigenous population led such observers
to the conclusion that Europeans needed to protect nature from these people
and these people against themselves.
The new regulations that were based on the scientific discourses can be
summarised in the concepts of management (Du. beheer) and protection (Du.
bescherming). While in the first case these regulations determined the acceptable
scope of harvesting economically valuable, (albeit lifeless commodities destined
for human usage), in the second case they told the people that it was best to
treat selected parts of nature with care and, even better, from a distance. Both
new conceptualisations had far-reaching consequences. As either a specialised
knowledge or an intact nature were required for managing and protecting
107 Cribb 1993, p. 243. Increasingly alleged Javanese cultural characteristics such as fatalism
and lack of initiative were blamed for the disappointing results.
108 Appelman 1930, p. 594. Fairness obliges me to note that the speaker was also negative about
all other people living in the archipelago. He characterised Indo-Europeans as ‘very bad
hunters’, the Chinese as the ‘worst hunters he knew’ and in addition, as ‘very dangerous
for the survival of certain sorts of animals’ due to their ‘rare obatjes’ (En. weird medicines),
and even the Dutch as ‘not knowing much about right hunting’ due to their lacking
education in this field and as often having an attitude of ‘après moi le déluge’ (Appelman
1930, p. 595-596).
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nature, forestry scientific management, natural scientific observation and
general admiration were the only authorised activities left in forests and
reserves. Hunting, gathering, grazing cattle, and various forms of agriculture,
on the other hand, were considered no longer acceptable in these areas if
mankind was to survive and to achieve progress.
The new discourses also added new time and place perspectives. The time
frame of scientific management differed verymuch from that of the indigenous
practices. For instance, closing an area with trees for 25 years would never
have occurred to an indigenous farmer.While most local practices, on the other
hand, were labelled ‘short-sighted’ (Du. kortzichtig) by the Dutch.109
To introduce and implement the new approaches the colonial government
needed an ever-growing bureaucracy to, among other thing, map, plan, manage
and control the state’s land. This bureaucracy was not created in one day. It
took time and patience to convince those with vested exploitation interests
and those that were more in favour of liberal ideas that a Forest Service was
needed and that such an organisation could be in their interest.
This brings me to the point that the colonial government was far from
unanimous about rational forestry, protection against disaster and nature
protection for natural science and recreation. Next to the opposition, which
favoured unbridled exploitation, there were those people who in principle
agreedwith some ormost measures but whowere doubtful about their imple-
mentation.
Despite all differences in opinion, coalitions emerged among those con-
cerned about the negative effects of human behaviour on nature and others
whowere primarily interested in control, profit, scientific progress, and possi-
bilities for recreation.
These coalitions weremirrored in the legal regulations. Many of the instru-
ments of the later regulations, such as requiring hunting licenses or introducing
export tariffs for rare species, reflect the government’s wish to create additional
revenuesmore than to protect nature. Similarly, the protection of junglewood
served to meet hydrological and climatological considerations but certainly
also the colonial agenda of maximising revenue by ensuring that ‘valuable’
trees could grow well through the conservation of ‘worthless’ trees.110
The analysis above has shown that there was no consensus about the
question of reserving nature, for what purpose and beneficiary, and bywhom.
There was not only disagreement about these matters between foresters and
the indigenous population and their advocates and between foresters and
planters and their advocates but also among foresters themselves. While the
rational forestry discourse kept gaining importance (especially reflected in
its institutionalisation in the Forest Service), the protection against disaster
and nature protection discourses remained contested and thus rather marginal.
109 For instance, Te Wechel 1931, p. 693.
110 Skaria 1998, p. 606.
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Another debate focused on the issues of motivation for policy and trust
in government and has continued until the present day. Scholars, such as
Peluso and Vandergeest111 and more recently Galudra and Sirait,112 have
claimed that the colonial rulers used natural scientific arguments to gain
control over territory. As such, they argue that the objective was to gain power
rather than to achieve sustainable forest production, protect against disaster
or to protect nature for scientific and recreational purposes. That foresters
defended theDomeinverklaring is a primary argument. They did so, according
to Galudra and Sirait, despite the fact that, among other things, the Agrarian
Commission which was appointed in 1928 had advised the government to
abolish the Domeinverklaring in favour of the beschikkingsrecht. According to
Galudra and Sirait they even ‘ignored’ arguments made in scientific articles
by, among others, Roessel that it was the geological formation and not the
vegetation that influenced the water supply and climate.113 Accepting such
arguments would have led to the conclusion that forest reservation as pro-
tection against disaster was not the only option and thus have questioned the
legitimacy of the Forestry Service’s claim on territory.
This argument is appealing. However, I am not convinced. Inmy opinion,
Galudra and Sirait generalise toomuch about the foresters when they insinuate
that they consciously opted to ignore arguments to get or maintain control
over territory and to use it for their own benefit or the benefit of certain Dutch
groups only. Another possibility would be that foresters were not convinced
by the scientific arguments. After all, if a person is really convinced of a theory
it takes great effort to convince him of another contrasting theory. Credibility,
acceptability and trust play a role here. Abandoning the forest theory that
claimed that forests were necessary for protection against disaster may not
have been easy for foresters if they wanted to remain credible in the forestry
science community. Apart from that, a new theory, in this case that geological
formations were more important factors for regulating the water supply than
the degree of forest cover, needed to be acceptable. This is an important point.
Did foresters not take over the new theory because they did not think it was
necessary to do so or because they did not find it attractive to do so? Not
finding it necessarywouldmean that theywere not convinced of the scientific
arguments, perhaps because they had questions about the methodology, the
argument or the applicability of the findings to the area. Not finding it attract-
ive would confirm the thesis of Galudra and Sirait that they were more in-
terested in power than in protection against disaster. The question of trust,
finally, is about whether or not foresters trusted the source of the new theory.
Earlier quotes of authors that reacted to Roessel’s new theory suggest that they
were reluctant to accept the new theory but subscribed to his plea for a better
111 Peluso 1993a; Peluso & Vandergeest 2001.
112 Galudra & Sirait 2006.
113 Galudra & Sirait 2006.
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methodology of research, including data collection. Of course, it is possible
that this was a strategy as well. We can, however, not know this for sure until
we find evidence for it.
Along with the question of why the new theory did not gain dominance
in the forestry science community is the question of why policymakers kept
repeating the old arguments. Did they know of the new theory? Yes, we may
assume that they did because they read the most important journals.. So, the
question remains again: why did they ‘ignore’ the new theory? Was it a kind
of strategy or were they not convinced of the arguments? Without a detailed
analysis of these specific colonial policymaking processes to produce evidence
for either hypothesis, we cannot know for sure. Such an analysis would present
a much more nuanced picture than that painted by the above mentioned
scholars: a picture which is not black nor white but painted in various shades
of grey that represented a variety of convictions and objectives.
What makes this kind of criticism – produced by the above mentioned
scholars, but also by activists and various other stakeholders – interesting is
that it reproduces arguments about a government that has deprived the indi-
genous population of their existing rights and endangered the livelihood that
were produced in the colonial and maybe even pre-colonial times. As such,
the work of these scholars etc. forms part of a counter-discourse. As the
following chapters in this part and also the empirical parts of this book will
show, both the government’s discourse as well as this counter-discourse have
remained nearly unchanged over time.

12 Re-emergence of the three natural scientific
discourses after the Second World War
The beginning of the SecondWorldWar changed the political situation in the
Indonesian archipelago. Japanese troops occupied the region in 1942, arrested
the Dutch and concentrated them in camps. After the Japanese surrender in
1945 onAugust 17th Sukarno proclaimed Indonesia’s independence. TheDutch,
however, tried to re-establish their control over the colony and only at the
end of 1949 – when they transferred the sovereignty to the Indonesian people –
did the Indonesian revolution come to an end.
Of course, only few of the policies discussed in the previous sections were
implemented during the war, which was dominated by the exploitation of
nature for the war and food production. But there are few examples that
suggest that the Japanese successfully enforced even some of them. According
to a Dutch forestry official,
‘the resident of Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) had prohibited the burning of
forests to prevent forests from turning into alang-alang fields. However, nobody
complied with this prohibition. There was an enormous practice of tolerating non-
compliance [gedoogbeleid] and the area was, of course, much too large for effective
enforcement. When the Japanese came – they were rather conscious of environ-
mental issues [milieubewust], that is, at least in their own country, in Borneo they
were enormous bandits and robbers – so, when the Japanese came, they saw that
the people burnt all the trees so they went to them, had them line up and cut off
an ear of some of them! After that nobody burnt any more trees. As a result, only
after three years had there grown a secondary forest. Except, once the Japanese
had left, the burning immediately started again.’1
Next to these differences in enforcement strategies, the Japanese also had a
clear priority: forest cultivation was even increased to meet the demand for
firewood and construction material.
After the war, however, according to the Dutch forestry official Heringa,
due to lack of control on the new plantations little was left of what foreign
security services had regarded as the ‘world famous’ Dutch forest management
in the Indonesian archipelago.2
1 Personal communication, W.M. Otto, 3 July 2003.
2 Heringa 1946, p. 8, 17.
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The period that followed was characterised by a struggle between those
wanting to return to the oldDutch system and those favouring the revolution-
ary ideal of social justice. Quite soon after the war Dutch foresters started to
debate how to rebuild or improve the old system. De Voogd, for instance,
pleaded for establishing a permanent council for hunting and nature protection
and a hunting and nature protection directorate which would be placed
directly under Department for Economic Affairs (instead of under the Forestry
Service). After all, De Voogd argued, such a structure would oblige Economic
Affairs to allocate money for hunting and nature protection.3 Forestry Main
Inspector Becking, on the other hand, argued in favour of increasing the timber
production without losing sight of sustainability.. According to him, the
Japanese had ‘demonstrated possibilities’ which should be continued. He
reproduced the rational forestry as well as the protection against disaster
discourse by pleading for a continuation of production and protection of
forests. Most importantly he argued that both categories of forest should be
managed by the central government. Protection forests should be placed under
the Forestry Service’s authority because they were a ‘typical welfare service’
that only produced costs but no direct financial benefits, because they served
a supralocal interest, and because their ‘unwise management’ (Du. onoordeel-
kundig beheer) would have disastrous consequences. To strengthen his plea
for granting the central government rather than a local government the author-
ity over these forests he even compared their protection to national defense.4
His arguments for also placing production forests under central government
authority were that their management was an extensive amount of work,
capital intensive, that their rentabilitywas low, and that all developed countries
had done so. Most importantly, however, he envisaged that protection forests
in the long run could increasingly be transformed into production forests which
would plead for placing all forests under the same authority.5 This argumenta-
tion raises the suspicion that Becking regarded protection forests as an instru-
ment formaking productionmore profitable by concentrating the production.6
After all, protection forests were said to serve certain purposes that would
definitely not allow their conversion into production forests. The crux lies in
Becking’s definition of protection forests, which included, in addition to the
forests that served as protection against disaster, ‘all forests that had not yet
been given a destination’.7 He thus claimed an additional category of forests,
which had been under the authority of the Binnenlands Bestuur or local
governments. He justified this claimwith the Forestry Service’s ‘expertise’ and
3 De Voogd 1946, p. 55-56.
4 Becking 1946, p. 94-95, 105.
5 Becking 1946, p. 106.
6 Becking 1946, p. 95.
7 Becking 1946, p. 128.
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‘organisation’8 and argued that it should be further expressed by renaming
the Forestry Service the Domain and Forestry Service (Du. Dienst voor Domein
en Boschbeheer), a part of which would become the ‘forestry conscience’ (Du.
boschbouwkundig geweten).9 But placing all uncategorised forests also under
the Service’s authority, in Becking’s opinion, did not affect the population’s
right to cultivate land. This right would just be limited to certain areas destined
for this purpose and to certain conditions. This proposed limitation Becking
justified with the transition from an ‘unregulated to a more ordered state’.10
Among the Indonesian foresters, it was especially the older generation –
the one that had worked for the colonial Forest Service – that soon after the
war argued that the Forest Service needed to restore its authority in order to
see to a balance between exploitation and conservation.11 This resulted in
a struggle between them and younger foresters who did not want to be as
harsh as their colonial predecessors12 and who thus argued for less control.
The foresters were thus torn between the egalitarian ideals of the newRepublic,
to strive for a just and prosperous society,13 and the desire to return to the
Dutch system of order.14 This is also reflected in a policy document that
resulted from a meeting in 1946 in Malang. Objectives for the forestry sector
stated in this document were:
1 To adapt the organization of the Forest Service to the government’s political
foundation (In. dasar politik), particularly by shifting the Forest Service’s
function from the trade/export orientation emphasized by the Dutch and
the pervasive forest slashing practiced by the Japanese to distributingwood
fairly, inexpensively, and directly to the people.
2 To increase production, prioritizing firewood production for the govern-
ment railway system and war-related industries.
3 To rationalize Forest Service operations and to repair forest product pro-
cessing plants.
4 To increase the knowledge of all foresters by establishing forestry training
institutions.
5 To help increase agricultural production by reforesting forest lands using
the tumpang sari system15 and, indirectly, by restoring damaged protection
forests in watersheds. Also, to enlist the assistance of village leaders and
the military to reforest the [reported] 102,000 hectares [of forest land]
illegally occupied by forest villagers.
8 Becking 1946, p. 128.
9 Becking 1946, p. 131.
10 Becking 1946, p. 129.
11 Peluso 1992, p. 98.
12 Peluso 1992, p. 112.
13 Weatherbee 1966, p. 22.
14 Peluso 1992, p. 97.
15 A system where peasants plant crops like rice and corn between teak trees.
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6 To make people aware of the meaning of forestry, by making them realize
the importance of laws and regulations. An information-dispersal program
was to begin, using radio, magazines, newspapers, short courses, and
traditional or religious institutions such as village leaders and Masjumi.16
Actually, only the first issue reflected revolutionary ideals: fair and inexpensive
wood distributionwas definitely a shift away from the earlier orientation. The
second issue was not oriented towards conservation at all. All the other issues,
finally, pointed in the direction of re-establishing institutions belonging to the
rational forestry and protection against disaster discourse as the key words
‘rationalize’, ‘increase knowledge’, ‘training’, ‘protection forest’, ‘make people
aware of the meaning of forestry’ indicate.
Interestingly, nature protection did not play a role in this policy document.
Likewise, in preparation of the 1945 Constitution the concern for erosion and
floods caused by deforestation was the only environmental issue debated.17
Just as in the late colonial times, the protection against disaster discourse was
strongly aligned with the rational forestry discourse, since its restoration was
also intended to stimulate the timber related industry18 and irrigated agri-
culture.19
The expression of ‘illegally occupied [land]’, on the other hand, indicated
that the Indonesian Forest Service intended to claim the same territory as state
land as the colonial Forest Service had done.20 In line with this the revolution-
ary government increasingly started to label forest clearing, which had been
tolerated or even encouraged during the war, again as ‘timber theft’.21
To help restore the old system even during the revolution European and
Australian foresters were released from prison camps. Likewise, European
professors were asked to teach forestry at Gadjah Mada University in Yog-
yakarta. Moreover, after 1949 the colonial institutions responsible for conserva-
tion were restored. The Forest Service again formed part of the Ministry of
Agriculture. And a small section of the Directorate-General of Forestry together
16 Peluso 1992, p. 98 citing Soepardi 1974. Masjumi was the biggest IndonesianMuslim party
at that time.
17 Cribb 2003, p. 41 citing Van Klinken.
18 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-31, 60-62.
19 Most of these restoration efforts were directed at Java andMadura. Before 1950, the imple-
mentation of such plans, originating from 1946, failed because the people were engaged
in the revolutionary struggle rather than in replanting activities (Departemen Kehutanan
1986, p. II-31, Peluso 1992, p. 97). After that, the realisation was according to the plans:
between 1950 and 1959 45.450 ha of economically valuable trees per year were planted.
Only in 1955 the targets were not reached due to a lack of funds (Departemen Kehutanan
1986: II-60-62).
20 Cf. Peluso 1992, p. 99-100
21 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-62. For a detailed study of the history of ‘illegality’ of
logging shown at the case of East Kalimantan see Obidzinski 2003.
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with the Institute of Nature Conservation based at the Botanical Gardens in
Bogor was made responsible for conservation.22
The nature protection discourse reappeared in the Forest Service’s 1951
plans for the new section on forest protection (In. Seksi Perlindungan Hutan).
These included the intention to conduct research on the situation of all existing
nature and wildlife reserves and on the hunting situation. According to the
Forest Service, the first results became visible in 1954: wildlife reserves were
rehabilitated; the hunt on Java andMadurawas better controlled; and the wild
hunt on elephants in South Sumatra had stopped.23
The same discourses remained dominant in the government’sworking plan
for conservation in 1956. The targets laid down in this plan can be divided
into three groups. To start with there were those directed at nature protection,
such as wildlife management, with special attention for the breeding of wild
animals and the prevention of the extinction of species. Then, there were the
targets that were linked to research purposes, such as the protection of nature
reserves for research on natural history. Finally, there were the economically
driven targets, such as forest management with a focus on an increase in
productivity for the people and the creation of a hunting regime that was
profitable for the people and the state.24
The situation remained the same during the period of the Guided Demo-
cracy, from 1959 till 1965,25 and the nature protection discourse further
institutionalised. By then, the forest protection section had beenmade a bigger
unit (In. Bagian Perlindungan Hutan). It continued to co-operate closely with
theNature Protection andHunting Section of the Botanical Gardens (In.Bagian
Perlindungan Alam dan Perburuan), (renamed in 1955 the Institute for Nature
Preservation of the Centre For Nature Research (In. Lembaga Pengawetan Alam
dari Lembaga Pusat Penyelidikan Alam). In 1961, this Institute was made part
of the Nature Protection and Preservation Unit (In. Bagian Perlindungan dan
Pengawetan Alam) in the Forest Service.26
In addition, a number of trips were undertaken to China and Africa and
conferences on nature conservation organised and attended. In 1962, a national
conference on nature conservation, which representatives from Australia,
Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam also attended, issued a
22 This fast restoration explains why the reserve at the Mount Gede was relatively well
guarded, since it was in the neighbourhood of the Botanical Gardens. The other reserves,
however, were somewhat neglected due to a lack of human and financial resources (Cribb
1988a, p. 344).
23 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-66.
24 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-66.
25 Sukarno, supported by the army, introduced this new system in 1957, first, with the
introduction of martial law on 14 March 1957 to counter regionalist movements, and later
with the return to the revolutionary constitution of 1945 in early 1959. This brought to an
end to the period of parliamentary democracy which had started in 1950 (Rahardjo &
Gusmian 2002, p. 227-258, Ricklefs 1981, p. 243-255).
26 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. 100.
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resolution pleading for the better care for nature by the government in order
to assure that the wider public could profit from its economic value. The longer
the government waited with the rehabilitation of land, the conference resolu-
tion argued, the bigger the loss for the public would be,. The resolution also
mentioned concrete measures that should be carried out by the government.
The frequent use of the term ‘research’ indicates, on the one hand, that the
attendants were primarily biologists. On the other hand, some political con-
siderationsmay have also played a role, especially in the first recommendation
that the government engage in conservation activities in West Irian. The
controversy with the Netherlands about this part of the archipelago, which
was to become the 26th Indonesian province in 1963, may have increased the
political support for this plea for conservation in Irian. The second recom-
mendationwas that the government should organise inventories in the nature
and wildlife reserves. Third, the research on sea turtles should be increased.
Regions with many turtles should issue regulations on the protection of turtle
eggs, taking the regulation for the north-western part of East Kalimantan,
Berau, as an example. Fourth, there should be more research done on the
Sumatran badak (En. rhinoceros) and a wildlife reserve should be established
in Riau for the badak. Fifth, the government should give more attention to the
problem of water pollution. Finally, the conference recommended including
biology into the curriculum of all schools in order to educate the population
about the need to care for nature.27
In accordancewith the Forest Service’s planning and the recommendations
made at the conference, the conservation section undertook six expeditions
to existing and potential nature reserves between 1960 and 1964.28
The protection against disaster discourse received a new impetus by
attempts to turn all ‘destructed and unproductive land’ on Java, the so-called
‘tanah kritis’,29 into protection forest. Since thiswas not possible due to existing
property rights, the government developed a ‘greening’ (In. penghijauan) policy.
From 1961 onwards a ‘national greening week’ (In. pekan penghijauan nasional)
was organized, a campaign aimed at raising awareness of how conservation
was a joint responsibility of government and citizens and at planting critical
land outside forest areas.30
Still, compared to the policies intending to increase the exploitation of
Indonesian forests, the nature protection and also protection against disaster
policies and activities remained marginal. As former forester Soekiman, in
2001, remembered this period: ‘maybe the quantity of the protected areas
27 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-102.
28 To Komodo (1961), Leuser (1962), Baluran (1962 and 1963), Ujung Kulon (1963 and 1964)
Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-102.
29 The full definition by the Forest Service for critical land was land that is ‘destructed and
not productive, not functioning as capital for agricultural production and not in terms of
water regulation’ Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-98.
30 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-98-100.
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increased under Sukarno but their quality decreased’. This was, according to
him, due to an increase of the population that as a consequence had insufficient
land for cultivation at its disposal. The number of people invading the pro-
tected forests to farm grew so high that the government could no longer
remove them and eventually invited them to grow plants between the trees.
This so-called tumpang sari system had had a predecessor in Dutch times, but
it had been limited to two years per location, a period in which the newly
planted trees gained so much height that they would overshadow the plants
in between. Under Sukarno, the top branches were cut so that the sun would
reach the people’s trees.31
Next to this small-scale exploitation in the forests, the state exploitation
of the forests was soon re-organised. A major impetus of this reorganisation
was the establishment of the state forest enterprise Perhutani in 1961,32 which
very much resembled what Becking had envisioned in 1946. Its primary aim
was to create financial profit for the state through forest exploitation.33 Like-
wise, in 1964 the Indonesian government decided that forestry was to become
a sector of such importance that it needed to be governed by a department
instead of a directorate under the minister for agriculture. The task of the new
department was ‘especially production’.34
Another main occupation of the Forest Service during Sukarno’s rule was
to re-appropriate the territory it had controlled before thewar. The government
wanted the people who had invaded the forests to leave them and used
arguments from all three discourses to convince them. In addition, it labelled
all the landless peasants who had invaded state forests ‘wild occupants’ (In.
penduduk liar) and began to evict them.35 The legal basis for this was first the
1948 Ordinance ‘Onrechtmatige occupatie van gronden’36 and from 1960
onwards Perpu 51/196037 which came into effect on 16 December 1960. This
latter regulation enabled the head of a district (In. bupati), a mayor of a town
(In. walikota), or the Minister of Agriculture to order the people who used or
occupied the land without a license or certificate to leave the land and to
enforce the order.38 It thus enabled the state, without court order, to evict
people without a certificate.39 In the elucidation of the regulation the govern-
ment acknowledged that there was a lack of land for housing and farming.
31 Interview 26 January 2001.
32 Through governmental regulations PP 17-30/1961.
33 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-76 MPRS decree II/1960 categorised forestry as project
B which was to finance projects from category A.
34 Ministerial Decree 1/1964. Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-79.
35 Peluso 1992, p. 101.
36 Staatsblad 1948 No. 110.
37 This Perpu was entitled ‘larangan pemakaian tanah tanpa izin yang berhak atau kuasanya yang
sah’.
38 Ex articles 4 and 5.
39 Elucidation Perpu 51/1960; cf. Peluso 1992, p. 116.
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And although the government could ‘understand’ (In.memahami) the reaction
of the people it could ‘not approve of it’ (In. membenarkan) and thus had to
prohibit unlicensed land use. After all, ‘unordered’ (In. tidak teratur) land use
would ‘hamper’ (In. menghambat) the implementation of development plans
or ‘often evenmake it impossible’ (In. bahkan seringkali sama sekali tidak memung-
kinkan lagi), result in financial loss for state and people, and, especially within
towns, be ‘irresponsible’ (In. tidak dapat ditanggung-jawabkan) in terms of safety
and health. In fact, the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960 went even further by
regulating that rights on land ceased to exist when land was being neglected
(In. terlantar, diperlantarkan).40
To clear this job, the government formed a special committee in each
province that was assignedwith the task of re-appropriation. Thesewere called
‘committees for the development of forest and agricultural areas’ (In. Panitia
Pembangunan Wilayah Hutan dan Pertanian) and were headed by the governor
of each province. Members were representatives of the military and of
organisations active in the field of agriculture.41
Not surprisingly, the attempt of re-appropriation met a lot of resistance.
According to the Forest Service even the committees just mentioned ‘constantly
thwarted [the Forest Service’s, JA] interests’.42 This can, according to Peluso,
be explained by the fact that governmental institutions represented in them,
such as the departments of Agriculture, Plantations and Home Affairs, could
gain from the Forest Service’s loss of a grip on land.43 After all, their juris-
diction over land would increase whenever land was decided to be labelled
as agricultural land instead of forest land.
However, outside the bureaucracy there wasmuchmore opposition, which
in the beginning was primarily formed of peasants who were not willing or
able to leave their new land. The land had become evenmore valuable to them
since they had also begun to build all kinds of infrastructure on it, such as
schools and mosques. This, in combination with their hope for a better future
and more just times, and famine in 1963 and 1964,44 made them defend it
by all means. The peasants were supported by – notably – communist
organisations,45 such as the Indonesian Peasants’ Front (In. Barisan Tani Indo-
nesia, abbr. BTI) and the Indonesian Forestry Workers’ Union (abbr.
SARBUKSI).46 As the PKI was the only party that – unsuccessfully – argued in
favour of legal provisions protecting the rights of such squatters,47 they turned
40 Ex articles 27.a(3), 34.e and 40.e.
41 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-62.
42 Peluso 1992, p. 110.
43 Peluso 1992, p. 110.
44 Mortimer 1974, p. 300, Peluso 1992, p. 118.
45 Mortimer 1972, Mortimer 1974.
46 Peluso 1992, p. 101.
47 Mortimer 1972, p. 17.
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into militant PKI supporters.48 Their struggle against the authorities resulted
in deforestation, violence, and casualties at both sides.
In the late 1950s the government tried to meet some of the peasants’
demands by starting a land exchange programme: peasants who had claimed
land prior to August 1957 were offered land outside the state’s forest land
in exchange.49 According to Peluso, the Forest Service profited from this, too,
since the exchange land had to come from other departments.50
However, the peasants did not content themselves with this programme,
encouraged and supported in this attitude by the communist party and its
organisations.51 Especially on Java, during 1964 and 1965, the situation es-
calated into an ‘agrarian war’ in which not only the peasants who had invaded
the forests but also various other groups of peasants occupied massive pieces
of private and state land in so-called ‘unilateral actions’ (In. aksi sepihak).52
These were then countered by landowners, right-wing village officials and
their supporting political organisations.53 This war ultimately led to an enorm-
ous bloodshed occurring after the alleged communist coup d’etat and the
counter-revolution starting on September 30, 1965.54 This resulted in a new
kind of ‘haunted forests’ where no one ever dared to go again55 because of
the blood of the uncounted people who had died there.
With the turbulent events of 1965 and 1966 any arguments in favour of
land reform and social justice had definitely lost the battle against the revived
natural scientific discourses. Thus, policy, law and government practice did
not change fundamentally to reflect a new social justice discourse. On the
contrary, the coalition of the proponents of social justice, with left-wing poli-
tical parties such as the communist Party PKI, made it possible for all govern-
ments since to label such ideas altogether subversive.56 The same events were
to lead to the end of the Old Order of Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno.
48 Mortimer 1974, p. 150.
49 Peluso 1992, p. 117.
50 Peluso 1992, p. 117.
51 Peluso 1992, p. 117.
52 Kasdi 2001, Mortimer 1972, Mortimer 1974.
53 Peluso 1992, p. 117-120.
54 The counterstrike and the events following were called the 30 September movement (In.
Gerakan 30 September, abbr. G30S) by the Soeharto government. For detailed analyses of
this time see Crouch 1973,Mortimer 1972, Mortimer 1974,Wertheim 1966,Wertheim 1979.
55 Cf. Peluso 1992, p. 121.
56 Cf. Peluso 1992, p. 103.
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In the following decade, the New Order government of President General
Soeharto in fact continued what Sukarno’s government had initiated in the
early 1960s, i.e. large-scale exploitation of natural resources. However, contrary
to Sukarno, Soeharto succeeded in creating a dominant and rather specific
discourse in support of the state that was to take the lead in this exploitation.
The discourse defined ‘development’ (In. pembangunan) as the main state
objective. To start with, it contained several elements of the international
development discourse officially launched by President Truman in 1949 but
built on much older ideas1 which we have already seen in the colonial think-
ing about progress: first, an evolutionary thinking, which explains its close
affinity with notions of growth;2 second, the promotion of a desire formodern-
ity, wealth and value;3 and third, a notion of ‘normality’ which implied that
everything not considered to be normal needed to be normalised.4 Then, the
Indonesian pembangunan concept was formed by the early nationalist pioneers
such as Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana who in the 1930s in his Cultural Polemics
made optimal use of the two meanings inherent in the Indonesian word root
bangun-: wake up and build (In. membangun).5 He therefore used the word
pembangunan to refer to both ‘national awakening’ and ‘nation-building’.6
Although from the early 1960s onwards the term was increasingly associated
with economic modernisation, in its essence it has always been interpreted
as ‘building’ something new as opposed to something ‘traditional’7 and that
has existed in nature so far. It meant man-made, similar to the civilisation of
the subjugate-and-rule discourse and the forests of the rational forestry dis-
course. Except that what was being made or built did not so much improve
nature – althoughwe find this, too, for instance in the form of plantations and
public parks – but infrastructure: skyscrapers, highways, bridges, factories
1 For an excellent history of the idea of economic development see Arndt 1987.
2 Watts 1995, p. 47.
3 According to Watts, to allow such desires was promoted successfully by Adam Smith at
the end of the 18th century. Before that, desire was perceived as the ‘origin of misery and
vice’ (Watts 1995, p. 48-49).
4 Watts 1995, p. 48.
5 Heryanto 1988, p. 10.
6 Heryanto 1995, p. 12-17.
7 Heryanto 1988, p. 22.
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etc. Nature only served as the ‘raw material’,8 i.e. either as construction
material or as a source of money, to achieve something better.
The three key terms of pembangunan became economic growth (In. pertum-
buhan ekonomi), stability (In. stabilitas) and equal access to, among other things,
income, education, health care, employment, participation and law (In. pemera-
taan).9 These key terms, also known as the ‘development trilogy’ (In. trilogi
pembangunan), were interrelated. However, what linked them above all was
that they formed part of an argument in favour of a leading role for the state.
Contrary to the intransitive and natural process of development (In. perkem-
bangan, literallymeaning ‘flowering’), what Arndt has referred to as theMarxist
understanding of the English word development, pembangunan and its key
elements were transitive and in a way un-natural, man-made processes that
required a strong actor with craftsmanship and engineering abilities.10 For
instance, turning Indonesia into a ‘modern’ and ‘prosperous’ state, the govern-
ment explained, presumed stability. To achieve this stability the state had to
free politics and media coverage from ideological conflict that in the stories
of supporters of the new regime was responsible for the economic malaise
in the 1960s.11 Only when stability (mainly interpreted as security and order)
was achieved, they argued, could all citizens focus on development.12 To
achieve economic growth, the state had to have a rational, planned, efficient,
effective policy and to ensure that foreign investment flowed into the coun-
try.13 This was different from the approach taken by the Sukarno government
in two respects: first, in that technocrats rather than politicians were to take
a lead and second, in that Sukarno hadwelcomed foreign investment but also
very much stressed the importance of Indonesia’s ability to ‘stand on its own
feet’ (In. berdiri di kaki sendiri).14 Finally, in distributing equal access to the
fruits of development, the state had to play a leading role (though it didn’t
publicly acknowledge this until its third five-year plan (1979-1984).15 Before
this, the state said to focus on economic growth and stability or else there
would be nothing to distribute at all.16
Pembangunan soon came to dominate the Indonesian public discourse. There
were many translations from English expressions, including development plan
(In. rencana pembangunan) and development administration (In. administrasi
8 Heryanto 1988, p. 22.
9 For an analysis of the fortymost important keywords of theNewOrder see Van Langenberg
1986. For a critique of pemerataan see Schulte Nordholt 1979.
10 Heryanto 1995, p. 22-24.
11 Mas’oed 1989, p. 4. For an analysis of how this worked in the case of the parliamentary
debates on the biodiversity conservation bill see chapter 18.
12 See, for instance, Ali Murtopo as cited in Mas’oed 1989, p. 11.
13 Cf. Mas’oed 1989, p. 9-10.
14 Laras 1998, p. 8-9.
15 Schulte Nordholt 1979.
16 Mas’oed 1989, p. 9-10 citing Schiller.
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pembangunan). However, there were also more ‘authentic’ expressions such
as Orde Pembangunan (another name for the Orde Baru or New Order, thus
contrasting the regime to the Old Order of Sukarno), Bapak Pembangunan (a
honory title for President Soeharto as the ‘Father’ of development), andKabinet
Pembangunan (development cabinet). As Heryanto has argued, by producing
and reproducing such expressions the government took full responsibility for
the process of developing the country. In return, Soeharto demanded obedience
as his title Bapak Pembangunan indicates: a father, as family, is by nature to
be respected and loved by his children and only accountable to those above
him in the hierarchy.17 By stressing this family aspect Soeharto combined
the modernist pembangunan with the much older patrimonial concept of rule
discussed in chapter 8.
The element of ‘stability’ was first of all institutionalised in a decree in
favour of a change of political culture. Already in 1965 the provisional people’s
congress under Soeharto’s leadership had decided that conflict was to be
replaced by ‘deliberations aiming for consensus’ (In. musyawarah untuk mu-
fakat).18 This was followed by all kinds of limitations of the space for political
parties. Within the legislature, this space was limited from July 1967 onwards
by a deal between Soeharto and the party leaders regarding, among other
things, enlarging the legislature from 347 to 460 MPs and granting the govern-
ment the right to appoint 75 military and 25 civilian MPs and one third of the
People’s Congress.19 This deal together with the establishment of a pro-govern-
ment group in Parliament, the Fraksi Karya Pembangunan, and the removal of
independentmembers of parliament through the so-called ‘recall mechanism’
and other measures, made Parliament responsive to the government’s
desires.20 Other strategies to institutionalise political stability included the
cooptation of SEKBERGOLKAR,21 the 1964 army-initiated secretariat of functional
groups, the merger of political parties and the provision that political parties
were only allowed to campaign in rural areas during election campaigns.22
To create ‘stability’ not only the legislature but also the bureaucracy and
the armed forces were reorganised. Policymaking was centralised and pro-
government military officers and civilian technocrats were installed in leading
positions of central government agencies, as provincial governors and district
heads.23 The various factions of the armed forces were brought under the
17 This paragraph is based on Heryanto 1995, p. 24-26.
18 MPRS Decree VIII of 1965. What this meant in practice in the case of deliberations on the
biodiversity conservation bill of 1990 will be explored in part III of this book.
19 Mas’oed 1989, p. 15.
20 Mas’oed 1989, p. 14-16.
21 This is an acronym of ‘joint secretariat of functional groups’ (In. sekretariat bersama golongan
karya). Examples of such functional groupswerewomen, youth, bureaucrats, andworkers.
22 Mas’oed 1989, p. 16-18.
23 Mas’oed 1989, p. 12.
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order of Soeharto as commander-in-chief and supporters of Sukarno were
removed as much as possible.24
Although ‘stability’ affected all aspects of public life, it was pembangunan’s
element of ‘economic growth’ that most determined policy and rules regarding
the treatment of nature.
13.1 POLICY
We can summarise the dominant policy of this first decade of the New Order
period regarding nature as follows: Indonesia, as a country blessed with
natural riches, should use these to finance the well-being of the Indonesian
people.
In addition to this element of pembangunan, the three scientific discourses
were more or less incorporated into the new discourse. Disaster prevention
arguments, for example, were still used, to, among other things, justify the
protection of mountainous forests and water catchment areas. Therefore, the
government granted no concessions in areas above 500 metres.25 Just like in
colonial times it argued that protecting these forests was inevitable for the
development – now called pembangunan – of agricultural production. Yet
relative to the forest area reserved for industrial production, protection areas
again played a minor role.
Alongwith this continued policy a new one began to emerge that was also
linked to protection against disaster. Increasingly, the Forestry Department
reproduced old stories about forest degradation, which narrated that ‘illegal
land occupation’ (In. serobotan or pendudukan secara liar), ‘illegal swidden
cultivation’ (In. perladangan liar), ‘forest fires’, ‘cattle grazing’, ‘inappropriate
harvesting of forest products’ (In. pemungutan hasil hutan dengan cara yang tidak
sesuai) and ‘arbitrary forest exploitation’ (In. eksploitasi hutan yang semena-mena)
caused erosion, decreasing land fertility, floods, droughts, landslides, and other
problems.
To tackle these problems the New Order government decided in 1966 to
start with ‘reforestation’ (In. reboisasi) and ‘rehabilitation’ programmes.While
rehabilitation applied to areas prone to floods and landslides, reforestation
was the term for all replanting in forest areas. Concessionaires, for instance,
had to invest in reforestation and the government and the state forestry com-
pany Perhutani invested in it, too. In addition, the first development project
with this purpose, financed by the World Food Programme in 1971/2, took
place in Central Java.26 However, reforestation was certainly not the govern-
ment’s priority. As a consequence, the results of these efforts have been limited.
24 Mas’oed 1989, p. 13-34.
25 Cribb 1988b, p. 345.
26 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-39.
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According to Dauvergne, ‘[e]ven according to official figures, Indonesia only
replanted 1,35 million hectares between 1969 and 1989’.27 And yet this did
not result in any sanctions for concessionaires.
The second instrument the government employed was ‘greening’ (In.
penghijauan) in areas that were officially not forest. To this purpose the ‘national
greening week’ was continued as a yearly campaign in December. The rural
population did not welcome public servants whole-heartedly, however. This
is no wonder considering the list of activities identified as problematic.
Although ‘greening’, just as protection forests, was presented as being in the
interest of the people, farmers suspected a hidden purpose behind the official
rhetoric of the prevention of erosion and floods, one that becomes clear from
a discussion in 1968 among bureaucrats.28 In it, an effort was undertaken
to define ‘greening’ for forestry, plantation, agriculture and cattle breeding
sectors. For agriculture, the final text suggests that the problem concerns ‘the
greening of empty land outside forests and plantations, thus situated on
people’s land (In. tanah-tanah milik rakyat), generally dry paddies (In. tanah-tanah
tegalan). On Java alone this category comprises no less than about 1,5 million
[hectare] (about 50% of all dry paddies). These need actually (if possible) to
be converted into protection forest (In. hutan lindung).’29 The last sentence
in particular must have scared farmers. Many may have felt as if they were
digging their own grave when supporting the government in this matter. Not
surprisingly, therefore, ‘the interpretation that greening is reforestation outside
forest areas is not always accepted,’ as a forestry official at a meeting of
forestry graduates remarked.30
Finally, with regards to nature protection in this period, the policy and
related practices of the Indonesian government were very limited. The
Indonesian government did not share any of the frames behind the nature
protection or ‘conservation’ discourse as it was increasingly called at the
international level.31 It did border some conservation areas, but ‘due to insuffi-
cient funds’32 that was about it. Furthermore, it ‘politely’ rejected any offers
27 Dauvergne 1997, p. 81. That is not much, indeed, considering an annual cut of at least 1,5
million ha (Dauvergne 2001, p. 151).
28 Greening Field Discussion and Operation held in Solo from 9-13 September 1968.
29 Achlil 1969, p. 3. Hutan Lindung is defined in art. 3(1) of the Forestry Act of 1967 as ‘a
forest area set aside for water regulation, the prevention of floods and erosion and the
protection of soil fertility’.
30 Achlil 1969, p. 4 emphasis added.
31 This term had been promoted by the nature protectionmovement as it was not as backward
looking as ‘preserve’. It was meant to transmit ‘a more positive and constructive message’
(Holdgate 1999, p. 17 citing Sheail). In the United States ‘conservation’ was initially linked
to irrigation andmeant ‘to construct reservoirs to conserve spring floodwaters for use later
in the dry season’ (Hays 1959, p. 5). As Hays notes, in its core the term has also been about
the ‘efficient’ use of natural resources.
32 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p.: III-68.
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from the IUCN, to, for instance, protect rare species.33 Such rejections were
‘disguised either as bland encouragement or the forwarding of notes to other
departments’, as Boardman notes.34
13.2 LAW
In 1967 the Indonesian Parliament and the government agreed upon a new
Forestry Act.35 This act had two official purposes: First, to regulate the increas-
ing economic activities in the forest areas, and second, to replace the old and
diverse colonial regulations in this field.36
Pembangunan appears literally in the act in the category of ‘production
forest’ (In. hutan produksi) which, according to art. 3 (2), must be used ‘to fulfil
the needs of the society in general and especially of pembangunan, industry
and export.’ It is also mentioned as the second interest forests are to serve
according to art. 6 (b).37
Apart from this direct reference to pembangunan the act also paved the way
for the development of tourism in natural environments. Actually, this idea
was based on a 1964 policy that had aimed for ‘using certain nature and
wildlife reserves in the interest of the people (tourism).’38 The 1967 Act intro-
duced for the purpose of tourism development a new category of forests, i.e.
recreation forest (In. hutan wisata). These were, together with the game reserves
(In. taman buru),39 the first instrument for the economic exploitation of natural
beauty and resources by allowing certain recreational activities.40 This act
thus formed the beginning of a new trend, i.e. that institutes of the nature
protection discourse were transformed into instruments for an increasing
exploitation of Indonesia’s flora and fauna for tourism.41 Tourism, and thus
also tourism in conservation areas, apparently had been discovered as a
potential additional development strategy.
Next to pembangunan, both the protection against disaster discourse and
the rational forestry discourse reappeared in the act. Eye-catching, and perhaps
33 These were among the only approaches by IUCN since the organisation in that period
mainly focused on Africa (Adams p. 21-2).
34 Cited in Adams p. 22.
35 Act No. 5 of 1967. Another important example of new legislation based on the idea of
exploitation of nature in the interest of the Indonesian people is the Mining Act of 1967.
36 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III 5-6.
37 The other interests mentioned are a. hydrology, protection against floods and erosion and
of soil fertility; c. source of income for the people; d. nature protection for science, culture,
defense, recreation and tourism; e. transmigration, agriculture, plantations and livestock;
and f. other purposes to the general benefit.
38 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-103.
39 Not included in the Forestry Act but nevertheless an existing category.
40 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-18.
41 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-41.
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due to the influence of Dutch trained foresters, forest protection is in a conse-
quent way placed before production throughout the act. In the preamble the
act states that forests ‘must be protected andmade use of’ (In. harus dilindungi
dan dimanfaatkan). Art. 3 mentions as the first of four forest categories ‘pro-
tection forests’ (In. hutan lindung). Likewise, art. 6mentions as the first interest
that forests need to serve hydrology and protection against floods and erosion
and of soil fertility.
The words ‘continuously’ (In. secara lestari) in art. 6 and ‘principle of
continuity’ (In. azas kelestarian) in art. 13 (2) are a reproduction of the rational
forestry discourse as they stress that forest exploitation must be undertaken
in a sustainable way.
Even the nature protection discourse was reproduced in the act as the
existing category ‘reserves’ (In. hutan suaka alam) was maintained (although
apart from that nature protection was no major issue in the act). Maybe these
elements of the act were due to the fact that in the 1960s especially the often
foreign-trained elite began to perceive the deforestation on Java and the
resulting extinction of the Java Tiger as a problem.42 They were to be reserved
for science and culture but also as an object of ‘national pride’ (In. kebanggaan
nasional).43 This formulation also made them part of the nation-building pro-
ject which changed the nature protection discourse from something associated
with colonialism, Euro-centrism and a movement which was opposed to
industrial development and modernity into something acceptable for the
government.44
The government’s factual rejection of the nature protection discourse was
typical for developing countries.45 It started to vanish only in the early 1970s
42 Cribb 2003, p. 37-38.
43 Ex art. 3 (3) a and b.
44 Indeed, the conservation movement, including the international organisation for nature
conservation, IUCN, had always been led by mainly Europeans and Americans and in-
creasingly attracted various groups in Northern countries who in the 1960s started to
question not only the dominant power structures but in fact the industrial way of life (cf.
Hajer & Fischer 1999 and Harré et al. 1999) and to search for a possible alternative. These
included groups as diverse as anarchists, communists, feminists, post-materialists, and eco-
centrists. Some of themwere mainly politically driven whilst others focused on the in their
opinion disturbed relationship between humans and nature. The radical utopias of social
anarchists, anarcho communists and utopian socialists were among others based on the
ideas of Murray Bookchin, Friberg and Hettne. Their ideas oppose capitalism and control
by states, claiming that neither injustice nor environmental problems can be solved without
political change. Another school of thought, including deep ecology and ecosophy, is
reflected in the work of, for instance, Devall, Sessions and Naess. Partly it takes an interest
in indigenous peoples and their relation towards nature, and partly it challenges the
anthropocentrism of all mainstream thinking (Adams 1995, p. 93-95). For another good
introduction into a variety of these utopias see (De Geus 1998). For a detailed description
of the history of IUCN and its activities in the various parts of the world see (Holdgate
1999).
45 Adams 1995, p. 22.
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when the nature protection/conservation discourse shifted towards ‘sustainable
development’. By then, conservation lobbyists increasingly tried to sell their
ideas with utilitarian justifications46 and developmentalist arguments. This
turned out to be an important step in gaining the support of governments and
NGOs in developing countries, as we will see in the next chapter.
46 Cf. chapter 9 of Jepson 2002; Holdgate 1999, p. 108.
14 Sustainable development discourse under the
New Order
The sustainable development discourse began to emerge in the early 1970s.
Where the international conservation discourse in its beginnings had been
propagated by nature protectors and later been transformed first by left-wing
activists in the Western countries and then by Western governments,
sustainable development was introduced by scientists of various disciplines
searching for solutions to environmental problems. Its core concept was
introduced at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm in 1972.1 Subsequently many others, including the Brundtland
Commission and international governmental and non-governmental
organisations such as UNEP and IUCN, adopted it.2
The concept of sustainable development was born out of a rather un-
expected marriage between arguments in favour of development, environ-
mental protection and human rights protection. Such a marriage had seemed
impossible for a long time because especially the movement promoting nature
conservation presented itself and was perceived as opposed to any develop-
mental or even human activities in nature reserves.
What helped bring these three strands together was in the first place that
the story of the earth being in crisis gained dominance.3 Problems were in-
creasingly being defined as global4 and as requiring a global solution. De-
forestation, for instance, was said to form a great danger for the entire earth.
It threatened the survival of many species – since the late 1980s increasingly
termed ‘biodiversity’5 which carries in it the potential of future medicines –
1 The Stockholm Conference ‘drew institutionally and conceptually on the international
scientific collaboration in the International Biological Programme (established in 1964), the
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE, established 1969) and the
man and Biosphere Programme (MAB, established 1968).’ (Adams 1995, p. 92).
2 Adams 1990, p. 1-2.
3 Adams 1990, p. 6-7.
4 Escobar mentions the 1972 Club of Rome report as the first theory of global problems
(Escobar 1995, p. 193). Sachs observed that the photographs of the world made it possible
to view the planet in terms of global management and that ever since a whole lot of
planetary sciences have emerged (Sachs 1999, p. 36).
5 Google lists some 27 definitions for biodiversity. Among them are ‘the variety of life on
our planet, measurable as the variety within species, between species, and the variety of
ecosystems’ and ‘the genetic, species, and ecological richness of the organisms in a given
area’. The turn to biodiversity indicates an increasing importance of medical arguments
in favour of conservation.
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and had an impact on the global climate. Sustainable development promised
to be a global solution fromwhich all stakeholders were to benefit. Therefore,
what made the discourse attractive was its optimism.6 Through the merger
of what were long thought to be irreconcilable interests it suddenly seemed
possible to solve every problem. Adger notes, for instance, that
‘the rhetoric of UNCED was almost exclusively dominated, we would argue, by the
belief that these so-called global environmental problems are in some way
“solvable” through globally co-ordinated action.’7
In the second place, the great ‘flexibility’8 and thus unspecific concept of
sustainable development enabled this remarkable discourse coalition. It
appeared to be broad enough for proponents of development, environmental
protection, and human rights protection and created the feeling of having
found a way out of a dead-end debate to save the earth. This ‘good news
rhetoric’,9 together with the fact that it did ‘not demand radical change of
policy direction’ and simultaneously allowed to ‘make high-sounding state-
ments with very little meaning at all’, made it very attractive to govern-
ments.10
In the third place, the conciliatory nature of slogans11 for it, including
‘ecological modernization’,12 ‘greening of industry’ and ‘partnership ethics’,13
created a common language, which at its surface had a high ‘greenspeak’14
content.
However, this is not to say that ‘green arguments’ or even ‘green values’
came to dominate the discourse. On the contrary, at its core stood develop-
ment, as an analysis of the 1987 report of the Brundtland Commission shows:
‘The report after all, focuses less on the negative consequences of economic growth
on the environment than on the effects of environmental degradation on growth
and potential for growth. It is growth (read: capitalist market expansion), and not
the environment, that has to be sustained.’15
Yet, not all authors agree on this centrality of development. Adams, for
instance, holds that the sustainable development discourse ‘has deep roots
inNorthern environmentalism. It has embraced ideas about development rather
6 Adger, et al. 2001, p. 702.
7 Adger et al. 2001, p. 682.
8 Adams 1990, p. 3.
9 Jamison 2001, p. 17.
10 Adams 1990, p. 3-4.
11 Jamison 2001, p. 17.
12 Hajer 1995, Hajer & Fischer 1999, p. 3.
13 Fischer & Hajer 1999.
14 Harré et al. 1999.
15 Escobar 1995, p. 195.
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late and rather selectively’.16 In my opinion, however, based on the Indonesian
case, the emphasis on development was a prerequisite if the new discourse
wanted to bridge the gap between developmentalists and environmentalists,
and also between industrialised and developing countries.
The third strand that sustainable development tried to integrate was the
‘social aspect’ of development, whichwas an attempt to accommodate human
rights protection arguments. In the context of conservation this new focus
resulted in the emergence of human rights arguments from the late 1970s
onwards,17 i.e. that policy also needed to take the fate of people living close
to or evenwithin reserved areas into account. This was new indeed, since prior
to this time policies had either denied or ignored the existence of these people
and in any case criminalised their activities in reserved areas. For conserva-
tionists this new rhetoric did not mean any change in the objectives or instru-
ments but rather an additional field of attention. Inmost cases they interpreted
it to mean that these people needed to be convinced to resettle in another area
rather than that they were entitled to a livelihood, development or self-deter-
mination within a conservation area.
Supported by the wave of democratisation and participation in the 1990s
the social element received a new impetus which culminated in the concept
of ‘co-management’: the people living close to or in conservation areas were
increasingly perceived as the key to success. If they were not attributed an
acceptable role, the argument ran, the conservation project would definitely
fail. As we will see in part IV the precise meaning of co-management, and
especially the question of who should be authorised to participate in co-
management schemes, remained contested in practice. The more romantic
conservationists together with certain human rights activists speaking on behalf
of indigenous peoples, increasingly focused their attention on the rights tradi-
tional and indigenous peoples should have in relation to nature – reserves
or resources-, rather than the more inclusive term of local communities. This
has changed slightly only from the year 2000 onwards. It resulted in a ‘Theme
on Local Communities, Equity, and Protected Areas’ (abbr. TLCEPA) formulated
by theWorld Commission on Protected Areas (abbr. WCPA) and the Commis-
sion on Environmental, Economic, and Social Policy (abbr. CEESP).18
Of even greater importance, the discourse once again embracedmanagement
as its core-solution. Certainly, this was not new: science had already defined
it in colonial times as the only solution to problems of overexploitation and
16 Adams 1995, p. 88.
17 Already in 1974 the UNEP/UNCTAD Cocoyok Declaration called ‘any interference in the
ability of people to secure basic needs […] a travesty’ (Fortwangler 2003, p. 27). See Fort-
wangler also for more details about the further developments of this element gaining
influence in the discourse.
18 The latter strives for recognising the ‘rights of local communities in the development and
implementation of conservation policies and strategies that affect the land, waters and other
natural and cultural resources that they relate to’ (Fortwangler 2003, p. 30).
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nature destruction. However, some of the more politically and spiritually
motivated groups adhering to the nature conservation discourse had attempted
to formulate an alternative that envisaged, among other things, ‘traditional
people’ and their knowledge as the more appropriate point of departure for
what they considered the right treatment of nature. The sustainable develop-
ment discourse, in its turn, did not leave any space for doubts about their
failure.
The managerialism had one important effect: it depoliticised highly political
issues. Porter summarises this point as follows:
‘First is the appeal to common, undifferentiated interests, nowadays globalized
as Our Common Future and under the organic metaphor of One World. This is
contrasted with the corrupt, parochial interests displayed by governance and
economic life today. A moral imperative is presented with which it appears un-
reasonable to disagree. Themoral appeal in turn legitimates a technocratic response
and the authority of a new kind of superintending manager in order to analyse
the system and to direct the changes needed.’19
This left little space at the policy level for explicit dissenting opinions about
what sustainable development should aim for. In addition, many projects due
to their avoidance of politics by definition have been failing to effectively
address issues of wealth and power.20
The second core-solution of the sustainable development discourse, how-
ever, definitely originated from the nature conservation discourse: aware-
ness.21 This, again, had great implications for the positioning of people. As
‘awareness’ or ‘consciousness’ is usually applied to issues related to the en-
vironment, natural resources or nature, especially scientists in favour of en-
vironmental protection ofwhatever form became very influential. They defined
the problems and often also the solutions to these problems. Those who
adopted their discourse also created a comfortable position for themselves,
especially when transforming it in a way that someone else was being blamed.
For instance, a government that accused swidden cultivators of destroying
‘nature’ or ‘natural resources’ and pledged to raise awareness would demon-
strate that it was taking the problem of nature destruction seriously without
positioning itself as being responsible. By contrast, whoever opted for contest-
ing the discourse for whatever reasons was classified as ‘irrational’, ‘un-
conscious’22 or ‘not yet aware’. The use of the different words is, by the way,
very much determined by who is talking and what kind of values he is pur-
suing. Generally, ‘not yet aware’ is favoured in contexts of nature protection
whereas ‘irrational’ is used more in contexts of resource management circles.
19 Porter 1995, p. 81.
20 Cf. Adams 1995, p. 98-99.
21 Cf. Harré et al. 1999, p. 79.
22 Cf. Escobar 1995, p. 195.
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Thus, in the former case, people who do not care for ‘nature’ are regarded
as people who have ‘not yet seen the light’ and thus need to be ‘enlightened’
by missionaries or even saviours, which comes in its rhetoric very close to
a religious movement. By contrast, in the latter case, people are characterised
rather as something that comes close to ‘stupid’ or ‘uncivilised’ and positions
them primarily as someone in need of a good teacher.
In sum, the positioning that results from this alleged lack of knowledge
together with all the other advantages the marriage between development,
environment and – although to a lesser extent – human rights created, in-
creased the discourse’s appeal and contributed to its dominant position.
14.1 POLICY
From the moment that development-arguments were also used in the context
of conservation, the Indonesian government increasingly institutionalised the
discourse. It even became one of the most eager signatories of international
treaties and a frequent host of conferences in the field. The following sections
therefore show an institutionalisation of what on first sight appears as a pure
conservation discourse combinedwith elements of the sustainable development
discourse. The latter enabled the government to embrace conservation projects
as a new development strategy and by doing so to transform the conservation
discourse to its own ends.
According to Emil Salim,23 who in 1978 was to become Indonesia’s first
minister for the environment, the StockholmConference in 1972was his – and
the Indonesian government’s – ‘first exposure to environmental concerns’. At
first he was suspicious, fearing for ‘yet another conditionality’ the rich coun-
tries tried to create to protect their own economies. ‘However, Indira Gandhi,
who chaired the Indian delegation, invited me and some others and she
convinced me that environmental destruction also had its effects on poverty.’
After reporting these new ideas to the cabinet and being appointed to chair
a new committee focusing on the environment, Salim tried to learn as much
as possible about the environment. When he turned to theWorldbank for help
it turned out that people there were not yet interested in the matter: ‘Only
James Lee and he advisedme to contact [the two NGOs, JA] Friends of the Earth
and Environmental Defense for information’. In the end, Salim found the
Canadian government ready to help.
In his later attempts to institutionalise sustainable development and es-
pecially its environmental elements, Salimwas backed by President Soeharto:
‘Personally he loves the environment. He always told me that he used to play
in the forest and to wash buffaloes but that the rivers are dirty now.’ Only
23 The following paragraphs are based on the author’s interview with Emil Salim on 11 July
2005 in Jakarta.
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later, ‘when his children had grown up did the problems start. Whowas close
to the President? His children were! We could no longer control the flow of
information he was receiving.’
Despite the backing of Soeharto, Salim recalled that his work in the cabinet
was difficult. The hardest thing for him was to convince other ministers of
the importance of accounting for environmental costs. Within the cabinet he
often stood alone:
‘Every time I raised my hand the Minister of Industry would say “oh no, the price
goes up again.” The Minister of Mining would say “what does a protected forest
provide for?” After all, conservation does not increase the revenues. I would react
“but who is solving the problems of erosion, habitat loss etc.?” Likewise, the death
rate of babies is not reflected in the price of polluting industries, but this kind of
talking is for many Chinese! None of these arguments are rewarded by themarket.
The other ministers were all conventional economists. But I was fighting to get
the price right and not to get the right price. If there is a market failure the govern-
ment must intervene.’
Apparently, Salim’s arguments did not convince the other ministers. The story
dominating their thinking was one of ‘we have too little money so we need
to keep the price low in order to sell much’ rather than ‘our resources are
scarce and vulnerable so we need to protect them’. This illustrates nicely how
unspecific the sustainable development discourse is. In Indonesia, but certainly
also elsewhere, it allowed for quite oppositional frames.
According to Salim there was also another explanation for the reluctance
of his colleagues to embrace his arguments for environmental protection.
Added to the fact that his colleagues were conventional economists, they were
according to him also ‘political animals’24:
‘A term of a minister is only five years. So you look only for short-term results.
Politicians want quick, tangible results. So does George Bush. Indonesia is not
unique in this respect. Politicians want ribbon cutting! What is a healthy environ-
ment? It is not tangible! So, I don’t blame my colleagues.’
In particular, his co-operation with the Forestry Department was difficult.
‘Only with Djamaluddin25 could I co-operate. Forest is money. It is God given.
It is BIG money. Most people in the forestry sector become greedy. I kept pleading
for selective cutting. It’s like hair. Don’t cut everything. Don’t cut it bald. However,
the Department of Forestry is struggling hard to open up all forests for production.’
24 Cf. Snellen’s four rationalities theory developed in the context of policymakers. Snellen
differentiates a political, economic, scientific and legal rationality (Snellen 1987).
25 Djamaluddin Suryohadikusumo was Forestry Minister between 1993 and 1998.
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In fact, these two quotes show that Salim explained the unwillingness of his
colleagues to accept his specific frame of sustainable development in terms
of not being able to resist the temptation of using and securing one’s power.
Although he did not often succeed in convincing his colleagues he still had
not turned into a cynic. He was not frustrated but still called it a ‘challenge’
to fight for the environment: ‘It gives you adrenaline, you become a fighter.
Politics is fighting! If you don’t fight, it is all bullshit.’
The strategy he chose was building alliances with countervailing forces
including the press, educational institutions and Islamic groups.
‘Islamic groups really understand. If you pray you need clean water so you need
clean rivers etc. Indonesia is a religious country. So, for instance, in Bali where
people love eating turtles Santris help to preach to people to conserve turtles.’
However, the strategy did not help everywhere. In the Forestry sector, for
instance,
‘forestry associations were among my biggest enemies. They were all co-opted by
the government. Foresters depend on the government for jobs so they kept quiet
about the ongoing exploitation. They were supporting the destroyers more than
the protectors of the forests so sometimes I was really lonely [in my struggle].’
Apparently, those in favour of exploitation had chosen the same strategy as
Salim. But he was not as convincing since given that he could only offer them
arguments and not jobs.
That sustainable development was increasingly included in Indonesian
policies and that Indonesia in the 1980s even embarked on conservation
projects does not mean that Salim succeeded in convincing other Indonesian
policymakers of the importance of environmental issues. Jepson’s research
has shown that acceptance of such projects was based on strategy rather than
on the internalisation of arguments.26 One consultant remembered that the
government ‘had shown some interest [in national parks, JA]. I think they said
“we should do something about national parks because everyone else is [emphasis
added].”’ This quote reflects a desire to keep up with others, especially with
developed nations. This was also one of the key arguments that convinced
then president Soeharto: ‘[A] long-term technical advisor recalled that the
simple argument that national parks were part of the structure of a developed
nation state was the one used with Soeharto and “he believed it”.’ Another
argument that convinced the Indonesian elitewas that ‘they couldmakemoney
from national parks through tourism.’ In other words, as argued above, they
presented conservation as an additional development strategy. A finalmotiva-
tion was that the Forestry Department wanted to look good while continuing
26 The following paragraph is based on the findings by Jepson (Jepson 2002 chapter 9).
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to exploit the forests. In the words of a staff member ‘they needed some PAs
[protected areas] so they could log the rest without being blamed.’ This was
probably also the reason why there was a permanent struggle about which
areas should become the object of the project. In its second phase the UNDP/FAO
project also included the preparation of a National Conservation Plan, which
IUCN lobbied for in preparation of its bigger project of a World Conservation
Strategy. Jepson cites a long-term technical advisor speaking about themotiva-
tions for accepting this as saying:
‘[Forestry] would go along with anything like this as long as somebody came up
with the money. They were always keen on surveys and knowing what was going
on [meaning what resources they had].’
Thus, also according to the findings of Jepson, Salim was one of the few who
was convinced of one particular environmental argument, i.e. that environ-
mental degradation increases poverty. For most of the other policymakers the
values underlying the international conservationist discoursewere ‘definitely
not’ the main motivation for the Indonesian government to embark on a
conservation project.27 They apparently listened more to exploitation argu-
ments and arguments of modernity and symbolism.
The wide range of arguments in favour of sustainable development, or
in other words, the unspecificity of this discourse, is thus responsible for the
impressive number of Indonesian policies after 1972 that refer to sustainable
development. The 1973 BroadGuidelines of State Policy (abbr. GBHN) pleaded
for the ‘rational’ (In. rasional) and ‘wise’ (In. dengan kebijaksanaan yang menye-
luruh) use of natural resources and for ‘taking the needs of coming generations
into consideration’ (In.memperhitungkan kebutuhan generasi yang akan datang).28
From 1978 onwards, the notion of ‘natural resourcesmanagement’ (In. pengelo-
laan sumber daya alam) started to replace the sole ‘use’ (In. dimanfaatkan) of
resources.29 With its introduction the Indonesian policymakers aimed to
ensure that development can continue (In. pembangunan yang berkesinambun-
gan).30 This management should be ‘suitable’ (In. sesuai or tepat). Though such
adjectiveswere not defined in the documents and therefore left a considerable
freedom for the implementation. After the United Nations Conference on the
Environment and Development in 1992 (UNCED), the documents increasingly
contained references to sustainable development (In. pembangunan secara or
yang berkelanjutan). To achieve this goal, paraphrased as the ‘highest possible
welfare for the people with attention for the maintenance of the function and
27 Quote by an expatriate president of an Indonesian-based conservation foundation. One
exception to this rule was PrijonoHardjosentonowho in the late 1960s headed the conserva-
tion section (Jepson 2002, chapter 9).
28 Aziz 1994, p. 413.
29 For example, Aziz 1994, p. 302, 371.
30 Aziz 1994, p. 318.
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balance of the natural environment’, natural resources should be used in a
‘planned, rational, optimal and responsible way’.
Likewise, conservation and terminology related to it has been taking a
prominent place in Indonesia’s policies since the late 1970s. Here, we can
observe the following development: Repelita III (1978-1983) usedmost notably
the notion of a continuance (In. kelestarian) of natural resources and the en-
vironment. Other important notionswere ‘care’ (In. pemeliharaan) for replanted
areas and ‘prevention’ (In. pencegahan) of new soil damage.31 Repelita V (1988)
introduced the term konservasi. Though it appeared in addition to the older
terminology, the text did not define konservasi. Its use seemed to be quite
arbitrary without a special meaning or intention, as the details will show. It
first appeared in combination with soil,32 in regards to the prevention of new
damage mentioned above. In a following section konservasi was linked to the
forest.33 According to the text it needed to be ‘increased’ (In. ditingkatkan),
which is to stress that Indonesia has been practicing it for a long time
already.34 The stated objectives for forest conservation were to protect eco-
systems, to develop research, science, education and tourism.35
Not surprisingly, after UNCED in 1992 and the adoption of the biodiversity
convention, Repelita VI (1993-1998) had a much larger section on forest con-
servation. It stated that there was a need for inventories and ‘forest use
arrangements’ (In. penatagunaan hutan) to, among other things, conserve the
benefit of the ecosystems. Both formed a precondition for, among other things,
the establishment of protected areas. The plan stated furthermore that dry
forests (In. hutan tanah kering), swamp forests (In. hutan rawa), hydrological
forests (In. hutan perairan) and ‘special natural characteristics’ needed to be
conserved to protect ‘genetic material, biodiversity and ecosystems’ (In. plasma
nutfah, keanekaragaman hayati dan ekosistem) and to ‘develop nature reserves
for tourism’ (In. cagar alam wisata).36 This section is interesting, firstly, for
its increase in objects for conservation, and secondly, for the addition of two
new objectives. These, i.e. the protection of genetic material and biodiversity,
show the influence of UNCED.
Turning to the question of which actors the policies blamed for nature
destruction and overexploitation we encounter ambiguity. On the one hand,
the Indonesian government adopted the (in itself new) element of the conserva-
tion discourse that pleaded for attention for people living in or close to areas
with limited access. It hosted in October 1978 the 8th International Forestry
31 Aziz 1994, p. 371.
32 Aziz 1994, p. 236.
33 Aziz 1994, p. 237.
34 This is a general characteristic of themacro policies. The texts often demand that an activity
or approach should be ‘increased’ (In. ditingkatkan), ‘perfectionated’ (In. disempurnakan),
‘further developed’ (In. terus dikembangkan), or ‘continued’ (In. terus dilanjutkan).
35 Aziz 1994, p. 238.
36 Aziz 1994, p. 92.
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Congress entitled ‘Forest for the People’. Addressing the congress, vice presi-
dent Adam Malik pleaded for developing a social, people-friendly forestry
policy. It was, however, far from clear what was meant by this. The Congress
only declared that the ‘world’s forests must be maintained, on a sustainable
basis for the use and enjoyment of all people’ and that ‘a maximum amount
of employment must be afforded in rural areas.’37 These objectives had
already been the focus of earlier Indonesian policies and remained the focus
of later ones, albeit without achieving the results hoped for.38 This has been
partly due to the fact that the government tried to have people change from
(semi-) nomads into permanent residents.39
On the other hand, the policies primarily related the destruction of nature
to ‘the people’ (In.masyarakat or rakyat), especially those making a living with
swidden cultivation. These were often seen as a source of trouble since their
loyalty to the state objectives was doubtful. After all, they were not keen on
leaving their lifestyle behind and adopting a mainstream lifestyle. This, one
could interpret as not recognizing the state and its main objective of develop-
ment. In addition, swidden cultivators were ‘widely blamed for the creation
of so-called “green deserts”, large areas of alang-alang grass (imperata cylin-
drica), which can become the climax vegetation when tropical rainforest is
cleared extensively and repeated fires prevent forest regrowth.’40 The New
Order government portrayed swidden cultivation as ‘irrational’ and ‘old-
fashioned’ (In. kuno, literally ‘ancient’) as the subtitle to a photograph in a
history of the Forestry Department states: ‘[…] this kind of ancient [In. kuno]
agriculture is a waste of natural resources, which forms a problem for
conservationists who try to tackle it’.41 Despite its reference to ‘conservation-
ists’, the reference to ‘waste’ shows that the New Order adopted the natural
resources management rather than a romantic conservationist discourse. In
addition, it shows that the government regarded swidden cultivators as people
with practices of the past that were no longer acceptable in a modern Indo-
nesia.
The impression that it was mainly swidden cultivators that were blamed
for nature destruction is also given by the choice of instruments directed at
actors. The first – and only – such instrument is found in Repelita I and states
that ‘swidden cultivation, which is unproductive, destroys natural resources
and environment and hampers the socio-economic development of swidden
cultivators themselves, needs to be controlled.’ This control should take the
37 Perhutani 1978, p. 3.
38 Safitri 2005, p. 2-3.
39 For more see Barber 1989.
40 Cribb 2003, p. 40-41.
41 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-47. Hays has shown convincingly that themainmotive
of conservationists in the United States of America was to rationalize the use of natural
resources. Portraying swidden cultivation as a ‘waste of resources’ follows this very line
of argumentation (Hays 1959).
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form of ‘resetelmen’, training and supervision (In. pembinaan), and information
(In. penerangan dan penyuluhan).42 Also Repelita III (1978) mentioned the need
to increase ‘the people’s awareness’ (In. kesadaran masyarakat) of the importance
of the continuity of natural resources and their ‘feeling of responsibility’ (In.
rasa tanggung jawab) for conserving the forest.43 This instrument was specified
five years later by mentioning the need for control of swidden cultivation (In.
perladangan berpindah) and for information programs (In. penyuluhan).44 These
two instruments remained the sole actor-oriented ones for the rest of the New
Order Period. Interestingly, the documents remained vague about who ‘the
people’ consist of aside from those swidden farmers. There was, for example,
no reference whatsoever to entrepreneurs in the logging or mining businesses.
Although Repelita IV (1983) for the first time generally acknowledged that
mining can cause environmental damage, it did not express a need to address
actors in this sector.45 Obviously, the policymakers considered the protection
of business to be more important than identifying and addressing all actors
for their possible role in nature destruction and overexploitation.46
As the government kept blaming swidden farmers, it, not surprisingly,
has always been reluctant to adopt the international discourse on indigenous
peoples with its emphasis on safeguarding the rights of these communities.
When the international community increasingly developed policies and
guidelines for the treatment of indigenous – formerly called tribal – commun-
ities, Indonesia kept arguing that its population predominantly consisted of
indigenous peoples.47 The government preferred to refer to its tribal peoples
as ‘isolated’ (In. terasing), which somehow ‘lost touchwith themain processes
of social, religious, political and economic change’ andwhich the government
therefore, in its argument, needed to guide to the mainstream.48
As a consequence of this argument the Indonesian government also did
not adopt the human rights element of the sustainable development discourse,
or the claim of conservationists that traditional people are inmany cases good
– if not better – protectors of nature than the state. Rather, it opted for trans-
forming the discourse in such a way that conservation appeared to be an
additional development strategy. In this way, it did not acknowledge any
directive role for local, traditional or indigenous communities.
42 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-45-9.
43 Aziz 1994, p. 371.
44 Aziz 1994, p. 305.
45 Aziz 1994, p. 308.
46 The New Order government would never have admitted such a bias, however, as parlia-
mentary debates on the Biodiversity Act in 1990 show (see chapter 18).
47 Persoon 1998, p. 281.
48 Persoon 1998, p. 289. Yet, although defining tribal peoples as ‘deviations’ from the main-
stream (Persoon 1998, p. 295) bears a clear connotation of backwardness and primitiveness,
the Indonesian government still preferred the euphemistic term ‘terasing’ to other references
which were more outspoken in this sense (Persoon 1998, p. 287).
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So far, I have analysed the conservation related sections of the GBHN and
Repelitas. In addition to these, there are four other important policy documents
I want to mention here: the National Conservation Plan for Indonesia (abbr.
NCP) of 1981, the Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia (abbr. BAP) of 1993,
the Agenda 21- Indonesia (abbr. A21I) of 1997, and the Indonesian Biodiversity
Strategy and Action Plan (abbr. IBSAP) of 2003.
The NCP was the first building block for Indonesia’s system of national
parks. It argued that conservation is needed to ‘preserve as much as possible
of the planet’s genetic diversity for the enjoyment and benefit of mankind.’
This formulation, especially the notion of ‘enjoyment’, pointed to the under-
lying conservation discourse. The notion of ‘benefit’, on the other hand, was
a reproduction of more utilitarian arguments, i.e. arguments based on the
conviction that the value of nature depends on its utility for mankind. This
is even more evident in the case of the second conservation goal the NCP
mentions, i.e. ‘to keep open the widest range of man’s future development
options’ (emphasis added). To achieve these two aims the NCP prescribed the
development of national parks. National parks were very much compatible
with the sustainable development discourse and attractive to the Indonesian
government since they combined conservation with tourism. This combination
already had a predecessor in the Indonesian recreation forests. Furthermore,
national parks were accepted as a new instrument among nature protection
officials at the Forestry Department since they hoped that this compromise
with those in favour of development would produce better results than the
strict reserves and wildlife reserves.49
However, it is also interesting to note that the Indonesian government’s
choice for this originally American instrument was very much a question of
coincidence, of the Americans being in the right place at the right time: accord-
ing to a former high-ranking forestry official the government could have just
as easily chosen the European ‘protected landscape’ instead if the consultants
involved in the preparation of the NCP had originated from Europe.50 The
most important differences between these two kinds of instruments, both
recognised by IUCN as conservation areas,51 is that a national park in principle
49 Personal communication with official at Conservation Section, Forestry Department, Jakarta,
17 May 2001.
50 Personal communication with former director of nature protection at the Forestry Depart-
ment, Lukito Daryadi, 9 May, 2001, Jakarta.
51 IUCN defines seven categories of protected areas: ‘strict nature reserve/ wilderness pro-
tection area managed mainly for science or wilderness protection’; ‘wilderness areas
managedmainly forwilderness protection’; ‘national parksmainly for ecosystemprotection
and recreation’; ‘natural monuments mainly for conservation of specific natural features’;
‘habitat/speciesmanagement areasmainly for conservation throughmanagement interven-
tion’; ‘protected landscapes/seascapes mainly for landscape/seascape conservation or
recreation’; and ‘managed resource protected areas mainly for the sustainable use of natural
resources’ (www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/wpc2003/pdfs/outputs/pascat/
pascatrev_info3.pdf).
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is considered uninhabited by humans whereas a protected landscape is a
conservation area under cultivation. The higher population density in Europe
is the major reason for the European preference for this sort of conservation
area, so at least for densely populated areas this conservation instrument could
have formed a good alternative to national parks.
Be that as it may, the NCP confirmed Indonesia’s choice for national parks
as the newmajor instrument for conservation. According to the NCP these were
necessary because ‘habitats outside reserves will largely be converted or
destroyed’ and since ‘the survival of wild species outside reserves cannot be
relied upon.’ This, together with the notion of ‘enjoyment’, leads me to two
of the underlying assumptions of the drafters of the NCP: first, that national
parks can effectively protect what needs to be protected and second, that in
principle all people will want to visit such areas for recreational purposes.
The second assumption in particular also appears in the emphasis the NCP
puts on ‘adequate access’ to national areas and in the recommendation to create
at least one national park in each province.
The Biodiversity Action Plan was a follow-up to the Biodiversity Conven-
tion, which had been signed at UNCED in 1992 by 158 countries despite many
unresolved issues which were hidden behind its ambiguous language.52 It
differs in at least five respects from the NCP. First, it was, according to its
foreword, prepared not by the Forestry Department’s consultants but ‘as a
national consensus’ by theNational Development PlanningAgency (Bappenas),
the Forestry Department, TheNational Institute of Science (LIPI), theMinistries
of Agriculture, Environment, and Interior, provincial and local governments,
universities, national professional organisations, the private sector, NGOs and
international organisation.53 Second, it was less optimistic about the effective-
ness of conservation as it defined the goal of conservation as ‘to slow the rate
of biodiversity loss’.54 Third, it was very explicit about ‘sustainable develop-
ment’ due to the fact that it was drafted after UNCED. Fourth, it for the first
time stressed that it was not wise to focus exclusively on protected areas, as
‘well-protected and managed [...] represent only 8 percent of the nation’s land
surface’ and that consequently ‘[p]rotection forests, selectively logged forests and
other disturbed habitats will come to play an increasingly important role in con-
servation as primary forest areas continue to decline.’55
Still, it formulated the objective to ‘establish an integrated protected area
system covering all major terrestrial habitats and approximately 10 percent
52 WRI/UNEP/UNDP 1994, p. 156-7 One such disagreement centred, for instance, around
the issue of how much money the developed world should provide for conservation in
developing countries and how these should account for those funds.
53 Bappenas 1993, p. i.
54 Bappenas 1993, p. 4.
55 Bappenas 1993, p. 37.
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of Indonesia’s land area’56 and the ‘area of marine protected areas to 20 mil-
lion hectares by the year 2000’.57 This objective was, in part, a repetition of
what the Indonesian government had already presented at an international
forum in 1975 as its target for land conservation (see below).58 Fifth, the BAP
for the first time institutionalised the concepts of ‘partnership’ and ‘co-manage-
ment’ that emerged internationally in the early 1990s in the conservation- and
sustainable development discourse by recognising that
‘[a]pproximately 40 million people live in, or are dependent on, resources in the
public forest estate. These people are the de facto forest managers and this must
be recognized. This means recognizing their rights to land and resources and
working with them to develop sustainable systems of forest management, land
restoration and agrosilvicultural production for both local and national needs.’59
This shift was due to the fact that the old approach of closing off protected
areas and policing them began to be seen as a failure and no longer desirable
or feasible.60 The BAP therefore ‘re-examined’ the government’s potential role
in biodiversity conservation and recognised its limitations.61 This change in
approach and a greater role for public participation appear in several of the
recommendations and strategies. There is, for instance a whole paragraph on
community participation62: a call for recognising a ‘range of “peoples’
rights”’,63 several references to the greater role NGOs and community institu-
tions should play in conservation,64 including that they should be involved
in discussions and agreements about the boundaries of protected areas and
that ‘regionalworkshops [should be held] to discuss theNational Biodiversity
Action Plan and its implementationwith provincial authorities, NGOs and local
communities [which should result in] Provincial Biodiversity Action Plans
incorporating national, provincial and local priorities’.
However, despite all these changes toward a more realistic and yet also
a more ‘people-oriented’ rhetoric, the BAP still maintained the old emphasis
on awareness and technical solutions such as funding and training for institu-
tional strengthening. Consequently, the BAP reads on the one hand like a guide
for investors, one designed tomake new investments ‘effective’.65 On the other
hand it reads like an attempt to provide a policy solution to different argu-
ments about the failing implementation of conservation policy thus far.
56 Bappenas 1993, p. 34.
57 Bappenas 1993, p. 40.
58 Jepson 2002 citing Hardjosentono.
59 Bappenas 1993, p. 43.
60 Wells & Brandon 1992.
61 McCarthy 2006, p. 222.
62 Bappenas 1993, p. 43-44.
63 Bappenas 1993, p. 48-49.
64 See, for instance, Bappenas 1993, p. 50,52,56.
65 Bappenas 1993, p. 6.
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The Agenda 21- Indonesia was designed in 1997 by the Ministry for the
Environment and the UNDP after consultation with NGOs, universities and
government agencies. Themain advantage of this advisory rather than legally
binding document is that it is written in Indonesian, which at least in theory
allows for better implementation than English documents. On the whole, the
document covers many aspects of sustainable development. However, it is
characterised, just as the other documents discussed above, by an extraordinary
ambition that is far from realistic. The section on Biodiversity Conservation
alone covers more than 40 pages, advocating fivemain programmes: effective
protected areas, conservation in production areas, ex-situ conservation, tradi-
tional knowledge protection, and sustainable biodiversity management with
just benefit sharing. As with most of the impressive documents in Indonesia,
the Agenda 21 has played a limited role. Until 2001 only few sectors and cities
had formulated an agenda for themselves.66 According to a survey conducted
in 2002 many stakeholders did not even know it existed.67 One idea that has
been implemented was to create Integrated Conservation and Development
Projects (abbr. ICDPs) in ten selected Indonesian national parks. ICDPs are, as
their name suggests, an attempt to bring the ideas underlying the sustainable
development discourse into practice.
14.2 LAW
The sustainable development discourse also became institutionalised via legal
regulations. In 1972, 1973 and 1980 the Minister for Agriculture issued four
new decrees. Three of these decrees68 added 36 wild animals to the list of
protected species from 1931. The fourth decree69 determined the criteria for
felling specified types of trees.70 In addition, Indonesia signed and ratified
66 Among these sectors were mining, tourism, and forestry. Semarang, Bandung and Saman-
rinda were the only cities with a local agenda 21 (personal communication with environ-
mental scholar and former expert staff at the Ministry for the Environment Prof. Dr.
Sudharto P. Hadi, 26 September 2008).
67 Bappenas 2003, p. 101 citing Ministry for the Environment.
68 SK Mentan No. 327/Kpts/Um/7/1972, SK Mentan No. 66/Kpts/Um/2/1973, and SK
MentanNo. 421/Kpts/Um/8/1980. In 1974/5 another two types were added to this animal
protection list Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-65.
69 SK Mentan No. 54/Kpts/Um/2/1972.
70 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-42-43.
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conservationist conventions, such as CITES71 (in 1978), the World Heritage
Convention72 (in 1989), and the Convention on Biological Diversity (in 1994).
However, themost important institutionalisations of the conservation and
sustainable development discourse were acts such as the Environmental
ManagementAct (abbr. EMA) of 1982 (amended in 1997)73 and the Biodiversity
71 The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
was signed at Washington, D.C., on 3 March 1973 and amended at Bonn, on 22 June 1979.
It shows some elements of the sustainable development discourse but iswith itsmain focus
on fauna and flora protection in its essence conservationist. An extract of its considerations
shows this: ‘The Contracting States, Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their many
beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the earth which
must be protected for this and the generations to come; Conscious of the ever-growing
value of wild fauna and flora from aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational and economic points
of view; Recognizing that peoples and States are and should be the best protectors of their own
wild fauna and flora; Recognizing, in addition, that international co-operation is essential for
the protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through
international trade; […]’. The Treaty aims at protecting rare species against exploitation
through trade restrictions. All rare or nearly extinct species are categorized in one of the
three appendices. Appendix 1 generally prohibits trade in animals threatenedwith extinction
(though exceptions are possible). The trade in animals listed in appendix 2 should be
controlled. Animals listed in appendix 3, finally, are protected in at least one countrywhich
has asked other parties to assist it in controlling the trade. Regularly, the signatories of
the convention determine which species should be included in which appendix. Three of
the most well-known Indonesian mammals, all of them are indexed in CITES appendix
1, are the Java Tiger, Orang Utan and the elephant. The relevance of this convention is
shown by the following figures.Wiratno notes that in the 1970s therewere a few Java tigers
left, and in 2002 they were declared extinct. Of the Sumatran tiger nomore than 400 animals
are estimated to be left. Their skulls are sold for US$ 1600 in Taiwan, their skin for $3000
(Wiratno, et al. 2002, p. 45). Bakels argues, too, that in Indonesia the economic value is
the major reason for killing tigers etc. on a large scale (Bakels, 2000, p. 6).
72 This Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
entered into force on 17 December 1975. It subsequently entered into force for each State
three months after the date of deposit of that State’s instrument. It ‘provides for the pro-
tection of rare fauna and flora. Under the terms of this treaty, nature reserves which are
officially listed can qualify for funding and technical assistance byUNESCO’ (Pompe 1992,
p. 131). It states that Natural properties should: i. be outstanding examples representing
major stages of the earth’s history, including the record of life, significant ongoing geological
processes in the development of landforms, or significant geomorphic or physiographic
features, or ii. be outstanding examples representing significant ongoing ecological and
biological processes in the evolution and development of terrestrial, fresh water, coastal
and marine ecosystems and communities of plants and animals, iii. contain superlative
natural phenomena or areas of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic importance, or
iv. contain the most important and significant natural habitats for in situ conservation of
biological diversity, including those containing threatened species of outstanding universal
value from the point of view of science or conservation.
73 For details concerning the EMA see Hardjasoemantri 1999. For a discussion of the EMA
see Bedner & Niessen 2003. For an account of public litigation and mediation under the
EMA see Nicholson 2005.
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Conservation Act (abbr. BCA) of 1990.74 The BCA was the implementation of
article 12 of the EMA, which was designed as an ‘umbrella’ under which a
number of follow-up pieces of legislation needed to be drafted.75 As the BCA
was to form the legal basis for national parks, I will describe it in some detail
in part II following my analysis of the parliamentary debates preceding its
enactment. Here, suffice it to say that the act was, among other intentions,
designed to form the legal basis for the – albeit limited – economic exploitation
of certain protected areas and that it was apart from that a continuation of
colonial regulations rather than something new.
14.3 OTHER INSTITUTIONS
Apart from these legal acts the sustainable development discourse was also
reflected in the following institutions:
First, in 1971 a special section for Nature Conservation andWildlife Man-
agement was created within the Forestry Directorate.76 On this section’s
initiative 30 conservation units (In. Balai Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam) were
planned that became responsible for making inventories of the flora and fauna
in the conservation areas, maintaining the borders around the areas, building
and maintaining paths for patrols, and protecting the areas by means of
patrols.77 Their establishment was expected to take a long time. But by 1979,
only 8 of them had been established.78 In 2006 their number had quadrupled,
varying in size and importance.
Second, in the aftermath of the Stockholm Conference, the Indonesian
government formed a committee to design an environmental management
plan. The then State Minister of Development Planning, Prof. Emil Salim,
chaired this committee. In 1978, this committeewas transformed into the State
Ministry for the Monitoring of Development and Environment (In. Kantor
Menteri Negara Pengawasan Pembangunan dan Lingkungan Hidup).79
Third, in 1974 Indonesia embarked on its first internationally funded
conservation project.80 This United Nations Development Programme/FAO’s
Nature Conservation and Wildlife Management Project aimed in both its
74 The full name of the act is Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 1990 tentang
Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam Hayati dan Ekosistemnya meaning ‘Act on the Conservation
of Living Resources and their Ecosystems’.
75 Cf. Niessen 2003, p. 67.
76 Cribb 1988a, p. 344.
77 Eight on Java and one in each province on the Outer Islands Departemen Kehutanan 1986,
p. III-41-42.
78 Thesewere situated inMedan, TanjungKarang, Bogor,Malang, Banjar Baru, Palu, Kupang
and Ambon Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-68.
79 Arnscheidt 2003, p. 50, cf. Wiratno et al. 2002, p. 44.
80 Veevers-Carter 1978, p. 14.
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phases (1974-78 and 1979-82) for expanding the country’s network of conserva-
tion areas. It was funded partly by the Dutch branch of the World Wildlife
Fund (WWF),81 an organisation which had been established in 1961 to raise
funds for conservation projects around the world andwhich also increasingly
got involved in their implementation.82Triggered by this project the
Indonesian government already in 1975 presented at an international forum
a target of reserving ten percent of its land for conservation.83 Another direct
result was that in1977, the area of strict nature reserves almost tripled from
770 615 to 2 624 626 ha.84 Before that, Komodo Island was designated as a
reserve in 1966.85 Statistics report furthermore, that before 1973, 131 strict
nature reserves (907 790 ha), 24 wildlife reserves (2 252 410 ha), 4 game
reserves (134 550 ha) and 2 recreation parks (77 ha) were established.86 How-
ever, from 1973 to 1974 the total area of strict nature reserves had been reduced
from 825 790 ha to 699 440 ha arguing that many reserves, especially on Java,
proved to be too small to effectively protect species from extinction.87 Various
other old reserves were maintained, at least on paper.
As a consequence of the incorporation of the aspect of recreation into the new
economic discourse, nature andwildlife reserveswere partly redefined as areas
open to touristic activities:88 during the period of the second Repelita (1973-
1977), the Forestry Directorate opened 40 nature and wildlife reserves for
tourism.89 Then, in 1980 the Indonesian government declared the country’s
first five national parks: Gunung Leuser, Gunung Gede Pangrango, Ujung
Kulon, Baluran and Komodo. Two years later, when Indonesia hosted the Third
World Congress on National Parks and Conservation Areas, another eleven
national parks were declared, including Pulau Seribu and Kutai.90
1982 was on the whole a year in which Indonesia protected large strands
of forest area as ‘hutan lindung’91 probably due to the fact that the NCP had
been drafted a short while before and because of the above mentioned inter-
national congress.
Later, in the 1990s, Indonesia embarked, as proposed in Agenda 21, on
a number of ICDPs, including in Gunung Leuser, Kerinci Seblat and Siberut
that aimed to reconcile conservationwith socio-economic interests of the local
population in national parks. Critics have argued that these projects in many
81 Jepson 2002, p., chapter 9.
82 The international branch was founded in 1971 (Holdgate 1999, p. 79, Veevers-Carter 1978,
p. 14).
83 Jepson 2002 citing Hardjosentono.
84 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-65.
85 Cribb 1988a, p. 344.
86 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-41.
87 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-68.
88 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. II-103.
89 Departemen Kehutanan 1986, p. III-65.
90 Wiratno, et al. 2004, p. 105.
91 Cf. Cribb 2003, p. 41.
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cases failed to effectively conserve the areas andmainly succeeded in pursuing
development for local communities without changing their attitude towards
nature.92
The fourthmajor institutionalisation of the dominant sustainable develop-
ment discourse was Indonesia’s regular hosting of big environmental confer-
ences, such as the third international congress on National Parks in Bali in
1982. The then Minister of Forestry Soedjarwo, used the congress to declare
Indonesia’s first national parks and tomake public the rather arbitrary govern-
ment’s commitment to reserve ten percent of Indonesia’s land surface.93
According to Jepson, the congress presented a great opportunity for the govern-
ment to ‘promote a conservationist image to the world.’94 This explains why
the government ‘never [seems] short of money for conferences’, as Jepson
quotes one of his expatriate informants.
Fifth, Indonesia started to celebrate ‘environmental day’ every year on June
5th,95 on which it awarded the environmental award Kalpataru96 to encourage
environmentalism, ‘chosen to show that traditional Indonesian culture shared
with modern science an awareness that human prosperity depends on the
natural environment.’97
Sixth, there have been efforts to revitalise so-called ‘traditional’ conservation
measures including theMoluccan Sasi,which is being portrayed as a traditional
taboo scheme to prevent overexploitation of natural resources.98
Seventh, in 1995 a trust fund called the Kehati foundation was opened for
biodiversity conservation. This fund, chaired by Emil Salim after his retirement
as minister, aimed to support local and national initiatives for biodiversity
conservation.
Eighth, there have been efforts to institutionalise the concept of co-manage-
ment, among others in BunakenNational Park, Lore LinduNational Park and
Komodo National Park (see also part IV).
As this enumeration could go on and on, I conclude that the New Order
government massively institutionalised the sustainable development discourse
in its various facets. This is to say that in almost all its policies it reproduced
the concept.
92 See, for instance, Wells 1999.
93 Cf. Jepson who provides a good insight into why it was ten percent. Statements included
‘pragmatism’ (the more territory the more income for the conservation section), ‘they also
have in mind they can change it when they want ‘, ‘high symbolic value with little cost’,
and ‘completely arbitrary[,] it just sounded good’. Interestingly, according to Jepson this
arbitrary percentage has consequently been adopted in the dominant international discourse
on biodiversity conservation.
94 Jepson 2002, chapter 9.
95 Referring to the start of the Stockholm Conference in 1972.
96 This name is derived from the ‘”tree of wishes” fromHindu-Javanesemythology, a bountiful
source of good things for humankind’ (Cribb 2003, p. 42 citing Aichele).
97 Cribb 2003, p. 42.
98 Kissya 1993; see also chapter 7.
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14.4 DISCOURSE REPRODUCTION, TRANSFORMATION AND REJECTION
After the New Order government started to accept and reproduce the
sustainable development discourse or to transform it for its own purposes,
much to its own surprise, the environment became a key subject for NGOs that
were striving for political change in Indonesia or that were opposing the way
the government effectuated development to criticise the government’s perform-
ance.99 In fact, the attractiveness of this discourse for the opposition should
not have surprised the government considering that it had attracted all kinds
of oppositional groups in other countries as well. The criticism of the
Indonesian NGOs nevertheless had to focus on or be related to environmental
issues. This explains the high acceptance of the discourse by NGOs and at the
same time their preoccupancy with human rights issues.100
Criticismwas in the beginningmainly linked to pollution but increasingly
also to conservation issues. Generally speaking there were critics that blamed
the government for not being serious enough about sustainable natural
resources management or conservation, and there were critics that blamed
the government for being too serious. As much of the criticism focused on
government practices, it will be dealt with in part IV. In addition, at the end
of the next chapter I will mention a few examples.
99 Cf. Cribb 2003, p. 43.
100 Kalland & Persoon 1998.
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The fall of the Soeharto-regime in 1998was caused by a severe economic crisis
and took away all remaining political support for the regime. However, this
change in regime did not reduce the dominance of the sustainable development
discourse in Indonesia. But in the post-Soeharto era, stories that hitherto had
to be told low profile surfaced and gained dominance in the public debate.
One such story was about the corruption, collusion and nepotism (In. korupsi,
kolusi, nepotisme, generally referred to as KKN) conducted by the New Order
regime. Solutions were generally framed in a reformist and democratic rhetoric
which certainly also influenced the conservation policies.
15.1 POLICY
Thus, in 1999 the state policy (GBHN) and development plan (now called
Program pembangunan nasional, abbr. Propenas) pleaded for ‘just treatment for
thewhole population’ and equal rights regarding the use of natural resources,1
which calls to mind the concept of ‘pemerataan’ of the New Order discourse.
However, contrary to ‘pemerataan’, the public discourse, due to an increasing
lobby of adat communities (see below), now specifically referred to the need
to reconsider the rights of traditional communities. They were to be given a
say in themanagement of natural resources. This change in approach resulted
in the fact that swidden farmers or other actors were no longer singled out
and named as the main or only target group for control or information pro-
grammes.
A second change came in the approach, namely that the plan identified
poverty as one important cause for the destruction and overexploitation of
natural resources, including the plundering of forests and conservation areas.
Though earlier plans implicitly made the same point by stating that the direct
benefit of the forest for the people living in and around them might help
increase their ‘feeling of responsibility’,2 this plan had become easier on the
people by explaining their behaviour through causes outside themselves.
However, this new approach changed nothing about the overall tendency to
1 Government of Indonesia 1999, p. IV11, X1-12, MPR 1999, p. 65.
2 Aziz 1994, p. 304, 371.
146 Sustainable development discourse under Reformasi
blame ‘the people’ without further specification. Therefore the term could
include all layers of the Indonesian society. Still, the policy documents create
the impression that it is still primarily poor people living in and adjacent to
the forests that are being held responsible for destruction and overexploita-
tion.3
Many people in Indonesia interpreted the Reformasi rhetoric as a new
possibility to legitimise their non-compliance with the existing legal regulations.
They sawReformasi as awell-deserved chance to better their economic situation
after, as they would argue, the political elite had done so for the last 32 years.
In press reports and government reactions, however, such people were por-
trayed – just as in the past by the colonial, Sukarno and Soeharto govern-
ments – as ‘wild occupants’ (In. perambah liar), ‘wild loggers’ (In. penebang liar),
‘wild miners’ (In. penambang liar) and ‘wild inhabitants or occupants’ (In.
pemukim liar).4
In addition, organised crime continued and increased its illegal logging
operations in national parks and other places. Obviously such criminals kept
themselves far from the public debate so it is unclear what kind of arguments
they would have used to justify their operations. In any case, their behaviour
reflected that they thought that the forests existed for exploitation and eco-
nomic profit rather than for any other purpose.
The fact that the respect for national park boundaries nearly vanished from
1999 onwards led tomany cries for more and better enforcement of the existing
rules.5 This shift towards a renewed emphasis on law enforcement is also
reflected in macro-policies. In 1999, the programme dealing with conservation
areas attached to the development-plan aimed at increasing and continuing
the life-sustaining function of the forests. This is to be achieved through no
further specified development (In. dibina dan dikembangkan).6 Of this, only the
security aspect was dealt with inmore detail. The programme urged to ‘imple-
ment integrated forest security with the active participation of society and
related agencies (In. instansi terkait), in co-ordination with the local security
3 It is interesting to note that there has been, just as in the international discourse, little
attention paid to the role of the consumers in other countries with their ever increasing
demand for, among other products, tropical timber.
4 For instance, Banjarmasin Post 13November 2000, ‘Supremasi HukumLemah, PetiMarak.’,
Banjarmasin Post 9 November 2000, ‘Lima Tahun Lagi Hutan Kalteng Habis.’, Kompas 31
January 2001, ‘TN Kutai Sulit Diselamatkan’, Kompas 13 October 2000, ‘Tragedi Kehancuran
Hutan Kaltim’.
5 For an overview see Wilshusen, et al. 2002. For Indonesia see, for instance, Newsgroup Pela
4 December 2000, ‘Deklarasi Senggigi’, Suara Pembaruan 1 February 2001, ‘Emil Salim: Jangan
Gegabah Eksploitasi SDA; Keruskan TamanNasional MakinMemprihatinkan’, Pikiran Rakyat
7 February 2001, ‘Kondisi Terumbu Karang Hampir 50 Persen Rusak, Habitat Ekosistem
PesisirMakinMemprihatinkan’,Kompas 19 June 2002, ‘PelestarianOrangutanDi Indonesia
Terkendala Penegakan Hukum’.
6 Government of Indonesia 1999, p. 340-341.
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apparatus’.7 The policymakers have thus left the emphasis on establishing
and developing protected areas. Instead, the programme stated that activities
had to help to, among other things, ‘protect conservation areas from destruc-
tion caused by unbridled exploitation of their natural resources’.8 However,
instead of providing some thoughts on how to achieve an ‘active participation
of the society’ or ‘co-ordination with the local security apparatus’ the activities
mentioned included the evaluation of policies for resource management,
conservation and rehabilitation, and the introduction of negative incentives
for resource exploitation in the form of tariffs. By doing so, the text again used
a managerial approach: while indicating that securing the forests was perceived
to be important and that the society, government agencies and the security
apparatus should play some role in it, it failed to realize that implementing
is not a technical matter alone but a highly political process.
Since the frequent reproduction of arguments in favour of law enforcement
did not take away public criticismwithin and outside Indonesia another policy
was revitalized: Social Forestry. At a conference in Bonn in 2003 the Secretary
General of the Forestry Department, Wahjudi Wardono, described the essence
of the policy as follows:
‘Social Forestry is associated with empowering people who live below the poverty
line. This is especially true in remote rural areas, such as in and surrounding forests.
By giving local communities the opportunity tomanage their forests in a sustainable
manner, the government is helping them to reduce address [sic!] some of their most
urgent social problems.’9
Social Forestrywas thus about empowering poor rural people tomanage ‘their’
forests in a sustainableway.With this policy, the government tried to integrate
several objectives: poverty reduction, sustainable forest management and ‘social
justice’.10 This was to be achieved by ‘defining an incentive for the community
to be involved’, by paying attention to ‘short-term income generation’, by
making the operational plan ‘local’ and ‘site-specific’.11 This policy integrated
all keywords that dominated the public debate at the time: poverty reduction,
empowerment, social justice, sustainable forest management, and local. The
blending of sustainable development was still a very effective and for the
government extremely useful concept. By shifting the attention towards social
justice it could present it as new, andmore responsive to the desires and needs
of the people than former policies.
Another important conservation policy document of the Reformasi period
is the Indonesian Biodiversity Strategic and Action Plan (IBSAP) that the
7 Government of Indonesia 1999, p. 341.
8 Government of Indonesia 1999, p. X-6.
9 Ministry of Forestry 2003, p. 4.
10 Rusli 2003, p. 2.
11 Rusli 2003, p. 2.
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Indonesian government finalized in 2003 as an update of the Biodiversity
Action Plan. It was, again, an impressive document. In response to the 1993
BAP, which was still seen as ‘highly exclusive’ and ‘top-down’,12 this time
the process had beenmore participative: it included a first nationalworkshop;
the distribution of about 200 questionnaires about respondents’ knowledge
of biodiversity, the 1993 BAP, and their ‘opinion on how IBSAP should be
formulated, what should be the contents, whether it would need a legal status,
and whether they would subsequently use IBSAP documents as a reference’;13
six regional workshops; the preparation of technical reports through con-
sultants; focus group discussions, the preparation of a draft document and
a second national workshop.
Apart from being criticised for its exclusiveness the BAP had also been
rejected as being donor-driven, so this time the IBSAP was not written in English
but in Indonesian and only afterwards partly translated into English.
If one reads IBSAP carefully, it tried to effectuate a revitalization of the
concept of sustainable development. The importance of this concept, according
to the analysis in IBSAP, had been ‘disregarded’ and made way for pure ex-
ploitationwithout paying attention to sustainability. Therefore, IBSAP identified
as a ‘structural problem’ in the management of biodiversity in Indonesia
‘the development paradigm adopted by the government in the 1970-1990s era, which
had not accommodated the importance of sustainable development of biodiversity.
The government viewed biodiversity as valuable resources to be liquidated in order
to earn foreign exchange, accelerate economic growth and diversify the economic
base (Dauvergne in Sunderlin and Resosudarmo 1997). In otherwords, biodiversity
utilization was based on the principle of total exploitation, quick exploitation and
sale of rawmaterials. Therefore, the rate of biodiversity degradation and extinction
has been increasing as the economy grows.’14
This emphasis on exploitation for economic growthwas alsomade responsible
for what among critics of the New Order had come to be known as ‘ego-
sectoralism’:
‘The economic growth orientation has hampered amore integrated planning because
each sector has to compete to earn foreign exchange fast. In practice, each sector
will disregard policies or regulations of other sectors that may hamper them to
achieve their economic growth target. This made inter-sectoral co-ordination in
resource management a difficult process (MoE 2002).’15
12 Bappenas 2003, p. 2.
13 Bappenas 2003, p. 3-4.
14 Bappenas 2003, p. 64.
15 Bappenas 2003, p. 64.
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Seeing sectoralism as a problem directly pointed towards the well-known
solutions of integration and co-ordination, which, however, appeared difficult
to realize.16 Therefore IBSAP also proposed a new concept as a major strategy:
‘mainstreaming’. This it defined as taking biodiversity – and thus in this case
not the ‘environment’ as in the jargon of the 1970s – into account in ‘all de-
cisions relating to development’17 and as
‘developing a national policy and legal framework that also incorporates the
provisions in relevant international conventions […] followed by and incorporated
in the operational procedures by all levels of regional government in the form of
regional regulation and technical guidelines […].’18
To do so, several new institutions were being proposed, including a national
council on sustainable development (In. dewan nasional pembangunan yang
berkelanjutan), which had been proposed at an international level at UNCED
in 1992. Such a council has also been advocated by a prominent Indonesian
environmental lawyer and activist, Mas Achmad Santosa. In his words, such
a council was badly needed since ‘there was a misperception of sustainable
development which had been interpreted as only referring to environmental
problems’.19
The IBSAP is also interesting for its attention to other implementation
matters. There is, for instance, the new issue of making the policy document
legally binding. In his foreword, the Deputy of Natural Resources and Environ-
ment of the Ministry for the Environment, Dedi M. Masykur Riyadi, made
an interesting remark that suggests how the bureaucracy and other actors value
policy documents:
‘To have a legitimate and effective implementation of IBSAP, it is possible to make
this document legally binding in the form of law (Undang-Undang) or other types
of legal documents.’20
The official in Samarinda quoted in the introduction would have put it like
this: it is a nice document that has cost a lot of effort and energy. Now it is
finished. But it is nothing more than a policy document that will be stored
on a pile or on a book shelf. And yet, althoughmany people in Indonesia share
16 See Bedner & Niessen 2003 on the issue of harmonization, co-ordination and integration
in Indonesian environmental and sectoral law.
17 Bappenas 2003, p. 103.
18 Bappenas 2003, p. 83-84.
19 Media Indonesia Online 7 October 2004, ‘Perlu Ada Menko Pembangunan Berkelanjutan
Dalam Pemerintahan SBY dan JK’. Until now this council has not been formed due to the
resistance of especially the Mining and Forestry Departments. They feared that it would
make KLH more powerful and that it would reduce the importance of the whole cabinet
(personal communication, Sudharto P. Hadi, 26 September 2008).
20 Bappenas 2003, p. iv; see also chapter 4.
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these ambivalent feelings about the importance of policy documents, I do not
think that all of them would draw the same conclusion, i.e. that making it
legally binding would make people take it more seriously. After all, this
conclusion reflects a kind of trust in the strength of legally binding documents
that I did not encounter among people involved in the implementation (see
part IV).
Other strategies for implementation mentioned were capacity building
through ‘dissemination of various laws and regulations, concepts andmethods,
knowledge and technology as well as information on the sustainablemanage-
ment, rehabilitation and conservation of biodiversity’; decentralisation through
providing ‘space to formulate and implement local biodiversity action plans’;
participation andmovement, i.e. ‘create amovement for national biodiversity
management’ by among others prioritizing the involvement of communities,
‘learning’ and ‘genuine implementation’; co-ordination and implementation,
i.e. every government agency ‘needs to take follow upmeasures by formulating
or revising (if already in existence) their respective strategic plans and budget
allocation’; andmonitoring and evaluation through Bappenas, sectoral govern-
ment agencies, communities and the private sector.21
In sum, the policies influenced by the Reformasi discourse were mainly
characterised by keywords belonging to the human rights frame of sustainable
development. IBSAP is special for its attention to matters of implementation.
15.2 LAW
The Reformasi discourse was also institutionalised in law. Preparations for a
new Forestry Act had begun in 1989 when President Soeharto had asked his
new Minister of Forestry to ‘improve’ the 1967 Act. Silva et al. speculate that
international criticism formed the catalyst for this request.22 The same authors
describe how the first ten years of internal discussions led to a draft of merely
‘cosmetic’ changes but that even ‘many senior MOF officials’ kept this bill from
being sent to Parliament since – in line with the Peluso and Vandergeest
argument – they feared that other ministries would claim jurisdiction over
denuded forestry land.23 When in 1998 a major economic and political crisis
forced President Soeharto to step down, the World Bank, with its conditions
for loans, gained influence.24 The reform bill of 1998 ‘incorporated the World
Bank’s market-oriented policy recommendations and promoted community
forestry’.25 However, before handing the bill to the DPR, controversies arose
21 Bappenas 2003, p. 83-85.
22 Silva, et al. 2002, p. 79.
23 Silva et al. 2002, p. 79-80.
24 Silva et al. p. 81.
25 Silva et al. 2002, p. 81.
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about the government’s commitment to community forestry and about a
counter bill produced by the Forestry Department’s bureaucrats. The com-
promise that was reached in 199926 ‘slanted’ towards the Ministry’s interests
by giving them significant say about the concession size.27
What is new in the act in terms of conservation is that it uses ‘conservation
forest’ (In. hutan konservasi)28 as a new supra category for the old ‘reserve
forest’ (In. hutan suaka alam).29 This new category covers the old strict and
wildlife reserves, the conservation areas introduced by the BCA, and hunting
gardens.30 Particularly important from the point of view of tribal groups is
that art. 8 (1) and (2) stipulate that the government can designate conservation,
protection and production forest for a special objective, such as research and
development, education and religion and culture. The management for these
specially designated areas can be given to adat communities, institutions for
research and education and social and religious institutions.31
One issue provoked criticism of mining companies: the act prohibited open
pit mining in protection forests and did not make any exceptions for con-
cessions granted prior to 1999.32 Under serious pressure from these mining
companies, which stated that not changing this new rule wouldmake investors
turn their back on Indonesia, President Megawati signed a governmental
replacement regulation (In. Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang,
abbr. Perpu),33 which overruled the new Forestry Act.34 On August 13th of
2004, Parliament enacted this regulation as law. Both the replacement regula-
tion and the parliamentary enactment refer to legal certainty and the difficult
position the old stipulation could create for the government in the face of
international investment as the main arguments for this change.
Part V of the 1999 Forestry Act is entitled Forest Protection and Nature
Conservation but onlymentions the objective of conservation as ‘safeguarding
forest, forest areas and their environment so that their protection, conservation
and production functions are realised in an optimal and sustainable way’.35
Except for this it does not stipulate anything about conservation or refer to
the BCA.
More generally, the 1999 Act attributes a bigger role to regional govern-
ments, adat communities and society-at-large than the BCA. Article 60 (1), for
26 Act No. 41 of 1999 as amended by Act no. 19 of 2004.
27 Silva et al. 2002, p. 81-82.
28 Art. 6 (2) Act 41/1999.
29 Art. 3 (3) Act 5/1967.
30 Art. 7 Act 41/1999.
31 Art. 34 Act 41/1999.
32 Art. 38 (4); see on the contestedness of this issue Rosser et al. 2004.
33 Perpu 1 of 2004, signed on March 11, 2004.
34 Bachriadi 2004, p. 5. According to Prof. Sudharto P. Hadi, the government was afraid of
being sued by the companies (personal communication, 26 September 2008).
35 Art. 46 Act 41/1999.
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instance, obliges the central and regional government to safeguard (In. penga-
wasan) forests. Article 60 (2) states that ‘the society and or individuals parti-
cipate (In. berperan serta) in this safeguarding’. The regional government plays
an important role as it is authorised to determine in a regional regulation
whether or not an adat community still exists – after having heard adat law
researchers, the local population, local adat leaders and other involved
parties.36 The section on participation gives the right to society to enjoy ‘en-
vironmental quality resulting from the forest’,37 the right to obtain and pro-
vide information and to control the forest development,38 and to obtain com-
pensation in case its access to the forest is removed as a consequence of forest
classification.39 The Act even provides for the possibility of class action40
and a dispute resolution mechanism.41
In sum, the Forestry Act 1999 has incorporated a few basic concepts of
the BCA, forms a compromise of many diverging interests, attributes as a
consequence a bigger role to the regional governments and society, is more
precise in terms of rights and obligations, and even provides for conflict
resolution mechanisms. In this it, far better than the BCA, acknowledges the
political character of natural resources management. However, it also again
depends on many implementation regulations for its effectiveness – how to
determine if an adat community still exists, for example, and others42 – and
still favours production and exploitation more than protection and conserva-
tion, especially since its amendment in 2004 (see above).
15.3 DISCOURSE REPRODUCTION, TRANSFORMATION AND REJECTION
Critics have been wondering how serious the government is about sustainable
development. For many environmentalists, for instance, open pit mining in
conservation areas was definitely not sustainable. They argued that existing
contracts all contained a ‘force majeure’ stipulation allowing the government
to resolve the contract ‘if the government sees it as necessary to save forests’.43
By contrast, entrepreneurs and ministers in favour of continuance of the
contracts argued that resolving the contracts would mean a loss of revenue
for the state and credibility among investors. The debate centred on the ques-
tion of what should be sustainable: the foreign investment or the environment.
36 Art. 67 (2) Act 41/1999.
37 Art. 68 (1) Act 41/1999.
38 Art. 68 (2) Act 41/1999.
39 Art. 68 (3) Act 41/1999.
40 Articles 71-73 Act 41/1999.
41 Articles 74-76 Act 41/1999. For a more detailed criticism of this act see Elsam et al. 2000.
42 Ex art. 67 (3).
43 Bappenas 2003, p. 65; for more information about mining in conservation areas consult
thewebsite of the Indonesian advocacy network onmining JATAMhttp://www.jatam.org.
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Another example of criticism of the government concerns a conservationist
argument put forward by Longgena Ginting, chairman of Walhi:
‘Even “legal logging” through forest concessions can be considered an illegal
operation because it contributes to the killing of our forest. Certainly, this holds
true if we can agree that overcutting is a crime against our natural resources.’44
Ginting called the current practices of logging a crime and consequently
everybodywho did not want or did not struggle hard enough to change these,
a criminal:
‘Unless they want to be called criminals, the Forestry Department and the Asso-
ciation of Indonesian Forest Concessionaires (APHI) must immediately halt this
robbing of the forest. Theymust stop natural forest conversions until the establish-
ment of sustainable forest management.’
As such, he considered the government as much as the actual loggers as the
ones to blame. Since in his eyes the government ‘always turned a blind eye’
to unsustainable forest exploitation and thus failed to perform its task to take
good care of the country’s natural resources, he called for a dialogue about
the future forest management in Indonesia:
‘Let’s first discuss the need to change the existing pattern of forest exploitation.
We must evaluate the forest resources that we still own and calculate whether to
continue with the consumption pattern that is three times our forest’s production
capacity.’
In his opinion, the way in which the Indonesian government interpreted
sustainable development was not sustainable at all. Sustainability would
require a new calculation of how much forest should be opened for con-
sumption. As a solution he proposed not only a dialogue and a simultaneous
moratorium on forest conversion but also the closure of indebted and ineffic-
ient industries, the recognition of land tenure rights, and spatial zoning for
forests.
A closer look at his solutions reveals that Ginting, just like all other pro-
ponents of the natural resources management discourse, pointed at the import-
ance of an efficient use of natural resources45 and a rational approach towards
them. In addition, just like in many other Walhi campaigns, he reproduced
the story of indigenous people being better custodians of nature than the
44 Ginting 2000.
45 Cf. Hays 1959.
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government by calling for the recognition of tenurial rights.46 This added
an element of sentiment and human rights to his argument.
In sum, he accused the government of acting not in the interest of the
Indonesian people because it either tolerated or supported criminal behaviour
and the inefficient and irrational use of the country’s natural resources.
Walhi has certainly not stood alone in the reproduction of the indigenous
people argument. Already in 1993, SKEPHI ‘s director Indro Tjahjono, stated
that his organisation ‘thinks that the role of indigenous people in forest pro-
tection is substantial. Their traditional laws and rights must be recognized.’47
One way to promote this was to help indigenous people organise themselves.
In March 1999, this impulse became a reality: AMAN, the Indigenous Peoples’
Alliance of the Archipelago, was inaugurated (In. Aliansi Masyarakat Adat
Nusantara).
In its declaration, issued at the end of its inaugural congress, AMAN not
only demanded the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and customary
law but also rejected the use of labels the government had been giving to them,
such as ‘illegal cultivators’ (In. peladang liar) and ‘isolated tribes’ (In. suku
terasing), and the use of the term ‘state owned land’ for areas they regarded
as their land.48
In 2002, AMAN, together with more than forty NGOs, issued a joint state-
ment.49 According to this statement ‘the failure of forest governance and
corrupt forestmanagement’ have caused, among other problems, the large-scale
conversion of natural forest, various natural disasters (including forest fires,
floods and landslides), and human rights violations. Failure of governance
and corruption were again accusations addressed to the government for not
taking themanagement of forests seriously enough. In addition, the statement
was an accusation of not taking good care of the Indonesian people. Good
care would not only mean taking into account ecological considerations but
also the security and economic situation of ‘millions of local people and
indigenous communities living in forest areas’. One of the solutions put
forward in the joint statement was to grant tenurial rights to local communities,
which would form the main incentive for them ‘to protect and utilise forest
resources in a more sustainable and equitable way’.
Other keywords usedwere ‘civil society involvement in the process of law
enforcement’ and ‘local initiatives to protect remaining forest resources’. What
46 The moratorium had to last at least ‘until the borders of all indigenous peoples’ rights are
defined’ (Down to Earth 2002).
47 Mult inat ional Monitor 1993, ‘Sacri fycing Sustainabi l i ty’ (http://
www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1993/11/mm1193_11.html). In 1990 his plea
had beenmore nuanced regarding adat law, arguing for ‘reviving’ and ‘modifying’ it. Apart
from that he had also argued for a fair and just international trade and for parliamentary
involvement in the granting of logging concessions (Bourchier & Hadiz 2003, p. 172-175).
48 Down to Earth 41/1999 (www.gn.apc.org/dte/41ama.htm).
49 Indonesian NGOs and AMAN 2002.
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catches the eye in this argument is that non-state actors are presented as more
capable of solving the problems at hand than the state itself. Whereas in this
particular case the argument is made that both indigenous and local commun-
ities should be involved in forest management to make it effective, in other
cases it was often only the indigenous people who were presented as the
solution or better future managers.
It appears that actors outside the government started to accept the
sustainable development and conservation discoursemainly after its adoption
of a more people-friendly language. Only then did it become acceptable,
especially for traditional communities that increasingly claimed the right to
manage conservation areas (pointing at their indigenous knowledge and their
traditionalism). By doing so, they used the discourse to emphasise the political
element of policies that limit popular access to nature and their resistance
against the positioning of the discourse, in particular the claim that local users
of natural resources are the ones who are ‘guilty’. Adger notes that such
counter-discourses generally claim that, actually, local users are victims:
‘International economic relations including international development assistance
are portrayed [by such discourses] as negative interventions and as neo-colonialism
rather than as offering possibilities for trade, income and conservation. Local and
traditional knowledge is seen as a provider of sustainable practices, and local people
will therefore be better off when left alone.’50
However, simply transforming this discourse helped prevent the negative side
effects of the discourse’s elements of romanticism and alternative knowledge
that tended to constitute traditional peoples as people of the past, which would
prohibit them from using firearms and motor boats. As Li has shown, the
Lindu people, for instance, in their fight against a hydro power plant, suc-
ceeded in positioning themselves as traditional but ‘in no sense’ as primitive:
‘The mention of Christianity confirms their nationally acceptable religious standing,
yet little is made of the influence of ninety years of missionary work upon their
“traditional” rituals and practices. They are shown to be in touch with nature and
bearers of tribal wisdom, but by emphasizing the orderliness of the Lindu land
use system it is made clear that there is nothing wild about this scene. […] It is
noted that the Lindu people are not poor. They have an adequate standard of living,
though not luxurious, and they are satisfiedwith their lot. Thus they are sufficiently
similar to “ordinary villagers” not to be in need of drastic changes or improvements
framed as development, still less the civilizing projects directed at masyarakat
50 Adger et al. 2001, p. 703. Compare also to a quote by Shiva: ‘when forests, land and water
are being “developed” or “scientifically managed”, or - one might add - protected for
biodiversity conservation, then they are appropriated from communities whose lives and
livelihoods they supported for centuries.’ (Horta 2000, p. 187).
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terasing. Yet they are unlike “ordinary villagers” in their uniqueness, their special
knowledge, and their attachment to their place.’51
By positioning themselves as traditional but not primitive and as ordinary
but still unique, the Lindu people stressed that they were good custodians
of their natural environment and not in need of state development projects.
In part IV, I will give more examples of how traditional communities have
transformed the sustainable development discourse for their own purposes.
Interestingly, there are a number of arguments against conservation and
the way it is pursued which are not or only rarely being used. First, there is
denial. At the international level, prominent representatives of this include
Lomborg, Stott, Beckerman, and Burroughs.52 They claim, among other things,
that ‘estimates of future extinction rates lack any kind of empirical basis and
are therefore unnecessarily alarmist’.53 They also question the possibility of
predicting species loss, especially of species that ‘have actually not been
discovered’.54 Second, there are those who criticise the proponents for not
being consistent in applying their concepts, such as Stott whowonderswhether
biodiversity conservation should not mean conserving parasites as much as
tigers. Likewise, Horta observed that,
‘some biodiversity appears more equal than others [to conservationists]: while some
land-use systems and agricultural practices enhance biodiversity within managed
landscapes […] such environments tend not to be high priority in conservation
terms.’55
Others again lay more emphasis on the role of northern governments. They
accuse them of favouring the populist environmental discourse but financing
state-centred activities, for instance through the World Bank.56 One might
add that a similar pattern is to be observed among the average Dutch forester
and Northern citizen. In the words of a former Dutch forestry official,
‘the Dutch forester is almost by definition a conservationist and does not like to
discuss timber production at all… although the timber that the Netherlands import
(90% of the total demand) obviously needs to be produced somewhere.’57
Likewise, the average northern citizen supports Greenpeace and the WWF but
at the same time favours buying cheap, tropical products.
51 Li 1999, p. 17.
52 All cited in Adger et al. 2001, p. 707-708.
53 Horta 2000 citing Simon and Wildavky.
54 Horta 2000 citing Mann.
55 Stott 1999; Horta 2000.
56 Horta 2000, p. 196.
57 Personal communication, W.M. Otto, 3 July 2003.
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16.1 DOMINANT DISCOURSES THROUGHOUT HISTORY
In the Indonesian archipelago, already from pre-colonial times onwards there
have existed rules on how to treat nature, reflecting what I have called the
‘spiritualist discourse’. The main argument for complying with such rules was
that spirits owned and inhabited the natural environment neighbouring the
human settlements and that they decided over humanwell-being and therefore
had to be treated with respect. In other words, if members of a community
wanted the spirits to take good care of them they had to do something in
return.Most likely, this discourse served tomake sense of natural phenomena
and one’s life conditions and to create a sense of control for humans. Another
function was the regulation of human-human relations, as it served to claim
resources vis-à-vis other communities. It is important to note that the fear of
overexploitation or extinction of resources did not play any role in the spirit-
ualist discourse. It was not built on a story of nature being in an irreversible
crisis. Instead, it was built on a general trust in the benevolence of the spirits
and their care for the humans who had entered into a relationship with them.
This general trust explains why the rules regarding the respectful treatment
of nature remained negotiable for users of this discourse.
The next discourse that gained dominance was the subjugate-and-rule
discourse. It served to delegitimize existing resource and power claims based
on the first discourse. For the first time the discourse explicitly valued domest-
icated nature above wild nature and encouraged rather than discouraged
cultivation. Themost prominent argument in favour of a subjugation of nature
was that the Hindu gods were inclined to take better care of humans if they
restyled nature from something dark and chaotic into something bright and
ordered. Awelcome effect of cultivation was that forests that had been cleared
could no longer provide shelter to people who did not wish to acknowledge
the authority of a new ruler. A person with the ambition to rule had to demon-
strate his capabilities by subjugating wild nature to demonstrate that he was
not afraid of any of the spirits living therein. Reserves were no longer reserved
for spiritual reasons but rather for the exclusive exploitation by the royal court.
In exchange for being acknowledged as the ruler entitled to enjoy such privi-
leges, a king had to take care of the well being of his subjects.
The first discourse that gained dominance under the rule of the VOC and
the colonial state was the rational forestry discourse. It was the first of three
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natural scientific discourses, propagated by scientists and state officials alike
– who were all to define ‘progress’ as their objective – and that remained
dominant even after Indonesia had become an independent country. Its main
underlying story was the first of its kind: a story of a potential man-made
future crisis, i.e. that the supply of wood would end if the authorities did not
take action to ensure a sustainable yield. This discourse was similar to the
subjugate-and-rule discourse in its non-spiritualist approach. But where the
Hindu-influenced kings had attempted to replace the spirits with some other
benevolent deities to gain power over resources and manpower, the rational
forestry discourse rationalised nature, reducing it to the parts of a direct
economic use. The ideas of this discourse served an additional purpose to
subjugating nature, spirits and people and legitimising new resource and
power claims: maintaining and improving nature’s productivity and perform-
ance.
The second natural scientific discourse that gained dominance among the
Dutch authorities in the Indonesian archipelago was the protection against
disaster discourse. Just like the rational forestry discourse it was based on a
story by foresters about a potential man-made crisis that needed to be pre-
vented. Only this time the envisioned crisis was one of natural disasters such
as droughts and floods. Here, significantly enough, nature was not reduced
to its productive function but appreciated for a protective function that needed
to be protected from human malpractices and ignorance. This discourse was
the first attempt to structurally protect nature, specified parts of it in particular,
not against over-exploitation but against any economic exploitation.
The third natural scientific discourse – nature protection – also argued in
favour of protecting particular parts of nature, both territories and species,
against economic exploitation. What made it different from the protection
against disaster discourse was that it introduced a scientific and a romantic
value of nature. The basis for this discourse was stories about nature as a
source of scientific knowledge andmoral improvement. Other stories and their
related arguments belonging to this discourse were economically motivated
though. One such story was that the crop production was in danger if insect
eating birds were not protected. Another such story was very similar to the
rational forestry stories as it told of animals becoming extinct due to over-
hunting them for trade.
The first new discourse aboutman-nature relations that gained dominance
in independent Indonesia was the pembangunan discourse. With regards to
its conceptualisation of nature it was a marriage of elements from the sub-
jugate-and-rule and rational forestry discourse. The element from the subjugate-
and-rule discourse that pembangunan reproduced was also transformed in the
rational forestry discourse, i.e. that it aimed to build something new, as
opposed to traditional, and something that was man-made, as opposed to
natural. Of course, the New Order government did not propagate this as
restyling nature after a divine or scientific model but rather as using the
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natural riches to finance the development of the Indonesian people. Nature
was thus conceptualised as a means to an end rather than as a direct object
that needed to be ‘re-created’. In this, pembangunanwas similar to the rational
forestry discourse that was also concerned about the productivity of nature.
However, contrary to rational forestry, in its early days pembangunan lacked
a primary concern for sustainability.
That began to change only when the Indonesian government started to
reproduce the rhetoric of the sustainable development discourse that evolved
from a marriage between three formerly separate discourses: conservation,
i.e. the international successor of the old nature protection discourse, develop-
ment – the international umbrella concept of pembangunan – , and human
rights. The sustainable development discoursewas unspecific enough to allow
for various conceptualisations of nature and related definitions of problems
and solutions. Yet, there was one element that did gain dominance: that
something needed to be done to prevent, this time, a global crisis. However,
there was certainly no consensus about the elements and scope of this crisis.
The Indonesian New Order government readily embraced the discourse but
interpreted it mainly as a continuation of or at the most an attempt to sustain
pembangunan.
During the first years of Reformasi nature kept being conceptualised as a
resource supplier. However, the transition to a new regime meant that the
internal struggle of various schools of thought under the umbrella of
sustainable development – development, conservation and human rights –
was being fought more openly.
16.2 POLICY AND LAW
Now that we have seen how pre-colonial communities and kings, VOC traders,
and colonial and Indonesian governments in the Indonesian archipelago
throughout history conceptualised nature we can turn to the question of what
kind of policies and laws institutionalized the dominant discourses.
The spiritualist discourse, to start with, had as its major objective to behave
in such a way that the spirits that inhabited nature would take good care of
the well being of the people living in their neighbourhood. To implement this
policy people formulated rules ranging from the very general, such as living
in peace and harmony, to the very specific, such as prohibitions to cut certain
trees or hunt certain animals, and rules about rituals to be performed before
entering the spirits’ habitat and offerings to be brought after hunting. Im-
portantly, these rules were negotiable. Another type of regulation that had
its roots in the spiritualist discourse had to do with making resource claims.
People claimed trees and terrestrial and marine territories as reserved and
legitimised such claims via the fact that they or their ancestors had negotiated
an agreement with the spirits that owned the resources and territories.
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The policy belonging to the subjugate-and-rule discourse was similar to
that of the spiritualist discourse except that it aimed at satisfying new deities
that were to replace the old spirits. The rules that were to ensure that these
deities would take good care of humans were, for rulers, about subjugating
nature, the spirits living therein and their subjects, as the deities obviously
disliked the spirits and had a preference for a restyled nature that – more than
the wild and untouched nature – resembled their own world. This first type
of rule certainly served to legitimise power and resource claims of new rulers.
To secure these new, royal, resource claims there was another type of rule
that we also, albeit in another form, already know from the spiritualist dis-
course: rules about not entering royal reserves, about not harvesting royal
resources, about not trading products and about paying taxes for resources.
For the subjects of such a new ruler these new rules meant that they had less
direct access to nature and that they had to enter into a new relation of de-
pendency. As long as a ruler took good care of his subjects, however, this did
not necessarily have to result in worse living conditions.
When the Dutch traders and, later, colonial authorities began to think about
a possible crisis in the supply of timber they developed a policy that aimed
at sustaining and eventually improving the forests’ productivity. The rules
belonging to this rational forestry discourse aimed at regulating the exploitation
of forests. The rules, again, were similar to those of the earlier discourses: not
cutting certain trees, or in themost extreme case prohibiting access to particular
forests. But these rules reserved trees and forests only for a certain period of
time until they were big enough or until a forest was recovered. And the rules
were based on a completely different rationale and favoured new, this time
foreign, actors: most notably scientists who attained the authority to define
‘good management’ and the Dutch authorities who on the basis of this new
knowledge claimed authority over all production forests.
The next discourse, i.e. protection against disaster, was institutionalised
in a policy that aimed at protecting humans and their economic activities
against natural disasters, such as droughts and floods. The rules belonging
to this discourse were again not new: the Dutch authorities prohibited the
access to particular forests, only this time not to claim a monopoly for their
exploitation but to protect them against it.
Likewise, the policy built on the nature protection discourse aimed at
protecting certain territories and species against human exploitation. It did
this, however, not to uphold their protective function as in the case of the
protection against disaster discourse but to uphold their function as a source
of scientific knowledge andmoral improvement. To achieve this objective two
types of regulations were issued. The first concerned hunting. Once again,
as in the spiritualist discourse, there were prohibitions and exceptions formu-
lated about the hunt of particular species. None of the instruments, a prohi-
bition to kill particular species, the obligation to obtain a license prior to
hunting and closed hunting seasons, was new. Only the rationale behind them
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was. That was true also for the second type of regulation belonging to the
nature protection discourse: prohibiting popular access to particular territories.
This type of regulation had also been issued under the dominance of various
other discourses. However, importantly, under the nature protection discourse
exceptions were made for certain new actors, such as scientists.
The first policies and laws of independent Indonesia reproduced rational
forestry and the protection against disaster discourse in particular to justify
the governmental re-appropriation of land. Later, the Indonesian government
also started to re-institutionalise the nature protection discourse in govern-
mental plans and activities, including conferences and study trips to other
countries.
The pembangunan discourse, the first ‘new’ discourse on man-nature re-
lations to gain dominance after Indonesian independence, was institutionalised
in development plans and legislation that aimed at regulating the exploitation
of the country’s natural riches. As nature protection did not play any role in
the pembangunan discourse, the legislation, most notably the 1967 Forestry Act,
was about production and protection against disaster only. However, there
was one element in the new legislation that recalled the recreational aspect
of nature protection, i.e. a new category of recreational forests. However,
contrary to the ideas of the nature protection discourse, these recreational
forests were mainly to serve as another development strategy instead of as
a counterweight against development and production.
From the early 1970s onwards, the Indonesian government also increasingly
reproduced the rhetoric of the sustainable development discourse in its regular
development plans and other documents. Conservation elements of the dis-
course were institutionalised in several major policy documents, such as the
National Conservation Plan of 1980 and Biodiversity Action Plan of 1993 and
ratifications of international conservation treaties. In terms of legislation, the
government produced several animal protection decrees, but most importantly
the Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1990 that, just as in colonial times, pro-
vides for the possibility to reserve both areas and species.
All policies and legislation of theReformasi era so far have also reproduced
the sustainable development discourse. They differ from their predecessors
mainly in their relatively stronger focus on human rights issues. The national
development programme of 1999, for instance, very much focused on
communal rights in their relation to natural resources and thus also to con-
servation. The new Forestry Act of the same year again showed the lack of
specificity of sustainable development. It formed a compromise of very di-
vergent interests that were related to the government’s three main streams
of thinking: development, conservation and human rights issues. In terms of
conservation it, again, did not introduce new instruments but only a new
supra-category called the conservation forest.
In sum, therefore, and quite significantly, especially in terms of policy
instruments – resource claims, prohibition of access, reservation and the like –
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little has changed throughout history. What have changed are the rationale
behind and the purpose of rules. Likewise, who benefited from discourses
and policies and the rules built on them and who did not has partly changed,
as the following paragraph will show.
16.3 ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF DISCOURSES AND THEIR
STRUCTURES
The spiritualist discourse was enabling for communities as a whole. Especially
in their relationship with other communities, an agreement that had been
negotiated with the spirits inhabiting a particular natural environment could
be used to make and legitimise claims. The notion of ‘tradition’ was here of
major importance. Whoever could convincingly claim that his communities’
ancestors had negotiated such an agreement could outlaw or at least constrain
competing claims. But also within communities, individuals could use the
discourse in a similar way, for instancewhen claiming or ‘reserving’ particular
trees.
The subjugate-and-rule discourse intended to enable another individual
actor: a person with the ambition to rule over others. Showing the power to
subjugate nature and the spirits living therein would demonstrate that the
power claims of such a person were supported by some other super-power
and thus legitimise them in the eyes of others. Here, a key term was thus not
‘tradition’ but ‘religion’ as this super-power was presented as some deity.
However, in many cases the circumstances, including that the new discourse
still had to compete with the spiritualist discourse and that a ruler himself
had to compete with other persons with equal power claims, obliged such
rulers to listen to the needs of their subjects very carefully.
The discourses that followed enabled the VOC and later on the colonial
and post-colonial state to allocate territories and resources either to production
or other purposes. This time, to legitimise this power the state used neither
tradition nor religion, but ‘science’, which was opposed to both tradition and
religion.
The use of tradition, religion and science has enabled other categories of
actors as well. In the context of the spiritualist discourse those directly related
to the founding fathers of a community have always been given more respect
and influence than those lacking such ties. In addition, in some contexts dukuns
have played a role in interpreting natural phenomena and in defining rules
to restore harmony between man and nature. In the context of the subjugate-
and-rule discourse, religious scholars have increasingly taken over this role.
In the following discourses, finally, scientists were attributed a significant role.
They became the ones to create categories, to define ‘good management’ or
‘good protection’ and to define the present and future of nature. As benefi-
ciaries scientists differ from religious scholars and those with ancestral ties
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in that they have been claiming specific, exclusive rights of access to nature
for research.
Obviously, whenever a new source of legitimacy gained dominance in a
certain context, old sources of legitimacy became disadvantageous for actors.
After all, referring to one’s family ties to support resource claims clashedwith
the ideas of religious scholars and their kings, and of scientists who were, for
instance, convinced of the merits of forest protection against human exploita-
tion. The fact that the legitimacy of tradition has been challenged by religion
and science explains why one category of actors – traditional communities –
that has been constrained by most of the discourses.
As we will see in the following paragraph on participants, stories, argu-
ments and strategies used in debates about nature conservation, there were
also other actors who tried to either benefit from reproducing arguments of
the dominant discourses or from transforming or rejecting them.
However, before turning to this it is important to note that unspecific
discourses have been enabling for many more actors than specific ones.
‘Sustainable development’, for instance, a discourse that the Indonesian govern-
ment as well as its critics readily adopted, was enabling for many actors
because – as a transformation of the existing dominant Indonesian discourse
of pembangunan – it allowed all actors to pursue their various strategic object-
ives.
For the oppositional Indonesian NGOs, the fact that the discoursewas linked
to pembangunan meant space in the authoritarian environment of the New
Order. The vocabulary belonging to pembangunan could also effectively be used
for sustainable development or pembangunan yang berkelanjutan. In addition,
as it was an international discourse it enabled the NGOs to direct international
attention to what they perceived as the government’s poor performance. As
a result, the government’s strategy to keep pembangunan a highly specific
discourse increasingly failed.
For all governments under both the New Order and Reformasi, the
sustainable development discourse has been attractive because it allowed the
government to continue its approach and simultaneously gain international
legitimacy and support. Adopting the discourse thus strengthened the govern-
ment’s position vis-à-vis the international community in the sense that it could
use the discourse to create obligations for the developed world to help Indo-
nesia financially. That this was one of Indonesia’s objectives was also expli-
cated. In 2003, the Secretary General of the Forestry Department Wahjudi
Wardono, for instance, closed his speech in Bonn by saying
‘Ongoing international assistance will make a vital contribution to the achievement
of sustainable forest management in Indonesia. I look forward to continuing success
in our co-operation.’1
1 Ministry of Forestry 2003, p. 8
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Simultaneously, the concept of ‘sustainable development’ also kept strengthen-
ing the position of the government vis-à-vis the population since it legitimised
to some extent its top-down and paternalistic treatment: the government used
it to position itself in the role of the one who defines norms and how to realise
them.
Having said that, the question ofwhy the Indonesian government actually
also institutionalised the conservation elements of sustainable development
remains. As noted above, one explanation is that conservationists increasingly
used developmentalist and later human rights related arguments to sell their
ideas and instruments. It was thus a transformation of the existing Indonesian
discourse that was appealing to Indonesian politicians such as Salim who
strove for development, human rights and poverty alleviation.
However, in addition to this substantive and to the above mentioned
strategic reasons of money, legitimacy and power there seem to have been
two more strategic reasons for the Indonesian government and bureaucracy
to embrace the discourse. These have been on the one hand respect and status,
as Indonesia could manifest itself as a nation that was not inferior to
industrialised nations and on the other hand, especially for the ForestryDepart-
ment, information about forests that could be used for the future exploitation
of forests.
In sum, the unspecificity of sustainable development has enabled both the
government and most Indonesian NGOs to support conservation for strategic
purposes. Not surprisingly, this has added to an omnipresent suspicion among
various actors: no one can ever be sure that someone else means what he says.
It could merely be his or her strategy to use a certain argument, which will
be switched to a completely different argument as soon as an objective has
been achieved. This is an important point to which I will return in part IV.
Because unspecific discourses are enabling for many actors, they are
attractive. One strategy in the struggle about discourse hegemony has therefore
been to find stories that were able to persuade actors with different objectives
to enter into a loose coalition. However, not all actors have succeeded in
finding such a story.
16.4 DEBATING NATURE CONSERVATION: A FIRST ANALYSIS OF ACTORS
In pre-colonial times policies and rules were flexible in the sense that they
were constantly renegotiated. We may assume that most stakeholders could
directly participate in such negotiations. However, the larger kingdoms and
states grew the more centralised the debate about policy and rules became.
Thus, although there must always have been much debate at the local level,
at least since the formation of larger indigenous and colonial states members
of local communities – whether chiefs or small farmers – normally were only
in the position to enter into the debate when state officials or critics working
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in these regions spoke on their behalf. In some contexts they therefore opted
for ignoring a dominant government discourse and the policies and rules based
on it, such as in the case of the Dayak who for many years stayed in an area
reserved by the colonial government. Staying in the area reflected a counter-
discourse, most probably some kind of a (transformed) spiritualist discourse.
Most of the debates described in this part of the study took place at the
national level. They demonstrate that the more frames and discourses that
have evolved themore governments and even departments have been internal-
ly divided. In the colonial period debates were dominated by foresters, sur-
geons and biogeographers – sometimes organised in pro-conservation NGOs –,
state officials working for the Forestry Service, the Economic Department and
some regional officials, and by planters and timber traders. Immediately after
independence the debate took place among officials striving for a
reestablishment of the Dutch forestry science approach and central control
and those striving for social justice in whatever form. But also, outside the
department, a similar struggle was fought that eventually escalated into an
agrarian war between the state and peasants mobilised by the communist
party. Especially from the early 1970s onwards the New Order government
tried to recentralise and control the debate. Then increasingly international
conservationist organisations entered the debate, trying to mobilise support
for conservation within the Forestry Department against the dominant forces
focusing on fast economic growth. Starting in the 1980s the Ministry for the
Environment and new environmentalist and human rights NGOs got increas-
ingly involved in the debate about the environment, and from the 1990s also
increasingly about nature conservation. Where the Forestry Department mainly
represented the interests of the private sector theMinistry for the Environment
and the NGOs, including Walhi and Skephi, focused on environmental and
human rights issues. When, after the beginning of Reformasi, farmers and
planters increasingly ignored borders of conservation areas, the Forestry
Department again appeared divided. Some saw law enforcement as the remedy
and others wanted to explore new forms of participation.
16.5 CONTESTING NATURE CONSERVATION: STORIES, ARGUMENTS AND STRATEGIES
The stories and arguments that the participants in the colonial debate used
fell apart to those that questioned the definition of the problem, questioned
the definition of the solution, or problematised the consistency of governmental
rhetoric and practices.
Stories belonging to the first category included that – without reason –
the government (together with the scientists) accused swidden cultivators of
destroying forests and their protective function, that not forest clearance but
geology caused natural disasters, and that other problems, such as the destruct-
ive effects of nature, were much more serious than for instance the threat to
166 Conclusion part II: Continuity and Change
species and territories. The related arguments all had the same tenor: that the
government needed to redefine problems and solutions either on the basis
of better research about the real source and extent of the problem or on the
basis of a better weighing of interests, and that the government needed to
refrain fromwithholding from certain actors, such as indigenous communities
and plantation holders, the right to exploit nature.
Likewise, the second category of arguments pleaded for at least redefining
the solution. Examples of such arguments were that the government needed
to take into account the economic situation of indigenous communities who
would suffer land-shortage, which was presented as a much bigger problem
than forest destruction, and that the government should consider agriculture
as solution to the problem of maintaining the forests’ protective function as
forest reserves. Again, indigenous communities and plantation holders were
the main stakeholders behind these arguments.
The third category of stories and related arguments, finally, included those
that accused the government of discrimination, as it allegedly granted con-
cessions to plantation holders in areaswhere it denied indigenous communities
the right to cultivate land, and those that accused the government of not being
serious enough, most notably about keeping up the protective, scientific and
recreational functions of the forest. Themain stakeholders behind these stories
and arguments were scientists and all actors that these scientists claimed to
be struggling for.
In the post-colonial debates, not only the governments but also opponents
of the dominant discourses used many stories and arguments similar to the
ones just described. One of these similarities concerned the modern conserva-
tion areas, including national parks. Especially from the 1990s onward, critics
of such conservation areas argued that conservationists were more concerned
about the well being of nature than that of people and thus should rethink
their priorities. Similar to the debate about forest reserves in the colonial period
such critics also argued in favour of another weighing of interests. However,
there were also some additional arguments brought to the fore. The most
important one, the argument that the government should return traditional
rights to adat communities, only had a chance to convince people in times that
the dominant discourse did not totally oppose ‘tradition’. Not surprisingly,
this kind of argument was reproduced especially in the Reformasi period, a
period that followed the collapse of a regime that had dedicated itself to
progress and modernity. This collapse allowed actors to present tradition as
an alternative source of legitimacy.
Telling stories and arguments is, however, only one factor determining
the course of the debate. Another important factor is just how these stories
and argumentsweremade andwhich strategies governments and critics have
employed in their struggle for discourse hegemony.
Governments, to start with, have in some cases attempted to undermine
the trustworthiness of other actors, for instance by portraying them as back-
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ward, superstitious, irrational or stupid. In other cases they have tried to find
a story that was acceptable to as many actors as possible. Examples of such
stories were ‘progress’ and ‘sustainable development’. Such stories were
unspecific enough to allow for various frames. In the case of pembangunan,
the Indonesian government has used yet another strategy: by having its own
version of development reproduced over and over again through the media,
schools and courses for state officials and by sanctioning oppositional versions
it attempted to keep the discourse as specific as possible and thus to tightly
control the discursive structures.
Actors with frames contrary to the government have mainly attempted
to undermine the trustworthiness of their opponents. Some of them, including
scientists among each other, have trivialized observations, denied the applic-
ability of explanations that did not match the dominant way of thinking or
criticised the methodology of their opponents. Others, such as entrepreneurs
and conservationists, have accused their opponents of exaggerating their
problems and thus of not being honest. Critics of the government have in all
periods tried to delegitimize it with accusations of hidden objectives and of
a lack of integrity and thus also by attempting to undermine its trustworth-
iness.
In search of answers on research question one, this part of the study has
focused on conservation policies and laws in the Indonesian archipelago and
the ideas they have been based on throughout history. With this general
understanding of the historical perspective we are ready to zoom in on parti-
cular debates that have taken place in 1990 and during the early years of
Reformasi. These will deepen our insight of how actors have interpreted the
dominant discourse of sustainable development and with what kind of argu-
ments and strategies and with what effect they have tried to mobilise support
in the debate.

Part III
Dominant discourses in Indonesian nature
conservation policy- and lawmaking:
three cases from 1990 to the present

17 Introduction
From the 1970s onward, the sustainable development discourse has dominated
Indonesian policies and laws. Because this discourse was born out of a
marriage between the three formerly distinct discourses of economic develop-
ment, environmental protection and human rights protection it has remained
unspecific. This, as the three cases presented in this part of the book will
demonstrate, has left space for actors involved in policy- and lawmaking from
1990 to the present to try to make their specific frame dominate policies and
laws.
On March 8th 1990, at the start of the parliamentary debates of the Bio-
diversity Conservation Bill he was to defend, the Minister of Forestry argued
that conservation in Indonesia needed to be defined as a subcategory of
development:
‘As already determined in the Broad Guidelines of State Policy the potential of
natural resources and their ecosystems forms part of the basic capital for the
continuing national development […]. Therefore, the management of nature reserves
and conservation areas needs to be directed in such a way that conservation is not
only for the sake of conservation but in the interest of the people.’
With this plea, the Minister contested the environmental frame. His primary
concern was not environmental or nature protection, but ‘the people’. As we
will see later, this he translated in terms of ‘economic growth’.
Nearly a decade later, at a national co-ordination meeting about future
policies organised by theMinistry for the Environment, an official from Bali’s
environmental impactmanagement agency noted that the sectoral departments
were not the right institutions to implement environmental policies because
their main objectives were development oriented:
‘The Environmental Management Act of 1997 has regulated that the sectoral depart-
ments are responsible for the implementation of environmental policies. At the
same time these departments have to issue licenses for the exploitation of natural
resources. We need a strong environmental department.’
This plea, which reflected the dominant frame of the meeting, aimed at a
stronger institutionalising of the environmental frame at the expense of the
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dominant development (i.e. economic growth) frame of the New Order’s
pembangunan discourse.1
Another three and a half years later, a coalition of actors had emerged that
argued in favour of a Natural Resources Management Act. In the opinion of
this coalition
‘the centralist regulations in the field of natural resources management so far neither
protect the sustainability of natural resources and the environment nor give suffi-
cient space for access, interests and rights of adat communities for the control,
exploitation and management of natural resources.’2
The coalition propagated that not only the environmental frame but also a
specific adat human rights frame should replace the present emphasis of
economic growth.
These quotes from different actors very much reflect the discourses actors
in the three cases of policy- and lawmaking, presented in this part of the book,
used to convince their rivals. At the centre of the analysis is how various actors
at certain points in time have struggled to make their version of nature con-
servation policy and law dominant in Indonesia. Apart from providing insight
into the stories, arguments and strategies of actors it will show that especially
practices belonging to the pembangunan discourse have dominated law- and
policymaking during the last two decades in Indonesia and influenced – and
often prevented – the debate of nature conservation.
Understanding the debate and lawmaking practices of the New Order
regime is the basis for understanding the most important Indonesian conserva-
tion act and how it works in, for instance, national parks. Gaining insight into
the dynamics and practices that developed in the law- and policymaking arena
at the beginning of Reformasi creates insight into the continuity and change
of New Order discursive structures and practices that influence the debate
of nature conservation in Indonesia.
The three cases have been chosen for their relevance in the field of nature
conservation in Indonesia. The Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1990 forms
the legal basis for species protection and all Indonesian conservation activities
concerning protected areas. It provides the basis for, among others, all national
parks in Indonesia. The 1999 environmental co-ordination meeting was one
of the first meetings initiated by the government and designed to bring
together bureaucrats, NGOs, and academics after the fall of the New Order.
Its result formed the input for the People’s Congress’ discussions on the
1 ‘Development’ was no Indonesian invention, of course. Rather, it was a discourse that after
the Second World War gained worldwide dominance with the increasing decolonisation.
See, for instance, Heady 1996. The general consequences of this dominance for law are
described in Allott 1980.
2 Draft for the Academic Background Paper for the Natural Resources Management Bill,
9 August 2002.
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environmental paragraph of the Broad Guidelines of State Policy of 1999. Part
of it was directly related to the future of nature conservation policy. The result
of the third process described here, finally, is a draft for a new act that not
so much focuses on protected areas but advocates a radical change of Indo-
nesia’s natural resources policy and law in general. As it still needs to be
debated in Parliament the relevance for the future of protected areas and all
other conservation issues is not yet clear. A final political decision has to be
reached.
In addition to being highly relevant for the course of nature conservation
in Indonesia, the cases are representative for the debate about nature conserva-
tion that has taken place at the three points in time discussed. As indicated
by the quotes at the beginning of this introduction they show a clear shift from
a debate dominated by a centralist developmentalist discourse via a more
centralist environmentalist discourse towards a deadlocked debate between
actors with a decentralised environmentalist frame with attention to human
rights and justice and actors with a centralist developmentalist frame. This
shift was catalysed by Reformasi, a discourse enabling environmentalists and
human rights activists to more openly enter the political arena.
What makes the comparison of the three cases all the more interesting is
that the interpretation and debate of some of the issues that were raised during
all three debates stayed the same, while others changed over time. Of special
importance in terms of change is the issue of participation. Not only the
interpretation of this concept has evolved throughout time but also its
institutionalisation in policy- and lawmaking itself.
The focus of all three case studies has been on analysing arguments and
strategies of the actors involved. In the first case this has been done on the
basis of theminutes of the parliamentary debates on the Biodiversity Conserva-
tion Act. This made it possible to analyse the whole debate in all its details,
except for shorter and longer lobby sessions of MPs and theMinister of Forestry
inside and outside Parliament. In the second case, observations and taping
of parts of the discussions that occurred during the three day co-ordination
meeting as well as informal conversations with participants have formed the
basis of the analysis. The third case, finally, has been analysed on the basis
of various documents, including position papers and documentationmaterial
of the public consultation process, as well as summarizing minutes of inter-
departmentalmeetings and a number of interviewswith key resource persons.
As the three quotes at the beginning indicate the stories and arguments
used in all three cases will tell us much about how various actors have
conceptualised sustainable development. The analysis will also show how
actors made sense of policy and law and the processes that preceded them.

18 The ‘Un-politics’1 in Indonesian lawmaking
in 1990: the parliamentary debates on the
Biodiversity Conservation Bill
18.1 THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT IN 1990: THE CONTEXT OF THE DEBATES
The Indonesian Parliament under the New Order has usually been described
as uncritical.2 To typify their elected representatives the Indonesian public
often used the expressions ‘5 D’s’ (datang, duduk, dengar, diam, duit) meaning
that MPs only came to Parliament, sat down, listened, kept their mouths shut
and received money, and ‘tukang stempel’, meaning that they would agree to
every bill proposed by the government without opposition.
One reason for this image was that at least two groups represented in
Parliament – FKP and FABRI – intended to and in many cases did support the
government in Parliament. After the 1987 elections3 there were four groups
in the DPR: the Golkar group, Fraksi Karya Pembangunan (abbr. FKP), that with
299 MPs represented large parts of the bureaucracy and other so-called ‘social
groups’,4 themilitary group, Fraksi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (abbr.
FABRI), with 100 appointed MPs, Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan (abbr. FPP) with
63 MPs representing the Islamic spectrum, and Fraksi Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
(abbr. FPDI) with 38 MPs representing the former nationalistic and Christian
parties. This small number of groups was due to a forced fusion of Islamic
parties into the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi
1 I borrow the term from Crenson (Crenson 1971).
2 See, for instance, Sanit 1992, Bourchier & Legge 1994, Schwarz 1994, Bourchier 1999,
Ismatullah 2001, Magenda 2001.
3 Elections under the New Order were officially called the ‘party of democracy’ (In. pesta
demokrasi). In reality, however, they were, at least partly, characterised by manipulation
and fraud.
4 GOLKAR was founded by the Indonesian government in 1963 as an alternative to the
Western-style political parties (see, for instance, Hering 1989 and Reeve 1985). It was a
political group for various functional groups, such as technocrats, civil servants, trade
unions, youth groups, and women groups. Under the New Order it was a public secret
that all government employees were obliged to vote for GOLKAR (cf. Liddle 1978, p. 183).
After the introduction of the ‘floatingmass’ policy in 1972 - according to the official rhetoric
designed to enable villagers to concentrate on the material and spiritual improvement of
their lives -, GOLKAR was also the only party that was allowed to organise itself at the
village level, which increased its political influence. See for more information on this policy,
for instance, Babari 1985, p. 136, Bourchier & Hadiz 2003, p. 45-48.
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Indonesia) that took place in 1973.5 The close alliance of FKP and FABRI with
the government meant a potential opposition of about 20 %.
According to the Indonesian political scientist Sanit, one of the important
factors determining the MPs’ performance was their educational background.
After all, lawmaking is a rather technical activity that requires the intellectual
capacity to think through the complexity of the matter under consideration.
Between 1982-1987, 59,1% of the members of Parliament had a university
degree, 17% a high school degree and 18,5% a military educational degree.6
We may assume that the percentages for the period of 1987-1991 stayed more
or less the same.
In addition to educational background, the economic situation of the MPs
remained an issue of concern. Lawmaking requires that MPs can concentrate
on their work in Parliament without having to think about how to acquire
additional income to fulfil their needs. In the early 1980s, however, the average
monthly income of IDR 500.000 was considered hardly enough for a member
of Parliament, especially for the about 30% full-time politicians. As Sanit notes,
many of them, including those with an additional income from something
like a pension or business, ‘very likely felt that [the low] income from the DPR
formed a problem for them to fully concentrate on their jobs as DPRmembers’.7
That lack of a full commitment certainly had a negative impact on the quality
of debates.
Likewise the fact that the government could and did suspend critical
members with the so-called ‘recall-mechanism’ potentially discouragedMem-
bers of Parliament to be too critical.8
However, it would be ‘unfair’9 andwrong to see the Indonesian Parliament
as no more than a machine that uncritically agreed with anything the govern-
ment proposed.10 According to Sanit, although the system made the MPs
dependent on the government, some of themwere still very active and deter-
mined to seriously fulfil their role. Both Sanit and Bedner have analysed the
1986 deliberations of the Bill on the Administrative Courts and both revealed
5 Sanit 1992, p. 11.
6 Sanit 1992, p. 9.
7 Sanit 1992, p. 11.
8 Pompementions art. 4 (g) jis. art. 13 (f) and art. 43 Act 16/1969 as amended by Act 15/1985
as the legal source for this practice Pompe 1999, p. 16. Apparently this right and practice
was abolished from 1999 until 2003. Pompe describes that art. 38 (2) of Act 4/1999 explicitly
abolished this right Pompe 1999, p. 16. Djadijono, on the other hand, reports that articles
85-87 of Act 22/2003 give the right to political parties, the council of honour (In. badan
kehormatan) and chairing committee (In. pimpinan) of the Parliament, the electory committee
(In. komisi pemilihan umum) and the President to discharge and replace members of parlia-
ment. Especially the fact that political parties can recall legislators is criticized at present.
Sugiarto, for instance, fears that it makes legislators too dependent on the party and thus
limits their concentration on realizing public aspirations (Sugiarto 2007, p. 366).
9 Sanit 1992, p. 3.
10 Cf. Bedner 2001.
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that the people’s representatives put forward many problems to be discussed
in the Special Committee. As Bedner notes in his analysis, surprisingly ABRI
was the most critical group.11
More than previous analyses of parliamentary debates under the New
Order this discourse analysis will focus on the very dynamics of the debates.
It will show that the process did not satisfy the good lawmaking standard
requirements (see chapter 4), that lawmaking should be based on reason,
informed by experience, and aim for substantive effectiveness. The analysis
will lay bare the strong discursive structures of the pembangunan discourse
and the government’s strategies to discourage criticism and to quickly end
controversies, and show that the MPs did not dare to trespass these unwritten
rules and lacked effective counter-strategies.
18.2 LAWMAKING PROCEDURE
OnNovember 14, 1989 President Soeharto sent the Biodiversity Conservation
Bill to the Indonesian Parliament. Before and after that it followed the formal
procedure as determined in Presidential Instruction 15 of 1970. According to
the ForestryMinister, who presented the bill, the draft had been prepared and
commented on by the Forestry Department after collecting relevant com-
parative material both within and outside of Indonesia and after several
meetings with experts from the government, academia and practitioners.12
According to Lukito Daryadi, former Director of Nature Protection, a so-called
multi-stakeholders forum, consisting of representatives from the government,
business, NGOs and society, had also advised the Forestry Department. How-
ever, he added, the input of the NGOswas ‘maybe limited’ (In.mungkin kurang)
and ‘not yet complete’ (In. belum complete).13 This quote suggests that the
government was informed about what was going on in the field and how NGOs
defined problems and solutions without necessarily taking these perceptions
into consideration.
The bill had to pass four stages in Parliament. The first stagewas a plenary
session in which the government explained its bill. At the second stage, the
groups presented their first reaction to the bill, followed by the governmental
reaction to the groups’ opinions. At the fourth stage, Parliament formally made
a decision about the enactment of the bill. All of these three stages were very
un-political and formal14 without providing room for debate.15 It was only
11 Bedner 2001.
12 Speech Minister of Forestry, 29 January 1990. Cf. Hartono 1979 describing the general
lawmaking procedure.
13 Personal communication, Lukito Daryadi, Jakarta, 9 May 2001.
14 Sanit 1992, p. 14.
15 Sanit 1992, p. 14.
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at the third stage, in the so-called ‘Special Committee’ (In. Panitia Khusus, abbr.
Pansus), that actual debate took place.
In the case of the Biodiversity Conservation Bill this stage commenced on
May 14, 1990. 30 legislators were appointed asmembers to the Special Commit-
tee (henceforth SC). 11 members of the committee originated from the FKP, six
from FABRI, two from FPP and two from FPDI. Another 17 MPs were appointed
as reserve. The committee was chaired by five MPs: two from FKP, one from
FABRI, FPP and FPDI each. 21 officials of the Forestry Department represented
the Government in the discussions.
In addition to 12 regular sessions the SC held a ‘lobby weekend’ at Taman
Safari in Cisarua. Under the New Order, the term ‘lobby’ was interpreted as
a mechanism to achieve a consensus. After all, that was all that lawmaking
was about: debating with the aim to reach a consensus (In. musyawarah untuk
mufakat). From the Indonesian Independence onward, the Indonesian govern-
ments havemore or less continuously presented this principle as the very core
of Indonesian democracy.16 It has been conceptualised as something that has
its origins in the Indonesian adat and differs from the ‘Western’ more
confrontational style of politics. Adat scholar Koesnoe has pointed to the fact
that various adat communities knew such a kind of a mechanism and that the
People’s Congress in 1968 has attempted to formulate a same kind ofmechan-
ism for the democratic system at the national level.17 As an example Koesnoe
described the five elements of the begundem of the Sasak on Lombok: First,
that each participant had the opportunity to freely express his thoughts on
the issue of discussion without any time limit and without having to take into
account the social position of other participants. The second element is similar
to one of the three good lawmaking standard requirements, i.e. that the dis-
cussion has to focus on the problem that needs to be solved. The third pre-
requisite is that all contributions needed to be based on the will to reach a
solution. Fourth, all participants are expected to act during the debates in a
respectful way. Fifth and finally, all participants are required to respect the
decision taken.18 Not only the four official stages of the Indonesian lawmaking
procedure but also the organisation of a lobby weekend very much reflected
the underlying ideas of begundem and musyawarah untuk mufakat. The overall
aim was to achieve a consensus and to avoid sharp controversies.
To work out the more ‘technical’ questions a working group (In. Panitia
Kerja, abbr. Panja) was formed by 25 legislators. There were13 representatives
from FKP, five from FABRI, four from FPP and three from FPDI. Eight officials
16 It is mentioned in the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. Between 1950 and
1957, Indonesia established amulti-party systemmodelled after the example of theNether-
lands. After that it returned to the 1945 Constitution. For more details on the ‘democratic
experiment’ and the return to the 1945 Constitution see, for instance, Feith 1983, Nasution
1992, Bourchier & Legge 1994, and Legge 2003.
17 Koesnoe 1969, p. 17.
18 Koesnoe 1969, p. 10-13.
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from the ForestryDepartment represented the government. Thisworking group
initially held threemeetings. Subsequently it was split into two sub-committees,
i.e. the drafting committee (In. Tim Perumus, abbr. Timmus) and the small
committee (In. Tim Kecil, abbr. Timcil). The Timmus’ task was to finalise the
act’s articles and to draft their elucidation. The Timcil had to discuss the act’s
title and preamble and to draft the general elucidation.
The most important sessions of both sub-committees took place during
five days in Hotel Horison, Jakarta from June 25 until June 29. Actually, the
discussions within the SC were scheduled to end on July 2 or earlier but they
took longer than foreseen. Nonetheless, on July 19, 1990, only two months
after the committee was formed and after 37 days of deliberation, the Bio-
diversity Conservation Act was enacted. For an act related to other important
acts like the Forestry Act and the Environmental Management Act, and that
replaced colonial regulations and incorporated modern insights about nature
conservation, this seems a very short time.
18.3 STAGE 1: THE MINISTER’S ARGUMENTS TO JUSTIFY THE BCB
On January 29th, Minister Hasjrul Harahap began his speech in Parliament
with a typical story belonging to the sustainable development discourse. He
stressed that the natural resources of the country formed the nation’s basic
capital for all development activities but that, due to the ‘extent of exploitation
activities’ (In. banyaknya upaya eksploitasi), and above all the fact that this
exploitation was happening in an ‘unwise’ manner (In. kurang bijaksana), this
capital was ‘declining’ (In. makin menurun). This he presented as the main
reason to propose this bill to Parliament:
‘The decline of our natural resources and their ecosystems in our beloved country
has already reached a point where it has become very urgent [In. mendesak] and
necessary to quickly take planned and continuous efforts to conserve the natural
resources and their ecosystems. Although these efforts began some years ago the
problems that we have described still occur and continue. This needs to be stopped
quickly and as a first step we consider it necessary to revise the existing regulations
in the field of biodiversity conservation and to improve them in one act, i.e. the
Biodiversity Conservation Act.’
Referring to Indonesia’s support for theWorld Conservation Strategy of 1980,
the Minister thus emphasised that the government had already begun with
conservation efforts but that these had not yet solved the problems of over-
exploitation and nature destruction. The BCB was in his opinion a ‘first step’
to tackle the ‘unwise’ exploitation of natural resources in Indonesia.
This quote already contains two of the four main arguments he was to
present later in his speech. The first one was the need to ‘quickly make planned
and continuing efforts to conserve the natural resources and their ecosystems’.
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By referring to the concept of planning and by labelling the exploitation
‘unwise’, the Minister reproduced important elements of both the rational
forestry and pembangunan discourse. His reference to the notion of ‘continuity’
added an element of the sustainable development discourse.
The second argumentwas the necessity ‘to revise the existing regulations’.
The colonial regulations, he added later, were ‘no longer appropriate’ (In. sudah
tidak sesuai lagi) and the later regulations were ‘not comprehensive’ enough
(In. parsial). As will be shown below, his argument contained two sub-argu-
ments: one in favour of ideological change and one in favour of legal develop-
ment.
In Minister Harahap’s discussion of the colonial regulations the nature
protection elements of the discourse propagated by international conservation-
ists played a minor role. Only his mention of the fact that the existing regula-
tions needed to be adjusted to new developments in conservation, such as
the focus on ecosystem protection and ex situ conservation in zoos and the
like ,directly referred to nature protection. Much more prominent was the
development element of the sustainable development discourse. To begin, the
Minister stated that the existing regulations in the field of conservation focused
purely on protection and not simultaneously on exploitation. His statement
that the colonial regulations did not include new conservation instruments
such as national parks – which also allowed for exploitation – pointed in the
same direction. Finally, he ruled out conservation for its own sake:
‘As already determined in the Broad Guidelines of State Policy the potential of
natural resources and their ecosystems forms part of the basic capital for the
continuing national development […]. Therefore, the management of nature reserves
and conservation areas needs to be directed in such a way that conservation is not
only for the sake of conservation but in the interest of the people.’
What he meant by a ‘conservation in the interest of the people’ became clear
in his next statement. It concerned a type of conservation that people could
earn money with:
‘Natural beauty with its various unique features forms a potential of natural
resources and their ecosystems which can attract domestic and foreign tourists.
The management of such ecotourism activities can create new job opportunities
and apparently has a high potential to give work to thousands of people, whether
educated or not. Likewise, it opens the possibility for business, an increase of the
state income and the development of the areas.’
In this view, conservation was thus a new kind of development strategy, as
the words ‘jobs’, ‘business’, ‘state income’, and ‘development’ indicate. This
is not to say that the Minister limited his understanding of conservation to
the development of conservation areas. After all, he translated conservation
into the trilogy of protection, preservation and sustainable exploitation (In.
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perlindungan, pengawetan dan pemanfaatan yang berkelanjutan). Still, the emphasis
of the colonial regulations on nature protection formed a major motive of the
Minister for proposing the BCB.
However, the Minister did not limit his argument in favour of revising
the existing regulations to elements of sustainable development. In his dis-
cussion of both the colonial and the Indonesian regulations he pointed to the
need of ‘legal development’. The Forestry Act of 1967, the Environmental
Management Act of 1982 and the Fisheries Act of 1985were not able ‘to totally
tackle the problems arising in the field of conservation of natural resources
and their ecosystems’. After reciting a number of articles (though without
providing any information about their substance),19 he concluded that the
BCB would be a contribution to Indonesia’s ‘legal development’. This apparently
meant two things: to make the regulations effective (‘able to totally tackle
problems’) and to replace colonial regulations with national regulations. By
referring to legal effectiveness the Minister presented himself as someone
believing in law as an instrument for material change. His second element
of legal development invoked a powerful symbol of nation-building: the
replacement of colonial regulations was seen as a goal in itself, with no need
to paymuch attention to what aspects of the old regulations were good enough
to be maintained and which were to be changed. The argument in favour of
legal developmentwas also based on legal discourse, stressing that regulations
need to be uniform and integrated, characteristics the colonial regulations
lacked. Finally, the Minister referred to the fact that the state structure had
changed and hence national instead of regional regulations and a redistribution
of authority were needed. This latter argument could have been used in the
context of legal effectiveness as well, but was not. Instead, Minister Harahap
only mentioned that the old regulations allowed very light sanctions only.
This understanding of increasing the regulations’ effectiveness was exceedingly
thin: the higher the sanctions, the more people would comply with them.
TheMinister’s thirdmajor argument in favour of the Biodiversity Conserva-
tion Act was the need for a guideline for future policies:
‘This Biodiversity Conservation Act is not only needed for our legal development
but will also provide a clear direction for our biodiversity conservation policy. By
this, legal certainty will be achieved, for the bureaucracy as well as for the general
public.’
19 For instance, the two articles of the Fisheries Act he mentioned were art. 1(1) ‘Fisheries
are all activities related to the management and exploitation of fish’ and art. 1(2) ‘Fish are
all kinds of fish including other water species.’ As we will see later he wanted to close
the gaps the Fisheries Act left with respect to provisions on the protection of species and
the exploitation and conservation of coral reefs and their ecosystems. Regarding the Forestry
Act, he later explained that it lacked provisions on national parks, great forest parks and
nature recreation parks.
182 The ‘Un-politics’ in Indonesian lawmaking in 1990
This suggests a self-evident, direct causal relationship between a clear guideline
for policy and legal certainty.
As his fourth argument in favour of the BCB, the Minister mentioned the
international campaign against tropical wood ‘certain groups inside and
outside the country’ were launching at the time against Indonesia. This bill
would prove that the Indonesian government was not only exploiting its
natural resources but also ‘seriously striving for’ (In. sungguh-sungguh berusaha)
their conservation. Having emphasized themerits of the financial and technical
co-operation between Indonesia and the international community in the field
of conservation beforementioning this campaign, he suggested that conserva-
tion efforts in the form of this act and the existence of foreign aid in this field
were also interrelated.
In sum, the Minister expected the bill to serve instrumental as well as
symbolic purposes, demonstrating a rather uncritical belief in the instrumental
potential of legislation. In terms of discourse, he primarily used the bill to
institutionalise the development elements of sustainable development in
legislation, regulating a field that used to be regulated by nature protection
arguments.
18.4 STAGE 2: THE GROUPS’ REACTIONS
18.4.1 Reasons and arguments to support the government in issuing this bill
All four groups supported the Biodiversity Conservation Bill. According to
FABRI’s spokesman Zainuddin, the government’s strategy of protection, pre-
servation and sustainable exploitationwas acceptable and convincing. Repro-
ducing what the Minister had said, his interpretation of sustainable develop-
ment consisted mainly of elements of rational forestry and development. In
line with the rational forestry discourse he pleaded, for instance, for ‘rational’,
‘wise’, ‘responsible, thoughtful’ and ‘controlled’ use of resources and for
‘planning’ and ‘management’. By reproducing the Minister’s story that con-
servation can increase the welfare of ‘the people’ he also subscribed to the
idea of development-conservation and pleaded against the idea of nature
protection.20 Zainuddin added another dimension to development-conserva-
tion as he also showed concern about the sustainability of Indonesia’s economic
development: not quickly issuing the act would in his opinion have negative
effects on foreign aid. Development apparently needed to be co-financed by
the outside and also depended on the issuance of this conservation act.
20 The dominant interpretation of pembangunan was always presented in terms of economic
growth for ‘the people’ but in practice the beneficiarieswere only certain segments of them.
See also below on the question towhat extent the BCAwarranted an increase of the people’s
welfare.
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A novel argument in favour of the act, Zainuddin added, was that it should
be enacted in order to implement what other regulations had ordered:
‘The Indonesian people in general very much hope for the issuance of this act. With
it the ideals enclosed in article 33 of the Constitution of 1945 will be completely
implemented sooner. Likewise, what has been determined in the GBHN and Repelitas
will be fully achieved so that the equal distribution of welfare, which is longed
for by the entire Indonesian people, can be achieved sooner. In addition, we are
certain that we will all happily welcome it because it will realise the aspiration
of Act 4 of 1982 [the first Environmental Management Act]. This means that the
safe continuity of humankind will be better guaranteed to be free of the pollution
that already very much endangers the life of humanity in general.’
This response was thus not limited to conservation and development but also
concerned the role of law and how law relates to implementation. Just as the
Minister, Zainuddin, hoped that the act would be more effective than the
existing regulations. His firm statements that this act was what the Indonesian
people ‘hoped for’ and that they would all ‘happily welcome it’ showed little
doubt as to the outcome. As an implementation of other policies and regula-
tions, he argued, the new act would at least help achieve its declared goals.
What is more, enactment of the Biodiversity Conservation Act was even to
serve to show to the world that ‘Indonesia seriously participates in sustaining
the environment and that it seriously implements the act.’
In sum, Zainuddin subscribed to the idea of development-conservation
presented by theMinister. He hoped for an effective regulation of conservation
matters, but he approached this effectiveness in a somewhat naïve way, pres-
enting enactment as an equivalent to implementation and the achievement
of goals.
Just as his colleague from the military group did, Soedarmadji from the
Golkar Group FKP supported the government’s conservation bill with reference
to sustainable development. However, contrary to the Minister and the ABRI
speaker, when dealing with the need for conservation efforts he reproduced
stories and arguments belonging to all three environmental frames: nature
protection, protection against disaster and rational forestry,:
‘The objective condition [In. kondisi obyektif] in various places as symptoms of nearly
extinct (endangered), vulnerable and rare flora and fauna, the occurrence of various
natural disasters, floods and landslides that have resulted in casualties, forest
destruction, increase in unproductive land, increasing disappearance of mangroves,
all these things contribute to the conviction of our group about the importance
and actuality of these problems so that the Biodiversity Conservation Act quickly
needs to be issued.’
He used the same discourses in explaining what he called the ‘objective con-
dition’:
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‘We need to admit that the objective condition at various places shows that we
still lack attention toward, as well as that parts of society lack understanding and
awareness of the efforts to conserve natural resources and their ecosystems.’
His argument in favour of more attention toward the problems presented can
be interpreted as an appeal to rebalance the elements of sustainable develop-
ment and to redirect part of the attention given to the economic aspects toward
the conservation aspects of sustainable development. In quoting a paragraph
from the GBHN, ‘people’s welfare’ and ‘social justice’, he also reproduced the
equal distribution (In. pemerataan) aspect of pembangunan, thus relating the
economic element of sustainable development to the discourse’s human rights
element.
While introducing these new elements, Soedarmadji’s statements also
included the role of this specific law and of law in general. Just as the ABRI
speaker had, he considered the Biodiversity Conservation Act as an imple-
mentation of earlier acts and policies. But he was much more precise about
implementation:
‘In this respect our group sees the need for regulating various aspects of responsibil-
ities and obligations of the government and society in the conservation of natural
resources and their ecosystems […].’
In addition, in line with legal discourse, he pleaded for a law that was to take
into account present and future developments to ensure its longevity. It should
also ‘regulate, unify and integrate’ the existing terminology in order to con-
tribute to ‘clearer and less confusing and overlapping’ rules.
FKP speaker Soedarmadji thus more than the Minister and the military
speaker referred to the environmental frames of sustainable development.With
regards to legal development he appeared less naïve than Zainuddin.
Djafar Siddiq of the Islamic FPP also supported the bill. Just like the
Minister, FABRI and FKP, he criticised the existing regulations using keywords
like ‘too simple’, ‘limited’ and ‘weak’. His unsurprising conclusion was that
the act could be justified by the need for ‘legal development’ and ‘providing
a clear direction for policy’, meaning in the first place clearer regulations.
Future regulations needed to be ‘formulated in a clearer way in order to
prevent differences in interpretation and perception that can form an obstacle
in achieving the desired goal’. This would be theway to achievemore effective
regulations. Contrary to the FKP speaker, Djafar Siddiq saw such regulations
not as an objective in themselves but as a means to an end.
Also new was Siddiq’s criticism of the timing of the act. In his opinion,
the bill should have been proposed earlier, i.e.
‘before we invited tractors and bulldozers into our thick forests, before power saws
sang the song of falling trees and cleared our forests, before our mangroves were
stripped and skinned, before ships packed with waste entered our clear rivers.’
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In addition to voicing this remarkable critique of the government’s neglect
Djafar Siddiq was also the first to explicate the need for a balance between
the three major elements of sustainable development. A discussion of global
problems, showing his familiarity with relevant studies and reports led him
to the conclusion that
‘we must strive to create, develop and take care of a balance in the development
of natural resources and their ecosystems, in fulfilling the needs of society and
future generations and really take into account the sustainability of the natural
resources and their ecosystems to realise sustainable development.’
How this balance should look, what the appropriate way to achieve it would
be and what role the Biodiversity Conservation Act could play, however, he
did not specify, as if there was no need to discuss these issues.
Siddiq did suggest that development had gained the upper hand in the
present situationwhen compared to environmental and human rights elements.
Each sector tended to realise its own interests only, the so-called ‘ego-sectoral-
ism’ (In. egoisme sektoral). This was problematic for conservation given its many
dimensions and the need to involve many agencies. Therefore, in his opinion,
‘the aspect of co-ordination forms an important issue in the planning and
implementation of protection and the control of conservation.’ Again, what
this meant for the act the FPP speaker did not clarify.
Finally, by contrast to, most notably, the speaker of the military group,
he not only saw the Biodiversity Conservation Act as an instrument to silence
criticism but stressed that there was a genuine will to improve the regulations
by learning from existing shortcomings: ‘Ourweaknesses and our shortcomings
become valuable lessons for improvement in the future, and we are indeed
determined to improve them.’ He thus emphasised that he saw the act as an
instrument to effectively regulate conservation.
The last speaker of the day, Nikolaas H.E. of the Democratic Group, also
repeated some of the expectations of the other speakers including those about
legal effectiveness, legal certainty and a clear guideline for future policies,
without, however, sharing the overall optimism about the potential of the
proposed act (as the next section will show).
His interpretation of sustainable development primarily paid attention to
nature’s protective and economic functions. The problems that were to be
addressed were according to him the ‘unwise’ exploitation of natural resources
and the consequent disasters such as floods and droughts:
‘Some time ago already the world realised that the management of natural riches
everywhere tends to decrease as a consequence of the unwise human exploitation
of natural resources with possible dangerous consequences such as floods and
erosion, droughts and other disasters that will be disadvantageous for the people.’
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In addition to this reproduction of a globalised version of the rational forestry
and protection against disaster elements of sustainable development, he defined
conservation very much in development terms:
‘After studying and discussing in a detailed way all existing material including
that present in the BCB, the government’s explanation of this bill, and the aspirations
of the society at large, the FPDI is of the opinion that the motivation for conservation
of natural resources and their ecosystems is in fact a step and effort to exploit
natural resources, being a grant from God Almighty, for the welfare of the
Indonesian people and humanity in general.’
With this emphasis on exploitation he reproduced the dominant pembangunan
discourse interpreting sustainable development primarily as ‘sustaining de-
velopment in the interest of the people’.
In conclusion, all speakers supported the government’s proposal to issue
a new conservation act, emphasizing the need for sustainable development.
However, their frames differed. Three of them limited the environmental aspect
of sustainable development to elements of rational forestry and protection
against disaster. Only the FKP speaker referred to nature protection as well.
Furthermore, compared to the environmental and human rights aspects of
sustainable development, exploitation of natural resources for the people’s
welfare was the most prominent objective for the speakers.
With regard to the role of this specific act and law in general, all speakers
had great expectations, but there was no consensus about the ‘right’ motive
for the act; views on this ranged from foreign criticism and possible conse-
quences for foreign aid to searching for a remedy for the ‘objective condition’
of nature destruction. In addition, all speakers reproduced legal discourse,
including references to the fact that other regulations had ordered the issuance
of this act and to clarity and effectiveness. Regarding effectiveness, the FABRI
speaker showed himself to be very naïve or indifferent whereas most notably
the FPDI speaker doubted the act’s potential to solve problems.
18.4.2 Critical issues
Although all groups raised a cheer for the government’s bill, most notably
the FPDI speaker used the second stage of the lawmaking process to critically
interrogate the Minister about the seriousness of the government’s intention
to really conserve nature, about the exact meaning of conservation and what
conservation would look like in practice. These questions aimed to lay bare
the government’s real motivation for the act and to force it to account for its
activities – or rather lack thereof – so far. The Minister’s responses reflect
important practices belonging to the pembangunan discourse (see chapter 13)
aiming for freeing politics from ideological conflict.
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18.4.2.1 Questioning the seriousness of the government
To start with, Nikolaas asked for additional information about why the bill
had not been produced much earlier:
‘Why is the act only now being proposed although many disasters, such as floods,
decreasing water flow in rivers, elephants that destroy plantations, the occurrence
of new plant diseases, etc., have already occurred among others as a consequence
of clearing the forests?’
While FPP speaker Siddiq had raised the same issue, unlike Nikolaas he had
framed his criticism in poetical language. In any case, the Minister was not
prepared to admit that the international campaign formed the immediate cause
for the bill and chose to not answer the question.
The FPDI also wanted to know what exactly resulted from the meetings
and discussions with academics prior to drafting the bill. Again, the Minister
did not respond.
Nikolaas was also the only speaker who asked for detailed information
about the extent of the problem and the government’s efforts to solve it:
‘TheGroup of PDI hopes for detailed explanations from the government about how
far the destruction [In. kerusakan] of natural resources and their ecosystems has
proceeded and where it is to be found, and what efforts the government has already
undertaken, is currently undertaking and will undertake in the future.’
Once again, the Minister did not provide the information asked for.
Next to Nikolaas, FKP spokesman Soedarmadji also posed some questions.
Hewanted to know towhat extent the government thought that this bill would
effectively supplement the Forestry, Fisheries and EnvironmentalManagement
Acts. This was in fact a critical issue as it could be interpreted as questioning
the coherence, consistency and effectiveness of the legal system. However,
formulating this question in very general terms allowed theMinister to answer
without providing much detail. According to him the act meant an improve-
ment primarily in terms of introducing new categories of reserves and the
ecosystem approach.
Nikolaas was – again – the only one questioning the act’s potential effect-
iveness. Hewondered, for instance, towhat extent the proposed act was indeed
going to silence other countries’ criticism. The Minister said the government
had already taken measures to counter foreign criticism:
‘The accusations are not based on facts. Based on FAO reports […] still 74,5 % of
Indonesia’s landmasses are coveredwith forest whereas in other countries, especial-
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ly in industrialised countries, only 10 to 30 % are covered with forest. […] The
industrialised countries thus twist the facts in their own interest.’21
This shows how the government pursued a double strategy. On the one hand,
it denied allegations from other countries that it was not taking care of its
nature; on the other hand, it expected that these denials were not sufficiently
convincing and therefore it needed this act to demonstrate how serious Indo-
nesia was about conservation. Apart from that, this quote and the lack of
further questions from MPs about how other countries had reacted showed
that the government circumvented awkward questions and that legislators
contented themselves with superficial, avoiding answers.
Besides questioning the act’s potential to silence foreign criticism,Nikolaas
also wondered whether it would be able to ensure the implementation of
reforestation. He reproduced the story of the timber industry’s capacity by
far exceeding the sustainable capacity of the forests and asked for a govern-
mental reaction. Again, this question was left unanswered.
He also wondered who in Indonesia was actually able to prevent the
destruction of nature and whether this bill could be successful:
‘Although conservation efforts have started in the beginning of the 1980s, the
destruction of natural resources and their ecosystems has continued, from then
until now, and obviously the government has not been able to prevent this. Who
in our country will actually be able to prevent this destruction? What guarantee
is there that enacting this bill will regulate or prevent this destruction?’
In response, the Minister said:
‘Actually, this is the joint responsibility of the government and society. The destruc-
tion of natural resources and their ecosystems in this world is largely caused by
people who use them in an unwise manner. Causal factors, among others, are that
some of the people are not yet aware and that there does not yet exist a strong
legal basis for regulating the use of natural resources and their ecosystems. There-
fore the government is resolute to increase the information programmes for the
people and in addition, the government wants to emphasise through this bill that
both they and the society are responsible for conserving natural resources and their
ecosystems.’
TheMinister thus answered a question about capability by referring to respons-
ibility, an inconsistency undisclosed by the MPs.
Nikolaas also questioned the government’s seriousness in conservation
matters by referring to, among other things, the ongoing forest exploitation
as ‘unplanned clear cutting’ (In. pembabatan hutan tak terencana) and by stating
that ‘protection forests were not being protected [In. terlanjur] due to the
21 8 March 1990.
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government’s indifference [In. kelalaian]’. The Minister said ‘not to agree with
the expression used by the group’ and pointed to the ‘principle of continuity’
(In. asas kelestarian) as the basis for the exploitation of production forests in
Indonesia, through, among other things the application of the system of
‘selective cutting and replanting’ (In. Tebang Pilih Tanam Indonesia, abbr. TPTI).
He thus responded to the factual question from PDI by referring to a norm.
Remarkably, however, the Minister did not try to disprove the accusation
of having neglected its tasks. He said the government
‘realized that protection forests fulfilled an important function and role in support
of life supporting systems. Therefore, protection forests that have been used for
other purposes need to be restored. In these cases, the government will give guid-
ance to the people and in certain cases the government can take measures of order
by paying a compensation as regulated by law.’
The government needed to repair this mistake with persuasion or force. What
wasmissing here was an analysis of why the government had neglected these
forests so far, but that question had not been asked.
18.4.2.2 Questioning the meaning and future practices of conservation
In addition to accusing the government of not being able to prevent nature
destruction and wondering about the proposed act’s potential in achieving
that objective, Nikolaas also pleaded for defining the scope of nature conserva-
tion much more broadly than the government had done:
‘Therefore, the PDI group invites us to think about how to conserve the other natural
resources outside those areas to ensure that this act will concern the whole area,
the whole environment and its ecosystems of our country.’
In reaction, the Minister referred to much less far-reaching ex-situ conservation
efforts outside conservation areas, such as zoos, that were already undertaken
by the government and also an object of the bill.
The FPDI speaker took a somewhat ambiguous position on the subject of
isolated tribes. After expressing his support for the government’s policy of
persuading isolated tribes to move out of the forests and to ‘participate in
pembangunan’, he wondered whether nature should not be conceptualised as
including some of these people:
‘However, we also realize that these isolated tribes [In. suku-suku terasing] that live
in these forests form part of this ecosystem, so that if they are being socialised the
question arises whether or not this will destroy the balance of this ecosystem. […]
How does and will the government balance its efforts to socialise [In. dimasyara-
katkan] them and to conserve ecosystems?’
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Predictably, Minister Harahap did not feel much like ‘conserving people’:
‘[…] the government has no intention to conserve isolated tribes in nature reserves.
Efforts to increase the value, quality of life and intelligence of isolated tribes have
already been undertaken in various kinds of programmes. The role of humans in
an ecosystem will soon be taken over by other elements of this ecosystem. There-
fore, the natural balance will still be guaranteed. The government does not want
our peoples, especially the isolated tribes, to become an object for foreign anthro-
pologists that try to keep these isolated tribes as they have been in the past for
their own interest and profit.’
What’s remarkable about this answer is that theMinister here reproduced the
idea of nature protection of a nature being separated from humans (and the
consequence that protected areas needed to be uninhabited) where he in the
beginning of the debate had referred to development-conservation in the
interest of the people. Apparently, only people who already participated in
the government’s version of development were entitled to benefit from con-
servation. Remarkable was also how the Minister readily assumed that dis-
turbing an ecosystem was no problem because nature would compensate for
the disturbance. Would that also hold true for other parts of an ecosystem,
one wonders.
In addition, Nikolaas wanted to know the criteria for establishing conserva-
tion areas, such as national parks, recreational parks and nature reserves.
The Minister replied that criteria would include the biodiversity of plants
and species that were not yet protected in other areas, the type of ecosystem,
the ‘original and undisturbed condition’ of the area, and the size of an area
that had to enable effective conservation.
Showing again his awareness that conservation areas are not empty spaces
Nikolaas also questioned the social effects and implementability of the pro-
posed act:
‘What will be the fate of people that have inhabited these [protected] areas from
the beginning, and also of people living in the coastal areas, what are their rights
and obligations?’
This questionwas left unanswered. Aswas a question about business activities
in conservation areas:
‘What is the fate of the enterprises that already hold an official license and are active
but that if their location is determined to become a conservation area have to stop
these activities? Howwill the government solve this, will they receive a reasonable
[In. layak] compensation? What is the way out of this?’
Nikolaas also appeared to be concernedmore generally about the implementab-
ility of the act. This concern was rooted in past experiences:
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‘From various experiences we know that many laws do not function as intended,
that they differ in practice and that they experience obstacles that are among others
caused by a weak control and a lack of implementing regulations. Consequently,
many violations of laws occur and affect the authority of the government. […]
Considering that the role of control will be very important for the implementation
of this act and for its effects […] the FPDI at this opportunity hopes for explanations
by the government about which efforts will be undertaken in the field of control
in terms of system, personnel, institutions, working patterns etc. so that the act
will really function and be implemented. Also concerning the implementing regula-
tions, will these really be finished in a short time after enacting this bill?’
Control mechanisms, manpower and the issuing of implementing regulations,
a subject touched upon also by all other groups, were thus the core concern
of this question. But he did not link this problem to a possible solution in the
act. For instance, he did not consider the possibility to requiring the govern-
ment through the act to provide for sufficient personnel, but instead, ‘hoped
for explanations’ about the government’s plans.
TheMinister replied in very general terms that in the beginning the existing
institutions were to implement the act and at a later stage these were to be
adjusted to the specific needs. He did not say anything about control mechan-
isms, but saw no serious problems for implementation. Regarding the imple-
menting regulations the Minister eased the minds of the MPs by responding
that they:
‘have already been prepared and will be issued not long after enacting this act.
The government considers the governmental regulations as very necessary for the
BCA’s implementation.’
The final important issue raised by FPDI in the first comments concerned the
act’s space for an active role of the people. Nikolaas pleaded formore attention
to this to make conservation more effective:
‘People are a central element. They play a key role in efforts of conservation of
natural resources and their ecosystems but at the same time destroy these very
resources. The human factor or element can contributemuch to conservation efforts
if they [the people] are given balanced andmatching authorities, tasks, obligations
and responsibilities.’
The Minister said, as quoted above, that preventing the destruction of nature
was a ‘joint responsibility of the government and the people’, thus answering
a question about rights with a reference to responsibility.
Nikolaas was not satisfied with this approach, because he considered the
government’s interpretation of participation as too narrow:
‘This bill does not yet fully reflect the balance [of seeing people as destroyer and
conservator] since it only regulates obligations, prohibitions, and sanctions but
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nothing about the authorities and participation of people. The FPDI interprets
participation not only as mobilisation but also as including the right to veto and
accuse anybody that violates the provisions in this act.’
TheMinister responded that he, too, considered participation to bemore than
mobilisation:
‘the responsibility of the people is actually not limited to mobilisation but the
government also grants rights to the people in accordancewith the existing regula-
tions.’
However, his response demonstrates his unwillingness to deviate from the
status quo and explain exactly what these rights were. It remained unclear
to what extent these rights coveredwhat Nikolaas had asked for. They certain-
ly did not give the people the right to veto the establishment of conservation
areas.
In sum, of the four groups involved, PDI posed the most critical questions.
However, some of themwere formulated too vaguely to force the government
to provide a clear answer. Where they were precise the government avoided
answering them at all or formulated the answer in a way that suited its own
interests. In doing so, the Minister positioned the MPs as people who were
allowed to ask questions but who were not, by definition, entitled to an
answer. The MPs in their turn, due to the structure of the second stage of the
lawmaking process, did not have the opportunity to really enter into a debate
with the Minister or other groups.
18.5 STAGE 3: ISSUES RAISED DURING THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE SESSIONS
Officially, the third stage of the lawmaking process served this purpose of
debate. The analysis will show that the debate suffered from a lack of obliga-
tions to strive for problem-solving and instead ruled by obligations to keep
up the appearance of a consensus and mutual trust.
All groups were asked to provide a list what they perceived as problems.
This inventory (In.Daftar InventarisasiMasalah, abbr. DIM) served as a guideline
for the debate. I will focus on the issues of conservation, participation, imple-
mentability, and sanctions since these issues apparently formed the major
concern of the groups. As it would take too much space to analyse the whole
debate in a detailed way, I have summarized large parts of it. However, to
help create an understanding of arguments and strategies used and to enable
the reader to get a sense of the atmosphere, the first issue from the inventories
for conservation areas is presented in a detailed way.
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18.5.1 Conservation
Within the Special Committee (henceforth SC), one issue of concern were the
criteria for conservation areas and the consequences of such areas for human
beings. FPP urged the government to include an article in the act that obliged
it to first make an accurate inventory of an envisaged conservation area to
determine its ‘potential and carrying capacity’ (In. potensi yang ada dan daya
dukungnya).22 This inventory, Tadjudin Ibrahim said, should be used to deter-
mine the management approach for an area:
‘The reason is that before we determine a basic [management] pattern for an area
which is stated later in art. 7, we certainly should use data from inventories.
Therefore, if the Minister at our first meeting was said to agree [In. berbarengan],23
maybe we are here of the same opinion, that before correcting it we should first
conduct inventories.’
Using inventories was thus presented as better than correcting the approach
afterwards. To convince the Minister, the speaker here referred to an earlier
statement by the Minister himself. Although not presented as such, from the
perspective of effective conservation, this seemed to be a relevant proposal.
It also seemed to be amost reasonable proposal considering the government’s
earlier answer to PDI’s question about the criteria it was to use for determining
a conservation area.24 Yet, FPP was not to succeed in finding support.
In his first reaction on June 8th, the Minister had commented that more
important than inventories was ‘how to finish [In. menyelesaikan] this act’.
However, in the SC, without any clear reason he interpreted FPP’s proposal
as a plea for doing inventories before enacting the BCA:
‘Doesn’t the respected Djafar Siddiq perhaps mean that before this inventory is
done this bill should not be enacted? If that is so our term of office might be
finished before the inventory is finished.’
This misinterpretation provided him a reason to refuse the proposal.
A few days later, FPDI came with its reaction to FPP’s proposal. Its speaker
said they liked the idea but feared stagnation in the act’s implementation:
‘FPP’s proposal is very sympathetic [In. simpatik] indeed because I think this in-
ventory sector [sic] is very important indeed. To prevent overlap later on I think
22 SC 8 and 12 June 1990.
23 The original text is here unclear. Likewise, it is not clear what statement exactly the speaker
is referring to.
24 The answer had been that the government was to use, among other things, an area’s
biodiversity, ‘undisturbedness’, size and the extent to which an area represented genetic
material not present in other areas as criteria.
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we need data about which areas need conservation and which ones don’t need
conservation. However, this can lead to stagnation in the sense that this act will
not proceed if we wait to enact it, if we wait for inventories before conserving.
Therefore I probably agree if this act [and the lawmaking] proceeds but is accom-
panied with inventories so that there will be no stagnation.’
The speaker, Markus W., thus demonstrated remarkable trust in the govern-
ment but also proceeded from the same misinterpretation as the Minister.
Then theMinister came with his official response. He replied that actually
many inventories were done. Then, hemade a typically authoritarian proposal,
i.e. to regulate this issue later in a governmental regulation:
‘Does the FPP not agree with the government that this should be regulated in an
implementing regulation of this act since indeed, as argued by FPDI, if inventories
are included in the act, this [act’s implementation? JA] later can be hampered. […]
Therefore I offer that inventories will absolutely be undertaken […] andwe promise
that we will, once we are finished with these debates, distribute the input for
governmental regulations so that you can see whether it is included there. Although
actually governmental regulations only need to be drafted by the government, but
on the basis of this consensus and deliberation, what is wrong about consulting
FPP about this later on?’
TheMinister thus presented this offer even as a special favour from a friendly
and compromising government, as he stressed he wasn’t required to consult
the groups on drafts for governmental regulations.
The GOLKAR group first called FPP’s proposal ‘brilliant’ (In. briliant) but
then pointed to two other articles in the act that according to its speaker,
Soedarmadji, ‘already contained [In. tercakup] the implementation of inven-
tories’:
Art 17: ‘The sustainable use of natural resources and their ecosystems is undertaken
by paying attention to the continuity of the potential, carrying capacity, diversity
of the natural resources concerned according to the valid regulations.’
Art. 18 (1) ‘The sustainable use of plants and wild animals can be undertaken in
the form of taking care of them for pleasure, investigation, research and develop-
ment.’
However, these two articles of the government’s draft did not oblige the
government in any way to make inventories. In addition, whereas Djafar Siddiq
had opted for an additional article on inventories as a basis for determining
conservation areas, these articles dealt with a completely different issue!
However, as Soedarmadji repeated in his conclusion, thewords ‘investigation’
and ‘research’ ‘already contained’ (In. sudah tercakup) inventories. Therefore,
he concluded that ‘adding an article’ on this issue was ‘not necessary’ (In. tidak
usah menambah pasal).
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The ABRI group finally also got involved by saying that inventories are
‘very important’. However, according to its speaker Sukorahardjo, including
a provision about them was redundant since ‘if we conduct conservation
activities these automatically already cover inventories, i.e. maybe in the early
process of planning.’
In addition, the speaker rejected the proposal on financial grounds:
‘if we include it here it may very much constrain the government because the
money is limited and the problem is vast. So maybe the government needs to
determine priorities what needs inventories first. Therefore, the ABRI group is of
the opinion that this proposal should not be included [in the act, JA].’
These two statements are rather contradictory. The first statement is incon-
sistent in itself as the speaker started off very convincedly (‘they do already
cover’) and then much less convincedly (‘maybe in…’). In addition, if the
inventories were automatically covered it would be inconsistent not to include
them in fear of budgetary shortages. The argument that conservation auto-
matically included inventories thus rather served to legitimise the financial
argument.
At that point the chairman concluded that the issue needed no second
round for debate:
‘FPP’s wish is accommodated, only it will not be placed in the act to prevent fears
that have been uttered by FPDI that the implementation of this act will be obstructed.
TheMinister already promised to soon issue a governmental regulation to regulate
it. What about it, FPP?’
FPP’s Djafar Siddiq began his reaction by claiming that Golkar’s comment was
irrelevant since FPP had proposed inventories for determining conservation
areas and not for the use of resources. Then he reacted to the financial argu-
ment saying that
‘we are aware of the fact that this is an inducement [In. pancingan] to emphasize
how little attention we have paid to inventories so far due to the financial problem.’
It is not completely clear what exactly he wanted to say here. Apparently he
attempted to reduce his proposal to ameans to show that so far little attention
had been paid to inventories. This reduction was the transition to his final
statement:
‘We hope for and we respect the government’s attitude that offered to place it in
a governmental regulation because we want to put forward that it may be part
of the management. […]’
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Thus, the earlier so convinced ‘inventories certainly should …’ was scaled
down to a timid ‘may be…’ and PPP thus accepted the compromise of a vague
promise rather than insisting on its own demand.
Most arguments used to refuse the proposal were thus vaguely formulated
and invalid, with the exception of the financial argument made by FABRI. It
was also remarkable that Djafar Siddiq only reacted on Golkar’s invalid
argument. He could easily have asked FPDI to explain what exactly would be
hampered, and he could also have refused the Minister’s argument that mis-
interpreted his proposal. However, this would have meant breaking the
unwritten rules of parliamentary debates.
The next issue raised was that of compensation. In its first reaction to the
bill FPDI had already questioned what rights and obligations people living or
working in conservation areas would have, but in the SC the group reduced
the matter to the question of compensation in the case of expropriation of
land.25 FABRI and FPP argued that adding this to the act was a ‘sympathetic’
proposal but a redundant one, since other laws already regulated this issue.
FPDI insisted that nonetheless it was practice that ‘those who did not yet receive
any compensation are chased off the land. And it is obvious that that needs
to be noted.’ TheMinister said he was ready to include the issue in the elucida-
tion but not in the act:
‘About the compensation, we can agree to include it in the elucidation, but the
government wants to explain that if implementing officials from the government
make mistakes, this does not need to be stressed in laws because the laws are
already like this. The government does invite the respected Parliament to paymore
attention to the rights of the people exactly in cases where the solution is in accord-
ance with the existing regulations. But there are also cases where compensation
has already been paid but people demand more money, so what about these
compensation problems, very sensitive indeed, but there are advantages to include
FPDI’s proposal into the elucidation.’
The Minister thus attempted to discourage the MPs to design laws so as to
ensure that government officials could be held accountable. Instead he asked
them to focus on cases where things were going right. Finally, he presented
compensationmore as a problem than as a solution, suggesting that including
it in the act could provoke abuse.
FPP put forward a related issue. It proposed a subsidy for conservation
areas because people had to leave their land, could not develop agriculture
and plantations and did not have any tax income. Refraining from paying
subsidies would result in the destruction of nature. The group’s speaker
25 SC 13 June 1990.
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wondered ‘without such a subsidy, what can we eat, what can we produce;
we will need to log trees, that is the consequence.’26
The group also held that a subsidy would make the people care for the area
theywere living in and create a ‘sense of belonging’.27 Furthermore, the group
linked its subsidy argument to the argument in favour of an equal distribution
of development benefits (In. pemerataan) and argued that acting otherwise
would mean forcing the people in and close to conservation areas to live their
life in the margins forever. Here, Djafar Siddiq used the expression of ‘mati
konyol’, meaning that without a subsidy the people would die for nothing.
TheMinister responded in twoways. First he quibbled over the expression
‘mati konyol’. Again and again he returned to it, first denying that this was
the case and in the end trying to make fun of it:
‘the government does not agree with FPP in saying that at present the people die
for nothing since dying alone alreadymeans pain, dying for nothing is evenworse.’
In addition, theMinister tried to invalidate FPP’s argument in favour of pemera-
taan by comparing the conservation areas to other, poorer, areas:
‘That the regional income decreases because the forest and the like cannot be
benefited from, I think if we want to compare peoples in Indonesia there are still
more with a more difficult life than there, if we look at their life.’28
TheMinister thus turned the argument around in favour of an equal distribu-
tion. His message was that those living close to, for instance, Gunung Leuser,
should not complain since others were worse off. At the end, he closed the
debate by referring to pembangunan:
‘but we agree that conservation, I do not agree with the word “subsidy”, as if it
should be subsidized, but if we say that all repayments are not in the form of
money but we hope that the respected members of Parliament, especially the
representatives of these regions, will strive for all possible development that can
be realized there.’
Setting aside the illogical structure of the sentence, its core argument is clear:
conservation areas and the people living close to these could expect nothing
more and nothing less than what was done anyway. In one word: develop-
ment. As an example, the Minister pointed at alang-alang fields adjacent to
the Gunung Leuser National Park and suggested to think about how to
develop these. He thus offered development as a solution to a problem caused
by non-development.Whether this was feasible and how this had to be realised
26 SC 12 June 1990.
27 SC 12 June 1990.
28 SC 12 June 1990.
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he left open, but with the responsibility on the shoulders of the people’s
representatives and not the government’s. The idea of a subsidy, however,
he rejected with great force and FPP did not insist.29
18.5.2 Participation
The government had only incorporated two articles on the role of the public
into its bill. The first one (art. 3) stipulated the joint responsibility and obliga-
tion of the people and the government for conservation.30 According to
Minister Harahap, this article was based on the EMA of 1982’s definition of
sustainable development as a ‘rational and planned effort’ (In. upaya sadar dan
berencana), whichwouldmean that the people as well as the governmentwere
responsible and obliged to act in accordance. He added that the same EMA
had defined environmental NGOs as organisations growing from within the
society and active in the field of the environment. His conclusion that ‘this
pushed us to draft article 3’31 showed that implicitly he interpreted ‘the
people’ as consisting of NGOs.
FKP used the debate on this draft article to press for a whole chapter on
public participation. Its speaker Soedarmadji presented FKP’s proposal as a
matter of effectiveness: without participation, he argued, development and
thus also conservation – a part of development – were ‘empty words’ (In.
omong kosong) and not to be realised regardless of the duration of the dis-
cussion.
Prior to the debates in the SC, FPDI had already coined public participation
as one of the three success factors of conservation, along with governmental
determination and public awareness. In the SC, however, the group only put
forward that ‘the people’ not only included ‘small people’ (In. rakyat kecil) but
also entrepreneurs (e.g. in the logging business).32 The reason for this state-
ment wasmost likely that the Indonesian government in general used to accuse
farmers and not entrepreneurs of the destruction of nature and that the
business sector thus would have needed some special treatment in the act,
i.e. specific rules designed to curb their unsustainable behaviour. However,
the Minister thought this was self-evident and thus not noteworthy.
29 SC 12 June 1990.
30 The second one will be dealt with below.
31 This opposes to some extent the impression that the late 1980s and early 1990s were
characterized by a new ‘openness’ (In. keterbukaan) in Indonesian politics ( Cribb 2003, p.
46). However, especially the involvement of national NGOs in the international campaign
against the logging of tropical timber which formed one major motivation for the BCA
explains this ministerial emphasis on acting responsibly.
32 SC 12 June 1990.
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The other parties did not focus on participation to achieve effectiveness,
and gradually it became clear that FKP in fact also had other objectives with
participation. The group’s speaker elaborated that
‘participation is very much needed to provide the government with input so that
the government knows what the society aspires to. Participation will make the
people more ready to accept governmental decisions. […] Participation will result
in the validity of democracy, especially of the Pancasila democracy itself.’33
Thus, FKP presented participation as an instrument to increase the people’s
willingness to accept governmental decisions, the government itself and its
version of democracy.
FABRI stressed that participation should be guided by the government:
‘The ABRI group is of the opinion that [participation] can not yet develop on its
own as we would hope but still very much depends on governmental efforts. It
is therefore to be hoped that the government will provide education, information
and stimuli to make participation happen.’34
What kind of participation FABRI hoped for, or why it was desirable was not
further elaborated.
FPP focused on the second article in the governmental draft where participa-
tion played a role. Art. 31 (2) created the possibility for the people to play a
role in licensing tourism enterprises for the exploitation of certain protected
areas. However, FPP considered the expression ‘have the people participate’
(In.mengikutsertakanmasyarakat) as attributing them a ‘weak position’ (In. posisi
lemah). Therefore, the text should be changed into ‘together with the people
through their co-operatives’.35 Although the Minister praised this proposal
and stated that it should be included in the Tourism Act as well, he did not
amend the article in the end, even though FPP raised the issue once more at
the SC’s last session.36
Thus, everybody joined in the chant of praising themerits of participation,
but not even the different definitions of participation implicit in the groups’
first reaction to the draft led to a meaningful exchange of opinions. FPDI did
not repeat its plea to include people’s rights into the act or to treat the people
more as subjects than as objects. Neither did FPP insist on attributing a stronger
role to the people. Instead, FKP’s narrow definition dominated the debate:
partaking in ‘determining the direction, strategy and policy for development
through the people’s representatives, carry the burdens and responsibility for
33 SC 19 June 1990.
34 SC 8 June 1990.
35 SC 8 June 1990.
36 19 July 1990.
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development and enjoy its benefits’.37 In this view the only active role was
reserved for the people’s representatives. The Minister agreed and even went
a step beyond by explaining that the difference between the government and
the people was that the ‘government governs, and Parliament are the people’s
representatives’38 limiting participation to the people’s representatives in
Parliament. In the regions, the Minister said, participation was guaranteed
through the members of the regional parliaments. At the national level, the
discussions about this act formed another act of participation. Moreover,
intended or not, the Minister made the role of the government more active
than that of the people’s representatives: the government ‘governs’ whereas
the MPs ‘are representatives’. The examples of ongoing participation the
Minister presented further illustrated the limited role he saw for the people,
for instance, scouts and other groups such as the association of soccer-clubs
ought to take part in yearly planting activities.39 Furthermore, the government
would stimulate and supervise conservation groups engaged in spreading
information. With the same aim, the Forestry Department would form
conservational cadres in conservation areas.40 Other forms of participation
were the teaching of public servants and entrepreneurs as well as the existence
of a special Forestry High School (SKMA). For direct input from the people
there was the Kotak Pos 500041 and – unspecified – meetings with all kinds
of groups, such as farmers and conservationists. In sum, all these examples
were activities orchestrated or closely supervised by the government. Moreover,
the Minister failed to provide details about these practices, which could have
contributed to a better understanding of participation and appropriate details
in the act to improve it.42
Led by the above-mentioned narrow definition of participation most
speakers stressed the role of the government in the further discussion. FKP
stated that it was the government’s responsibility to organise the people and
their conservation efforts.43 FABRI agreed that the government should stimulate
the people’s participation because it would not evolve by itself. In FPP’s eyes
it was important that the government remained in charge of giving direction
to and supervising conservation groups. Otherwise there would be the danger
37 SC 8 June 1990.
38 SC 12 June 1990.
39 These activities formed the so-called ‘greening movement’ (In. gerakan penghijauan) which
in the past was known as ‘greening week’ (In. pekan penghijauan) (cf. chapter 12).
40 See also the case Pulau Seribu where members of such a ‘cadre’ complained about its very
formalist character which did not stimulate to actively engage in conservation activities.
41 SC 19 June 1990. This P.O. Box, open for complaints from the society, was an initiative
started by Vice President Sudharmono.
42 See for example comment by LIPI researcher Dr AS Hikam (Kompas 19 September 1998,
‘Basmi Korupsi Perlu Moral Tinggi’).
43 SC 19 June 1990.
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of radical groups operating beyond the control of the government as had
happened in the past.44
As to how the Government should approach the people, FKP and FPP were
most outspoken. FKP proposed ‘sadarkon’, a new acronym meaning that the
people needed to become aware of the need for conservation through super-
vision, education and information.45 This vocabularywas the same the govern-
ment used in the context of pembangunan in general. The proponents considered
the people to be like children in need of education and incapable of taking
initiative themselves and the government, on the other hand, as the teacher
who tells the children what direction to head and what to do. Pembinaan is
even stronger in this sense and therefore hated by most people in the
villages.46 A direct translation of the concept of awareness in the international
conservation discourse, sadar konservasi thus neatly fit into the Indonesian
government’s pembangunan discourse. Indeed, both the Indonesian concept
of pembangunan and the international concept of environmental awareness
contain a strong moral element implying that the people who lack it have not
yet found the ‘right’ way of life.47 The interest of the government in including
this concept into the act was clearly to show that it had adopted the ‘right’
way of life and that it accepted the responsibility to lead its subordinates into
the same direction.
Education about conservation, FKP claimed, should start in Kindergarten
and continue until university. In the conservation campaigns societal
organisations48 and political parties including Golkar should also play a role.
FPP used the opportunity to make a critical remark about the legal restrictions
on political parties at the village level and expressed its hope that this was
going to change ‘in the decades to come’!49 In FPP’s views, education so far
paid almost no attention to conservation. The government, they argued, should
show films about the dangers of erosion etc. In addition, the FPP found it
important to give ‘guidance’ to the people instead of only imposing ‘prohi-
bitions’. The act should ‘stimulate’ people to feel responsible.50 However,
people living close to or in conservation areas should not as easily be regarded
as criminals. What was needed was a ‘wise [In. arif dan bijaksana] preventive
44 FPP gave the example of the BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia), a farmers’ mass organisation
strongly influenced by the Communist Party PKI. SC 19 June 1990.
45 SC 19 June 1990.
46 Although pembinaan can mean ‘development’ it is more often interpreted as a form of
governmental control since the development it supports is defined by the government.
Van Langenberg pointed to the fact that the New Order government used it also as a
depoliticising concept by emphasising its use for keeping the masses free from political
forces and for the mobilisation of society to its own needs (Van Langenberg 1986). In this
book, I translate it with ‘supervision’.
47 Cf. Harré et al. 1999.
48 As in Act 8/ 1985.
49 SC 19 June 1990.
50 SC 19 June 1990.
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approach’.51 However, the speaker did not further clarify this and thus failed
to create an alternative for the educational approach advocated by the FKP.
In sum, the various speakers defined participation as the near opposite
of political participation.52 They attributed the only active role to the govern-
ment, which should strive to remain in control of and to ‘activate’ the people
along previously defined lines. The attention for the people’s needs voiced
in the beginning was increasingly being pushed to the background.
18.5.3 Implementability
An issue all groups complained aboutwas that the government’s bill proposed
13 implementing regulations.53 This, they said, worried them since the past
had shown that if the government failed to issue these soon after the enactment
of the law there would be no implementation. The government replied that
matters of implementation should be regulated by governmental regulations
for the sake of flexibility, that it had already prepared the implementing
regulations and that they were to be issued soon after the law’s enactment.54
Strikingly, this governmental reply did not elicit any reactions from the legis-
lators. How could the implementing regulations have been prepared before
the parliamentary deliberations on the act? No one asked formore information
on the drafts, for instance, to be able to judge whether inclusion into the act
would be more appropriate.
FPDI at a certain point even used this same argument in response to FKP’s
proposal to include additional chapters on management, institutions and
participation. Demonstrating the strength of the government’s version of the
discourse on lawmaking, FPDI stated that details should be stipulated in
governmental regulations rather than in the act.55
At the last session of the SC most groups voiced once more their concern
about the high number of implementing regulations provided for the act but
they had failed to press successfully for including more details in the act or
demanding that the government issue their regulations within a certain period.
Likewise, FPDI failed to get back to the issues of political support and
manpower for the implementation and enforceability of the BCA it had raised
in its first comment. As a consequence, only the stipulation on Civil Investi-
gators (Pejabat Pegawai Negeri Sipil) evoked some discussion, which resulted
51 SC 14 July 1990.
52 That was completely in line with other efforts the government had undertaken to de-
politicize the Indonesian society, including the introduction of the earlier mentioned ‘floating
mass’ policy which aimed at restricting the political participation of the people at the village
level to voting once in five years.
53 SC 14 July 1990.
54 FGR 8 March 1990, SC 12 June 1990.
55 SC 19 June 1990.
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in the addition that they must report their findings to the Public Prosecutor
via the Police.56
Apart from the provisions for investigation, the governmental bill did not
mention which institutions should implement or enforce the law, or which
minister should be responsible for conservation. FKP pleaded for adding
chapters to the bill dealing with the management of conservation areas and
institutions for conservation but found no majority for this proposal.57 The
Minister restated once more that a government regulation rather than an
additional chapter in the act should stipulate the institutional side.58 The ABRI
group commented that such a special chapter was unnecessary since the
government had already explained that the existing institutionswere to imple-
ment the act:
‘So, we heard that no new institution will be established but that the existing
institutions will be encouraged to participate in conservation activities. […] do we
need to make that a chapter?’59
What remained in the end was an exchange of promises and hopes. To
strengthen his promise for a quick issuance of all required implementing
regulations the Minister cited a speech of President Soeharto from 1989 for
the occasion of the Day of the Environment to show the government’s deter-
mination to implement the BCA.60 Apparently, this speech was a more im-
portant guarantee for the implementation than guarantees that could have
been built into the act itself (cf. chapter 4).61 FPDI’s final remarks were exem-
plary for the tenor of the meeting:
‘We hope […] that the implementing regulations will soon be issued to make the
act effective […]. We hope that all sides involved in the implementation will fulfil
their tasks as well as possible because we need to realise that however good and
perfect this bill is, it will very much depend on its implementation, therefore we
all hope that the implementers will be honest, serious and dedicated, to achieve
the best possible result.’62
It is safe to argue that the legislators could have reduced the dependence on
promises and hopes if their debates had focused more on safeguarding the
bill’s effectiveness in a concrete manner.
56 Art. 39 (4) BCA.
57 SC 18 June 1990.
58 SC 19 June 1990.
59 SC 19 June 1990.
60 19 July 1990.
61 Cf. Bedner who also showed the relative importance of Presidential speeches compared
to legislation (Bedner 2001, p. 29).
62 19 July 1990.
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18.5.4 Sanctions
Unlike implementability, the issue of sanctions raised much focused debate.
FPP argued that since conservation would affect many people, a considerable
number would be punished if the stipulation of the act were put into effect.
Criminal sanctions should be applied only after three warnings.63 FKP, on
the other hand, advocated to make punishments more severe than in the
government’s bill by first increasing the maximum penalty from 100 to 500
million, and from 5 million to 100 million Indonesian Rupiah and by making
custody and financial sanctions additional instead of alternatives. All other
groups were in favour of the government’s ‘and/or’ formulation. Their moti-
vation differed, however. Exemplary of the group’s fancy for formalism FABRI
argued – legally incorrect – that this act could not stipulate sanctions beyond
those of its ‘mother act’, the Environmental Management Act. FPP pleaded for
the ‘and/or’ stipulation in order to protect the little farmerwhowould become
the victim of the additional stipulation. FPDI stressed that it was the judgewho
should be able to decide to apply one ormore kinds of sanctions. As a compro-
mise, the government proposed to make the sanctions additional in the case
of intent and optional for unintended violations of the act. Its argument was
quite convincing, i.e. that in the case of intended violation by, for example,
logging concessions it should not be possible to buy off custody and with it
the loss of face.
Nonetheless the groups could not come to an agreement and postponed
further discussion by first asking theMinistry of Justice and the Supreme Court
for an expert opinion. The SupremeCourt failed to provide any answer before
the end of the debate, while the opinion of the Ministry did not help much
since it did not express its favour for any of the options. It is unclear to what
extent its additional remark- that legal experts favoured ‘and’ instead of ‘and/
or’ in light of more legal certainty and limitations to the discretionary authority
of the courts – helped convince FPP. In any case, after a lobby FPP agreed on
the sole use of ‘and’.64 FPDI, on the other hand, half-heartedly insisted on
waiting for the Supreme Court, stating that if needed they would agree on
‘and’ as well.65
Regarding the severity of punishment, the government proposed to punish
destructive behaviour in strict nature reserves and the core sanctuary of
national parks with 10 years of imprisonment and 100 million Rupiah (8000
US $), using the EMA of 198266 and the Government Regulation on Protection
63 SC 8 June 1990.
64 SC 15 June 1990.
65 SC 20 June 1990. The groups agreed to receive the SupremeCourt’s answer but that it would
be received as a document without any consequence for their further discussions.
66 Maximum sanctions of 10 years imprisonment and a fine of 100 million Rupiah, ex art.
22(1).
Chapter 18 205
Forest67 as guidelines. These sanctions would be in accordance with the
importance of the protected areas in question. High sanctions would work
as a deterrent. Because of inflation FKP pleaded for accepting FABRI’s proposal
of a financial sanction twice as high, presenting this as a discount compared
to its initial proposal of 500 million Rupiah (40000 US $) fines. Its main argu-
ment was that such high sanctions would have a psychological effect and could
demonstrate to the outside world how serious Indonesia was about conserva-
tion. FKP refused to accept FPP’s argument that such fines were much too high
for the common people. ‘Of course’, Soedarmadji argued, his group was
conscious of the ordinary man, but to this end the judge had the possibility
to apply a lower fine than this maximum. Likewise, FPP’s argument that
violators of the law nowadays were perceived as products of their society and
that therefore reintegrating them should be more important than punishing
them did not lead to lower sanctions. In the end, after the decision had been
postponed again,68 FPP lost its case.69
18.5.5 Conclusion
The analysis so far has demonstrated thatmost debates on serious and sensitive
matters related to the question of how to balance economic growth, environ-
mental protection and human rights were closed even before the formation
of the SC. These included the evaluation of the conservation activities so far,
the nature and extent of nature destruction and the scope of the solution, i.e.
the question of whether conservation should be limited to specified areas or
not. Taking the last issue as an example, it was striking how little debate
developed. After all, FPP and FPDI hadmade some notable initial remarks that,
so far, international conglomerates had pressed Indonesia to exploit its natural
resources unsustainably, and that conservation policy should cover more than
conservation areas alone. In addition, all groups and the Ministry repeatedly
stressed that the colonial policy –whichwas built mainly on reserves – needed
to be revised. The first remark could have paved the way to discuss the impact
of trade and business on the management of nature and in what ways a new
law could limit their negative effects, while the second remark could have
initiated a debate on other instruments for nature conservation. However, the
Ministerial draft did not pay any attention to placing conditions on inter-
national conglomerates activities in Indonesia and clearly centred on conserva-
tion areas as the main instrument of conservation.
67 GR 28 of 1985.
68 Kamidya proposed to discuss the sanctions in the end after having reached an agreement
on all other stipulations as the procedure used to be in interdepartmental teams. SC 25
June 1990.
69 PDI supported PPP’s demand without adding much to the discussion.
206 The ‘Un-politics’ in Indonesian lawmaking in 1990
Even in the SCmost debates remained superficial. Themain exceptionwas
the discussion on sanctions, which produced clear positions. This is probably
because the issue was not about government responsibilities and therefore
did not directly affect it. However, in general, no MP asked for arguments
showing that proposed solutions could tackle a problem. Critical questions
and demands did not succeed in changing the draft in any substantial way.
Many of themwere worded vaguely or did not get to the point, andmoreover,
they were not repeated when unanswered. The arguments used to refuse
demandswere not strong or convincing in the sense that they lacked evidence
and details. Even obvious cases of misinterpretation did not make MPs insist
on continuing the debate. Where the speakers defined concepts differently,
these differences were glossed over until they disappeared from the debate
entirely. In cases that MPs at first demanded guarantees from the government,
they finally contented themselves with promises and hopes. As a result, the
government succeeded in getting its draft through the process almost
unscathed. Its most important strategy to this end was to close debates before
they had really started.
19 Arguments and strategies to close debates
and counter strategies
In this chapter we will further analyse with what kind of arguments and
strategies participants tried to close debates. The first mechanism was to not
answer questions at all and was applied by the Minister mostly during the
second stage of the parliamentary debates. Another strategy of the government
has also frequently been mentioned before: to make promises where guarantees
had been demanded. Other strategies were references to Pancasila, pembangunan
and pembinaan, the postponing of decisions, and an emphasis on a fast enact-
ment.
19.1 PANCASILA
The Minister in particular (but other speakers as well) frequently referred to
the state ideology Pancasila. In response to the groups’ first comments on the
bill, the Minister mentioned it immediately:
‘In principle, we can understand the thoughts which the groups have put forward.
They will basically all complement each other since they are all inspired by Panca-
sila, the Constitution of 1945 and the Broad Lines of State Policy […].’1
This statement suggested that the debates had to take place within the bound-
aries of Pancasilawith a focus on harmony and consensus instead of on conflict
and differences of opinion.
During the debates the Minister made many – albeit, more subtle – refer-
ences to Pancasila. In general, he emphasised the agreements and simultaneous-
ly tried to downplay differences of opinion. A telling example is the following
quote:
‘that there is much agreement among us both concerning the basic thoughts and
about the substance of this bill itself. Then regarding the issues that create the
impression as if there were disagreements, that only appears as such [my emphasis, JA]
since these issues need further explanations and clarification from the Govern-
ment.’2
1 8 March 1990.
2 Minister, 8 March 1990.
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In some cases he transformed the question asked in his answer in a subtle
way to avoid the real subject matter. For instance, in his reaction to FPDI’s urge
to include a broadly defined version of participation into the bill, theMinister
said
‘we need to explain that [in the draft] public responsibility [my emphasis] is actually
not limited to mobilisation [as FPDI has said] but [that] the government also pro-
vided the people with rights in accordance with the existing regulations’.3
Here, the Minister reduced ‘participation’ to ‘responsibility’, a building block
of the Pancasila ideology: the government used to stress that everybody held
the responsibility to strive for a harmonious atmosphere in society. The fact
that the Minister did not even make the effort to provide evidence or details
to support his statement made clear that he considered the government to not
really be accountable to Parliament.
Another signal for the politicians involved that the Minister appreciated
comments in line with Pancasila more was his praise of FKP, the group that
had suggested the inclusion of an entire chapter on participation. He reminded
others to ‘appreciate FKP’s opinion that participation and public awareness
needed to be developed continuously’.4 FKP had framed its plea as, among
other things, the implementation of the GBHN and related participation in line
with the government’s discourse to supervision (In. pembinaan), education (In.
pendidikan) and information (In. penyuluhan).
Another example of the Minister stressing the harmony between govern-
ment and Parliament occurred when the Minister reacted to FPDI’s quest to
make explicit that ‘the people’ meant more than the ‘small’ people such as
farmers and the like. TheMinister wondered if this was really ‘necessary’ since
‘we, sitting here together, are also the people’. ‘Therefore’, he continued,
‘let’s not create the impression that the government walks alone and not together with
the people [my emphasis, JA], it is clear that the government or in this case the
President has to implement the GBHN […]. The most important thing is how to
activate the people […]’.5
This was a statement that could not be misunderstood by FPDI. It implicitly
accused the group of challenging the concept of the integralistic state inwhich
all parts were ‘united’ and acting ‘together’.6
3 12 June 1990.
4 8 March 1990.
5 12 June 1990.
6 See, for instance, ABRI’s interpretation of Pancasila in Ramage 1993, p. 276. Likewise, Morfit
argues that ‘what Pancasila offers as a political ideology is unity rather than direction,
meaning that it is unlike Mao’s Great Leap Forward, for instance, ‘not designed to excite
mass participation in the development process or galvanize the nation into action’. Rather,
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The same issue also came to the fore when FPDI argued in favour of com-
pensation for people who would have to leave their land as a consequence
of conservation. As quoted above, the Minister closed that debate by stating
that MPs should not focus on executive mistakes but rather on cases where
everything was going fine.
At another session of the SC the Minister stressed his appreciation for the
parliamentary practices based on Pancasila by contrasting it to what he had
experienced in the New Zealand Parliament:
‘[…] how enjoyable this meeting in Indonesia was compared to what I saw there
[in New Zealand]. Here, no minister, whether woman or man, is interrupted,
debated or even labelled an idiot. [There] I wondered, are these now civilised
people? In this light I look at how enjoyable it is to be Indonesian since we still
are capable of reaching a consensus through deliberations without insulting or
depreciating other people.’7
Discussions in various countries certainly differ in terms of style. My argument
here is not that insulting legislators or government officials by calling them
names is to be preferred to harmonious discussions, but that contrasting New
Zealand to the government’s interpretation of Pancasila is a form ofmanipula-
tion by stressing that deviating from its consensus-oriented style is deviating
from civilisation. The legislators could read the message implied: they were
expected to avoid conflict and criticising the government during the debates.
19.2 PEMBANGUNAN
Adiscourse with the power to close debates before they really got startedwas
pembangunan. The Minister used it, for instance, in the case of FPDI’s critical
request to consider isolated tribes as part of an ecosystem and to guard that
the governmental efforts to integrate them into some kind of national culture
did not destroy this ecosystem.8 The Minister said that the government had
‘many programmes to increase their quality of life’.9 That was a clear reference
to pembangunan, with its emphasis on programmes and projects. As conserva-
‘it provides an encompassing umbrella of unity’ (Morfit 1986, p. 48). As Morfit argues, the
opposite side of this coin is its exclusiveness. It does not permit any communist or funda-
mentalist Islamic opposition in the political arena (Morfit 1986, p. 48), nor, as the analysis
of this lawmaking process shows, any criticism in Parliament that the government dislikes.
7 SC 15 June 1990.
8 12 February 1990.
9 For a discussion of the negative effects of this policy see Persoon 1985. For a discussion
on the lack of scientific evidence for the government’s assumption that its development
programmes are advantageous for the economy of tribal people and the ecology of areas
in which swidden agriculture is practiced see Dove 1986, p. 224-230.
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tion was considered subordinate to the overall development process10 the
Minister easily pushed FPDI’s argument – that developing themmeant destroy-
ing the ‘wholeness of an ecosystem’ - aside; their role in the ecosystem would
simply be taken over by another part of that ecosystem.11 Taken further this
argument means that conservation is not necessary at all since any loss of
species would be compensated by some other species taking over its role –
which comes close to the conceptualisation of the spiritualist discourse (chap-
ter 7). However, no MP asked any questions and the issue of isolated tribes
did not re-emerge in the SC. Pembangunan had thus proven effective in closing
this debate.
A second example was the Minister’s use of pembangunan to close the
debate on subsidies for conservation areas. He wiped away FPP’s plea for
subsidies by expressing the hope that the people’s representatives from the
region referred to would do their best to ‘develop’ it. Pembangunan was too
powerful to be questioned and thus, again, closed the debate.
Anotherword belonging to the pembangunan discourse, which theMinister
applied to the same purpose, was pembinaan (En. supervision). When FPDI,
for instance, wondered about the fate of people living and working in con-
servation areas,12 the Minister responded that the government was to ‘super-
vise’ them and that it could take ‘measures of order’, meaning forcedmigration
to other areas ‘while paying a compensation according to the existing rules’.13
The FPDI spokesman did not ask for any details about this approach but
accepted it as an answer to his question. Pembinaan thus closed this debate
even before it had actually started.
19.3 EMPHASIS ON FAST ENACTMENT AND POSTPONING DECISIONS
Anotherway to quickly close debateswas to postpone decisions. TheMinister
and the chairman of the SC were often quick to suggest that issues should be
left to implementing regulations, to the ‘working group’ or from there to the
‘small committee’ often combined with a reference to the desirability of a fast
enactment. For instance, when FPDI pleaded for the clarification of expressions
such as ‘conservation’, ‘nature reserve’ and ‘wildlife reserve’ the Minister
suggested they leave these questions to the ‘language experts’:
10 Although conservation was said to be part of development, Heryanto provides a counter
argument, saying that ‘Pembangunan does not even pretend to refer to things presumably
in “nature” or “natural processes”. On the contrary, it refers to an exploitation of nature,
as of human beings’ (Heryanto 1995, p. 22). See also chapter 13.
11 8 March 1990.
12 12 February 1990.
13 8 March 1990.
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‘[for] the problem of expressions I thinkwe have language experts, experts especial-
ly for that, perhaps later we canmake suggestions about expressions and commas,
which sometimes have a meaning of their own. I know that Mr. Dufri [from FPDI,
JA] is a lawyer and for lawyers the difference between a comma and a full stop,
between end and beginning is important. For us, on the other side, I myself come
from Tapanuli [North Sumatra, JA], this sometimes makes no difference. Thus, I
want to add a bit: why did North Sumatra not win the Kalpataru?14 […] The
answer was “Alah, for cleanliness look at the fish in the water.” Why, I asked.
“Because fish continuously take a bath,” they said. That is right too, I think. So,
they do not ever want to lose but search for arguments to defend themselves. […]
I want to bring in some humour since I see some tension […]’15
Although one could argue that this illustrated that the Minister conceived of
language as an instrument, easily to be separated from its context,16 it was
also a strategy to circumvent potential difficulties in Parliament.
Equally important was the argument that the act needed to be delivered
‘on time’. From the first plenary session onward, the Minister pleaded for a
fast enactment:
‘I suppose Parliament will agree that the faster this bill is enacted, the stronger
the legal basis will be, which can be used as guidance in the implementation of
the tasks in the field of biodiversity and ecosystem conservation’.
The question is obviously what he meant by a strong legal basis. If he meant
an effective act, some questions should have been asked. However, it is more
likely that he conceived of the act as a strong legal basis anyway, no matter
what effects the act would have in practice.
The repeated plea for fast deliberations became a mantra during the
lawmaking process. The chairman of the SC kept arguing that finishing on
time was important and voiced his ‘optimism’ that the ‘family atmosphere’
(In. suasana kekeluaragaan) in the committee would enable them to do so. In
the course of the deliberations the slogan ‘santai serius dan selesai’ (En. relaxed,
serious and completed) – the stress falling on selesai – both the government
and the groups repeatedly stressed the need for a quick completion of the
legislative process without giving specific reasons for the rush.17 The selesai
mantra showed its effect, for instance, when FPDI initially insisted on waiting
for an answer from the Supreme Court to the question of whether to choose
14 Price from the Ministry for the Environment for the cleanest city in Indonesia.
15 SC, 8 June 1990.
16 For a convincing argument against this conception seeMassier 2003, p. 29-37. Massier pleads
for conceptionalising language as action, dependent on the actor and its context.
17 In general, according to Hartono, the discussions in Parliament may need up to one year
‘and (paradoxically) only in very important and urgent political matters or in matters
concerning national development and the State’s budget, may the bill pass the DPR in the
shortest time, that is two or three months’ (Hartono 1979, p. 14)
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‘and’ or ‘and/or’ in the articles on sanctions but later half-heartedly stated
that if necessary they would agree on ‘and’ as well.18
In two cases, the chairman pushed the ‘fast enactment’ argument too far,
incurring serious opposition. The first case emerged when theMinister, at the
groups’ demand, presented a new version of chapters 3, 4 and 5, drafted in
only a few hours.19 When the chairman proposed to discuss these right away,
groups protested, since they had not even had the time to read them. After
a one-hour reading break they still could not agree to the schedule so the new
draft was put on the agenda of the working group in order so they could still
proceed in a timely manner. The second case emerged during the first session
of this very working group when the chairman tried to speed up the process
by proposing that all items should be passed on to one of the sub-committees
without further discussion. Oeng Rumadji of FABRI rebuked that there would
be no need for the working group if this was to happen. The chairman
defended his proposal by saying that after the first two articles had been
passed on he thought that passing the rest on as well was appropriate and
would ‘save his energy’ (In. daripada cape membacanya).20
A similar situation occurred when the FKP spokesman – who apologised
for this question in advance, in case it was being interpreted as criticism –
asked whether it would still be possible for the SC to make changes to the
proposed ‘final’ result of the SC. The chairman replied ‘preferably not’ which
led to FPP spokesman Djafar Sidiq’s protesting that they should strive for the
best possible result and that it therefore should be allowed. In the end, the
chairman agreed and said that formally even the plenary of the DPR could
still make amendments. He defended his first reaction by stressing that they
had agreed on completing the discussions on schedule.21
As the New Order discourse on harmonious and quick lawmaking was
generally strong enough to curb discussions, the SC managed to finish the
debates regarding the bill within a remarkable 37 days.22 Surprisingly, the
SC’s chairman Djamaluddin Tambunan stressed in his final remarks that
deliberations in the Pancasila democracy take a long time. FABRI’s spokesman
Soebagyo also stated that his group was surprised that the discussions were
not completed sooner since the act concerned such a ‘technical matter’.23
18 SC 20 June 1990. The groups agreed to still receive the High Court’s answer but that it
would be received as a document without any consequence for their further deliberations.
19 Since the lobby in Taman Safari ended on Sunday night and the next session commenced
the morning after, the Forestry officials did have only some hours to clear this job.
20 WG 25 June 1990.
21 SC 14 July 1990.
22 SC 14 July 1990.
23 SC 14 July 1990.
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19.4 COUNTERSTRATEGIES OR THE POWER OF DISCOURSE
Speakers of the groups also used a number of strategies to get their proposals
and demands for the act accepted. One strategy, for instance, was to repeat
something theMinister had said and then present one’s demand as if consistent
with the quote. Another strategy was to refer to practices in the field and
experiences of the past. However, none of these strategies appeared successful.
Sometimes this was due to the lack of support from the members of other
groups who called proposals ‘sympathetic’ or even ‘brilliant’ but in the end
did not support them. Even in those cases where the groups put forward
similar arguments they chose not to support each other but focused on their
own conversation with the Minister instead.
The strategy used most often by the groups was the reference to Pancasila,
pembangunan and other related concepts of the pembangunan discourse. Here
the question of to what extent this was really a strategy or instead an example
of the power of discourse arises. Most likely, it was both.
FKP spokesman Soedarmadji said, for example, at the SC’s first meeting,
on 8 June 1990:
‘The list of problems24 […] in principle does not show striking differences in
opinion. Maybe this is because of the awareness of the various groups of their
mission to take care of the suffering of the people as an extension of Pancasila.’
This statement was very similar to the one made by the Minister. As he had,
the speakers of the groups tried to make differences appear small. The idea
behind such statements, especially from the groups, seemed to be to get one’s
proposal accepted by convincing the others that it was actually not different
from what they wanted. Here, Pancasila and other concepts related to the
official pembangunan discourse thus served as a common story to find allies.
As this was the main strategy employed, the list of similar statements could
fill a considerable number of pages of this book. Words that dominated these
statements were ‘family atmosphere’ (In. suasana kekeluargaan),25 ‘harmony’
(In. harmoni), ‘openness’ (In. keterbukaan), and ‘deliberations to reach a con-
sensus’ (In. musyawarah untuk mufakat).
However, the strategy did not really work because it could be used as a
boomerang by the government to silence criticism.Whenever an MP attempted
to open a debate to suggest a critical amendment of the draft, the government
could, with another reference to the same discourse, close the debate.26 Its
effectiveness is illustrated by the fact that even FPDI, the group with the most
24 The list that served as a basis for the debates in the SC.
25 See for the relevance of this concept also, for instance, Ramage 1993, p. 273.
26 Cf. Ramage who called the NGOs’ strategy of the early 1990s to choose Pancasila as their
‘terms of references’ a weak strategy (Ramage 1993, p. 422).
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critical questions, accepted Pancasila as a clear boundary for its own political
space, not returning to any of its initial critical remarks later on. It neither
demanded the government state which rights were granted through which
article nor did it insist on clarifying why it wanted the bill to mention that
not only ‘small’ people were the ones to be regulated. ‘Harmony’, ‘the Presid-
ent’ and ‘GBHN’ silenced the FPDI spokesman. In fact, an implicit rule was that
insisting was not acceptable. The parliamentary minutes analysed for this
chapter suggest that the members of Parliament without exception in the end
accepted the dominant interpretation of Pancasila without any challenge.
Apparently, the government and its discourse on lawmakingwere too powerful
to allow for any effective counter-discourse. The government succeeded in
maintaining a system of ‘one big strong voice’.27
27 Van Langenberg 1986 citing Soeharto.
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Act
The parliamentary debates analysed so far resulted in an act intended to form
the future legal basis for Indonesian conservation activities. Considering that
as such it had great implications for actors living or working in or close to
conservation areas, that there are no academic publications on the quality of
this act and that the act is currently under revision, suggests that it is worth-
while to also discuss the act in terms of the rule of law discourse.
Eijlander and Voermans have listed a number of basic expectations1 of
legal acts. These include that citizens expect an act to create clarity about rights
and obligations, that governments expect an act to formulate the rules on the
basis of which they can rightfully and authoritatively govern and that judges
expect an act to enable them to decide disputes. Given that Indonesia has
always claimed to be a rechtsstaat (In. negara hukum) one would expect to find
references related to rule-of-law expectations. Indeed, some of the objectives
formulated to solve the problem of decreasing biodiversity and degrading
ecosystems – including ‘to provide a clear direction for Indonesia’s conserva-
tion policy’, ‘to ensure the government’s attention for conservation’ and ‘to
ensure the people’s understanding and awareness of the need of conservation’
– point in the direction of defining obligations. In addition, the objective ‘to
reflect the aspirations of society’ could also reflect the wish to ‘rightfully’
govern. However, as the expectations put forward by the Minister and the
four groups in the initial stages of the parliamentary debates show, the rule
of law was only one discourse among others. The other expectations – ‘to
improve the existing colonial and post-colonial regulations’, ‘to increase the
people’s welfare’, and ‘to show Indonesia’s commitment to conservation’ –
reflected other ideals such as nation building, development, and silencing
foreign criticism.
The following discussion of the act will reflect on the questions of to what
extent the act warranted the realisation of the above mentioned expectations
and what this tells us about the dominant conceptualisations of the rule of
law, society and conservation in this case.
1 Eijlander & Voermans 2000, p. 17-18.
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20.1 PROVIDING A CLEAR DIRECTION FOR THE CONSERVATION POLICY
One hope the Minister and the groups had expressed was that the BCA would
provide a clear direction for conservation policy. And indeed it does. It
describes the goals of conservation in Indonesia and provides for definitions
and general provisions about the two major instruments for conservation: a
protection status for certain areas and for certain species.
The main goal described in the act is one of conservation serving develop-
ment, whichwe could label as ‘pembangunan-conservation’.With the exception
of species protection, it is limited to certain territories. For these the BCA creates
legal boundaries for economic exploitation. One important aspect of pemban-
gunan-conservation is thus that exploitation-oriented sectors do not have to
consider conservation in all their activities. Another feature in this respect is
that the BCA creates the legal basis for a new instrument: the national park,
which partially allows for touristic exploitation.
20.1.1 Practice
Oneway to judgewhether or not the BCA has indeed provided a clear direction
for policy is to examine to what extent the definitions of the BCA have influ-
enced later regulations.
Acts issued after the BCA have indeedmore or less adopted its definitions.
The BCA defines conservation of natural resources as the ‘management of
natural resources wisely used in order to ensure their continuity and taking
care of and increasing the quality of their diversity and value.’2 The EMA of
1997 defines conservation in a similar way, as ‘management of unrenewable
natural resources to ensure their wise use and of renewable natural resources
to ensure their continuing existence by taking care of and increasing the quality
of their value and diversity.’3 The Forestry Act of 19994 does not define con-
servation as such, but has adopted the BCA’s definitions of nature reserve and
nature conservation area for forests areas serving conservation functions.5
With regards to protected areas there is no standard set of terms, as a joint
study by the Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law and the Natural
Resources Program concluded.6 This study found that in 1998 Indonesia had
some 157 regulations linked to Protected Area Management, many of them
issued after 1990. Overall, there is little consistency in these regulations.
2 Ex art. 1 BCA.
3 Ex art. 1 (15).
4 Act No. 41 of 1999.
5 Ex art. 1 (10) and (11). In this act these areas are called kawasan hutan suaka alam and kawasan
hutan pelestarian alam, whereas in the BCA they are called kawasan suaka alam and kawasan
pelestarian alam.
6 Sponsored by USAID; ICEL & NRM 1998, p. 3.
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Although the BCA, for instance, prohibits exploitation of nature reserves, sub-
ordinate regulations, such as joint decrees of theMining and Forestry Depart-
ment, make this very exploitation possible.7
In conclusion, it is fair to say that in theory the BCA provides a clear
direction for the country’s conservation policy. This direction is one of ‘pem-
bangunan-conservation’ as it subordinates conservation to the greater goal of
economic development. In practice, acts issued after the BCA have taken it into
account but lower regulations have stretched its policy guideline to the ad-
vantage of economic exploitation. Subordinate regulations and development
practices show that the theoretically clear direction of policy is of limited use
due to the systematic ignorance and negligence of the BCA (see part IV).
20.2 ENSURING THE GOVERNMENT’S ATTENTION FOR CONSERVATION
In the course of the debates the speakers of the four groups expressed the need
to ensure that the government would pay sufficient attention to conservation.
As the preceding section has shown, not without reason they appeared to be
concerned about the implementation and the enforcement of the act. However,
they did not succeed in translating these concerns into provisions in the act.
The need of implementation regulations, the lack of provisions for personnel
and institutions, as well as for financial and control mechanisms all bear
testimony to this.
20.2.1 Implementing regulations
The Minister refused to include provisions about personnel and institutions
in the act. Instead, he stated that the existing institutions would implement
the act in the beginning and later on the institutional arrangements could be
adapted to what was needed in the field. With regards to personnel he did
not say or promise anything at all. In addition, the Minister kept saying that
for the sake of flexibility all details for the implementationwould be articulated
in government regulations. However, the BCA did not oblige the Forestry
Department to quickly issue these implementing regulations. Neither did it
contain any details, which would have forced the Ministry to implement the
act immediately. As a consequence, many regulations have still not been issued
at present, while those in place often state that details will be regulated in
7 ICEL&NRM1998, p. 23, 49-50. One such example is SKBMenteri Pertambangan danMenteri
Kehutanan nomor 969.K/05/M.PE/1989, nomor 429/kpts-II/1989 tentang Pedoman Pengaturan
Pelaksanaan Usaha Pertambangan dan Energi di dalam Kawasan Hutan. Art. 3.1 makes mining
possible in strict nature reserves after hearing the considerations of theMinister of Environ-
ment and LIPI.
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ministerial decrees. For national parks, for example, it has taken some seven
or eight years for all needed regulations to be issued (see chapter 24).
In sum, the Minister had apparently lied about the already prepared
implementing regulations and thus the MPs for good reason feared that their
issuance would take a long time. Not including details in the BCA about
implementation or any obligation or time frame for issuing implementing
regulations effectively deprived the public of all legal instruments to ensure
the government’s attention to conservation.
20.2.2 Financial provisions
The BCA also lacked financial provisions. It does not regulate anything about
the use of revenues from conservation activities, including the fines for offences
of the BCA. As a developing country Indonesia suffers from a perpetual budget
deficit, so not surprisingly, conservation activities are not a priority on the
country’s development agenda. Any activity in the field is now financed either,
for 40-55 %,8 through international funds, on a project basis by the Forestry
Department’s budget or by the Reforestation Fund. This financing mechanism
has resulted in a ‘project-culture’ that is very sensitive to corruption as the
case study of Pulau Seribuwill show (chapter 25). Therefore, financial stipula-
tions in the BCA would have been a useful, if not obligatory, instrument to
finance the maintenance of protected areas and other conservation activities.
20.2.3 Control mechanisms
In addition, the act has failed to create control mechanisms for implementation,
only providing a general normative framework. The lack of control at various
levels is another result of the act’s vagueness on implementation. The fact,
for instance, that the government holds the discretionary authority to declare
protected areas results in a lack of parliamentary control contrary to, for
instance, New Zealand.9 As we have seen, this was precisely the intention
of the government. MPs should focus on where the executive functioned well.
8 Rhee et al. 2004, p. 10.
9 For further information see http://www.doc.govt.nz/About-DOC/002~Legislation/
002~National-Parks-Act-1980.asp .
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20.3 ENSURING THE PEOPLE’S UNDERSTANDING AND AWARENESS OF THE NEED
FOR CONSERVATION
Another objective the Minister and the MPs wanted to realise was to ensure
the public’s understanding and awareness of conservation. The act clearly
states that the government is the only driving force in the field of conservation.
It has to educate and inform the people about conservation to get them to
participate.10 How this is to be achieved the act leaves to a governmental
regulation that is yet to be issued.11 The BCA thus fails to realise this objective,
while not issuing the required regulation again raises doubts about the serious-
ness of the government.
The precise formulation of this issue makes clear that the Minister and
the DPR interpreted the rule of law in a way that does not attribute any rights
to the people. The BCA positions the government as teacher and the public
as children in need of education without paying any attention to their other
needs and realities. A government regulation on conservation educationwould
have required trust between the government and the people. After all, children
only learn if they trust their teacher. However, in 1990 and certainly after the
fall of the NewOrder, such a relationship was non-existent (as the case studies
in part IV will show).
Ensuring people’s understanding of conservation would have required
another approach. The DPR should have thought about more concrete ways
to achieve a broad societal basis for nature conservation. Two potential ways
would have been to promote the benefits of nature conservation for those
concerned and to actively involve them instead of limiting them to merely
receive information and education.
20.4 IMPROVING THE EXISTING REGULATIONS
The BCAwas to replace the colonial regulations in the field of nature conserva-
tion that were considered to no longer be in accordance with legal develop-
ments and the national interest.12 There was a clear consensus in parliament
that this was a good idea. The BCA replaced the Jachtordonnantie 1931,13 the
Dierenbeschermingsordonnantie 1931,14 the Jachtordonnantie voor Java en Madoera
194015 and theNatuurbeschermingsordonnantie 1941.16 Thus, the BCA integrated
several old regulations on the protection of animals and the issues of hunting
10 Ex art. 37 (1) and (2).
11 Ex art. 37 (3).
12 Consideration (e), BCA.
13 Indisch Staatsblad 1931 Nummer 133.
14 Indisch Staatsblad 1931 Nummer 134.
15 Indisch Staatsblad 1939 Nummer 733.
16 Indisch Staatsblad 1941 Nummer 167.
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and nature protection in one new law. However, apparently for the sake of
nation building, replacing the colonial regulations was an objective in itself.
The question of which parts of the existing regulations were still useful and
which needed to be replaced was not addressed. The fact that few Indonesians
can read and understand Dutch, combined with the time pressure, certainly
did not encourage the MPs to consider the colonial regulations themselves.
To analyse what exactly the BCA changed, the following comparison of
the BCA and theNatuurbeschermingsordonnantie of 1941 (henceforth NBO)17 will
pay special attention to the criteria for, reasons for and objectives of nature
reservation, prohibited and permitted activities in reserved areas, and author-
ities in the field of nature conservation.
20.4.1 Criteria, reasons and objectives of nature reservation
The grounds on which the colonial and the Indonesian government wished
to reserve areas for nature conservation differ enormously. Whereas in colonial
times the ‘extraordinary scientific, cultural or aesthetic value’18 of an area
and its ‘soil conditions, overgrowth, fauna, flora or natural beauty’ formed
the major reasons for its reservation, the corresponding Indonesian criterion
is an area’s ‘certain characteristics’. For wildlife reserves these characteristics
are their ‘biodiversity or the uniqueness of animal sorts (or both) the continuing
existence of which can be served by intervention’,19 while for national parks
the prerequisite is an ‘authentic ecosystem’.20 Thus the BCA introduced new
concepts, i.e. biodiversity and ecosystem, without providing information about
values justifying the reservation of nature for conservation purposes.21 It is
rather vague about when plants, animals and the like were to be regarded
as ‘extraordinary’ or ‘unique’22 because the formulation of the precise criteria
for the establishment of all kinds of conservation areas was delegated to
governmental regulations.23
17 With regards to the protection of animals not much changed. The main stipulations of the
old Dierenbeschermingsordonnantie 1931 were included in the BCA in art. 21, 22 and 36. In
terms of authority the BCA was less precise than the DBO, as in the case of the NBO (see
further on in the text).
18 Art. 2 Natuurbeschermingsordonnantie 1941. The cultural value was added only in 1941.
19 Ex art. 1 (11) BCA.
20 Ex art. 1 (14) BCA. The definitions for Grand Forest Parks and Nature Recreation Parks
do not mention any natural characteristics. Art. 1 (15) and (16) only mention the use of
these areas.
21 For an argument in favour of basing nature conservation policy on intrinsic values see
Jepson 2002.
22 The Forestry Act of 1967 still stated that nature reserves are protected in the interest of
science and culture (art. 3 (3a and b)).
23 Ex art. 8 (2), 16 (2), 18 (2), 29 (2) BCA.
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Regarding the reasons for reserving areas, the BCA is more precise than
the colonial regulations. It mentions various ‘functions’: ‘biodiversity conserva-
tion and serving as life supporting system’24 for nature reserves,25 and
‘sustainable use of its natural resources and their ecosystem’26 as an additional
function for nature conservation areas. The colonial regulations, by contrast,
state that areas are reserved where the ‘untouched preservation’27 or the
‘protection of fauna, flora or natural beauty is desirable to the public
interest’.28
The formulation of the BCA suggests a more scientific and therefore more
testable approach to nature reservation. However, the failure to establish an
obligation for the government to make inventories of areas prior to their
establishment as conservation areas (see above) undermines the testability of
the approach.
20.4.2 Prohibited activities
The strictest prohibition of the NBO, i.e. of access in general for strict nature
reserves,29 is absent from the BCA, but apart from that the BCA does not differ
much from the colonial regulations. It prohibits ‘all activities that can result
in change of the untouched state of the area’, ‘including reducing or destroying
the function or size of the area as well as introducing foreign sorts of plants
and animals.’30 The elucidation of the BCA defines the meaning of ‘change’
as ‘destroying the untouched state of the area and its ecosystem, huntingwild
animals present in the area and introducing foreign species’.31 The colonial
ordinances give more precise examples of prohibited activities. Only with
regards to protected plants and animals does the BCA lists which activities
are prohibited, including ‘taking away’, ‘owning’, and ‘trading’.32 Especially
for reserves and core zones of national parks, the act adds the prohibition of
introducing new plants or animals.33
The BCA’s prohibitions for wildlife reserves are the same as for the strict
nature reserves and are therefore stricter than those of the colonial days. The
24 According to art. 6 BCA such system is the ‘natural process of various living and unliving
elements which guarantee the continuity of life’.
25 Ex art. 1 (9) BCA.
26 Ex art. 1 (13) BCA.
27 Ex art. 2 (2) NBO.
28 Ex art. 2 (1) NBO.
29 Ex art. 4 (1) NBO.
30 Ex art. 19 (1) and (3) BCA.
31 Elucidation art. 19 (1) BCA. According to art. 19 (3) ‘foreign sorts’ are sorts of plants and
animals that did not exist in the area originally.
32 Ex art. 21 BCA.
33 Ex art. 19 (3) BCA.
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NBO of 1941 prohibited the damaging of a wildlife reserve’s flora and fauna.34
Since these colonial rules aimed only at protecting wild animals and plants
in the wildlife reserves it is not surprising that the prohibitions are not as far-
reaching as they are for the strict nature reserves. The BCA, on the other hand,
strives for protection of entire ecosystems in the strict nature reserves, wildlife
reserves and sanctuary zones of national parks, which makes it necessary to
maintain the prohibition of any change.35 Exceptions to this strict rule form
the other zones of national parkswhere only those activities not in accordance
with the zone’s function are prohibited.36
20.4.3 Permitted Activities
Major differences between the colonial and the 1990 regulation become
apparent when we compare the stipulations concerning permitted activities.
Under the colonial rule their number increased over the years. It began with
permission for scientific activities,37 which was soon followed by a rather
broad permit for all ‘activities aiming for the increase of the reserve’s effective-
ness’ and for the reduction of abundant animals.38 The latter is still valid for
wildlife reserves.39 Later on, activities with cultural aims were allowed too,40
which allowed traditional societies to keep up hunting practices that were
questionable from a conservationist point of view.41 This permission was not
continued in the BCA. As we have seen above, the Indonesian government
opposed it by arguing that traditional societies should be developed rather
than preserved.42
A major difference between the NBO and the BCA is the licensing for tribal
economic activities: The BCA does not provide for licenses to collect forest
products, graze cattle and coastal fishing.43 Significantly, it does not stipulate
anything about the role and rights of the people traditionally exploiting the
34 Ex art. 5 (1) NBO.
35 Art. 33 (1) BCA contains the same prohibition of change for the sanctuary zone of a national
park.
36 Ex art. 33 (3) BCA.
37 Ex art. 3 (2) Natuurmonumentenordonnantie (NMO) 1916; art. 3 (6) Natuurmonumenten-
en Wildreservatenordonnantie (NMWRO) 1932; art 7 (a) NBO 1941; art. 17 (1) and (2) and
31 (1) BCA. Art 8 (c) NBO and art. 22 (1) BCA explicitly mention the possibility to collect
animals and plants for scientific purposes.
38 Ex art 3 (6) NMWRO.
39 Ex art. 19 (2) BCA. The elucidation mentions food and drinking facilities for the wild animals
as examples.
40 Ex art. 7 (a) NBO.
41 See for example the debate on the hunting of birds-of-paradise in Papua (Cribb 1997a).
42 An exception forms art. 31(1) BCA which allows cultural activities in nature conservation
areas as long as they do not reduce the function of the area.
43 The NBO creates this possibility in art. 8 (b).
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areas to be reserved. As noted above, this reflects a very specific interpretation
of the rule of law. In line with the pembangunan discourse, the act does, how-
ever, provide for licensing touristic exploitation in the special exploitation
zones of nature conservation areas,44 ‘giving local people the opportunity
to participate in this exploitation’.45 But although the BCA does mention local
people in this article, it attributeswide discretionary authorities to the govern-
ment. It is the government that decides whether a license is given and to
whom; local people have no legal right to demand participation.
The permit for touristic exploitation may even include the building of
touristic infrastructure on the basis of a management plan.46 Clearly, the
permission for this kind of economic exploitation correspondswith the colonial
stipulation concerning wildlife reserves allowing forest exploitation in accord-
ance with previously approved plans.47 Though the BCA requires a manage-
ment plan48 it again leaves details, such as the criteria for approval of such
plans, to another government regulation.49
From the Indonesian government’s perspective, with its focus on pemban-
gunan, the new stipulations concerning tourism clearlymade an improvement.
The omission of licenses for more traditional activities was also in line with
the government’s pursuit of modernisation. But for traditional farmers and
fishermen, the act was no improvement because of its failure to allocate any
precise rights to them.
20.4.4 Authorities
Another major difference between the BCA and the NBO is that the BCA is less
specific in regulating authority for nature conservation. Inmany cases the BCA
simply states that ‘the government’ holds the authority to, for example, manage
conservation areas. This vagueness decreases the extent to which the act can
be implemented and creates a dependency on further regulations. It does not
even state that the Forestry Department would be the leading agency in the
field. The only positive exception to this pattern is the stipulation about investi-
gations, which not only specifies who is in charge of investigations but also
the rights of special investigators and some indications about procedure.50
From a perspective in favour of legal harmonisation and from that of
internationally operating conservationists, the integration of the CITES formula
was an improvement. With its ratification of the Convention on International
44 Ex art. 31 (1) BCA.
45 Ex elucidation art. 34 (3).
46 Ex art. 34 (2) BCA.
47 Ex art. 4 (2) NMWRO.
48 Ex art. 34 (2) BCA.
49 Ex art. 34 (4) BCA.
50 Art. 39 BCA.
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Trade In Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (henceforth CITES)51
in 1978, Indonesia followed the international community by differentiating
between species threatened by extinction and rare species. Its inclusion in the
BCA also made it possible to apply more severe sanctions in the case of an
animal threatened by extinction being killed, e.g. an orang utan worth ‘tens
of millions of [Rupiahs]’.52
Creating the possibility to declare nature reserves as biosphere reserves
is another example in this category of integrating international instruments
into the national legislation.53
20.4.5 Improving postcolonial regulations
TheMinister specifically mentioned the Forestry Act of 1967 and the Fisheries
Act of 1985 as regulations to be improved by the BCA. Compared to these, the
BCA obviously focuses more on conservation than exploitation. It provides for
more kinds of conservation areas than the Forestry Act54 and is more precise
about prohibited activities. Furthermore, due to its more general formulation
it can be applied to both terrestrial andmarine resources and their ecosystems.
In conclusion, the BCA provides a clearer legal basis for conservation activities
than the Forestry and Fisheries Act.
A major disadvantage of the BCA, however, is that it focuses solely on
conservation areas instead of trying to integrate conservation and exploitation
in general. As we have seen above, that was a ministerial choice that raised
only little criticism among MPs.
In sum, reflecting on what exactly the BCA changed in comparison to the
colonial regulations, the BCA continued many of the colonial approaches but
also adapted the existing regulations to developments in the field of conserva-
tion. Apart from that, it reflected a very specific interpretation of the rule of
law that was far more advantageous for the government and entrepreneurs
51 This convention finds its basis in an IUCN draft adopted in 1963. It went into effect on
July 1, 1975. In three appendices it lists “species threatened with extinction”, “species not
necessarily threatened with extinction but of which trade must be controlled in order to
avoid utilization incompatible with their survival”, and “species that are protected in at
least one country”. CITES controls trade in the listed species with a licensing system. For
further information see, for example, http://www.cites.org/
52 Explanation by the head of the legal office Kamidya, WG 25 June 1990.
53 Ex art. 18 BCA. The BCA defines a biosphere reserve as an ‘area with a virgin or unique
ecosystem or an already degraded ecosystem, under full protection and for scientific and
educational purposes.’ (art. 1 (12)). Art. 18 (2) foresees in an implementing regulation for
details about the designation. The fact that this implementing regulation has not been issued
may be one reason that no new areas have been declared biosphere reserves since 1990.
Another reason may be a lack of national funds.
54 This act only mentions strict nature reserves, wildlife reserves and recreation/ hunting
parks (art. 3 (3) and (4)).
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than for people living in or close to existing or potential nature reserves. In
particular, the large amount of discretionary authority for unspecified govern-
mental agencies deserves mention, as it made the act in many instances much
more vague than its predecessors, with possible negative effects for nature
and people.
20.5 INCREASING PEOPLE’S WELFARE
Just aswith the rule-of-law concept, the BCA gives a very specific interpretation
of the concept of ‘people’s welfare’. No doubt, at a very abstract level, the BCA
is meant to increase the people’s welfare. If all actors in the country conserve
or sustainably exploit the country’s natural resources and their ecosystems,
it will obviously benefit the Indonesian people more and for longer than if
they don’t. However, if one takes a closer look, the act is more beneficial to
some actors than to others. First, the Forestry Minister holds the power to
determine which areas fall under his authority and which do not. Second, the
research and education community gets exclusionary access to many of these
areas. Third, entrepreneurs in the tourism sector benefit from the act since
they can get exclusionary access to certain zones of conservation areas for their
business. As stated by the Minister, the management of conservation areas
and the preservation of species were undertaken ‘in the interest of science,
education, tourism, hydrology, genetic material etc.’55
The ‘losers’ are especially farmers, fishermen and otherswho live andmake
their living in conservation areas. The act does not provide for any alternatives
for them. The BCA could have regulated that the tourist exploitation should
economically benefit the local population. However, the existing provision
and the corresponding provisions in the implementing regulation GR 18 of
199456 were not detailed enough. In addition, as the regulations fail to curb
possibilities to circumvent such provisions, they are of little use. The Pulau
Seribu case in part IV will show how this is a major flaw of the act.57
Thus, the act takes a highly specific view of how to achieve ‘people’s
welfare’. In accordance with the dominant interpretation of the pembangunan
discourse in the early 1990s, it grants exclusive access to conservation areas
for some specific privileged groups. It positions the local population outside
the reach of any possible direct benefits of conservation.
55 29 January 1990.
56 Art. 10 (e) provides that the entrepreneur is required to ‘involve local people in his business
activities’, see also chapter 4.
57 Entrepreneurs claimed that they could work only with people with a specialised hotel
education which was out of reach for the local population. Even the local fishermen did
not benefit from the resorts since the entrepreneurs preferred to buy their fish in Jakarta.
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20.6 REFLECTING THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE SOCIETY
The objective of reflecting the aspirations of society is obviously linked to the
previous one. Many parts of Indonesian society aspire to a better economic
situation. However, the BCA apparently defines society in a very specific way.
Entrepreneurs in the ecotourism sector as well as scientists probably feel that
the BCA reflects their aspirations. On the other hand, there is only one issue
in the BCA that reflects the aspirations of poorer segments of society: compensa-
tion in case of the withdrawal of land rights (art. 9 (3)). PDI wanted this
included into the act and partly succeeded, as it was included in the elucida-
tion. But other critical remarks concerning this issue failed. However, if one
had asked the MPs at the time about whether or not the BCA reflected the
aspirations of society they would almost certainly have said yes. For them,
being representatives of societymeant, by definition, striving for realizing the
people’s will.
20.7 SHOWING INDONESIA’S COMMITMENT TO CONSERVATION
From the Minister’s point of view, the BCA achieved this final objective. He
said the act would make it easier for the nation, the people and especially for
the government to prove that the Indonesian nation had been active in con-
servation for a long time already, but now needed to regulate it.58 The fact
that ‘konservasi’ rather than ‘pelestarian’ was chosen as the title for the act
indicates that the act was intended to show something to the outside world.
Asmuch as theMinister, during the debates, had attempted to show that even
the histories behind the traditional puppet theatre had always been full of
concern for nature conservation and that it thus was nothing foreign at all,
the term ‘konservasi’ definitely was. As ABRI spokesman Zainuddin said: ‘konser-
vasi… is taken from a foreign language, the broader society does not yet know
its meaning’.59
20.8 CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, the Biodiversity Conservation Act reflected a very specific
interpretation of especially the concepts of conservation, society and the rule
of law.Within these interpretational frames the act certainly was an improve-
ment. But for people with other frames, the BCA was disappointing.
The act defined conservation as a kind of ‘pembangunan-conservation’, a
type of conservation serving rather than balancing a centrally orchestrated
58 8 June 1990.
59 11 June 1990, cf. the quote of the director for conservation in the introduction to part II.
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economic growth. The act paved the way for pembangunan-conservation in
at least six ways: first, it limited conservation to specific territories and thus
created the possibility for various actors to exploit nature, except for protected
species, in the rest of the country. Even within some reserved territories, most
notably the national parks, it allowed for limited economic exploitation (tour-
ism). Second, the act was intended to silence foreign criticism to ensure the
continuity of foreign development-aid rather than to change problematic
behaviour of specified actors other than local residents. Third, it defined
participation as mobilisation, attributing the central government – in particular
the Forestry Department – the only leading and activating role. Fourth, the
act nowhere specified which part of the government should do what and left
much discretion for the Forestry Department by calling for 13 implementing
regulations. Fifth, it authorised the government to issue licenses for tourism
in national parks, which could be seen as a chance to negotiate ‘contracts’ with
clients. Sixth, it did not provide for mechanisms to control the government.
Especially the last issue reduced the act’s potential to form part of a solution
for the problem of decreasing biodiversity and degrading ecosystems.
The act lacks attention for effectively changing the problematic behaviour
of specific actors. The parliamentary debates did not deal extensively with
problem-solving. To start with, the problems at hand were not articulated in
enough detail. Then, the debates did not focus at all on either identifying the
actors that caused the problems at hand or on their problematic behaviour.
One may add that the behaviour of officials sustaining the problematic be-
haviours of other actors should have been addressed. Hypotheses about why
actors behaved as they did were hardly uttered and not at all tested.
Instead, it seems that the proponents of the BCA mainly strove to create
the legal basis for national parks that since the 1980s were under development
and to make a gesture to the international community60 without intending
to really search for substantive effectiveness. Other evidence for this forms
the importance MPs and government representatives attributed to symbols.
This became especially clear when all groups stressed how ‘beautiful’ it was
that the act ended up consisting of 45 articles. In the eyes of the Minister there
rested only one blot on the act:
‘How beautiful would it have been if it had had 17 chapters but that is apparently
not always the case. But what is more important is that this Act was enacted with
60 Cf. Cohn who points at the possibility that ‘legislation may be a political show of power
in response to crises or issues that attract strong pro-legislation forces’ (Cohn 2001, p. 480).
See also Schuyt who argues that since legislation fulfils many more roles than just an
instrumental one the effectiveness approach is by definition of a limited value (Schuyt 1983,
p. 178).
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45 articles in the 45th year of the Indonesian independence. This will help to re-
member and get to know it more easily.’61
On the basis of what has been said above, we may thus conclude that the BCA
was mainly a symbolic law that aimed to silence foreign criticism and help
build the nation rather than to be substantively effective. An additional sym-
bolic function may have been to claim authority.62 For the Forestry Depart-
ment the protected area approach formed a possibility to claim authority over
more conservation areas than in the past. That this desire to control territory
has always been one of the Ministry’s major stakes in conservation policy has
been suggested before, for instance by Peluso and Vandergeest.63
Another function may have been to rationalise existing inequalities. After
all, the BCA does not seriously address the economic situation of people living
close to or in protected areas. On the contrary, it ignores that the envisaged
conservation areas were inhabited or exploited in spite of some members of
Parliament mentioning this fact during deliberations. It was thus not a matter
of lacking knowledge but a deliberate choice.
Veerman has suggested that laws can also serve to displace problems.64
This could well be true for the BCA as it replaced the problem of how to
reconcile or negotiate the various interests in natural resources to the imple-
mentation phase. If the government had intended to create aworkable situation
for such negotiations in the field this might not have been a problem. They
could have, for instance, created a communicative law.65 This would have
requiredmore details in the act about how to spread information and organise
debates about the norms in need of specification. Another possibility would
have been to create through the act a mechanism for negotiations in the field,
for example, local representative councils weighing various interests in the
national park in light of specified principles. The BCA did not provide for such
a mechanism.
61 SC 14 July 1990. The Indonesian Independence was declared on August 17th, 1945, which
attributes a special symbolic value to the number 17.
62 Edelman 1977, Edelman 1987.
63 Peluso & Vandergeest 2001.
64 Veerman differentiates between an instrumentalist, astounding, problem displacing, symbolic
and value expressing and consolidating function of a law (Veerman 2004, p. 19-20). Another
author that has theorised about symbolic laws is Aubert (see ch. 4). However, I do not think
that the BCA is an example of a symbolic law as defined by him: it is much less a com-
promise than the result of power politics of the Indonesian government at the time. Neither
is it an example of a law with a signal function. Neither deliberations nor the situation
in the field suggest that there existed a diffuse feeling in the Indonesian society that only
needed to be transformed into concrete norms in a law. On the contrary, the act would
have required a broad debate, either in Parliament or in the wider society, to have increased
its potential.
65 Witteveen & Van Klink 2000.
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In 1992, Sanit published some general, critical remarks about Indonesia’s
lawmaking practices, stating that the government succeeded in controlling
the whole debate in the SC.66 In support of this, my analysis has demonstrated
how this control worked during the debates on the BCA. Through various
strategies ranging from ignoring or intentionally misinterpreting critical ques-
tions to using specific concepts of the pembangunan discourse, the Minister
of Forestry successfully avoided or closed unwanted debates. The speakers
who wished to critically discuss the government’s bill did not succeed in
countering this strategy in an effective manner.
Two findings stand out. The first one relates to the quality of arguments.
The Minister and most speakers of the four groups used mostly opaque
language, especially regarding concepts. What did the Minister, for instance,
actually mean by a ‘clear direction’, what did he mean by ‘legal certainty’,
and had he actually thought about how the two related to each other? Perhaps
he even used them as buzz words without having a clear idea about them.
Likewise, a reference to ‘governmental efforts’ was just too imprecise to make
the government accountable. As a consequence, no satisfactory weighing of
the various interests in society related to nature conservation took place.
Considering the Minister’s efforts to close and curb any discussion about the
existence of these interests, this had been exactly what he wanted.
Second, the expectations of the Minister and MPs that a law was enough
to solve the problem of a decreasing biodiversity and ecosystems lacked any
sense of realism. Given the nature of these expectations and due to dominant
discourse, the act as an instrument to solve this problem could only be dis-
appointing. However, it served various symbolic functions well.
This brings us to the result of the lawmaking process, the act itself. It was
overall a continuation of existing policies. It integrated a number of existing
regulations and was adjusted to new conservation concepts and instruments.
However, the BCA was much less concrete than its predecessors and thus
unsatisfactory for general objectives of the rule of law, such as clarity and
accountability.67
66 Sanit 1992, p. 11-15.
67 For a detailed overview of elements that can form part of the rule-of-law concept see Bedner
2004.

21 Policymaking at the beginning of the
Reformasi era: The Rakornas of 1999
The second case dates from August 1999, when the Ministry for the Environ-
ment (nowKementerian LingkunganHidup, henceforth: KLH) for the second time
organised a national co-ordination meeting for environmental management
(Rapat Koordinasi Nasional, henceforth: Rakornas) entitled ‘Reformation of
environmental management at the doorstep of the 21st century’.1
Due to the political uncertainty following the end of theNewOrder regime
and the economic crisis, it had long been unclear whether this second Rakornas
would take place in 1999 as scheduled. It was delayed several times, but all
of a sudden it received approval and had to be prepared in a very short time.2
21.1 THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS
In accordance with the new political climate of Reformasi, KLH stated that it
wanted to use this meeting to openly discuss performances of the past and
make plans for the future. The director for the natural environment at KLH,
Aca Sugandhy, stressed that the result should not be based on bureaucratic
deliberations only as usual but ought to draw from the ‘input of all stake-
holders’.3 Thus, KLH presented participation as the core idea of this meeting.
Significantly, it defined participation much more broadly than the Forestry
Minister and the groups in the Indonesian Parliament had done in 1990.
Instead of claiming that the bureaucrats at KLH by definition represented all
interests in society, KLH had invited 250 participants from central government
1 Rakornas II Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup, “Reformasi Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup
Menyongsong Abad ke-21”, 9-11 August 1999, Jakarta. Five years earlier, in 1994, the then
Minister for the Environment, Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, initiated the first meeting for a
better co-ordination of all actors involved in environmental management in Indonesia. As
a result of that meeting the participants agreed on a number of co-ordinating mechanisms
(see also Arnscheidt 2003), among which was a nation-wide co-ordination meeting once
every five years.
2 According to a junior employee of KLH, the Ministry had only two weeks to prepare the
meeting. Some critics suspected that the sudden hurry was to be explained by President
Habibie’s wish to gain some credit for his re-election (the presidential elections were
scheduled for October).
3 10 August 1999.
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agencies with tasks related to environmental management,4 from provincial
governments,5 the provincial and district environmental impact management
agencies (In. Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah, abbr. Bape-
dalda Tk. I and II), from business associations, environmental non-govern-
mental organisations and from the environmental study centres of several state
universities. Observers from regional and international organisations had been
invited as well.
This list reflected two important changes in the political situation of Indo-
nesia. First, NGOs and student groups had gained prominence as they, with
broad popular support, had forced the Soeharto regime to resign and give
way to reforms. Second, the regions were going to play a much more promi-
nent role in environmental management due to the enactment of the Act on
Regional Autonomy6 of 1999 that was to go into effect a few months after
the Rakornas.
Whereas the officials from the centre and the regions strongly answered
KLH’s call, some of the NGOs chose not to accept the invitation. The reason
was their dislike of Panangian Siregar, theMinister for the Environment, who,
in their opinion, did not understand much and cared even less about the
environment, having gained the Minister’s post simply because of his party
background.7 Walhi8 and the Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law (abbr.
ICEL) were the most outspoken NGOs on this matter,9 although ICEL sent some
observers. The Indonesian World Wildlife Fund (abbr. WWF) at first made
public its intention to not attend the meeting but changed its mind eventually
‘for the sake of the environment’.10 Likewise, some of the representatives from
the private sector and from universities did not appear too eager even to attend
the panels they were invited for, either because they considered the meeting
not in their interest or not important enough. Thus although KLH presented
participation as much broader than in 1990 not all actors were convinced of
its integrity.
4 Representedwere KLH, the Environmental ImpactManagement Agency (In. Badan Pengen-
dalian Dampak Lingkungan, abbr. Bapedal) and various sectoral departments.
5 Represented were the four environmental management representatives of the governors
and the heads of the provincial agencies responsible for development planning (In. Badan
Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, abbr. Bappeda Tk. I).
6 Act No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy (amended through Act No. 32 of 2004).
7 PDI, the party the later PresidentMegawati Sukarnoputri originally was amember of. After
a Soeharto backed coup against her leadership at a PDI congress in 1996, however, she
decided to continue her political career in a new party, the PDI-Perjuangan (abbr. PDI-P).
8 Wahana Lingkungan Hidup, an influential Indonesian wide organised network of environ-
mental NGOs, internationally aligned with ‘Friends of the Earth’.
9 See for example Kompas 12 August 1999, ‘Rakornas LH hanya basa-basi’. As the third case
(chapter 22) will show the co-operation with NGOs improved when Sonny Keraf became
Minister for the Environment (personal communication, Sudharto P. Hadi, 26 September
2008).
10 Executive director of WWF, Agus Purwono, 10 August 1999.
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The arguments of those actors choosing not to accept themeeting reflected
the oppositional discourse that argued that the government consisted of
individuals primarily occupied with their personal power and personal gain.
To this end, they argued, the government representatives concerned had
developed and practiced an attitude of ‘keeping up appearances’.11 Organising
the co-ordination meeting was thus not seen as a genuine attempt to improve
the policymaking process and its results. Consequently, participating was
interpreted as support for this strategy of keeping up appearances rather than
as an opportunity to contribute to a better policy.
The result KLH claimed to hope for was an agreement about the formulation
of policy principles and a national strategy for environmental management
for the next 25 years, an action plan for the next five years, and a program
indicating priorities and activities for the next year.12 The result of themeeting
was to serve as input for the sessions of the MPR working group that had to
prepare the 1999 Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN) and the general
session of the MPR at which the political decision about this GBHN was to be
made. KLH refrained from being too explicit about how the agreement it hoped
for was to be achieved. It did not use the terminology of musyawarah untuk
mufakat (En. debates to achieve a consensus) that had determined the debates
in 1990. However, the structure of the meeting suggests that KLH did not opt
for a radical change in policymaking practices, as will be outlined below.
The meeting was officially opened by the Indonesian President, in his
palace. The rest of the first day was reserved for speeches of representatives
of various departments13 (Home Affairs, Finances, Forestry and Plantations,
Industry and Trade, andMining and Energy), non-departmental government
agencies (KLH/Bapedal and the National Development and Planning Board,
henceforth: Bappenas) and theNational Defence Institute (Lembaga Ketahanan
Nasional, henceforth: Lemhanas) about their strategies and policies concerning
environmental management. After each 25-minute presentation there was room
for one or two comments or questions from the audience and then a short
response from the speakers. Thus, the whole first day of the meeting was
reserved for top-down input.
During the second day four working groups were to evaluate environ-
mental policies of the past and to discuss the drafts for future policies as
prepared by the divisions for natural environment, man-made environment,
social environment and Bapedal’s directorate for law enforcement and dispute
resolution. Theworking groupswere chaired by a panel of experts who partly
presented and defended and partly commented on KLH’s draft and some 70
other members who could comment on and ask questions about the draft and
11 I borrow this term from Vickers (Vickers 2001).
12 KLH 1999, p. 6.
13 Although the ministers were invited to give a speech, not all of them could attend the
meeting personally, maybe because of the short notice about the precise date of themeeting.
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statements of the panel members. At the last group session in the evening the
working group was to draft a text that could serve as input for the new GBHN,
5-year-plan and the action plan for the year 2000-2001. For this purpose, KLH
had prepared a draft result text. The structure of theworking groupswas thus
very much one of inviting bottom-up input from participants for minor
changes, but certainly not to invite major challenges to KLH’s objectives.
The plenary sessions of the last day were reserved for presentations of the
results of the working groups, comments on these presentations from the
audience and for reaching an agreement about the final text of the meeting.
Based on observations of all plenary sessions and all sessions of working
group 1 on the natural environment, further analysis will show that this
structure of the meeting (together with the fact that many participants inter-
preted the new freedom of debate primarily as an outlet for all kinds of
grievances rather than as an opportunity to really influence policymaking)
led to a result that was very similar to the draft KLH had produced in advance.
21.2 THE DEBATE
21.2.1 The Presidential and Ministerial speeches
In their speeches, the President and the representatives of departments and
non-departmental state agencies discussed general developments, i.e. the
impact of globalisation for Indonesia, the effects of the economic crisis that
had hit the country in 1997, and the impact of Reformasi, in particular the
decentralisation that had been effectuated in 1999, on environmental problems
and problems related to environmental policies.
All speakers said they were highly concerned about the environment and
argued that the Indonesian government needed to pay more attention to this
matter. Apparently, in 1999, just as in 1990 when ‘ensuring the government’s
attention for conservation’ was formulated as an objective of the BCA, the
government was willing to acknowledge that things could be improved. This
was in many cases translated into terms such as ‘need to be mademore perfect’
(In. disempurnakan).
The motivation of the speakers to press for more governmental attention
for the environment ranged from external threats of sanctions and boycotts
to internal threats of overexploitation as a consequence of both development
and the economic crisis. Some of the speakers were concerned about the
sustainability of economic growth, such as theMinister of Industry and Trade
who said that
‘many activities that are oriented toward the exploitation of natural resources cause
pollution and environmental destruction and a decrease of the environmental
quality and of the availability of natural resources as capital for development for
now and in the future.’
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This concern was shared bymany other speakers whose motivation, however,
was fear of international boycotts and sanctions if Indonesia failed to demon-
strate a concern for the environment. This was a real threat considering that
the months preceding the Rakornas had been dominated by vast forest fires,
and the governments of the other ASEAN countries in particular increasingly
pressed the government to take firm steps to stop the fires.
Others, notably the Minister for the Environment and the Minister of
Forestry, suggested they be more concerned about the environment per se.
The Minister for the Environment pointed in this context to the sectors and
their tendency to let their sectoral interest prevail over environmental con-
siderations. The Minister of Forestry (not Hasrul Harahap who had defended
the BCA in 1990 but Muslimin Nasution) said that conservation areas were
threatened by the economic growth of mining, transportation and housing
sectors and by poor people plundering natural resources. Not protecting the
environment would eventually affect the quality of life:
‘The bad quality and quantity of biodiversity will cause a decrease of the quality
of life since mankind depends on the natural environment for water, air, raw
materials, medicines, and other commodities and services.’
He thus defined human needs broader than economic growth, a lesson he had
learned from the economic crisis:
‘The economic crisis that has hit us has made us aware that development only based
on economic growth does not sufficiently create welfare for the people.’
This fact had made the Forestry Department aware that conservation needed
to be directed more at increasing the welfare of the common people. The
Minister therefore repeated that sustainable development contained ecological,
economic and social elements – a change of position compared to his pre-
decessor’s who in 1990 had silenced any remark about poor people by referring
to pembangunan.
In terms of remedies, not all ministers were equally outspoken. Some of
them stuck to describing problems and their possible explanations, but others
did formulate solutions. The Minister of Forestry partly reproduced the Bio-
diversity Conservation Act by citing that conservation needed to encompass
protection, preservation and sustainable exploitation. For another part, he
focused on increasing the commitment of actors involved in the management
of conservation areas with attention for, among other things, human resources
and money. Thus, although admitting that the managing agencies were not
yetworking effectively, he explained this as primarily due to technical factors.
The same idea of strengthening governmental agencies, developing human
resources and providing sufficient funding to environmental management
agencies was a solution many other ministers fancied; this was by no means
a new idea but part of the pembangunan discourse.
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Another remedy that could have dated from the NewOrder period as well
was proposed by theMinister of Industry and Trade who suggested a change
in technology, this time towards clean technology. Whereas this suggestion
could admittedly have been made by any minister of any other capitalist
nation, the next solutionwasmore typically Indonesian: the President, together
with the Minister for the Environment and the Governor of the National
Defense Institute, argued that including the idea of environmental resilience
in the concept of national resilience could solve the problem that pembangunan
still did not sufficiently take environmental elements into consideration.
‘Resilience’ is in fact amilitary concept, here broadened to include the environ-
ment.14
Next to these old ideas there were also those reflecting the Reformasi
discourse. The Minister of Mining and Energy, for instance, pleaded for a
‘partnership’ (In. kemitraan) between stakeholders that should be characterized
by the principle of mutual, democratic respect. These were newwords gaining
currency in public debates in Indonesia.
Likewise, the Minister of Forestry, contrary to his predecessor in 1990,
proposed givingmore attention to communities living in and around conserva-
tion areas by developing ‘community based conservation and management’
and to empower adat communities in conservation by stimulating original
Indonesian management systems such as sasi on the Moluccas, subak on Bali
and repong damar in Lampung. The concepts of community basedmanagement
and of empowerment were new and belonged to Reformasi. The idea of stimu-
lating adat management systems, by contrast, had already been propagated
by Indonesia’s first Minister for the Environment, Emil Salim.
In addition to these people-oriented solutionswas the new idea of decentra-
lization. The Minister of Mining and Energy proposed replacing the existing
sectoral development approach with a regional one. This should be done, he
argued, by basing development on spatial planning which in turn should be
based on development priorities and the environmental and social carrying
capacity of a region.
Similarly, the Minister for Home Affairs saw a clear role for regional
planning agencies: these needed to take into account the environment, while
the new regional environmental impact management agencies (Bapedalda)
should control regional development initiatives.15
The Head of the Central planning agency (Bappenas) agreed to allow the
regions a larger role in policymaking as the existing policymaking structures
were too ‘centralist’. However, he combined this with a people-oriented
14 Being a military concept it reflected the fact that the Indonesian Army had played a
prominent role since the Indonesian revolution preceding the nation’s independence.
15 In practice, Bapedalda’s capacity to control regional development depends on the commit-
ment of governors, mayors and district heads, as Bapedaldas are considered as ‘comple-
mentary agencies’ (personal communication with Sudharto P. Hadi, 26 September 2008).
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approach as he pleaded for strengthening regional agencies but also the people
whom he – again – described as ‘partners’. Significantly, he even pleaded for
more ‘democratic and bottom-up policymaking with public hearings’ which
suggests that Bappenas at this point in time was already thinking about the
public consultation process it was to support in the third case analysed in this
part of the book.
In sum, although all speakers said theywere concerned about the environ-
ment and its role in the Indonesian development process, they produced
widely different arguments. Some ministers kept arguing for more attention
for the environment in order to sustain Indonesia’s economic growth. The
remedies they proposed dated from theNewOrder. Otherministers concluded
from the collapse of the New Order that it was time to increase the attention
for environmental and social aspects of sustainable development. They primar-
ily proposed decentralization and forms of public participation as remedies.
21.2.2 Short reaction to the speeches
In general, the participants did not refrain from criticism of the top-down input
from the ministers. To give an example, they raised doubts about the signi-
ficance of the meeting in general, considering that the result of the first co-
ordination meeting in 1994 had resulted in a couple of mechanisms that in
the end did not work. A concern about a perceived lack of effectiveness of
governmental instruments was at the core of such statements, reflecting the
Reformasi discourse that questioned all practices of the New Order.
Interestingly, most of the answers given by officials reflected the same
discourse. Questions about law enforcement in the context of forest fires and
the role of the army, for example, produced answers as
‘We are a rechtsstaat (In. negara hukum), but it is still theatre (In. masih sandiwara).
Law needs to be the guiding principle. […] Poor Pak [Soe]Harto, nobody dared
to tell him the truth, all reports were ‘Asal Bapak Senang’,16 that is what we need
to change.’17
and
‘[…] all people are involved, all of them share in the timber game.’18
16 This expression means that people around President Soeharto used to adopt an attitude
of ‘keeping him satisfied’ at whatever cost.
17 Governor of the National Defence Institute, 9 August 1999, own translation.
18 Director-general of the Forestry Department, 9 August 1999, own translation.
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These statements suggest that government officials at this meeting wished to
demonstrate that they dissociated themselves from the New Order. The dis-
course of all participants created a strong consensus that the New Order had
produced bad practices and that it was time to create something new. Due
to this consensus no question or criticism seemed taboo.
Whilst enabling all kinds of criticism of the New Order, the Reformasi
discourse simultaneously restricted the space for statements in support of the
Soeharto regime. Participants felt, for example, confused about the use of the
military expression of environmental resilience.
This did notmean that there was a consensus of doing everything different
from the New Order, as the example of the issue of economic growth demon-
strated.Where especially NGO representatives reproduced a complaint frequent-
ly heard in these days19 that the central government was too focused on
economic growth, the representative of theNational Planning Board defended
this focus by referring to the growing population. He also considered the
continually increasing dependence on foreign aid necessary so as to not delay
the country’s economic development. In addition, he presented the path of
borrowing money as normal and leading to success as
‘the rich countries of today used to borrow money as well before becoming rich
and Indonesia will, maybe after a decade, be in their present situation, and not
need any more foreign aid.’
In sum, the Reformasi discourse enabled the participants at the Rakornas to
utter all kinds of criticism of the New Order but was also unspecific enough
to allow for a continuance of old approaches.
21.2.3 KLH’s draft policy on the natural environment
This same reluctance to abandon everything from the New Order is reflected
in KLH’s draft policy on the natural environment. Reading through the one-line
descriptions of proposed programmes reveals many old concepts, although
some new ones as well.
It was in the working groups that KLH officially presented its draft. This
fifty-page document contained an evaluation of the environmentalmanagement
of the last five years, its problems, challenges, obstacles and opportunities,
19 See, for instance, http://www.bapedalda-makassar.go.id/isu_opini/05062003.asp for a
statement by Otto Soemarwoto, a retired professor of a Bandung university, that the national
development programme did not succeed in incorporating the principles of sustainable
development due to the fact that most parts of the bureaucracy and the society at large
considered a truly sustainable development to be too expensive.
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and proposed policy for the next 25 years, a strategy for the next five years
and programmes for the next year.
The policy for the coming 25 years focused on themanagement of protected
areas, the rehabilitation and conservation of natural resources – especially in
river areas and former mining sites – and the control and rehabilitation of
nature destruction as a consequence of forest fires. For the last issue, KLH
proposed a new law that, among other results, should regulate tasks and
authorities of agencies and responsibilities of the government, the private sector
and the people. In addition, KLH proposed 20 programmes for themanagement
of the natural environment and another 13 for the control and rehabilitation
of nature destruction.
Familiar were notions like ‘development of a management system for…’
(In. pengembangan sistem pengelolaan), ‘development of technology’ (In. pengem-
bangan teknologi), ‘increase of protection’ (In. peningkatan perlindungan), ‘stand-
ards’ (In. baku mutu) etc. These were very much the words of the pembangunan
discourse of theNewOrder government. Newwere the focuses on forest fires
and on ‘effectivemanagement’ of protected areas. Whereas the focus on forest
fires was evidently needed to solve a huge problem, both focuses aimed to
silence foreign criticism and at the same time reflected the critical attitude of
theReformasi discourse towards the past performance of the government. New
were also other Reformasi ideas about a greater, ‘active role’ for the people,
‘partnership’, ‘just exploitation’ and about developing a system of traditional
knowledge about conservation. And, last, was a remarkable programme about
biodiversity conservation in agriculture and unprotected production areas.
A similar issue had been raised by PDI in 1990 but had not been integrated
into the BCA.
The draft was thus a merger of technocratic pembangunan ideas and the
more people-oriented Reformasi discourse.
21.2.4 The debate within the working group on the natural environment
The debate within theworking group centred on threemain issues and largely
consisted of variations on the same environmentalist theme, i.e. how to get
more actors in the Indonesian development process to take the environment
into account. Another part of the debate concerned Reformasi, in particular
about how to develop new governmental behaviour and to what extent non-
governmental actors should participate in environmental management and
decision-making. A third part of the debate, finally, was about decentralisation.
It reflected the high degree of uncertainty about the present and future
situations of environmental management among the participants that resulted
from the new Regional Autonomy Act.
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After KLH had presented its draft policy the panel members commented
on the draft.20 The general atmosphere was one of criticism. The representative
of PSL Unhas, for instance, complained about the short time for preparation
of the session: ‘I only had one night to read all the input and to prepare my
speech.’ The WWF director showed his overall critical attitude towards the
Minister by opening his speech with the words: ‘I had already decided not
to come, but then I changed my mind for the sake of the environment.’ After
the comments from the panel, the participants in the audience could pose
questions (in most cases participants did not ask a question but described the
problems in their region), which was then followed by a reaction from the
panel.
In terms of substance, one argument dominated the discussion. It concerned
the critical assessment of the performance of regional governments and
agencies in environmental management:
‘In the distribution of authorities between centre and regions we need to be careful.
Certain tasks can be handed over. But there are other tasks, especially strategic
ones, that need to be reconsidered, where the centre needs to have the authority
to take action. Here is an example from South Sulawesi. There is an area that is
destined to become an international conservation area but people regard it more
as a supplier of marble and cement. Another example is about the pollution of the
river Jeneberang. NGOs and several government agencies already reached a con-
sensus that the mining of sand and stones (In. galian C) is very destructive. But
when asked about that, the regional government always explains it with its need
of income (In. pendapatan daerah asli). So, the regional government acknowledges
the destruction but considers its income as more important.’21
Participants thus feared that economic considerations would prevail if decision-
making authority regarding implementation of sustainable development were
transferred to the regions.
Whereas most of the comments got stuck in descriptions of similar prob-
lems from other regions and in formulating the need for decision-makers to
take the environment into consideration, some of the participants also thought
20 The panel of the working group on the natural environment consisted of KLH’s Director
for the Natural Environment who presented the draft text prepared by him and his staff,
KLH’s expert (In. staf ahli) on the global environment who acted as themoderator, the head
of the environmental study centre of Hasanuddin University (PSL Unhas), the executive
directors ofWWF Indonesia and theNGOKophalindo, and a representative of the Director-
ate for Nature Conservation of the ForestryDepartment. It thus representedKLH, environ-
mental scientists, NGOs active in the field of nature conservation and the Forestry Depart-
ment. Not present for unspecified reasons were the invitees from the environmental study
centre of Bogor University (PSL IPB) and from the business association MUIPB.
21 NGO representative, 10August 1999. Also according to Sudharto P.Hadi, regional govern-
ment interpreted regional autonomy as an ‘opportunity to gain more regional income
without considering the environment’ so forest destruction increased from 1,6 million ha
per year to 2,5 million ha per year (personal communication, 26 September 2008).
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about how to achieve this. One proposal reflects a belief in the need and
possibility to educate people in the regions to become environmentalists. Other
people appeared to be primarily concernedwith the need to counter the power
of regional actors, as the pleas for quickly installing the regional environmental
impact management agencies (Bapedalda) andmaintaining a powerful centre
in environmental affairs show.
Apparently, most participants shared this frame of a power game. They
were dissatisfied with the present institutional setting in which it was KLH’s
main task to formulate environmental policies and to ‘co-ordinate’ the activities
of other governmental agencies. The twomajor concerns in this respect voiced
at the Rakornas were ‘ego-sectoralism’ and ‘co-ordination’. Ego-sectoralism
was an issue that in 1990 already had been mentioned once by the PPP group
during the parliamentary debates about the BCA. Likewise, the Minister for
the Environment had referred to it without using the exact expression. It meant
that the sectoral departments let sectoral interests rather than environmental
considerations determine their decisions. A government official fromBali noted,
for instance, that the Environmental Management Act of 1997 stated that the
sectors were responsible for the implementation of environmental policies,
which she considered problematic because the sectors simultaneously had to
issue licenses. In 1999, this phenomenon that the sectoral departments did not
share the environmental frame of KLH was the most frequently used explana-
tion for KLH’s ineffectiveness.
According to various speakers, a case in point was the Environmental
Impact Assessment (In. Analisa Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan, abbr. AMDAL).
They described the environmental impact assessment procedure as a ‘pure
formality’ (In. alat administrasi saja) without any real significance, as, for
example, the case of Freeport22 had shown. An NGO representative therefore
concluded that the government was not serious about protecting the environ-
ment since in the context of the use of natural resources reality differed from
the rule prescribed by the Constitution. Although art. 33 (3) stipulated that
‘all natural resources shall be controlled by the State and shall be used for
the people’ in reality, the speaker said, the ‘government usually forgets about
the last part of this sentence’. In 1990 PDI legislators had also questioned the
seriousness of the government’s intention to conserve nature. However, at that
time one of the sectoral departments – Forestry – had been their debating
partner. TheMinister had chosen not to react to the PDI question. In 1999, there
was a broad consensus between NGOs and officials from the Ministry for the
Environment about the lack of political will of many sectoral departments to
take the environment into consideration.
22 PT Freeport Indonesia has been exploiting a huge goldmine inWest Papua since the 1970s.
TheNewOrder government issued permissive licenses for the operations of this American
enterprise without monitoring or sanctioning the environmental and social effects it pro-
duced. For a detailed analysis see Leith 2002.
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Participants had several ideas about how to stop ego-sectoralism. KLH as
well as some regional officials proposed an approach based on a region’s
biodiversity instead of on sectoral interests. Exactly how this was to be
achieved and implemented was not discussed, however.
Others pleaded for ‘environmental resilience’ (dealt with above) and ‘co-
ordination’. In this case, co-ordination was interpreted as giving one agency
the power to eventually force someone else to act in accordance with the
environmental frame. However, participants agreed that this was not feasible
in practice. In the past KLH had already attempted to co-ordinate through its
so-called ‘one-door policy’ – obliging departments to send their policies to
KLH for a check in terms of environmental sustainability. However, environ-
mental officials complained they actually lacked the authority to ‘co-ordinate’
officials of higher echelons23 since their positionwas lower in the bureaucratic
hierarchy. So, proposals to go further down this road by obliging sectoral
departments to keep KLH informed about how they were to implement their
policies, to ensure that the departments were taking the environment into
consideration, would also not work.
One participant concluded that as a consequence environmental manage-
ment should be positioned directly under the President, but most other parti-
cipants argued that KLH should become a full department to be able to counter
‘ego-sectoralism’. An NGO representative added that decentralisation also
demanded a central agency stronger than KLH at present. As the Director for
the Natural Environment from KLH commented, there have always been
discussions about KLH’s weak position and insufficient powers. Already under
Indonesia’s first Minister for the Environment pleas were made to transform
KLH into a full department but nothing had ever come of it. Under Sarwono,
the second Minister for the Environment, some people suggested they shut
down KLH and maintain (a stronger) Bapedal. In the end, the working group
showed a clear consensus that KLH should become a full department with
implementing tasks.24
In linewith environmentalist discourse, many participants thought a change
of attitude was most needed. Indonesian society as a whole needed to be
convinced of adopting environmental morals and ethics. One NGO represent-
ative even went as far as to propose an environmental screening for ‘develop-
ment agents’ (In. agen pembangunan) to ensure that only people with the right
attitude were admitted at positions where decisions about development were
made.
In addition to complaints that environmental policies were too permissive
and that few officials used an environmental frame in either the regions or
23 Civil servants representing the environment in many cases belong to echelon 4, whereas
those to be co-ordinated are echelon 3 officials.
24 In 2002 Bapedal was merged with KLH which, however, did not decisively increase the
Ministry’s power vis-à-vis the sectoral departments.
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at the centre, a lot of confusion emerged over what each department or non-
departmental agency was actually responsible for. This uncertainty had
increased due to Act 22 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy. Among participants
from the region it even developed into unease, making them request directives
from the centre, for instance, for handling the environmental consequences
of the increasing poverty. Some bureaucrats clearly preferred the certainty
of the old days. Uncertainty also existed regarding the financial consequences
of further-reaching autonomy. Participants feared that the financial (in)capab-
ility of regionswould determine their policy. The official answerwas a typical
pembangunan reaction, i.e. that it remained the task of the central government
to reduce poverty in the regions and to ensure an even distribution of wealth.
Another issue in this contextwas the responsibility for conservation, which
demonstrated that the Forestry Department, despite its references to, for
instance, community-based natural resources management, still reproduced
the discourse of the New Order. Its representative not only stressed that even
with Act 22 of 1999 conservation remained the task of the central government,
but also that his Ministry’s hesitation about whether or not districts or muni-
cipalities would be capable of managing such conservation areas originated
in the bad experiences delegating responsibility for managing protected areas
(In. kawasan lindung) to the regions. In order to prevent a recurrence of such
experiences he suggested making sure that in these cases central authority
could not be delegated to the regions and that the parks were administered
with a decent management approach, especially in the fields of human
resources and financing. In both cases, the uncertainty about regional auton-
omy produced familiar New Order pleas in favour of more central authority.
Finally, some participants argued in favour of more participation. However,
their use of the concept demonstrated that the discourse on participation was
very unspecific. Participants from the provinces as well as from NGOs stressed
the importance of having ‘the people’ and NGOs play a role in environmental
management, including decision-making about development. Such arguments
in favour of more participation had formed part of the oppositional discourse
since the early 1990s and remained an important concept of Reformasi. Re-
actions from the panels were positive. However, they reflected a
conceptualisation of participation very similar to the one in 1990. The Director
for the Natural Environment referred to Canada, where NGOs and students
helped to fight forest fires (andwere paid for it). Especially for national parks,
the representative of the Forestry Department repeated several times that the
government needed the NGOs because society trusted them more than the
government and society could play a role in the surveillance of the parks.
Clearly, both officials still approached participation as something to be directed
by the government.
Another Reformasi discourse focused on transparency. A representative
from East Java suggested, for example, that the process of decision-making
should be more open. Closed decision-making – such as in the cases of the
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reclamation of the coast in the north of Jakarta and the 1-million hectare project
of peat land in central Kalimantan – should be avoided in the future. Instead,
the government should be transparent about the objectives, the economic value
and the effects on people and the environment of a planned development
project. In the particular opinion of NGOs, transparency and involving all
stakeholders in decision-making would lead to environmental protection and
welfare for the people.
In sum, there was a struggle between those wishing to strengthen
environmentalism through education and those thinking that this could only
be achieved by creating powerful environmental institutions, either at the
centre or in the regions. These different arguments reflected different environ-
mental discourses.Whereas the first group of participants defined the problem
as a lack of knowledge, the second group considered a lack of political will
as the major obstacle, one that could only be countered with power. Finally,
the debate revealed that participants interpreted participation in variousways.
Representatives of the government tended to define it in limited terms with
the government remaining in control. NGOs pleaded for broadening participa-
tion to include society in decision-making about development.
21.2.5 The plenary sessions
On the third day of the meeting when many participants had already left, the
working groups presented the results of their discussions (see below).
After the presentations the debate about institutions, human resource
development and the consequences of the Act on Regional Autonomy for
environmental management continued without new insight.
Only a single critical remark was made about the vagueness of the action
plans formulated in the draft and the result of the working groups. According
to the speaker of an NGO they lacked information about who should do what
and when. This presents a parallel with the first case of the BCA, both in the
lack of details about the implementation phase and in the fact that criticism
of this kind did not result in either a discussion or an amendment to the final
text.
The final part of the meeting was a debate on an amendment of the
‘national environmental paradigm’, which had been introduced at the first
co-ordination meeting five years before. The purpose of this rather symbolic
explanation of the environment was officially to increase attention for the en-
vironment among awider public. In the end, the draft sentences were shorten-
ed in a few cases in order to reduce their complexity and thus be easier to
remember. Participants showed little interest in this part of the meeting, one
of them explaining to me that it was the Minister who had insisted on it.
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21.3 OUTPUT: THE FINAL TEXT ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
The final text of the working groups had been drafted at the last session of
the second day, in the evening. Prepared by KLH only small changes were
made, without much discussion. With less than one quarter of the ca. 70 group
members there, attendance at this session was very meagre. It was mainly the
representatives of NGOs who were eager to attend because of their well-
founded distrust of the executive, as the following quote of an NGO representat-
ive illustrates:
‘That is how it works: we just had the discussion but the result is already in the
computer. How is that possible? It was ready before the discussion. […] Earlier
on they tried it again: If you trust us you do not need to come to the session tonight
to discuss the result of the working group. […] I will for sure because I don’t
believe anything anymore.’25
Apparently, this person was no longer ready to accept promises from the
government but chose direct control. However, he was one of the few.
It was not clear at all how decisions about what should and shouldn’t be
included in the final text were made. There was no clear mechanism of pro-
posing, debating or voting. Questions were asked and comments were made.
Sometimes a chair of a session would support a comment, other times he
would give an answer and invite a following question.
The final text contained a plea for a strong centralist authority and many
technocratic solutions to protect the environment. In addition, it referred to
many concepts the New Order government had incorporated in its pemban-
gunan discourse, including ‘resilience’ and ‘co-ordination’. Apart from that
the text partly used Reformasi language when pleading for a more ‘active’ role
for the people, ‘partnerships’ and ‘developing a system of traditional know-
ledge’. Although these seemed to indicate a change in approach, they did so
only at first sight. The debates have made clear that there was no consensus
on the meaning of such concepts and that most government representatives
tended to interpret them in a way very similar to the 1990 case. The Rakornas
text also does not change the New Order tendency to grant far-reaching
authorities to the central government. It lists one-line project descriptions
without providing any details about the desired time scale or responsibilities
for their implementation.
In the text the input from the variousMinisters is clearly indicated as such,
whereas it requires a careful comparison of the draft and final texts to see
which comments from other participants influenced themeeting’s output. The
five pages of top-down input summarise the speeches of the first day and are
dominated by references to environmental resilience, creating an environ-
25 Personal communication, 10 August 1999.
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mentalist attitude, strong environmental institutions, decentralisation, partner-
ship between the government, the business sector and the people, and especial-
ly the development and environmental elements of sustainable development.
The next seven pages are very similar to KLH’s draft.
The most important changes consist of an added paragraph about institu-
tions, about human resources and about the ‘evaluation of the role of central
and regional environmental management institutions’. The paragraph about
institutions reflects the frame of environmentalmanagement as a power game,
as it proposes the establishment of a Department for the Environment that
could bemodelled after the examples of TheNetherlands, Thailand, Singapore,
Germany andAustralia, and the rapid establishment of regional environmental
impact management agencies. The paragraph about human resources mentions
that personnel in the regions needs to be ‘repaired’ (In. pembenahan) through
a better recruitment system, better training and education and better career
perspectives. The ideas behind this recommendation are that either environ-
mentalists should be selected for and kept in the regional environmental
control agencies or that other people should be educated to become environ-
mentalists. The new paragraph about the evaluation of regional and central
institutions in the field of environmental management argues that the centre
needs to maintain authority for environmental management due to the ‘differ-
ent interpretation of pembangunan’ in the region. One field of environmental
management that should not be decentralised is themanagement of conserva-
tion areas. The story behind this argument is that central institutions are by
definition more environmentalist than regional ones.
Despite these additions to the final text a number of arguments were not
included. Claims that the decision-making process should includemore stake-
holders and become more transparent and that the government still seemed
to focus on economic growth rather than on environmentally sound develop-
ment are nowhere to be found. And recommendations to change the bureau-
cratic rank of environmental officials in order to make co-ordination effective
and action plans more concrete had no effect. The New Order priorities of
top-down decision-making and economic growth were still dominant.
21.4 CONCLUSION: ARGUMENTS AND STRATEGIES
Although presented as something new, the Rakornas was primarily a continu-
ation of old practices and resulted in a text that was dominated by pemban-
gunan concepts recommended to increase the support for environmentalism
in Indonesia. However, part of the meeting as well as part of the final text
also reflected the new Reformasi discourse.
The main strategy of the Ministry for the Environment was to allow for
‘input’ (In.masukan) to demonstrate its intention to practice participation. The
Rakornas allowed for both top-down and bottom-up input, not less and not
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more than that. Reserving about 40 percent of the time and the final text for
ministers from other departments to ‘give their direction’ (In. mengarahkan)
for future environmental policy reflected that KLH had no radical change for
policymaking in mind. And, in spite of all the Reformasi talk about participa-
tion, the great consensus that New Order practices should be changed, and
the different setting with different actors and a different aim, the structure
looked much like the one of the lawmaking process of 1990. It still very much
depended on KLH’s willingness to explore issues in the debate and to either
change its draft or not. This was mainly due to the lack of a clear and trans-
parent decision-making mechanism. The one clear change was that no one
referred to Pancasila and its underlying idea that people had to achieve a
consensus without conflict.
Importantly, the critical atmosphere during the working group sessions
did not lead to debates. The more critical voices who doubted the usefulness
of the meeting and asked questions about the general direction of policy were
not organised and so remained voices in the wilderness. In addition, the only
strategy at their disposal – arguing in favour of change – was also used by
all other actors. The Reformasi discourse allowed everyone to utter criticism
but in no way obliged KLH to include it in the final text. Reformasi was just
too vague to enable radical change and allowed for sticking to nearly
unchanged practices.
In fact, instead of leading to debates the prevalence of old decision-making
structures led to a quick decrease in attendance at the sessions. After dinner,
for example, normally only one third of the participants reappeared at the
next session and only one third stayed until the meeting was closed. Most
attendees left after receiving their certificate testifying their attendance. Like-
wise, the concentration during the discussions decreased rapidly in the course
of the meeting, maybe in part because of the full programme.
The comments showed a great consensus that things needed to change
and that the environmentalist element of sustainable development needed to
be strengthened in the Indonesian bureaucracy. Even those departments that
were alleged representatives of the so-called ego-sectoralism defended the
environmentalist frame at the meeting.
Yet, there appeared to be a balance between support for remedies belonging
to the pembangunan discourse and to Reformasi to increase the influence of
environmentalism in the development process. It was primarily the NGOs, KLH
and – contrary to its position in 1990 – the Forestry Department arguing in
favour of ‘partnerships’, ‘strengthening’ or ‘empowering the people’, and
‘community-based natural resources management’. To this Bappenas added
decentralisation and bottom-up policymaking, which met with opposition from
Forestry, KLH and the regional Bapedaldas which argued in favour of a more
centralist environmentalism and emphasised their doubts about the capability
and will of regional governments to take the environment into account. This
reluctance at the same time reflected that they interpreted ‘partnerships’ etc.
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in a specific, centralist, and thus pembangunan way. All participants also, and
most ministers exclusively, thought pembangunan concepts such as environ-
mental resilience, technology andmanagement, supported environmentalism
in Indonesia, thus showing the continuing importance of the pembangunan
discourse.
Finally, contrary to the MPs in 1990, most participants of the Rakornas
thought that changing the attitudes of people, particularly government officials,
through education was not enough. Instead most participants favoured
strengthening the position of the environmental government agencies vis-à-vis
the other government players in the power game of Indonesian politics.
Significantly, thismeant that the decentralisation of environmentalmanagement
needed to be carefully reconsidered. As the demand for strong environmental
agencies was in line with KLH’s own perception it readily included this ‘input’
in the final text.
At the meeting the opposition in favour of radical change was too small
and unorganised to be significant. It lacked a clear vision about an alternative
decision-makingmodel, which enabled KLH to talk Reformasi but continue old
practices.
22 Reformasi Lawmaking: Drafting the Natural
Resources Management Act1
In the third case, contrary to the first two cases, NGOs active in the field of
environmental law and rights for adat communities played a prominent role.
They were determined to struggle for a radical change in the field of natural
resources management in Indonesia. To realise that dream they started to
propagate the idea of drafting an encompassing act on natural resources
management after the model of a comparable act in New Zealand.2 Not long
after the initial idea had been born the NGOs attempted and succeeded to
establish a coalition with prominent academics in the field of environmental
law, the then Minister for the Environment, Sonny Keraf, and officials from
Bappenas.
22.1 PROCESS
This coalition pursued two main strategies to find support for a new legal
regime for natural resources management. The first was to build as much
popular support as possible. The second was to follow the regular path of
lawmaking.
As part of the first strategy the coalition organised a multi-stakeholder
conference on natural resourcesmanagement. This attempt to put the environ-
ment back on the political agenda was perceived as necessary because since
the beginning of Reformasi politicians increasingly focused on ‘broad political
issues’.3 The new Minister for the Environment, Sonny Keraf, readily agreed
to chair the meeting. One of the main outcomes of this conference was the
recommendation to draft an act on natural resourcesmanagement (henceforth:
NRM Act).
As a next step and in accordance with the regular procedure for lawmaking
the Ministry for the Environment (henceforth: KLH) asked the President on
11 September 2000 to be granted the role of sponsoring agency for the drafting
process of the NRM Act, which it got on the 19th of February 2001.
However, KLH did not wait for this formal assignment. Soon after the
conference the coalition, headed by KLH, organised meetings and discussions
1 Rancangan Undang-Undang Pengelolaan Sumber Daya Alam, abbr. RUU PSDA.
2 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 14 May 2007.
3 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 14 May 2007.
250 Reformasi Lawmaking: Drafting the Natural Resources Management Act
in preparation of the draft and already in the beginning of February 2001 KLH
together with experts from universities, representatives from NGOs and various
governmental agencies, including the Forestry and Mining Departments,
discussed the first background paper for the bill.
Simultaneously, another coalition of land tenure reformers and environ-
mentalists lobbied the members of the People’s Consultative Congress (In.
Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, henceforth MPR) in 2001
to issue a decree on land reform and NRM.4 The environmentalists would have
preferred to lobby the MPR to include a mandate for the NRM Act in its Decree
IX of 2001. However, absent an agreement on the need for this act, this was
not pushed any further. Some groups were of the opinion that a NRM Act was
too clear a statement in favour of capitalism and favoured instead reform
aimed at increased implementation of the existing Agrarian Act of 1960, a more
socialist approach to land and natural resources. As a result of such internal
disagreements the MPR postponed the actual decision about how to reform
the relevant legislation and did not formalise any obligation to radically change
the NRM approach.
In the end, the decree recognized the MPR’s responsibility to resolve the
problems of poverty, structural inequalities, environmental degradation and
social conflict caused by the present legislation. Furthermore, it formulated
important principles for future policies in the field of land reform and NRM
andmandated the President and Parliament to soon regulate these issues and
to either ‘revoke, change and/or replace existing regulations not in line with
the principles determined in this decree’.5
22.1.1 Building broad public support: public consultation
In accordance with its aim to create as much support for the act as possible
the coalition for the NRM Act decided to consult the broader public about the
problems they experienced in the field of NRM and about possible solutions.
This process, that came to be known as ‘konsultasi publik’ (abbr. KP), intended
to make the future act more ‘legitimate’, ‘democratic’ and ‘just’ and ‘thus
4 MPR Decree IX of 2001; for a discussion of the Decree and the lobby preceding it see also
Lucas & Warren 2003. Prior to lobbying the MPR the NGOs screened acts related to the
environment (including the BCA,MiningAct, Forestry Act, Fisheries Act and Environmental
Management Act) in terms of criteria such as participation, sustainability, the acknowledge-
ment of traditional rights, co-ordination andharmonization (personal communicationwith
Sudharto P. Hadi, 26 September 2008).
5 Ex art. 6 MPR Decree IX/2001, compare for Lucas & Warren 2003. They state that major
weaknesses were that it excluded state land administered by the Ministries of Forestry,
Mining and Energy and Marine Affairs and Fisheries and that it renewed old promises
of justice without clarifying how to actually realize them.
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implementable’.6 Participation was thus defined as a solution for problems
with legitimacy and implementation of regulations.
However, apart from this official rationale for the consultation process
different actors also held other expectations:
‘For some it was a way to really listen to the people in the field and learn more
about their wisdom of managing natural resources and about the concept of bio-
region. Others hoped to obtain an objective justification for the act from the majority
of the people. In the first respect, the result was disappointing sincemost attendees
of the meetings were people that had been socialized by NGOs (In. binaan LSM)
and thus mainly reproduced our own discourses.’7
Be that as it may, this new process of public consultation together with all
other activities belonging to the strategy of building popular support reflected
the element of the Reformasi discourse that disapproved of everything associ-
ated with the NewOrder and the state. The public consultation was designed
as an alternative or at least as an additional element of the regular, formal
way of lawmaking. It was a new practice that was meant to help rebuild trust
in the state.
Together with the National Development Planning Board, Bappenas, NGO
representatives and academics, KLH formed a core team (In. tim inti) that was,
among other things, to organise a public consultation process on the issue.8
FromDecember 2002 to April 2003, the working groups gathered stakeholders
at 159 locations at the village, sub-district, district, provincial and national level.
In addition, the media spread numerous adds9 that – just as KLH’s website
did – asked for input from the interested public.10
Actors consulted were the central and regional governments and parlia-
ments, local (including adat) groups, academics, experts, professionals and
observers with various disciplinary backgrounds working at universities, in
business or for NGOs. Local institutions were made responsible for the imple-
mentation of the public consultation.
6 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 14 May 2007; Kartodihardjo et al., p. 16.
7 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 3 September 2007.
8 In January 2003 theMinister for the Environment gave the team an official status by issuing
decree 2/2003 on its composition. The members were the Minister for the Environment
Nabiel Makarim and one of his deputies, Hoetomo, whowould set out the general direction
(In. pengarah) and Koesnadi Hardjasoemantri and Daud Silalahi as chair and vice chair.
Ordinary members were the academics Sudharto P. Hadi and Hariadi Kartodihardjo,
Effendy A. Sumardja from KLH, Indra Darmawan from Bappenas, Mas Achmad Santosa
(a formerNGO activist but here listed as ‘ environmental expert’, and IsmidHadad,Wiwiek
Awiati, Sandra Moniaga and Longgena Ginting representing four NGOs. Apart from this
core team therewas also a technical team formed responsible for themore technical aspects
of drafting.
9 Suwarno et al. n.y., p. 9-13.
10 Http://www.menlh.go.id/i/art/pdf_1057702702.pdf.
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In addition to the publicmeetings focus group discussionswere organised
with academics specialised in the environment and NRM, economists, entre-
preneurs and adat groups to get a better insight into the nature of the critical
issues and the perceptions of entrepreneurs who, although invited, scarcely
attended the public meetings.11
Most participants welcomed this experiment although some of themwere
critical with regard to the question of representation, accessibility and trans-
parency12 and the priority the working group gave to lawmaking instead
to first solving the existing conflicts.13 They perceived ‘the academic approach’
as ‘reducing problems’ and producing ‘nothing but a technical solution’while
what was needed was a ‘creative and imaginative solution’.14 Others were
cynical about what the DPR would do with their input. Were the members of
Parliament going to use this new practice of participation as a strategy to
silence criticism and thus to keeping up appearances or were they really going
to pay attention to the ‘aspirations’ of the people?15 Such questions and doubts
reflected themost radical frame of the Reformasi discourse that consisted purely
of a deeply rooted distrust of state institutions.
After the process had been completed the organisers acknowledged some
problems aswell. According to Kartodihardjo, the public consultation process
workedwell to identify problems but encountered difficulties in linking these
to the ‘bigger picture’16 and thus to possible solutions. Likewise, one of the
initiators of the lawmaking process and the idea of public consultation con-
cluded that the process had turned out to be more difficult than expected:
‘The process of public consultation appeared to be difficult and expensive. What
was difficult about it was to determine who were the stakeholders, how to ensure
that the consultation was conducted in the same way at all places and to decide
when to actually consult the people. Actually, it would have been good to consult
11 Kartodihardjo, et al. [n.y.], p. 18.
12 See, for example, Suara Pembaruan 3 March 2004, ‘Pembahasan RUU PSDA Harus Lebih
Transparan: Konflik Muncul Karena Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat Tak Pernah Dihargai’.
13 Personal communication with a member of the working group, 14 June 2003 and Walhi
19 August 2003, ‘”Agrarian and Natural Resources Management Reform Now!” was the
Civil Society Cry During the people’s Assembly (MPR) Annual Sitting’ (http://www.eng.
walhi.or.id/kampanye/psda/gugatan/agr_natural_res/.).
14 Kartodihardjo, et al. [n.y.], p. 18.
15 Personal communicationwith one of the organisingNGO activists, 14 June and 4 July 2003.
The expression he used was ‘demokrasi pintu gerbang’, meaning that nobody knows exactly
what is going to happen to the input from outside the Parliament. Lucas andWarren report
on a case from 2001 that illustrates this same sort of public distrust and the official reaction
to it: ‘To the [farmers’] protest that the Policy Decision showed no serious intent to eliminate
the causes of the suffering of rural farmers, a delegation from the MPR Committee re-
sponded with a familiar and vacuous claim: “For a full year we have travelled throughout
Indonesia and have taken in all the aspirations that have been coming forth from the
people” (Lucas & Warren 2003, p. 121).
16 Kartodihardjo, et al. [n.y.], p. 17.
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them three times: once about the idea, then about the first and the final draft.
However, consulting them only once cost more than US $ 250.000 (IDR 3,1 billion).
That was not only for transportation but also pay people to attend. After all, people
were only willing to attend meetings when they were getting paid. They do not
yet regard the law as important. Only few groups are really interested; others are
more concerned about other matters. Also, what happened was that there were
some ‘free rider’ facilitators who used the consultation process to achieve their
own objectives. Some of them, for instance, belonged to the group that favoured
keeping the BAL of 1960 as themain legislation but tomake it more implementable.
As a result, the workshops they led rejected the idea of an NRM Act.’17
These conclusions show that organising such processes in the future will be
difficult to realise because of the enormous expenses. And one would need
even more in order to consult the public in a satisfactory manner, with clear
improvements regarding representation and facilitation – including a desire
to more tightly control the discourse of the facilitators.
22.1.2 Interdepartmental discussions
During and after the public consultation KLH focused on an element of the
formal lawmaking procedure, i.e. the interdepartmental discussions. These
took place on February 5th, 2001, November 19th, 2002, January 13th, February
27th, March 14th, April 29-30th and May 23-24th 2003. Between the March and
April meetings the departments were asked to send written comments on the
bill. It deserves mentioning that not all government agencies attended all
meetings. In addition, KLH held a bilateral meeting with the Department for
Energy and Mining on March 11th 2003.
22.1.3 Delay
In October 2003, the preparatory process for the NRMAct was suddenly called
to a halt. The then Minister for the Environment, Nabiel Makarim, who had
taken over the post from Sonny Keraf at the end of 2001, declared that he
thought it better to postpone further discussions until after the general elections
in 2004 since in his opinion the lobbying by community groups and sectoral
departments had not led to ‘a clearer concept of NRM’. As a result he disagreed
with a number of stipulations in the draft. These included the authority given
to adat communities which could be disadvantageous for the environment since
not all adat communities subscribed to sustainability.18 This led to an outcry
17 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 14 May 2007.
18 Media Indonesia 7 October 2003, ‘Perombokan RUU PSDA Bisa Picu Kerusakan Lingkungan’.
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from all NGOs that had been involved in the process since they feared post-
ponement would give the sectoral departments the opportunity to reform their
own legislation without having to consider the NRM Act and thus to bury the
draft.19
Others explained this delay in different terms. Sonny Keraf, for example,
thought one reason was KLH’s lack of money: ‘When the DPR discusses a draft,
large amounts of money are needed. I believe that KLH does not possess large
amounts to push the draft through the DPR.’20 It is not clear whether he was
referring to corruption or to the fact that KLH had to pay for meetings not
funded by the regular DPR budget. In the event that he was referring to
corruption his view was supported by Professor Koesnadi, at that time the
most renowned Indonesian scholar in the field of environmental law, who
said ‘it was very difficult for us to say that the DPR was corrupt, so we looked
for another way to postpone the process.’21
Koesnadi’s support for this delaymade two things clear. First, his approach
was a strategic one. He preferred to wait for a composition of Parliament that
would be favourable to getting the NRM Act passed. In 2005, he was much
more confident than in 2003 since ‘now there are many former students of
mine in responsible positions.’22 This we can interpret as a strategy of playing
it safe. At the same time it reflects a sort of clientelism as he obviously
expected his former students to be ready to support any proposal from him.
The second thing this support of the delay made clear was that within the
coalition the consensus about which course to take was fragile.
This impression was confirmed by an NGO activist who argued that the
participating NGOs consisted of three major groups:
‘There was the radical group that wanted to stop all mining and logging and there
was a moderate group that supported development only under the condition that
at the same time the environment was protected. In between these groups there
was a grey group. The radical and moderate group both made up 40% each, the
grey group 20%. The coalition was not solid and there were many disagree-
ments.’23
19 See, for instance, the press release by ICEL at http://techscape8.com/~icelorid/privdocs/
4c3fd57d5b557a4ce8592fde76244e12.htm, which speaks of a lack of ‘fighting spirit’ of KLH
which will benefit the economic growth lobbies. For a similar reaction by Sonny Keraf see
Media Indonesia 9October 2003, ‘JanganHapusKeberadaanMasyarakat AdatDi RUUPSDA’.
An NGO activist tried to look at it from the bright side: ‘this gives us the possibility to
first strengthen the civil society’. In addition, also according to her, there were still a number
of issues that needed clarification such as the concept of bioregion and what should be
the relationship between NRM and spatial planning (Personal communication, 10 October
2003).
20 Media Indonesia 9October 2003, ‘JanganHapusKeberadaanMasyarakat AdatDi RUUPSDA’.
21 Personal communication with Prof. Koesnadi, 14 January 2005.
22 Personal communication with Prof. Koesnadi, 14 January 2005.
23 Personal communication with NGO activist, 3 September 2007.
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Most likely, the academics,24 KLH and Bappenas felt a stronger bond with
the moderate group than with the radical one.
One disagreement between these ‘moderates’ and the ‘radicals’ concerned
the question of what compromises were acceptable. On one side of the coalition
the Ministry for the Environment supported by academics such as Koesnadi,
was ready to search for compromises to get the bill enacted. On the other side
were some of the NGOs that initiated the lawmaking process. They became
increasingly disillusioned during the process and accused the other coalition
members of sacrificing the ideals behind the bill for other objectives. According
to several NGO activists, theMinistry for the Environment ‘regards the process
just as a normal project’.25 It had become more concerned about enacting –
and thus bringing this project to an end – than about what to enact. ‘That is
related to the fact that the Ministry’s performance is measured in terms of
enacted acts.’26 One NGO activist also condemned the compromises agreed
upon by academics such as Koesnadi:
‘Apparently Koesnadi now agreed upon a compromise that I think goes too far.
I withdrew from the process because I think that too many compromises have been
agreed upon. The last draft is only about co-ordination. That has been forced upon
us. And that even though Indonesia is so bad at co-ordination! The initial idea was
that the sectors should slowly disappear. That in each bioregion areas for conserva-
tion, for production etc. should be determined. We could have realized that with
a transitional scheme. In about five years we want to be there, then over five years
there, etc. So, everybody would know precisely what to expect. But Indonesia is
apparently not capable of making radical changes. Only small steps, except for
the Declaration of Independence. The sectoral departments are too conservative.
They are kingdoms.’27
In her opinion, the compromises reached in 2006 had sacrificed the initial
objective of the NRM Act. As a consequence she saw no other option than to
withdraw, at least temporarily, from the process.
With no NGOs taking the initiative to further push the process, the bill has
not been sent to Parliament or even been included in the list of legislative
priorities of the DPR yet.28 More likely than not this delay will lead to the
prior amendment of sectoral legislation, such as the Mining Act, that the
proponents of the NRM Act had wanted to prevent. There has been another
24 Apart fromProf. Koesnadi fromUGM, Prof. Daud Silalahi (Unpad), Prof. Sudharto P.Hadi
(Undip), Dr. Asep Warlan (Unpar), Dr. Hariadi Kartodihardjo (IPB), Indra Perwira
(UNPAD), andMyrna Safitri (UI) were involved in the process at this stage (Kartodihardjo
et al. Prof. Maria Soemardjono (UGM) had withdrawn from the process earlier since she
was too busy with her work at the National Land Agency (BPN).
25 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 3 September 2007.
26 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 25 May 2007.
27 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 6 October 2006.
28 The so-called Program Legislasi Nasional (abbr. Prolegnas) (Hukumonline.com 2005).
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important delaying factor, however, which will be discussed below. This
concerns the strategy chosen by the Forestry and the Mining Departments in
particular.
22.2 THE DEBATE
The following paragraphs will analyse which discourses dominated the aca-
demic background paper drafted by the coalition, the public consultation and
the interdepartmental discussions, and which strategies actors used to either
create support for the bill or to oppose it.
22.2.1 Academic background paper29
This paperwasmeant to provide the government, parliament and societywith
‘insights into the urgency of basic principles for sustainable NRM […], the
urgency of drafting an NRM Act […] and to facilitate the drafting of the prin-
ciples, objectives and articles regulated in the NRM Bill’.30 The two main
arguments made in this paper were that the Indonesian NRM needed to change
radically and that a new act was the appropriate instrument to achieve this.
After having been drafted in pieces from at least November 200031 by various
members of the coalition,32 it had been discussed at various meetings through-
out 2001 and 2002 and ‘finalised’ at a meeting in September 2002.33 As such
it served as a basis for the negotiations with other departments.
The document began by describing the ‘empirical situation of NRM’, pro-
ceeded with a legal analysis of national legislation in the field of NRM and the
legal situation in New Zealand and the Philippines, explored the concept of
‘bioregion’, listed the documents that provided the legal mandate for the
drafting process and a number of concepts, and principles, and referred to
issues that according to the coalition needed to be included in the act.
22.2.1.1 ‘Empirical situation’
The definitions of problems in this first part of the academic background paper
showed that the coalition argued in favour of an interpretation of sustainable
29 Tim Inti 2002. Prior to this academic paper, a less detailed background paper had been
drafted about the motivation for the bill.
30 Tim Inti 2002, p. 6.
31 Suwarno et al. n.y., p. 249.
32 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 25 May 2007.
33 Suwarno et al. n.y., p. 250-251.
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development that primarily paid attention to ecology and social justice. The
few but apparently strong voices in favour of economic growth that had
prevented the debate at the Rakornas from developing in this direction were
not heard in this text. Still, in two ways, the text was a continuation of the
discourses that had also dominated the Rakornas: the authors mainly reacted
against what were from their perspective unsustainable practices of the New
Order regime and at the same time doubted the potential for regional auto-
nomy to improve this situation.
The authors’ main criticism of the New Order’s NRM policy and practices
concerned the priority these had given to economic growth at the expense
of the environment and the people. According to the text, the New Order
regime had translated its wish for economic growth solely into the exploitation
of nature. By doing so, it had reduced nature’s functions to commodity pro-
duction and neglected its ‘public functions’ such as the protective function
of forests for river basins. The authors condemned the New Order approach
toward nature for being ‘reductionist’ and ‘partial’ instead of ‘holistic’ and
‘comprehensive’. For the authors the main symbol of this approach was the
sectoral departments that had too many authorities and were not counter-
balanced by a powerful co-ordinating department and strong regulations.
In addition, the text refused the ‘centralist’ and ‘elitist’ nature of the New
Order practices that had neglected ‘equity’ and produced ‘imbalance’. This
had disadvantaged adat communities that were not granted the ‘space for
access, interests and rights of control, exploitation andmanagement of natural
resources’. As the main symbols for this problem the authors referred to the
deteriorating political, economic, and cultural situation of adat communities
and the occurrence of conflicts and environmental degradation.
Next to opposing the New Order the authors also, just like the majority
of Rakornas participants, spoke out against those practices of Reformasiwhich
they perceived as a ‘replication’ of the sectoral approach:
‘With the new power that has been given to regional governments there is a trend
that regional governments neglect or more intensively increase their regional income
without attention to environmental balance and security.’
In other words, the authors feared that the regional governments framed nature
in the same way as the sectoral departments, i.e. as something to exploit to
create income. This, together with technical management incapabilities and
ignoring the local people’s needs, the text continued, would most probably
result in an irreversible loss and destruction of natural resources.
In sum, the main story behind this section was that the sectoral departments
of the central government and the regional governments had not paid enough
attention to the environment and the needs of adat communities, which in turn
had had negative consequences for the environment.
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22.2.1.2 Indonesian regulations in the field of NRM
According to the academic background paper, the Indonesian regulations in
the field of NRM reflected the same lack of attention for environment and
people as observed in practice and therefore needed to be replaced by a new
legal regime: the NRMAct. The early NewOrder regulations in particular were
geared toward exploitation and ignored the interest of conservation and
sustainability. They were ‘apparently used as an instrument to support eco-
nomic growth’.34 In addition, they were ‘oriented toward big investors’ and
‘as a consequence ignored the interest and access to resources of adat commun-
ities and destroyed their economic potential’.35
Furthermore, the authors found that the regulations were based on an
ideology of state control and state exploitation of natural resources, which
made NRM ‘centralist’.
Another feature of these regulations was that they were ‘sectoral’ regula-
tions:
‘The government has implemented the [natural resources, JA] management in a
sectoral way. Consequently, natural resources have not been regarded as an inte-
grated ecosystem. This implies that the institution-building in the field of NRM has
not occurred in an integrated and co-ordinated way. Consequently, each sector
has tended to walk alone in accordance with the vision of the respective sector.’36
Hidden behind this conclusionwas the argument that NRM should be regulated
in a more co-ordinated and integrated manner.
In addition to this story about sectoralism, the analysis argued that the
later New Order regulations did not proportionally protect human rights in
the field of control, exploitation andmanagement of natural resources. Instead,
the regulations issued after 1990 maintained a state-based resource manage-
ment approach with little integration and co-ordination between sectors, and
limited recognition of adat rights. Finally, they still did not clearly regulate
the accountability of the government to the public. The BCA, for instance, was
criticized for limiting the definition of public participation to mobilization of
the public and for not being clear about which governmental agencies should
be responsible for conservation. As a consequence, there was ‘a lack of inte-
grated conservation activities as each agency had its own interpretation of
conservation in accordance with its sectoral policies.’37 The text thus argued
for ‘genuine public participation’ and for organizing the institutional landscape
34 Tim Inti 2002, p. 21.
35 Tim Inti 2002, p. 21.
36 Tim Inti 2002, p. 21.
37 Tim Inti 2002, p. 16.
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in a way that obliged sectoral agencies to interpret conservation in a specific
manner.
During Reformasi, the text concluded, the existing regulations on NRMwere
still not being amended to integrate principles of just, democratic and
sustainable NRM.
The final conclusion of this analysis stated that the government needed
to draft an NRM Act soon to accommodate the sustainability of the functions
of natural resources, to increase public participation, transparency and
democratisation in the field of NRM, to create co-ordination and integration
between sectors, and to further ‘good environmental governance’.
In sum, the authors argued there was a need for a new regulation that
would radically change Indonesian NRM. The key ingredients of this new
regime would be co-ordination, integration, and participation to ensure more
attention for the environment and the rights of especially adat communities.
It deserves mentioning that these key ingredients were by no means new.
Coordination and integration in particular, but during the later years of the
New Order also the notion of participation, formed a frequently used part
of the pembangunan discourse. However, the interpretation and implementation
of these concepts needed to be transformed into a version corresponding to
the ideals of a transparent, democratic and environmentally sustainable govern-
ance that formed the core of the specific Reformasi discourse propagated by
environmental and human rights NGOs.
22.2.1.3 Regulations from the Philippines and New Zealand
The next section of the academic background paper discussed the lessons for
the NRM Act from the legal regimes of New Zealand and the Philippines. The
text gave no explanations for the rationale behind this analysis and its con-
clusions, which would have facilitated those who had to decide about an
Indonesian NRM Act.38 Thus, it apparently did not aim to convince others
of the need of an NRM Act but rather provided two specific options for those
who were convinced of its desirability anyway.
22.2.1.4 The bioregional approach in NRM
This sectionwas interesting for its argument that using a bioregional approach
in future natural resources management in Indonesia would have numerous
positive effects.
38 According to Sudharto P. Hadi, the motivation for choosing these two countries was that
they demonstrated a proper management of natural resources by a single Ministry for the
Environment and Natural Resources. The coalition dreamed of a similar situation for
Indonesia (personal communication, 26 September 2008).
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According to the text, ‘bioregion’ is a concept that has its roots in
biogeography, a science that studies distribution patterns of plants and animals.
However, the text went on, the concept of bioregion goes further than that.
It takes into account ecosystems and past and current human activities as well
as plans for the future. At the core of this concept is the idea that bioregions
are not established in a top-downmanner but that they already exist and only
need to be discovered.
To this end two kinds of research need to be conducted: one that investi-
gates the patterns of distribution of plants and animals and one that examines
how people in this region live, what features of their environment they value
andwhy, and how they imagine their future in their environment. This valuing
and imagining the text calls ‘the understanding or ideology of bioregionalism’
(In. paham atau ideologi bioregionalisme).
However, next to the empirical side of discovering bioregions, the concept
seems to contain a normative side as well:
‘The key to success of the implementation of the concept of bioregion is to under-
stand to what extent a community understands the values of bioregionalism [in
a certain bioregion, JA] and to think of ways to increase the quality of this under-
standing of the values of bioregionalism.’39
This statement is in the original rather confusing due to the lack of a definition
of the term ‘bioregionalism’.40 However, the core claim seems to be that
communities need to be educated about the environmental values of their
living environment if they do not already know and appreciate them. Bioregion
thus appears to be more than the distribution patterns of plants and animals
and the human appreciation of their environment. It appears to be a specific,
ideal appreciation of a particular environment. And apparently, some un-
specified actor had to intervene in cases in which this appreciation did not
match the ideal. This argument sounds very familiar. It is the same one we
know already from the protection against disaster and the nature protection
discourses and the later discourses inspired by these two. Not surprisingly,
the text therefore also referred to ‘awareness’ when explaining the purpose
of community education:
‘Increasing a community’s understanding of bioregionalismwill create a high and
deep awareness of its space and environment. Furthermore, the awareness for its
space and environment will develop the awareness of local communities for owning
39 Tim Inti 2002, p. 43.
40 The text would make most sense if bioregionalism was to mean ‘the environmental values
or functions of a bioregion’. In that case, however, some of the words in the original text
could have been omitted.
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(sense of belonging), conserving, and protecting its environment including the social
life of a local community.’41
Here, we encounter old ways of thinking common to conservationists and
environmentalists in general, and that can be summarised as ‘if only people
knowmore about their environment they will understand that they will need
to change their way of life’.42 Furthermore, the quote reveals that at the core
of the bioregional approach is the ‘community’. This notion assumes a high
degree of homogeneity.
On the whole, the text left little doubt about the conviction of the authors
that the bioregion approach would solve the problems of NRM in Indonesia.
After all, according to the text, the bioregional approach meant
‘1. reducing the dichotomy and asymmetry between cities and villages in
sustainable development;
2. unifying and synchronising development activities of land and sea;
3. integrating ecological, economic and social components by being people- and
local stakeholder-based, and being trans-regional and trans-sectoral which would
encourage conflict resolution between regions, sectors and stakeholders;
4. encouraging co-operation between regions and enabling a system of incentives
and disincentives between regions;
5. a bottom-up, trans-regional and trans-sectoral approach so that interests of the
above mentioned sensitive groups can be recognised and accommodated;
6. recognising this [sic] diversity and adapting development to local characteristics
(the local ecosystem and culture);
7. using a decentralised approach and safeguarding justice, gender equality and
greater access to natural resources for local people, a transparent and responsible
system (accountability) and using development indicators that take into account
the reduction of natural resources and the environment;
8. a trans-regional and trans-sectoral approach that encouraged integrated law
enforcement although the law and legal system are still weak;
9. recognising social cultural diversity, including adat law, providing space for the
growth of local legal systems that are more in line with local NRM values so that
the public participation in law enforcement will increase;
10. recognising NRM rights of the people so that the state can give the people a
mandate for NRM. By this the local people possess the legal power to regulate the
NRM and to prevent an excessive exploitation.’43
41 Tim Inti 2002, p. 43.
42 At the end of the section on the bioregional approach the text listed principles and stake-
holders that needed to be included in the NRM according to the bioregional approach and
‘elements of bioregions that needed to be taken into account in NRM’ and of elements of
the ‘character of bioregions’. However, these lists did not add any new stories or arguments
in favour of the approach.
43 Tim Inti 2002, p. 45-46.
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This list reflects a highly specific version of the sustainable development
discourse, differing especially from the government’s version in case one and
two. The first building block is the idea of equal distribution of the benefits
of development, which had officially been part of the pembangunan discourse
(in the form of ‘pemerataan’) but according to this Reformasi discourse had not
been realized. This need for more equality is interpreted in a geographical
and a social way. Villages as well as local and especially adat people and
women are understood as those geographical entities and parts of society that
had not drawn any benefits from pembangunan. References belonging to this
part of the discourse include ‘decentralisation’, ‘adat’, ‘access for local people’,
‘interests of sensitive groups’, ‘justice’ and ‘gender equality’. The second
building block of approaching land and sea as an integrated system was new
indeed as none of the former discourses had paid attention to this aspect. As
the third building block the notions of ‘bottom-up’, ‘local legal systems’, and
‘a mandate for the people’ catch the eye. These notions imply a reduction of
the role of the state. Maybe also the notions of trans-sectoralism and trans-
regionalism form part of this block as sectors and regions are symbols of the
state organization that is believed to produce undesirable results.
22.2.1.5 Legal basis for the drafting of the NRM Act
The document listed five legal documents that were to provide the mandate
for drafting the new act. These were the preamble of the 1945 Constitution,
MPR Decree IV of 1999 about the Broad Guidelines of State Policy that ‘the
efficient making use of natural resources […] was to be regulated by law’,44
MPR Decree IX of 2001, and Laws 25 and 35 of 2000: the national development
programme (Propenas) for 2000-2004, which mentioned making a new Act for
NRM as one of the main activities under Programme 4 on institutions and law
enforcement in the field of NRM and the conservation of the environment, and
the Act on the Budget and Development Year-plan for 2001. Both acts the DPR
had enacted on the basis of the GBHN 1999 that the Rakornas had provided
input for.
22.2.1.6 Scope of the academic background paper
The next section of the academic background paper served to translate the
conclusions of the preceding sections into legal principles.45 It began by
44 Ex chapter IV, 4 (Tim Inti 2002, p. 48).
45 The legal principles mentioned were 1. continuity and sustainability, 2. justice, 3. democracy,
4. transparency, 5. participation and public accountability, 6. holism, 7. precaution, 8. eco-
efficiency, 9. optimal protection and biodiversity, 10. ‘the destructor pays’, 11. legal pluralism
and 12. recognition of adat rights.
Chapter 22 263
defining a number of key concepts and creating a framework for the new NRM
Act.
22.2.1.7 Conclusions and recommendations
The concluding section commenced by listing again four of the five legal
sources that had to demonstrate to opponents of the bill that there existed a
legal mandate for drafting the NRM Act, which showed their importance for
convincing other actors of the need for this act. Furthermore, the coalition
concluded that the environmental degradation and the quality of the existing
regulations were arguments in favour of a new act.
On the whole, the academic background paper attempted to make two
arguments: one, Indonesian natural resources management needed to radically
change and two, Indonesia therefore needed a new act. In support of the first
argument the paper drew a picture of the present situation that was
characterised by a state-centered, top-down and segmented style of decision-
making that was exploitative, favoured certain groups in society at the expense
of most notably adat communities, and led to environmental and social de-
struction. This was not only apparent from a decrease of Indonesia’s bio-
diversity and environmental destruction but also from social conflicts. The
authors argued that a lack of principles regarding sustainability, justice, demo-
cracy, transparency, participation and accountability in the existing regulations
were responsible for this undesirable situation. Together with the focus on
the legal mandate for the new act this formed the cornerstone for demanding
the drafting of the NRM Act.
This leads us to an interesting paradox: despite demandingmore participa-
tion in lawmaking processes the authors of this background paper were already
convinced that a new act was the only possible way to radically change
Indonesian NRM. The legal background of some of the authors, as well as the
fact that all of them subscribed to the same specific discourse in favour of a
radical change, may explain this conviction. However, the authors based their
argument on assumptions rather than on evidence, as one would expect from
an academic paper. The most important assumption was that a new act was
the best solution to the problems presented. The pros and cons of this and
other options, such as reforming existing regulations and institutions, were
not discussed. Other assumptions included that granting local and adat com-
munities a greater role in NRM, establishing a co-ordinating department and
using a bioregional approach would produce all the positive effects listed in
the paper. The undisputed conviction that a new act was the one and only
desirable solutionmay explainwhy the text did not focus on convincing those
with different frames. As such it did not create a strong position for the
interdepartmental negotiations.
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22.2.2 Public Consultation
After having discussed the issues dealt with in the academic background paper,
we will now turn to those raised during the public consultation process.46
Considering the strong argument of the authors of the academic back-
ground paper in favour of a new act it deserves special mention that partici-
pants of the consultationmeetings in various regions raised doubts about this.
Speakers wondered, for example, whether such an act could possibly accom-
modate the differences in character of the regions and the peoples of Indonesia.
Another question was how to be sure that this bottom-up process did not end
upwith a top-down result since people had the feeling that the central govern-
ment did not want to let go of authority.47 As the whole public consultation
process was being organised around the intention of drafting such an act it
would have been interesting to know how such questions were being dealt
with at these meetings, i.e. whether the organisers were open to such doubts
at all and with what kind of arguments they tried to convince those in doubt.
But, unfortunately, there are no materials available.
Apart from this special issue, the authors of the book, when describing
the process, conclude that three main issues dominated almost all meetings
organized, i.e. NRM, control over land, and institutions.48
To provide some more details, the following section will describe and
analyse problems and solutions that were discussed at meetings on Sumatra.
Meetings in other parts of the archipelago produced similar definitions of
problems and solutions although there were certainly regional differences.
Java, for instance, was special in the sense that the resistance against a new
act was more outspoken than in other regions. Instead, the farmers there
demanded an equitable land reform and declared they would only be ready
to support new regulations that take the side of the poor (In. berpihak kepada
46 It needs to be noted that although the documentation of the process attempted to objectively
report on the process and its results, it still lacked details about the facilitation of the
meetings that would have been useful for the analysis of this case, i.e. to describe with
which questions meetings were introduced and what the background of speakers were
and to give more direct quotes. This information would have made it possible to see which
actors and factors determined the discourses that dominated the discussion. After all, it
would be important to know, for example, whether farmers or poor fishermen or only NGOs
and academics cared about biodiversity and about the protective functions of nature.What
the documentation did mention was that in some cases, such as on Java, the facilitators
had directed the discussion according to their own agenda. In other cases, invited resource
persons directed the discussion. What made providing the information mentioned above
difficult was that, unfortunately but maybe also unavoidably, the facilitation and thus also
the questions that were being asked differed from location to location.
47 Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 26.
48 Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 16.
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rakyat).49 They thus produced a more socialist discourse than participants
on Sumatra.
22.2.2.1 Sumatra
The three main problems discussed at the meetings on Sumatra were the
discriminatory application of laws, ecologically unsustainable practices, and
conflicts between various actors. These reflected a discourse on the rule of
law that pleaded for fairer rules and governance in the interest of the ‘people’,
and a discourse on environmental management that presented traditional and
local actors as better managers than modern or distant actors. As such, the
participants at thesemeetings had apparently entered into a discourse coalition
with the organisers, though without automatically supporting the argument
in favour of a new act.
People at one meeting said to believe that regulations only served the
interests of investors. Ordinary people, in contrast, were being arrested by
forestry officials for collecting wood. This surprised them
‘since these people were being used by them [some high officials, maybe head of
district? Or people’s representatives?, JA] to climb to the throne of power. But
various regulations that were enacted by the regional Parliament as the people’s
representatives, as a matter of fact squeezed the people. For decades the people
had had their swiddens there, the people had already planted old trees such as
durian which were ready to be picked, but then they were arrested.’50
What was even worse, according to this source, was that after the arrest the
logging increased because the administration gave a license to a sawmill and
a timber factory ‘owned by people from outside the region’.
This story is interesting for the attention it pays to the problem of the
discriminatory application of regulations and because it indicates what these
‘small people’ expect from the government, their representatives and the law,
what kind of strategies they use to achieve their objectives, and what they
base their resource claims on. The people in this example seemed to know
that regulations should be general and that all people should be treated equally
before the law. That this was not the case in practice was condemned maybe
due to some kind of belief in the rule of law and justice, but maybe also due
to betrayed expectations related to the old patrimonial principle of reciprocity
(cf. chapter 7): if I support someone with claims for power I expect him to
return this support in times that I need it, and thus to act in my interest.
Reference to the ‘throne of power’ may be interpreted as an indication of such
49 Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 79-80.
50 Suwarno, et al. [n.y]., p. 33-34 citing Usman Rajo Alam, Kecamatan Koto Tangah Kodya
Padang, 17 February 2003.
266 Reformasi Lawmaking: Drafting the Natural Resources Management Act
patrimonial thinking. However, apparently the other party to this ‘social
contract’ did not (or no longer?) respect it. Finally, the quote offered above
reveals that the people in this case claimed resources on the basis of custom:
they had already been using them for decades without anyone protesting so
there was no reason to suddenly fear arrest. The fact that, according to this
speaker, the government issued licenses to strangers afterwards implies that
the government apparently had entered into a new contract instead51 – this
time with investors from outside.
Another problemmentioned again concerned the impression of the parti-
cipants that the government was interested only in increasing the regional
income and thus in exploiting nature and not in taking care of it. What made
this even worse was that the regional government interpreted the term
‘regional income’ (In. pendapatan asli daerah, abbr. PAD) in a way that did not
benefit the common people, namely as ‘money that flows to the cashier of the
regional government’ instead of taking into account the ‘rise and fall of the
income and the welfare of the people’.52 Thus, again, this was interpreted
as a case of favouring a certain group – this time, the officials themselves –
above others.
Other problems raised concerned ecologically irresponsible practices such
as deforestation and pollution caused by oil palm plantation holders, which
implied that local and traditional actors are the better managers of natural
resources. The deforestation practices of plantation holders were condemned
for ecological and social reasons. They were accused of causing the ‘total
destruction of biodiversity’ (In. pembinasaan keanekaragaman hayati) and ‘of the
life of people’ (In. merampas kehidupan masyarakat) as they ‘disturbed the
swidden cultivation’ (In. mengganggu aktivitas perladangan) and ‘often caused
the forced and violent expropriation of land, sometimes with the help of the
security forces’ (In. proses pembebasan lahan pun sering dilakukan dengan pemak-
saan dan kekerasan, bahkan melibatkan aparat keamanan). In addition, the parti-
cipants of this meeting said that the plantations disturbed the functioning of
river basins (In. daerah aliran sungai, abbr. DAS) and suspected that they caused
droughts and floods. The pollution by plantation holders was said to have
caused a decrease of the fish stock and to have endangered the public health:
one man who drank water from the river contaminated with pesticides from
the plantations had died. Finally, the plantation holders were held responsible
for the emergence of social conflicts due to unclear information about the
positive and negative effects of plantations.53
51 Cf. a similar argument made by legal scholar TristamMoeliono that the Indonesian govern-
ment has been using regulations to force others to enter into negotiations about such
contracts (personal communication, spring 2007, Leiden).
52 Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 34.
53 Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 35.
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The summary of the meetings dealing with this issue contained a repro-
duction of the biodiversity discourse and some version of the protection against
disaster discourse. In addition, people apparently reproduced a counter-dis-
course based on stories about nature forming the source of livelihood of people
and about local people being the rightful users and better guardians of es-
pecially the protective functions of nature. By reproducing the protection
against disaster discourse the speakers demonstrated that, contrary to the
plantation holders, they knew about these functions and behaved accordingly.
They seemed to lack trust in the good intentions of both the plantation holders
and the government. As said above, unfortunately, the sources available for
this analysis are not detailed enough to disclose whether the speakers at this
meetingwere all farmers andwhether or not theywere being assisted by NGOs
in their struggle against the plantation holders. This makes it hard to say to
what extent they had entered into a discourse coalition with those NGOs and
other actors striving for radical change or if they were just being presented
as a coalition partner by these actors.
Other conflicts referred to during meetings on Sumatra concerned those
between traditional and modern fishermen. Modern destructive fishing tech-
niques, including the use of pukat harimau, bombs and cyanide, were said to
destroy the coral reefs and as a consequence to negatively affect the income
of traditional fishermen, since the quality and quantity of fish decreased.What
made the situationworse for the ‘traditional’ fishermen, meaning those refrain-
ing from destructive methods, was that the others were not stopped but rather
supported by the security forces.54 Here we see again an argument in favour
of traditional NRM that is presented as more ecologically friendly and at the
same time as not getting the space it deserves.
People also recorded problems related to protected areas. These concerned
the unclear and arbitrary character of boundaries and – apparently for the
speakers closely related to this problem – the lack of possibilities for participa-
tion in planning and decision-making. In a few cases, the boundaries were
even said to have been changed by officials to the disadvantage of the
people.55 Apparently, showing Dutchmaps and referring to Dutch regulations
was one of the – unsuccessful – strategies employed by farmers who felt
disadvantaged by the borders of this protected area. Regarding the issue of
participation, people accused the government of not learning from past mis-
takes.56
54 Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 37.
55 Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 37-38. People liked to refer to old Dutch borders to make their
case. These old borders must have been borders of another form of protected area since
national parks only started to be established in 1980.
56 This soundsmore like an accusation ofNGOs or academics than of farmers but unfortunate-
ly the documentation material is not detailed enough to draw any conclusions of this type.
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The participants mademany proposals for how to solve the existing prob-
lems. These contained arguments in favour of better care for the environment
and the welfare of the local people, in favour of conflict resolution and justice,
and in favour of more participation.
Conspicuous is the considerable overlap of the environmentalist and adat
argumentation with the academic background paper. However, the public
consultation meetings also produced very different arguments, most notably
for the field of conflict resolution and in favour of the just implementation
of existing regulations instead of the issuance of a new one.
Other proposals concerned future policies: general policies, policies about
public participation, forestry, spatial planning, sea and coasts, agrarian affairs,
and distribution of profit from NRM. Quoting these would take toomuch space.
But the general impression they create is that most of them originate from
officials, NGOs, and academics rather than from the general public. Most of
them sound quite technical, as for instance the need for a department for NRM
and land affairs.57 Surprisingly, some of the proposals even implicitly argue
in favour of an NRM Act as they, for instance, recommend the review of an
existing law to ‘become input for the drafting of the NRMAct’ (In. untuk menjadi
bahan penyusunan UU PSDA). Apparently, the formulation of the recommenda-
tions was more dominated by NGOs, bureaucrats and academics than by the
discussion about the problems.
Another observation about almost all the proposals listed in the entire
documentation of the public consultation process is that they, unfortunately,
were not linked to problems. As this was also the case in the academic back-
ground paper it seems a general phenomenon. Linking problems to solutions
could have made the debate much more structured and thus easier.
In sum, the public consultation process as a whole revealed that many
participants doubted the NRM Act would solve the existing problems. These
were presented primarily in terms of a government not taking good care of
the environment or the majority of the people, and therefore not deserving
of trust. Aggrieved at the governmental treatment, they presented themselves
as the better managers of the country’s natural resources.
22.2.2.2 AMAN’s position paper
Next to participating in meetings organised within the public consultation
process, adat communities, represented by the umbrella organization AMAN
(Asosiasi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara), also wrote a position paper containing
their ‘key thoughts as input for the team drafting the NRM Act’.58 This paper
reflects a strong discourse coalition between AMAN and at least some of the
authors of the academic background paper. A recurrent argument is the one
57 Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 39-41.
58 AMAN position paper 2003.
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in favour of far-reaching participation in NRM. The AMAN paper presented
significantly more convincing reasons in support of this argument than the
academic background paper as it explained in more detail what was at stake
for adat communities. In addition, AMAN pleaded for thorough control of the
implementation process once the NRM Act had been issued.
Themain problem according to the AMAN paper was that adat communities
had been excluded from policymaking and implementation processes. Instead,
the public debate had focused on how to define adat communities. This debate
had been institutionalised in various laws in the form of stipulations giving
the government the authority to recognize adat communities as still existent.
In response AMAN wanted instead to strive for recognition, respect and pro-
tection of adat communities and their rights. The adat communities were said
to be more closely linked to land and resources than anyone else:
‘The relations between community and land and natural resources are special
because they determine each other’s existence. Land and forest, for instance, not
only form an economic source of life but also, importantly, form a cultural source
for adat communities. Adat communities build their systems of governance and
justice, their local beliefs and their arts on their intense interaction with land and
forest and get inspiration from it.’59
Another special feature of this man-nature relation, contained in the AMAN
paper, was the claim by adat communities that their relation with land and
resources had produced rights. These differed from other claims for land and
resources by other actors, most importantly in terms of time:
‘it is a fact that communities living in various places in Indonesia have systems
of self-governance [In. pengurusan diri sendiri) and of NRM based on systems of
values and understanding that have evolved from an intense interactionwith nature
that has been going on for a very long time already. This intense relation with
nature has also produced various forms of resource rights for adat communities.’60
The story that adat communities had had a long term relation with land and
resources thus formed the basis for claiming special rights also linked to the
culture and identity of those communities: ‘These rights also determine the
special cultural identity based on a system of values that varies from one group
to the other.’61 Adat communities thus defined themselves through this re-
lation. Destroying it would mean to destroy the adat communities, and AMAN
explained the emergence of many conflicts in such terms.
The NRM Bill was a first step in the right direction, according to AMAN,
since it made a start by recognising and protecting adat rights. As input for
59 AMAN position paper 2003.
60 AMAN position paper 2003.
61 AMAN position paper 2003.
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the lawmaking process AMAN pleaded for clear and consistent regulations to
prevent sectors from formulating sectoral definitions of adat communities and
for controlling the process of ‘translating this bill into lower regulations and
implementing regulations at the regional level’. This quote made clear that
AMAN distrusted the whole lawmaking and implementation system. By plead-
ing for a controlled interpretation of an NRM Act and thus keeping the dis-
course contained in the act specific, AMAN hoped to be able to control the act’s
benefits for adat communities.
As a specific suggestion, AMAN stated that the definition of adat commun-
ities should include reference to the rights that had emerged from the relation
between people and nature and to their special identity, since this formed the
main difference between actors with competing claims. In addition, where
the bill stipulated that the state recognises the rights of adat communities on
natural resources, AMAN wanted the bill to ‘recognise the existence of adat
communities and the rights that go along with their existence’, which was not
contained in the bill. Finally, where the bill granted ‘protection to the existence
of a variety of management systems that supported the sustainable exploitation
of natural resources’ AMAN argued in favour of protection for ‘the existence
of adat communities and the rights that come along with them as well as the
variety of management systems…’. After all, in the opinion of AMAN, it was
the existence of communities and their rights that determined the existence
of various management systems.
To sum up, AMAN supported the issuance of an NRM Act that it perceived
as a vehicle for recognition, but at the same time the association pleaded for
caution during the implementation phase. In terms of discourse, AMAN pres-
ented adat communities not so much as environmentalists but rather as the
historically rightful managers of natural resources with the highest stakes.
22.2.3 Minutes of interdepartmental meetings
So far, I have focused on the academic background paper, the public consulta-
tion and the AMAN position paper. In the analysis of these data I have iden-
tified the dominant discourses and pointed out existing discourse coalitions.
I will now turn to the issues raised during the first political debates about the
proposed NRM Act at various interdepartmental meetings. Here, the coalition
of the Ministry for the Environment, Bappenas and NGOs for the first time
really had to convince other actors of the need for the NRM Act and of the
coalition’s version of it. Seen in this light it is surprising that, although some
of the quotes given below might suggest otherwise, most notably the first
meeting did not have the character of a discussion. It appeared more as an
opportunity for participants to place comments, comparable to the concept
of ‘input’ that had dominated the Rakornas. Participants often did not directly
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react to questions or comments by others so in many cases they did not even
try to convince speakers expressing doubts about the need for an NRM Act.
22.2.3.1 The 27 February 2003 meeting
This first meeting was characterised by a tense atmosphere that can even be
felt when reading theminutes. TheMining Department in particular appeared
radically opposed to the act. To win its case, its representatives followed
interesting discursive strategies, as the analysis will show.
Although signalling a general readiness to take the act into consideration
when revising its own sectoral regulations, one representative of Mining
primarily pleaded for consulting entrepreneurs in the drafting process. His
colleague said he also principally supported the act ‘although he had not yet
received a draft’, but he hoped that it would support the investment climate
(In. mendukung iklim investasi) – or in other words economic growth and thus
pembangunan. He also demonstrated that he had read the academic background
paper as he said that it and the MPR decree IX of 2001 both stated that there
existed imbalances between the concepts of NRM that needed to be recon-
sidered. He had also found such an imbalance in the draft of the act that had
apparently been distributed at the meeting. He referred to two articles that
in his opinion demonstrated such a conceptual imbalance:
‘This can be seen in that one of the articles of the draft stipulates that natural
resources are controlled by the State, whereas in another article adat communities
are recognised to manage natural resources.’62
The speaker thus conceptualised state control of resources as something all-
encompassing, not allowing for resource management by adat groups. Ironical-
ly, he did not see management by entrepreneurs to be in conflict with state
control, signalling the close relation between the two in his mind.
Not surprisingly, this representative of the Mining Department was very
much concerned about the position of themining business under the proposed
act. Just like his colleague, he also wanted to consult entrepreneurs
‘within the framework of security title [sic! Probably meaning ‘tenure security’,
JA] in accordance with the principle of justice. That is necessary considering that
the act gives guarantees to adat communities where actually the government already
has issued licenses for NRM to investors so that the rights already are with the
investors. This, we need to discuss to come to a win-win solution.’63
62 Rizal Chairil, Mining Department, 27 February 2003.
63 Rizal Chairil, Mining Department, 27 February 2003.
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This quote formed a neat example of the strategy of using the words of one’s
opponents to win one’s case. It referred to tenure security, rights and the
principle of justice, all concepts generally belonging to the discourse countering
the government and favouring change. Yet, here a government representative
used the same words to defend the status quo. Although the speaker also
signalled that he was ready to look for a situation that was in everybody’s
interest, one cannot be sure if this was a genuine intention or just another
strategy.
The statement raised some irritation on the side of the NGOs. One of their
representatives said that the drafting team had already planned a dialogue
with entrepreneurs, demanding that theMining Department be patient. Here,
she proceeded, ‘we hope for more constructive [emphasis added, JA] criticism
so that the items that we agree upon can be given form in the act.’64 Apparent-
ly she felt that the representatives from the Mining Department were playing
games, perhaps due to the choice of words quoted above.
The (undisclosed) representative of the Agrarian Department appeared
to be more co-operative than his colleagues from the Mining Department by
focusing on the consequences of enactment. He showed concern about the
expectedwork load, possible overlapwith existing regulations and possibilities
for misuse of the proposed act. He wondered whether this act was going to
be an act next to existing acts or whether it needed to be seen as an ‘umbrella
act’. The speaker in some way showed a preference for an umbrella law as
in the other case the act would possibly produce implementing regulations
that could lead to conflicts with regulations in his department. However, he
was still concerned about the consequences this act would have. Hewondered
whether all 53 existing acts that related to NRM needed to be adjusted. Next
to this concern of the possible work load that was to be expected, he wondered
what the scope of this act would be. After all, he said, there already existed
an act on spatial planning regulating planning and exploitation. Finally, with
regards to adat communities he pleaded for a ‘real check’ (In. harus dikaji secara
benar-benaran) in order to prevent ‘fake adat communities’ (In. masyarakat adat
jadi-jadian) from coming into existence.
Coalition member Agus Prabowo who represented the national planning
board, Bappenas, was one of the few who responded to the comments made
by others, providing a potential point of departure for negotiations between
the more exploitation oriented departments and the conservation oriented
coalition:
‘After having listened to a number of opinions and comments, I get a bit of a
picture about what needs to be regulated in the NRM Act, i.e. a balance between
conservation and sustainable exploitationwith a philosophy that natural resources
64 Wiwiek Awiati, ICEL, 27 February 2003.
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are a gift fromGod and entrusted to us. Therefore the issue is how this act searches
for this balance and hopefully this can also be measured.’65
However, the various participants basically ignored this proposal to create
mechanisms to weigh conflicting interests.
Prabowowas also the only participant referring to the public consultation
process. In Aceh, he said,
‘it was like entering the cage of a tiger. They wanted a guarantee that the results
of the public consultation process would be integrated into the act. They […] also
wanted the people to become the owners of the natural resources. And then, there
is the problem of time. If the Ministry for the Environment presents the draft in
March to the DPR, and the public consultation is not finished before June, that needs
to be reconsidered. Otherwise we will be accused of deceiving the public.’66
Prabowo thus reported on the atmosphere of the public consultation and about
two participation-related concerns aired in Aceh. He also seemed worried
about the coalition’s credibility.
Walhi’s representative shared this concern but drewdifferent conclusions,
pleading for – again – more participation. He said there was a need for ‘more
public debate to increase support’ for the act. This sounded more like a
strategic comment made to his fellow proponents of the bill than an attempt
to convince its opponents.
With regards to the demand made by one of the Mining Department’s
representatives to consult entrepreneurs it needs to be noted that this had
already been plannedwithin the framework of the public consultation process.
The focus group discussion revealed that the entrepreneurs did not succeed
in agreeing on the nature and extent of the problems of the current NRM
practices – themajor problem not acknowledged by the coalition. On average
they seemed to perceive sustainable ecology and sustainable economy as
conflicting interests and therefore did not take sustainable ecology into con-
sideration.67 Thus, theMiningDepartment could be sure of the entrepreneurs’
support for its opposition against the act.
22.2.3.2 The 14 March 2003 meeting
At the secondmeeting some of the participants already commented on specific
articles of the draft that had been distributed at the first meeting. The Depart-
ment for Defense and Security’s representative, for instance, said the following
about the feasibility of the act:
65 Agus Prabowo, Bappenas, 27 February 2003.
66 Agus Prabowo, Bappenas, 27 February 2003.
67 Kartodihardjo, et al. [n.y.], p. 31.
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‘The word “equal distribution” [In. merata] will turn into a boomerang for the
government […] and the expression ‘not causing asymmetries’, that is very difficult
to realize […] and “each person has natural resources rights”, that will turn into
a boomerang.’
Although not generally opposed to the act, he was clearly very concerned
about its practical consequences.
More than these comments, however, two fundamental issues dominated
this meeting and led to the first real discussions: the pressing question of
whether the act was desirable at all and, the point raised earlier by the repres-
entative of the Agrarian Department at the February meeting, what the act’s
legal position should be.
The representative of the Co-ordinatingMinister for EconomicAffairs, was
the first to wonder whether this act could rule over other acts considering they
were all acts of parliament. This reflected that in the Indonesian lawmaking
and implementation practice the principles for judgingwhich regulation should
prevail in the event of conflicting regulations belonging to the general legal
discourse, such as ‘new above old’ and ‘specialized above general’, were far
from self-evident.68
While the representative from the Department for Marine Affairs and
Fisheries did not get further than repeating the old mantra that the participants
needed to reach a consensus about the legal position of this act, the Cabinet
Secretariat’s representative tried to circumvent this problem of conflicting
regulations by concluding that ‘we need to first agree whether with this act
all existing acts need to be revised.’ In addition to a concern for certainty this
quote also reflected the fear that in that case all regulations needed to take
another look towards adat communities, as in the proposed act.
The Forestry Department’s representative argued that if one needed an
umbrella act, the Forestry Act 41 of 1999 should fulfil this role. After all, in
her opinion, this act already regulated the adat issue. A little later she added
that the proposed act was moreover too detailed for an umbrella act. She was
not by definition opposed to the idea of an umbrella act but she considered
the Natural Resources Act primarily an act about or even in favour of adat
communities – and thus not, one may add, in favour of foresters.
The Indonesian expert on environmental law, Professor Koesnadi, was the
only representative of the coalition who defended the idea that the NRM Act
should function as an umbrella for old as well as for new regulations. He
stated that
68 While this discourse seems to play a role in criminal law cases and in administrative cases,
technical and implementation guidelines (In. petunjuk teknis, petunjuk pelaksanaan) are decisive
for the interpretation and implementation of laws, especially in interactions between state
and citizens, and state and consultants. These guidelines can bewritten or oral instructions
from all kinds of state institutions, including the Supreme Court (personal communication
with Tristam Moeliono, 10 September 2007).
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‘one of the principles for this act is sustainability, i.e. sustainability for the coming
generations. […] At this moment the regions do not understand NRM. Therefore,
the NRM Act will act as reference for all NRM. In addition, it will form the basis
for national and regional regulations.’
What’s significant about his comment is that Koesnadi did not accuse the
sectoral departments of not beingwilling or not taking care of the environment
but searched for a story that was acceptable to all participants at the meeting.
He did not emphasise the ‘ego-sectoralism’ that had frequently been referred
to at the Rakornas and in the academic background paper, but the regional
incompetence. He thus hoped to convince the representatives of the central
government of the need to support this new act. At the same time his comment
was meant as a response to those who wished to maintain the status quo.
The latter included the representative of the Minister for the Eastern
Regions of Indonesia, who argued against the intention to create a National
Council for Sustainable Development. The tasks and authority of this council
would overlap (In. tumpang tindih) with those of existing institutions, a type
of story more usually produced by critics of the government.
The Department of Industry’s representative also opposed this council,
arguing that creating a new institution at the central level was not in line with
‘regional autonomy’. In fact, she made clear that in this context she gave
prevalence to this story, which she interpreted as supporting a ‘slim central
government’, above the story about ‘regional incompetence’, Koesnadi had
proposed.
Next to criticism of the creation of this council, themore general arguments
that had already dominated the first meeting were put forward against
changing the status quo. TheMining Department’s representative, for instance,
repeated ‘don’t let this act disturb the sectoral laws […] and don’t let this act
stipulate the open property of adat communities. Thatwill disturb investments.’
One of his colleagues also argued in favour of investment, adding that this
year was declared to be the ‘Year of the Investment’. However, according to
him, ‘this act appeared to be very much opposed to this, considering that we
need to increase the state income’. A new argument against the act was offered
by the representative of the Co-ordinating Ministry for the Economy, who
stated that clarity about what exactly the MPR’s Decree IX of 2001 had ordered
was needed first.
Without reacting to this, again, Professor Koesnadi attempted to find a
story that all participants could embrace, stressing that the concepts behind
the proposed act were not new, that all participants in fact had the same
objective and that the main problem resulted from the regional governments:
‘[The act] is no setback but all this is an accentuation of existing concepts since
none of us want the destruction of our natural resources. However, in the practice
of the regional autonomy the natural resources are being destroyed already. There-
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forewe need to reconcile to further discuss [everything] to achieve a shared under-
standing.’
The representative from the Department of Industry appeared unimpressed,
reproducing the story of ‘weak law enforcement’ as themain problem: regula-
tions should not be changed when implementation is the problem.
The final argument produced against the act focused on the permission
for theMinistry for the Environment to lead the lawmaking process. In support
of the new act, the representative of the Department for Foreign Affairs started
by saying that it was not the state secretariat that had given the permission
but the President. If the President himself had agreed with the act, this argu-
ment suggested, the participants of the interdepartmental meetings should
not dare to disagree.
However, the Cabinet Secretariat’s representative immediately took the
edge off this argument by stating that a permission to lead the lawmaking
process did not mean that a lawmaking process needed to proceed if it ‘caused
confusion’ (In. menimbulkan kerancuan) between the sectors. Immediately, a
bureaucrat from theMining Department started to refer to examples from the
past when her Department had received permission to propose an act but
without result. Furthermore, she said about Koesnadi’s story of ‘regional
incapacity’ that the Regional AutonomyAct already provided for this problem.
Therefore, she ended her plea by saying ‘we should check the MPR’s Decree
IX/2001’. As if he had been waiting for this remark, Koesnadi’s colleague
immediately reproduced the decree stating that all sectors should review the
existing sectoral regulations.
The speaker of the legal bureau of the Forestry Department,Wasdja, finally,
showed that the sectoral departments felt attacked by the proposed act when
concluding that ‘if the lawmaking process is continued, refrain from bringing
the sectors into discredit. The act should be reconsidered in this respect.’ Other
remarks were probably motivated by the same feeling. Professor Koesnadi
had realized that and therefore tried to direct the attention to the regions as
the cause of the problem, but without much success. At this meeting the
resistance against the act turned out to be immense.
In sum, speakers refused to support the act for the following reasons: it
would endanger investment, it overlapped or conflictedwith other regulations,
and there was no legal mandate for drafting it. Significantly, there was only
onemember of the coalitionwho tried to turn the act’s enemies into supporters
by searching for a story acceptable to them. No direct questions were posed
about what opponents would regard an acceptable solution. An interesting
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feature was also that the minutes were never discussed at the following
meeting.69
22.2.3.3 The 29-30 April 2003 meeting
By virtue of the participating academics the atmosphere at the following two
meetingswasmuch less tense. According to an NGO activist, ‘as NGOswe really
needed the academics since nobody would listen to us when we said some-
thing.’70 Increasingly, participants commented on specific articles, but the
contentious issues of the desirability of the act and its status vis-à-vis other
regulations remained unresolved.
To further a solution, the representative from the Department of Industry
made a conciliatory proposal:
‘Considering that there are still parties that question the need for the NRM Act,
maybe it would be an idea to have the sectors present the sectoral regulations,
compare them to the MPR Decree IX/2001 and what is not in accordance with this
decree or not yet covered should be regulated by this act.’
However, the representatives of the Forestry Department and of the Cabinet’s
Secretariat still pressed the question of what the act ‘really aimed for’ (In.
kemana arah RUU PSDA yang sebenarnya?), and whether it was really needed.
The latter speaker continued with a whole list of problems that neatly sum-
marized other comments. It was formulated as if the speaker spoke for awhole
group of participants:
‘And if we look at the draft of March 14th, we do not see many changes. How does
this act relate to the other organic acts considering that a part of its substance is
already regulated in the other sectoral acts? The statements in the general elucida-
tion very much force the sectoral acts into a corner. We would like that to be
changed; the draft about the adat communities is not clear; the National Council
for Sustainable Development the sectors do not yet agree with because its main
task overlaps with the tasks of other institutions. Can the act provide answers to
the sectoral problems?’
In short, the proposed act invaded the jurisdiction of other regulations and
institutions. Other complaints were that the earlier discussions had not yet
resulted in many changes and that the act aimed too much at scapegoating
the sectoral departments.
69 I must note here that some of the quotes were too vague to make sense of. According to
one participant, the minutes had in fact not been intended to be made public. Even she
had had to ask for them (personal communication with an NGO activist, 25 May 2007).
70 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 25 May 2007.
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At the end of this meeting it was decided to temporarily leave out from
the discussion (In. dipending) the issues of the National Council for Sustainable
Development, of the adat communities and of the bioregional approach.
22.2.3.4 The 23-24 May 2003 meeting
This meeting, again, focused on concrete articles of the draft. Comments
concerning the interpretation of concepts in fact all argued in favour of the
status quo. They included the fear of the Department for Infrastructure that
the word ‘restoration’ (In. pemulihan) could be interpreted as ‘opposed to
development’ (In. anti pembangunan) and the argument of the Forestry Depart-
ment that granting people rights was difficult to guarantee and could make
great numbers of people demand compensations.
Members of the coalition seemed to have realized at some point that their
strategy was failing. Therefore, they made two new proposals to achieve an
agreement on contested issues. A representative of the Ministry for the En-
vironment proposed a special meeting to discuss the concept of bioregionwith
the Forestry Department, while the Department for Marine Affairs and Fish-
eries, the NGOs and Professor Koesnadi asked the participants to propose their
own draft about adat communities ‘with awin-win solution’ (In. denganwin-win
solution).
22.2.3.5 Written objections from state agencies
After these four meetings the departments were asked to send in written
comments on the draft. Not surprisingly, the main objections against the NRM
Act were put forward by the Forestry and Mining Departments.
The Forestry Department’s refusal to support the bill reflected a specific
legal discourse that was opposed to umbrella acts and to parting with the
control over revisions. The first point the department built its argument on
was that the legal structure did not provide for acts that were higher or lower
than others. Therefore, speaking of an umbrella act was not considered correct.
Second, replacing other acts with the NRMAct was not considered correct either
since ‘every act has a specific structure’ which would make it impossible to
replace all of them with a single one. As its third reason to refuse the bill the
Forestry Department pointed to the MPR Decree IX of 2001, which had ordered
a revision of the existing legislation in the field of NRM. To implement this
decree, it argued to not deviate from the ‘usual procedure’:
‘If one wishes to revise one or more sectoral regulations, as ordered by MPR decree
IX, in accordance with the usual procedures these laws can be revised one by one.
[…] If one or more acts in the field of NRM will be revised, this revision will, in
accordance with the usual procedure, not be fused in one draft as in the NRM Act
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but will take the form of a revision of individual acts. Therefore we can not agree
with the NRM Act.’71
It concluded its letter by stating that if one wanted to draft an NRM Act it
should be limited to formulating principles. All sectoral regulations dealing
with NRM, on the other hand, should be revised by the responsible sectors
themselves.72
The Mining Department followed a similar line of argumentation. It also
claimed that the legal system did not provide for umbrella acts and that the
MPR Decree had not called for this special act but for revising the existing
regulations. To stress that it was dedicated to implement this decree it listed
a number of regulations under revision. The Mining Department added one
new argument, i.e. that the NRM Act was not in line with art. 33 (3) of the
Constitution as it granted NRM rights to adat and local communities instead
of to the state. Therefore, it concluded that the bill’s concept of NRM was
debatable:
‘The Mining and Energy Department right from the beginning of the interdepart-
mental meetings at the Ministry for the Environment and at bilateral meetings has
voiced its objections against the concept of NRM that has been drafted in the NRM
Act since this concept is not in accordance with the legal principles regulated in
the Mining and Energy regulations. Based on these considerations we are of the
opinion that before proceeding with this act all sectoral agencies need to discuss
the academic draft.’73
This proposal came as a complete surprise since the academic background
paper had played no role whatsoever during the meetings. Significantly, on
this last issue the Mining Department’s argumentation differed enormously
from the Forestry Department’s one: where Forestry said that the NRM Act
should be limited to formulating principles, Mining rejected the proposed act
on the grounds that these very principles which it regarded as opposed to
the existing ‘Mining principles’. Apparently, the Forestry Department thought
that such a ‘limited’ act would leave it with sufficient power to regulate its
own affairs. It did not expect these principles to become binding in practice.
By contrast, the Mining Department used the ideological difference as an
additional argument to refuse the NRM Act.
71 Reaction from Forestry Department, 15 July 2003.
72 In addition, as a minor point, the Department used environmental discourse arguing that
the draft would increase the degradation of the existing conservation areas due to incon-
sistent provisions. As an example it quoted an article which determined that conservation
areas were open for other activities whereas another article stipulated that activities except
for research were prohibited.
73 Reaction from Mining Department, 29 July 2003.
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22.2.3.6 The 9 September 2004 coalition meeting
On 9 September 2004 a meeting of the coalition revealed that 15 departments
had sent in their comments. The existing draft had already adopted the results
of the public consultations. To decide whether the departmental comments
were acceptable or not the Minister for the Environment had formulated a
number of criteria for the bill reflecting the ideals of sustainable exploitation,
enforceability, acceptability and equity: it should effectively solve problems
and safeguard the sustainable exploitation of natural resources by, for instance,
limiting illegal logging; it should not produce serious negative side effects;
it should be enforceable; it should be acceptable for the society at large; and
it should not grant privileges to certain groups.
Furthermore, the minutes of this meeting show that the participants per-
ceived the refusal of the bill by the Forestry and Mining departments as the
biggest problem. Some of the participants made sense of this refusal by stating
that these two departments still did not see the crisis of the natural resources
in Indonesia or that their refusal was based on their ‘ego’. Professor Koesnadi
then proposed to organise an informal high echelon meeting with the two
departments, demonstrating that he had drawn the conclusion that the only
way out of this impasse was to informally create support among the leadership
of these departments. Such informal meetings could be used to tackle both
a refusal based on a lack of knowledge or understanding (‘not seeing the
crisis’) and a refusal based on unwillingness to give up some of their influence
(‘ego’).
The further discussion of the coalition at this meeting focused on issues
of legislative quality, mainly related to certainty and feasibility. In the context
of the latter, for instance, it was concluded that the guarantee to grant com-
pensation to anybody experiencing problems as a result of resource exploitation
‘needed to be exercised’ (In. perlu di’exercise’).
Furthermore, new attempts were made to find solutions to the resistance
of the sectoral departments. These included an in-depth discussion of contested
articles, such as the onementioned above about compensation. Questions that
needed to be answered included who would have to pay compensation and
whether it was ‘right and just’ (In. tepat dan adil) to give compensation to
people who ‘did not have any legal relation’ to resources, for instance illegal
occupants of land.
As an additional strategy to convince theMining and Forestry departments
it was proposed to move the part of the considerations about the problems
with the sectoral approach to the elucidation or to reformulate it in a more
polite way. The reason for this proposal was that
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‘the NRM Act does not need to “condemn” the earlier regulations (although reality
shows that the statement made is true). This is meant to reduce the resistance of
the sectors against the NRM Act.’74
This strategy thus intended to make the text less offensive for those govern-
mental actors regarded as part of the problem.
22.2.4 Some notes on the three major unresolved issues
The hitherto unresolved issues include whether or not the NRM should be an
umbrella act or an ordinary act, the precise meaning of the concept of bio-
region, and what kind of authority the adat communities should obtain.
22.2.4.1 A framework law?
There was much political opposition against the idea of an umbrella act. Still,
most opponents of the NRMAct framed their refusal in legal terms stating that
the Indonesian legal hierarchy did not differentiate between umbrella and
ordinary acts. This is indeed the case. Yet, especially in the field of environ-
mental law, leading scholars, such as Koesnadi, have tended to plead for the
enactment of umbrella laws. Those in favour of creating an umbrella law
regard this as an instrument to oblige actors to strive for an interpretation of
sustainable development that takes all three – economic, ecological and social –
aspects into account rather than only the economic one.
The concept as proposed by Koesnadi has its origin in the Netherlands.75
It does not mean that an umbrella act possesses any more legal force than
ordinary acts. Thus, there is no way to have a judge review whether other
regulations issued for the same policy field are in conformitywith it. However,
once Parliament issues a ‘kaderwet’ (Dutch for framework law), it is morally
obliged to issue other acts of Parliament within this more general framework.
As an additional advantage of umbrella acts, proponents see that it reduces
theworkload for Parliament as it helps the bureaucracy to adjust implementing
regulations.76
If the obligation an umbrella act creates is only a moral one, why was the
MiningMinistry so opposed to it? Apparently, theMinistry’s officials perceived
74 From comments on RACT PSDA 9 September 2004, Hotel Bintang.
75 For more detailed and critical commentaries on umbrella acts in Indonesia see Bedner 2008
and Niessen 2003, p. 78.
76 In fact, in 1990 the Minister of Forestry used the same argument of flexibility to justify that
his draft of the BCA required 13 implementing regulations. He did not, however, refer
to the concept of an umbrella act. If he had done so and formulated his draft in a way that
enabled implementing agencies to fill in the details according to the local circumstances,
the act could have become more convincing.
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even a moral obligation as a setback. In future parliamentary debates this
would create a rather strong argument to weaken the influence of the sector.
And indeed, environmentalists have been pleading for an umbrella act on NRM
with this very intention: to reduce the opportunities for the various sectors
of mining, forestry and the like to issue legislation which favours exploitation
and downplays other interests, such as those of the environment or traditional
or other marginalized communities. The example of the proposed stipulation
to have licenses no longer issued by only the Mining Ministry but simul-
taneously by the Forestry Department and with the agreement of the local
population77 illustrates this well.
22.2.4.2 Bioregion
The concept of bioregionwas refused both on political and conceptual grounds.
The coalition presented it as an important alternative approach for natural
resourcesmanagement and as a solution against sectoralism. They argued that
the administrative borders often resulted in passing on the responsibility for
sustainablemanagement. However, not only the interdepartmental discussions
but also the focus group discussion of academic experts in the field of environ-
ment and NRM revealed that this concept was still not very clear.78 Even one
member of the coalition admitted that she saw the public consultation as a
way to learnmore about bioregions, a conceptwhich she did not really under-
stand.79
That is no wonder, as the discourse about bioregion is very vague and
contains various interpretations of this concept, ranging from liberal to
radical..80 Various beliefs, criteria and aims co-exist. According to Meredith’s
overview article, possible pitfalls include not acknowledging that bioregions
are cultural constructs, drawing an ideology based on past situations as a
strategy to counter rapid social change, ‘assigning an activist agency’ to terri-
tories, conceptualising bioregions as something homogeneous and static, and
assuming that humans are associated with only one territory. However, Mere-
dith also pointed to possible merits of the concept:
‘learning the natural rhythms and biophysical components of a micro-region is
both fulfilling and useful. Knowing the biogeography of the past aids in under-
standing present modifications, which in turn can provide a blueprint for wise
future use (or non-use). Bioregionalism’s cultural component might be approached
in the same manner, focusing not exclusively on cultures of the past, but also on
cultures of the present (who actually inhabit the bioregion) as well as cultures of
the future (who can reasonably be expected to arrive, given the pace of global
77 Cf. Kompas 21 December 2002, ‘Libatkan Penduduk Lokal Dalam RUU PSDA’.
78 Kartodihardjo, et al. [n.y.], p. 29.
79 Personal communication, 3 September 2007, Leiden.
80 Meredith 2005, p. 84-85.
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interaction). In addition, there are transients, both human and biophysical, which
form an integral part of the bioregion.’81
The concept of a bioregion could thus help to formulate rules about a wise
future use of resources. However, preconditions for this would be to take into
account past, present and future inhabitants.
Be that as it may, these possible merits did not form an solution to the
problem that the concept was not well understood by many of the relevant
actors. Nor did they respond to possible criticism including the assumed ideal
bioregionalism, the question of how to prove that this concept would be able
to solve the problems at hand and the lack of a discussion about how to change
from the existing situation to the ideal situation in which bioregions formed
the basis for the Indonesian NRM.
22.2.4.3 Rights of access to natural resources
This third issue was also heavily contested. There were various positions in
the debate on rights of access to natural resources. AMAN, at the one end of
the spectrum, demanded unconditioned resource rights for adat groups and
argued that the NRMAct needed tomore explicitly recognise adat communities
without giving investors or decision makers the opportunity to deny their
existence as had frequently happened in the past.82
Opposed to the radical position of AMAN were more moderate ones. In
2004, one year after the drafting of the AMAN position paper, professor Sudhar-
to, deputy at the Ministry for the Environment, showed that unconditional
rights were not acceptable. He advised the drafting committee to formulate
a clear environmental condition for granting resource rights to adat commun-
ities. He proposed to include in the definition of adat communities ‘that their
values support the continuity of the environmental carrying capacity.’ Likewise,
the economists who participated in a focus group discussion agreed that rights
of access to natural resources in any case needed to be equalized and not
favour certain groups in society.83
Not surprisingly, themost radical position at the other side of the spectrum
was taken by the mining sector, which claimed that the attention for adat
communities in the act, together with attention to the environment, was
exaggerated instead of balanced with other – e.g. business – interests.84
Although this sector, just as economists, claimed to favour a more balanced
approach, this is doubtful considering its position taken at the interdepart-
81 Meredith 2005, p. 84.
82 Kartodihardjo, et al. [n.y.], p. 32.
83 Kartodihardjo, et al. [n.y.], p. 30.
84 Miningindo.com 4 June 2003, ‘Mining Ministry Rejects Bill on Management of Natural
Resources’.
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mental meetings. There the conclusion had been that the Mining Department
and their supporters favoured the status quo.
22.3 CONCLUSION: ARGUMENTS AND STRATEGIES
According to an NGO activist, the main strategy of the coalition had been to
directly lobby the Ministers and the President to create support for the NRM
Act. Sonny Keraf, the Minister for the Environment at the start of the process,
had agreed to this strategy. In the beginning only four ministers, including
Sonny Keraf himself, ErnaWitoelar and Rias Rasyid, and the President, Abdu-
rahmanWahid alias Gus Dur, supported the act.85 The strategy to lobbymore
ministers failed when Sonny Keraf was replaced in 2001 by Nabiel Makarim,
and in 2004 by Rachmat Witoelar. Neither of them attempted to lobby his
colleagues at the sectoral departments. Apparently, theMinisters did not dare
to because theywere afraid that in the process theymight lose their jobs. After
all, ‘the position of a minister is a political position and thus most ministers
are preoccupied with surviving politically.’86
When asked about arguments used to convince other actors, an NGO activist
replied:
‘It was so obvious that there were so many problems … floods, nature destruction
through mining operations…And the second argument was about adat commun-
ities. That was refused the most.’87
The story that nature destruction was perceived as an obvious and thus gen-
erally accepted problem was also used by Koesnadi, who at one meeting
attempted to build support for the act by stating that ‘none of us wants
destroyed natural resources!’ Yet, this story was not being reproduced by the
opponents of the act and the strategy of finding a common story failed. The
same happened to Koesnadi’s attempt to gain support through the story of
regional governments causing themajor problem. The other actors just refused
to reproduce it or draw the same conclusions. Instead, regional autonomywas
used to weaken the proposed act and for some even remained the solution
to the problems in the field of NRM.88
85 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 24 May 2007.
86 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 14 May 2007.
87 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 24 May 2007; original emphasis.
88 Compare also for a comment made by Rachman Wiriosudarmo, chairman of Yayasan
Ecomine Nusa Lestari, who said in 2000 that a NRM Act was no longer necessary. The
regional heads should be given the full authority over natural resources. If he used this
authority for improper purposes the people could dismiss him and elect a new leader
(MinergyNews.Com, 10 October 2000).
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As a final strategy, the coalition, again represented by Koesnadi, asked
other actors to produce a draft of their own of the articles concerning the adat
communities. Its effectiveness cannot be assessed properly, since the inter-
departmental discussions were not continued and the lawmaking process has
come to a halt.
The most prominent counter strategy of the main opponents of the pro-
posed NRM Act, i.e. the Forestry and Mining Departments, was to reject the
new act on legal grounds. The fact that the NRM act was to serve as an
umbrella for other acts of parliament was labelled as ‘not appropriate’ and
the legal basis for the act was presented as ‘questionable’. Being questionable
itself, this legal argumentation reflected that the two departments above all
regarded law as a political resource89 to block change.
In addition, the Mining Department – more so than the Forestry Depart-
ment – rejected the proposed act on ideological grounds. By contrast, the
Forestry Department opted for a strategy of keeping up the appearances of
a consensus. Suggesting that it would accept an act that ‘only’ dealt with legal
principles – no matter how much these differed from its own approach –
indicated that it was ready to grant the coalition the victory of issuing the act
without intending to practice it.
Other counter strategies included sending low-ranking officials lacking
the authority to accept anything other than the status quo and reproducing
words from discourses commonly used by critics of the government in support
of their own objectives.
So far, the strategies of those actors pressing for an NRM Act have failed.
In the eyes of some members of the coalition the draft had already been
watered down: the early drafts granted the authority of managing new ‘natural
resources areas’ (In. kawasan sumber daya alam) to a specific management agency
(In. badan pengelola), while the 2006 draft determined that ‘natural resources
management is done through co-ordination’.90 It thus reduced the proposed
agency’s role to co-ordination91 no further defined than ‘taking into account
the interests of various sectors, regions and all stakeholders’92 and thus lack-
ing details about how to accomplish this. In addition, the process has come
to a complete stop as the coalition has not succeeded in convincing central
government actors of the need for the act.
At present, a number of NGOs in favour of the act are thinking of a more
political alternative strategy, i.e. of producing a counter draft. It should be
presented by some members of Parliament if the Ministry for the Environ-
ment’s draft is to eventually be debated in Parliament. An NGO activist readily
89 Cf. Oomen who described the use of law as a political resource in the context of South-
Africa (Oomen 2002).
90 Ex art. 15 (2).
91 Ex art. 16 (1).
92 Ex art. 15 (2).
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acknowledged the failure of all strategies used so far and explained the need
for this new strategy as follows:
‘By now I think it was the wrong strategy to not directly send the draft to Parlia-
ment as a private member’s bill. After all, it concerns a radical bill. Bureaucrats
cannot handle such bills. They don’t want to go beyond harmonising existing
regulations. And the present draft is nothing more than a lip-service reform. It is
not of much use. It speaks of co-ordination but not of how to achieve it. It is not
clear enough.’93
In her eyes, the process had shown that radical changes could not be achieved
through the usual procedure. In this view, radical change was too politically
contested and thus had no chance to be decided by bureaucrats. If it was to
be negotiated by bureaucrats the result would unavoidably be a watered down
version of the initial proposal. If in the future this strategy is followed, it will
be interesting to see if and in what form the DPR will eventually enact this
bill. Will the MPs accept the enormous changes towards a less state-directed
andmore participatory NRM? In other words, will they bemore open to radical
changes than the bureaucracy? On another occasion, the same NGO activist
herself doubted this. After all, PKB was the only party she considered as
supportive of the ideas of the NRM Act. Apart from that there
‘are some individuals in the PDI-P, such as Sonny Keraf. In 1990 the party had to
be critical to show that it was really a democracy we were living in. Right now
they have become part of the system and are no longer critical. PKB maybe…
Golkar? Forget it!’94
This list of political parties in favour of the proposed act does not appear very
promising in terms of support for a radical change. So it remains questionable
whether this proposed strategy will bring the NGOs closer to their goal.
93 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 14 May 2007.
94 Personal communication with an NGO activist, 14 May 2007.
23 Conclusion part III: continuity and change
A comparison of three cases of law- and policymaking during the last two
decades in Indonesia nicely shows which concepts have been contested and
which discourses have dominated the results.
The dominance of the pembangunan discourse has beenmost conspicuous
in enabling and constraining actors in their political struggle as it has kept
structuring debates and their outcomes. As was explained in chapter 13 the
dominant frame of pembangunan is one of economic growth and political
stability presiding over all other objectives. A dominant story is that what is
man-made and modern is preferable to what is nature-made and traditional.
Another story important to pembangunan is that in the past ideological conflict
had hampered economic growth. Such stories made the central government
argue that it needed to free politics from ideological conflict and to take the
leading role in the development process. In all three cases eventually the frame
of economic growth and the leading role for the central government remained
dominant, although its dominance was increasingly contested. Likewise in
all three cases the emphasis on consensus dominated the debate. The first main
practice reflecting this discourse was a form of debate mainly consisting of
an exchange of comments, free of the obligation to defend one’s position and
to convince others or agree on a compromise. All three cases were dominated
by this practice. In 1990, the Minister often ignored questions and MPs did
not insist on answers to them. In 1999, the format of the Rakornas was that
participants could provide input but that the Ministry for the Environment
was not obliged to provide arguments or criteria to either or not take these
into account. In the post-2000 case, the members of the coalition in favour of
the NRM Act only in few cases tried to challenge arguments against it and
demand a further discussion. The second practice was the tendency to grant
far-reaching, sometimes even discretionary authorities to the central govern-
ment.
The most important change that occurred after the fall of the Soeharto
regime was that Reformasi helped to suppress the ban on ideological conflict
of the past. This paved the way for, most notably, NGOs to explicate their own
frame of change with divergent interpretations of sustainable development,
participation, and good legislation. Another remarkable change was related
to the scope of participation in law- and policymaking. In the first case the
ForestryDepartment had consulted a small number of academics, experts and
NGOs before sending the draft to Parliament. At the Rakornas KLH had gathered
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some 250 participants to ask for their input and in the last case, the coalition
organized a public consultation processwithmeetings at 159 locations bringing
together thousands of people. In that respect, there was a clear trend toward
including an increasing number of people in the course of such processes.
23.1 STORIES AND ARGUMENTS
In all three cases, there was a clear political struggle taking place about, most
notably, the concepts of ‘sustainable development’, ‘participation’ and ‘good
legislation’ and ‘good policy’.
The most important contested concept was sustainable development or
the question of how much value should be attributed to economic growth,
ecological protection and human rights. In 1990, for instance, FPDI pleaded
for not limiting conservation to protected areas that, if effectuated, would
impact the dominant focus on economic growth. In addition, both FPDI and
FPP – unsuccessfully – asked that attention be paid to the rights of people living
close to or in protected areas. The government and at least two groups, on
the other hand, saw conservation and human rights as subordinate to economic
growth. The 1999 Rakornas was characterised by a strong consensus about
the need for ‘change’, for ‘more attention for the environment’ – especially
among the uninvited regional governments – and for more ‘participation’.
Behind these arguments the same different frames of sustaining economic
growth, protecting the environment per se and granting the population more
rights were still hidden. However, these differences did not lead to a struggle
for discourse hegemony. In the third case, the post-2000 preparations of a bill
on natural resources management, the positions were more openly opposed
than in the earlier cases. The NGOs, together with academics, the Ministry for
the Environment and Bappenas argued in favour of environmental protection
and a delegation with authority to manage natural resources, whilst most
sectoral departments (with the Mining and Energy Department in the lead)
stressed the importance of economic growth,making clear that it did notwant
any change. The Forestry Department was in that respect much less open, by
declaring to support an act as long as it did not cover more than legal prin-
ciples – thus leaving many decision-making powers with the sectoral depart-
ments. In practice this would havemade it possible to ignore the act, especially
considering the high value attached to implementing regulations and even
departmental circulaires for the implementation (cf. chapter 4). Likewise, the
position of the coalition proposing the act was also formulated in a more
confrontational way, as it immediately defined the sectoral departments as
a large part of the problem.
Contestedwas not only howmuch attention should be paid to the environ-
ment in relation to the other two elements of sustainable development but
also who the real scapegoat was, who needed to pay more attention to the
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environment. Although actors in all cases started by criticising the central
government, this did not stand up in the first or the second case and remained
heavily contested in the third case. In the first case, the groups started off with
a wish to ensure the ‘government’s and the people’s attention for conservation’
but the BCA definitely focuses more on ‘the people’ than on ‘the government’.
It has formulated a lack of knowledge as the core problem and ‘awareness’
(In. sadar konservasi) as a key solution. As this is integrated in the article on
participation of the people, it is clear that the government (just like the colonial
government in the past) positions itself as not in need of awareness, education
and information. Just as at the beginning of the parliamentary debates of the
BCA, at the start of the Rakornas even various representatives of the central
government mentioned ‘the government’ as in need of becomingmore environ-
mentalist. However, in the end, the criticism almost exclusively focused on
regional governments. Interestingly, this time the voices pleading to educate
regional governments were as strong as those claiming a lack of political will
in, above all, the sectoral departments and regional governments. This open
criticism of a lacking political will was clearly made possible by Reformasi.
In the third case the coalition regarded the lack of political will of the sectoral
departments as the core issue. The dominant frame within the coalition was
that it was ‘obvious’ that nature had been destroyed. It did not assume that
the sectoral departments did not know that they needed to change their attitude
and behaviour but rather that they did notwant to. However, not surprisingly,
the sectoral departments in particular rejected the attempts of NGOs, academics,
the Ministry for the Environment and Bappenas to position them as the main
problem.
Next to sustainable development, ‘participation’ was contested. As stated
above, in the pembangunan discourse a leading role was given to the central
government. In 1990, all groups frequently mentioned the need for public
participation in nature conservation. However, only FPDI protested when the
Minister andGolkar limited participation in decision-making to parliamentary
representation and participation in conservation as directed by the government.
By contrast, FPDI argued in favour of a more active role for the common people
regarding not only obligations but also rights. At the Rakornas, again many
participants, this time including the Forestry Department, pleaded for participa-
tion,. However, most government representatives, with the exception of Bappe-
nas that proposed the idea of public consultation, still conceptualized participa-
tion as something that ought to be directed and controlled by the central
government. NGOs, on the other side, demanded much more: participation
in decision-making about development. Yet, this difference in interpretation
was not problematised and thus ‘participation’ closed the debate before it had
really started. A new aspect of participation, which had played no role in 1990,
was the role of regional governments. At the Rakornas, participants were
divided about this matter that had gained importance with the Regional
Autonomy Act of 1999. Some thought that the central government needed to
290 Conclusion part III: continuity and change
train officials of the regional environmental impact management agencies to
create an environmental attitude among regional government officials and
others thought that recentralisation was the only remedy for environmental
protection. In fact, both arguments were in favour of a leading role for the
central government. In the third case, this role for the first time was really
contested. In the academic background paper for the NRM Act, the coalition
pleaded for far-reaching participation of adat and local communities in parti-
cular. It was exactly this conceptualization of participation that sectoral depart-
ments rejected.
The participants in the three case studies also struggled about the use of
law and policy and the concepts of ‘good legislation’ and ‘good policy’ though
without using these terms. In the first case, although all groups supported
the government’s act, especially FPDI questioned whether it was to solve the
problems at hand. For this group, substantive effectiveness definitely formed
part of the concept of ‘good legislation’ whereas other groups, most notably
FABRI, more or less seemed to assume that enacted legislation by definition
was effective and that legislation was good if it silenced criticism. Although
all groups showed a concern for the act’s implementability, especially with
regards to the high number of implementing regulations, FPP deserves special
mention in this respect as it asked how to deal with people and enterprises
living and operating in future reserves, which was another plea for problem-
solving. Furthermore, for both government and groups, high sanctions were
an important element of effective and thus good legislation. In the second case,
we find a few actors that questioned the use of policy as a whole as ex-
periences of the past had shown that they had no effect. In addition, there
were actors defining ‘good policy’ as policy made in a participatory way, and
others pleading formore details about the implementation, such aswho should
do what and when. In the third case, finally, the question of the desirability
of a new act deadlocked thewhole process. Already during the public consulta-
tion doubts about the act were raisedmainly on the grounds of a lacking trust
in the substantive effectiveness and justice of legislation. In the end, the op-
position of most notably the Forestry and Mining Departments brought the
process to a standstill. In their opinion good legislation was legislation that
didn’t deviate from the existing regulations. Apparently, the Forestry Depart-
ment no longer thought that legal development was necessary.
23.2 STRATEGIES OF ACTORS IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DISCOURSE HEGEMONY
One important strategy many actors in the three cases used – though with
different objectives – was to attempt to create the impression or keep up the
appearance of a consensus. In 1990, both the Forestry Department and critical
legislators did this primarily by referring to concepts such as pembangunan
and Pancasila. The Forestry Department did so to discourage criticism and close
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debates, while critical legislators tried to transform the dominant discourse.
In 1999, all participants frequently referred to Reformasi or ‘change’, to
‘attention for the environment’ and ‘participation’. Members of the Ministry
for the Environment and the sectoral departments especially used these com-
mon arguments to signal their support for reforms. In doing so they tried to
remain credible among the participants, to make the meeting acceptable and
avoid conflicts. And in the post-2000 case, the coalition tried to launch common
stories about the malperformance of regional governments and the deplorable
state of the environment to create support for its proposed bill. The Forestry
Department appearedwilling to keep up the appearance of a consensus about
the nature of the problems of the environment and the desirability of a new
act to resolve them – however, only as a strategy to silence criticism and
proceed as usual.
Another important strategywas to specify unspecific concepts. This strategy
was used by the Forestry Department in 1990, which specified development
as pembangunan and conservation as pembangunan-conservation. Likewise in
the second case, which was dominated by the unspecific Reformasi discourse,
theMinistry for the Environment successfully defined participation in decision-
making as ‘providing input’.
In the third case, the strategies used to oppose the bill really stand out.
Concepts such as ‘justice’ and ‘security’ were appropriated from the NGO
discourse and the coalition’s proposal countered with the strong and specific
pembangunan discourse, with an emphasis on economic growth, existing
procedures, and central co-ordination and leadership.
23.3 ENABLING AND CONSTRAINING EFFECTS OF DISCOURSES AND THEIR
STRUCTURES
As said above, pembangunan dominated the outcomes of all three cases. In other
words, the actors in favour of change did not win the fight for discourse
hegemony although Reformasi had paved the way for voicing more than one
ideology. Although conceptualised as an alternative to New Order practices
even the tendency to consult more andmore people before making a decision
on a draft policy or law did not enable those consulted in their struggle for
influence. In the first case, the Forestry Department remained in firm control
of the draft. In the second case, it was KLH that decided about including or
ignoring inputs from the other participants without being transparent about
its criteria, and in the third case, the coalition did not withdraw its NRM bill
despite the many doubts about its desirability expressed during the public
consultation. One improvement was that the Ministry for the Environment
defined criteria for either or not incorporating input from the public consulta-
tion into the NRM bill.
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In general, what constrained those struggling for change was the strength
of those in favour of pembangunan. In 1990, the pembangunan discourse was
too specific to allow for change and actors opposed to such change were too
powerful. In 1999, the Reformasi discourse was too vague and the pembangunan
structures for how to debate still too dominant. In the post-2000 case, finally,
the sustainable development discourse was too heavily contested to allow for
change.
In the case of the BCA, the structures of the pembangunan discourse, the
small size of the opposition and the Minister’s power to sanction non-com-
pliance by re-calling legislators helped him to win the struggle against the
few critical legislators. Pembangunan structures included the unwritten rule
that legislators should not question or criticise the leading role of the central
government but should praise it, that one should not insist on answers or
compromises, or make demands, and that everything, including lawmaking,
was subordinate to the objectives of economic growth and stability. Such
structures allowed the Minister to avoid answering questions, to fob MPs off
with promises where guarantees had been demanded, and to misinterpret
questions, postpone decisions and press for a fast enactment at the expense
of the quality of the lawmaking process.
In 1999, the Ministry for the Environment used the strategy to present the
Rakornas as practiced participation and thus a real improvement of Indonesian
policymaking. However, in the end, again, the debate turned out to be nothing
more than an opportunity to utter grievances. The key notion of ‘input’ enabled
theMinistry to decide by itself which comments to include in the draft without
having to be transparent about its criteria. In addition, the discussions were
chaired in a way that favoured the bureaucrats and experts rather than the
audience: at all sessions people were invited to make comments and raise
questions but the last word had a panel member or the chairman refusing a
continuation of the same exchange of opinions. Participation was thus inter-
preted as granting the opportunity to throw up a ball without providing for
long rallies with winners on both sides.While in 1990 the structures of pemban-
gunan were so specific that no one dared to contest them, in 1999 Reformasi
was too unspecific to force the Ministry to really change its practices. In any
case, the few actors opposing these practices didn’t clearly name differences
in discourse or insist on debating them, either because they still respected the
old pembangunan rule of non-insistence or because they lacked a specific
alternative model for another type of debate.
The third case differed from the first two cases in the sense that the former
opposition was the leading actor in the process that challenged pembangunan
with a counter-discourse, being very specific about who to blame and praise
and how to solve problems. As this counter-discourse was directly opposed
to pembangunan, clearly, in this case it was not a common story that prevented
a debate but the lack of such a story. In otherwords, most notably the Forestry
and Mining Departments refused to accept the stories presented by the co-
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alition. They preferred to oppose them with stories of the apparently still
powerful enough pembangunan discourse. The actors proposing the NRM Act,
on the other side, both seemed to be taken by surprise and still submitted
themselves to the consensus model. As they had departed from the idea that
there was a consensus about the problematic situation of Indonesia’s natural
resources they did not appear ready to produce arguments to convince their
opponents. On the contrary, they mostly listened to comments and questions
and only in few cases directly reacted to these. But in no case did such a
reaction lead to a further exchange of direct questions or arguments. The
format of the debate had still remained unchanged.
In sum, in all three cases those in favour of change did not insist on a
debate with obligations. By not insisting they (consciously or not) kept alive
an important pembangunan practice.
23.4 OUTCOMES
The fact that in all three cases concepts have been contested is not reflected
in the outcomes of the case studies. Instead, pembangunan can be said to be
the winning discourse in all three cases.
In the 1990 case, the Biodiversity Conservation Act defined conservation
as a kind of ‘pembangunan-conservation’, a type of conservation serving rather
than balancing a centrally orchestrated economic growth. The act paved the
way for pembangunan-conservation in at least sixways: first, it limited conserva-
tion to specific territories and thus created the possibility for various actors
to exploit nature, except for protected species, in the rest of the country. Even
within some reserved territories, most notably the national parks, it allowed
for limited economic exploitation (tourism). Second, the act was intended to
silence foreign criticism to ensure the continuity of foreign development-aid
rather than to change problematic behaviour of specified actors other than
local residents. Third, it defined participation as mobilisation, attributing the
central government – in particular the Forestry Department – the only leading
and activating role. Fourth, the act nowhere specified which part of the govern-
ment should do what and left much discretion for the Forestry Department
by calling for 13 implementing regulations. Fifth, it authorised the government
to issue licenses for tourism in national parks, which could be seen as a chance
to negotiate ‘contracts’ with clients. Sixth, it did not provide for mechanisms
to control the government.
In the 1999 case, the draft environmental paragraph for the GBHN that came
from the Rakornas resulted in a plea for a strong centralist authority andmany
technocratic solutions to protect the environment. In addition, it referred to
many concepts the New Order government had incorporated in its pemban-
gunan discourse, including ‘resilience’ and ‘co-ordination’. Apart from that
the text partly used Reformasi language when pleading for a more ‘active’ role
294 Conclusion part III: continuity and change
for the people, ‘partnerships’ and ‘developing a system of traditional know-
ledge’. Although these seemed to indicate a change in approach, they did so
only at first sight. The debates have made clear that there was no consensus
on the meaning of such concepts and that most government representatives
tended to interpret them in a way very similar to the 1990 case. The Rakornas
text also does not change the New Order tendency to grant far-reaching
authorities to the central government. It lists one-line project descriptions
without providing any details about the desired time scale or responsibilities
for their implementation.
The result of the post-2000 case was a draft for the NRM Act with a very
uncertain future. That the bill, which in the beginning aimed for a radical
change from a natural resources regime focusing on centralist exploitation
to a regime of management delegated to adat communities, was not sent to
Parliament can be seen as a result of the pembangunan discourse. Even if the
watered-down 2006 draft were presented to Parliament it would be unlikely
to be issued as something other than another homage to the ‘co-ordination’
of the past: while the NRM Act initially aimed to radically change the institu-
tional landscape in the field of natural resources management, the 2006 draft
no longer succeeds in doing so due to its emphasis on an undefined notion
of ‘co-ordination’ and the fact that a detailed list of tasks (for yet to be estab-
lished management authorities) has been wiped out and referred to a pres-
idential regulation. Apart from this, it must be noted that it still gives many
more details regarding rights and obligations of government and people than
the BCA. However, as has been stated above, the future of the bill and thus
also of these provisions is uncertain.
As the following part of the book will show, the lack of a debate on the
BCA regarding problem-solving displaced problems to the arena of implementa-
tion. Significantly, the lack of a constructive debate observed in all three cases
of policy- and lawmaking discussed in this part continued.
Part IV
Dominant discourses in national park
implementation in Indonesia: case material
from conventional and donor parks

24 Introduction
The previous part demonstrated howmuch and inwhat ways the pembangunan
discourse dominated the policy- and lawmaking arenas under theNewOrder
and at the beginning of the Reformasi-era. This had two consequences for park
management. First, the BCA opened national parks to some extent for tourism
development, access to which became contested. Second, the actors involved
in debates about policy and law had failed to focus on problem-solving and
thus substantive effectiveness. Therefore, not surprisingly, the problemsmen-
tioned by critics of the government during the debates analysed above and
the unresolved struggle about definitions of problems and solutions persisted
and unfolded in the implementation phase.
This part of the book hence focuses on the discourses dominating the
implementation of national parks. It will do so by analysing two conventional
national parks, Pulau Seribu Marine National Park (henceforth Pulau Seribu)
and Kutai National Park (henceforth: Kutai) where the conflicts were likely
to be more prominent than in parks where the Forestry Department together
with donor agencies tried to design compromises. Such compromises, including
co-management schemes and integrated conservation and development
schemes, were presented as an answer to the perceived lack of attention for
local needs of participation and economic development in the conventional
parks. However, until the present, conservation in all parks has remained
problematic. I will argue that in all cases actors dedicated to nature conserva-
tion have found themselves in a discourse coalition with others primarily
pursuing different or even opposite interests. In addition, they have ex-
perienced extensive and effective opposition from actors outside this coalition.
However, fearing the loss of influence conservationists have not entered into
a fundamental and ongoing debate with either of them about the need for and
preferred form of conservation.
The discourses dominating the national park implementation have partly
remained the same as in 1990 and partly changed. In 2000 and 2001, when
the main part of the fieldwork for this implementation study was conducted,
Indonesia’s national parks were threatened by what conservationists and the
Forestry Department label ‘encroachment’ and ‘nature destruction’ by people
living in or close to national parks, new migrants and entrepreneurs looking
for economic opportunities. TheDirector of ConservationAreas at the Forestry
Department, Widodo Sukohadi Ramono, explained this in terms of policy and
a change of attitude:
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‘Actually, there is no clear conservation policy, no good policy. But… right now
we are living in a somewhat strange period. Many things are changing. We have
laws but people do not comply with them. Right now, we are therefore preparing
a Presidential Decree in support of the implementation of the Biodiversity Conserva-
tion Act. Actually, the decree does not stipulate anything new. It only more or less
repeats what is stipulated by the Biodiversity Conservation Act. Still, we consider
it necessary to issue this decree to protect the conservation areas. At the moment
everybody does whatever he likes to do, everybody just thinks of himself. Why?
Maybe because of the eforia Reformasi. In former times we were raised to respect
the rights of others but now everybody just seems to think of himself. In former
times, there was also discipline, but that has gone, too. It seems as if everybody
is preoccupied with trying to make as much profit as possible. Maybe, the discipline
will come back in times of scarcity. Right now, there are still too many resources.
Right now, people do not yet realise that we need to conserve.’1
His quote reflects the confusion, powerlessness and resignation many bureau-
crats dedicated to conservation experienced at this point in time and that they
tried to counter what was happening under the guise ofReformasi by referring
to ‘old’ values.
Still, within the national park authorities conservationist bureaucrats have
tried hard to find support for conservation among various groups of actors,
including agencies of the regional government, scientists, local people, and
entrepreneurs. Their approach can be summarizedwith the key-term ‘partner-
ship’ (In. kemitraan).2 However, as the quote above already suggests they had
little success. Although Widodo tended to explain this ineffectiveness of the
national park policy with the lawlessness arising from all changes triggered
by the regime change in 1998, the analysis will demonstrate that implementa-
tion had also been a problem earlier.
The empirical case material shows two types of struggles: one about policy
and one about its implementation. The struggle taking place in national parks
is thus not only about the precise interpretation of sustainable development
but also about the government’s performance. In Pulau Seribu, more than in
the other cases, local actors have accused the national park authority of not
really striving for the declared policy objectives but only attempting to ‘keep
1 Personal communication, 10 May 2001.
2 This key term reflects a relatively new discourse of ‘partnership’ that has been popular
within the field of nature conservation in Indonesia since the late 1990s. Academic confer-
ences have adopted the discourse as well, as demonstrated, for instance, by the panel
‘Conservation through Partnership: Case Studies of National Parks in Indonesia’ at the
4th International Symposium of the Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia, 12-15 July 2005, Depok,
Indonesia. Likewise, a glance at recent publications dealing with nature conservation reveals
a frequent use of words related to partnership. This discourse departs from the idea that
‘conservation is always surrounded by enemies’ (quote from Koen Meyer, UNESCO, at
a discussion organised by Conservation International, Jakarta, 23 January 2003). It argues
that those in favour of nature conservation therefore need to find partners who will join
them in promoting nature conservation.
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up appearances’ (In. berpura-pura). Interestingly, some of the rangers openly
shared the local critique of the implementation practices and struggled for
more ‘professionalism’ in implementation. In all national parks various actors
have contested the national park policy. Kutai has been special in this respect
for the confrontational role the regional government played in this matter.
The literature on ‘alternative’ parks shows that so far pro-conservation
coalitions have been fragile and temporary and bear the responsibility for
creating new social conflicts. The struggle against the national park policy has
continued from the outside and from within such coalitions.
The specific type of struggle dominating in Pulau Seribu has directed my
attention primarily to park officials and local inhabitants and their respective
debate on the performance of the national park authority. By contrast, in Kutai
I have interviewed park officials and officials from the regional government
of the East Kutai district to analyse their debate about conservation and
regional autonomy.
As in the previous part on lawmaking and policymaking in this part the
struggles for a change in policy and implementationwill be analysed in terms
of stories, arguments, practices and strategies actors use to convince others
of their position. Most significantly, I will argue that even in the implementa-
tion arena a debate aiming for problem-solving does not take place or at least
is effectively frustrated by many actors. Again, just as in the previous part,
many actors appear preoccupied with maintaining or increasing their power
and thus with the political effectiveness of their words and deeds.
However, before turning to the analysis it is important to first understand
the formal position and tasks of the key government actor in the implementa-
tion and thus also in the struggle over policy and implementation: the national
park authorities.
24.1 THE NATIONAL PARK AUTHORITIES
At the time the fieldwork for this study was undertaken, Ministerial Decree
185 of 1997 regulated the organisation of implementing organisations in the
field of nature conservation, such as the National Park Authorities (In. Balai
Taman Nasional, abbr. BTN).3 This decree described, first of all, the position
of the organisation in the bureaucratic hierarchy. It is a technical implementing
unit (In. unit pelaksana teknis) of the directorate for forest protection and nature
3 The decree was amended in 2002 (KeputusanMenteri Kehutanan 6186/Kpts-II/2002), 2006
(Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan P.29/Menhut-II/2006) and 2007 (Peraturan Menteri Ke-
hutanan P.03/Menhut-II/2007). The latest version will be discussed later on.
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conservation (In. perlindungan hutan dan pelestarian alam, henceforth PHPA4)
of the Forestry Department.5 It is ranked at echelon 3, which makes it in
practice impossible for its director to effectively communicate with higher-
ranking bureaucrats fromgovernment departments and regional government
agencies. It is led by a director6 and is accountable to the director of PHPA.7
Its main task is to implement themanagement of national parks in accordance
with the existing regulations.8 Art. 3 finally mentions more or less concrete
activities for the implementation: (a) the drafting of a development programme
for the national park, (b) the running, protection, preservation and exploitation
of the national park area and its ecosystem, (c) promotion and information,
(d) securing the area, conserving forest and environment, species and develop-
ing ecotourism and (e) administration. With the exception of administration,
the activities are not further specified.9 None of the activities is well defined.
This lack of specificity gives a great discretionary authority to the park author-
ities. But it does not strengthen them vis-à-vis other governmental agencies.
Nor are the other regulations more precise. For the task of ‘preservation’
of a BTN we can, for instance, refer to GR 68 of 1998. This regulation lists
activities falling under the heading ‘preservation’ for core, exploitation and
wilderness zones. In core zones the activities are (a) protection and safe-
guarding, (b) inventory of the potential of the area and (c) research and devel-
opment related to management.10 For exploitation zones the third activity
is research and development related to eco tourism (In. pariwisata alam).11
In wilderness zones the first three stipulations are the same as for core zones.
An additional activity is the management of the habitat and population of
animals (In. pembinaan habitat dan populasi satwa).12 All further stipulations
concerning preservation in national parks were delegated to Ministerial
Decrees.13 Thus, again, this regulation does not address questions of how
to conduct an activity and also fails to formulate principles that could guide
the work of national park authorities and expected results.
4 In the meantime the directorate has changed names twice. First, from 2001 onwards, it was
called directorate for nature protection and conservation (In. perlindungan dan konservasi
alam, abbr. PKA) and a few years later directorate for forest protection and nature conserva-
tion (In. perlindungan hutan dan konservasi alam, abbr. PHKA).
5 Ex art. 1 (1).
6 Ex art. 1 (2).
7 Ex art. 1 (1).
8 Ex art. 2.
9 Art. 5 specifies administration as matters related to personnel, finances, correspondence,
archiving and household (In. urusan kepegawaian, keuangan, surat menyurat, kearsipan dan
rumah tangga).
10 Art. 39.
11 Ex art. 40.
12 Ex art. 41.
13 Ex art. 42.
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The only principles that Decree 185 of 1997 mentions are co-ordination,
integration and synchronization. These apply to the work at the BTN and to
contacts with other agencies.14 What exactly is meant by these principles,
why they are considered important and how they are to be implemented is
not explained. There is only one article that, although not explicitly linked
to co-ordination, could be interpreted as specifying the principle of co-ordina-
tion. It requires unspecified officials at the BTN to send copies of reports for
their superiors to agencies with related work.15
For the relations between officials at a BTN it is important to note that
according to decree 185 of 1997 the director is responsible for leading, co-
ordinating, and supervising his subordinates.16 He is also obliged to use
reports he receives from them.17 The subordinates, in their turn, are obliged
to follow orders and are accountable to their leader.18
In addition, for national parks Ministerial Decree 671 issued in October
1997 andMinisterial Decree 597 issued inAugust 1998 contain job descriptions
for all positions at the BTN. These include information about a position’s place
in the overall administrative hierarchy, mission and tasks, expected work
results, required material, responsibilities and authorities, and requirements
such as education. However, even these descriptions do not provide many
more details about the tasks of a BTN. For the director of a BTN, for instance,
decree 671 lists as expected work results 1. a work plan for the BTN, 2. super-
vision, distribution of work and direction for the implementation of tasks of
his subordinates, 3. letters and decrees related to the national park, 4. reports
on the activities of the BTN, 5. information and data for other agencies, 6.
letters, and 7. meetings. These descriptions are too general to provide a clear
guideline for the implementation. What is lacking is, for example, a guideline
of how a work plan for the BTN should look, and what kind of information
about the BTN’s activities – whether in the form of reports or data – is expected
and by whom.
Rangers decree 597 is rather detailed. It mentions ‘preventing and limiting
the destruction of forests and their products caused by humans, animals, fire
and diseases’19 as one of the two main tasks of rangers. This task is further
specified as, among other things, patrolling, controlling licenses, reporting
violations of law to the Police and preventing or prohibiting various activities,
including settling and farming without a license, grazing cattle outside grazing
areas and bringing logging equipment into protected forests.20
14 Ex art. 15.
15 Ex art. 19.
16 Ex art. 16.
17 Ex art. 18.
18 Ex art. 17.
19 Ex art. 4.
20 Ex art. 5.
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Regarding the task descriptions of office personnel there is an impression
that regulations pay more attention to administrative than to practical con-
servation activities. The fact that administration is the only task specified in
Decree 185 of 1997 and the fact that the administrative section of a BTN is much
bigger than the conservation section support this. Another remarkable aspect
is that the task descriptions for rangers seem primarily to be designed for forest
areas. They do not specify what kind of activities rangers should prevent in
marine protected areas.
That Decree 597 for rangers was issued in 1998 is reflected in its obligation
for rangers to respect ‘legal norms, social norms, human rights and the pre-
sumption of innocence’.21 As it does not explain or specify these the drafters
of the decree apparently assumed that rangers and their superiors knew the
rationale for this provision and how to implement it.
Apart from the tasks described in the regulations just mentioned the fact
that national parks are for the most part22 financed by the national develop-
ment budget creates another package of tasks. First of all, once a year the BTN
needs to formulate project proposals with accompanying budgets. If a project
proposal gets accepted, the BTN receives the money through the Forestry
Department some time after the national budget has been decreed. Usually,
the BTN then needs to send a report every three months about the progress
of the project. At the end of the budgetary year a yearly report on the project
is due. These reports usually focus on the financial aspects of activities rather
than on effects in terms of protection, preservation and sustainable exploitation
for a protected area or species. This has great consequences for what is labelled
a successful project, i.e. a project that has used the whole budget rather than
a project that has led to certain effects.
In conclusion, national park authorities need to conduct conservation and
finance related activities. The conservation related activities are not well
defined in the existing regulations. The finance related tasks form a significant
part of the activities of the BTN and are not well connected to the objectives
of conservation.
After I conducted my fieldwork, a relevant new decree of the Forestry
Minister on national park authorities was issued in 2007.23 This decree intro-
duced a new classification of large and small national parks.24 In addition,
it listed a number of new activities for national park authorities, including
(a) determining the zonation, drafting a plan of activities, monitoring and
evaluating the management of the national park, (d) controlling forest fires,
(f) developing nature loving and conservation information programmes, (g)
21 Ex art. 7.
22 Usually only the costs for personnel are covered by the routine budget.
23 PeraturanMenteri Kehutanan P.03/Menhut-II/2007 tentang organisasi dan tata kerja unit
pelaksana teknis taman nasional.
24 Ex art. 4.
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co-operating in the development of conservation and developing partnerships
for conservation, (h) empowering the people living close to national parks,
and (i) developing and exploiting environmental services and eco-tourism.25
For large national parks article 12 (c) adds that mapping, a geographical
information system and a website belong to the tasks of a national park author-
ity as well. For small national parks, art. 20 (b) adds to the earlier mentioned
broad activities that the management section should fight illegal logging and
transporting of timber, plants and wild animals. Although this decree does
provide some more detail than previous ones and even includes the new
concept of ‘empowerment’, it is still not specific about how the listed activities
should be implemented. Nor does it provide details about the rationale behind
these activities.
Keeping this legal framework for the implementation and the BCA inmind
I will now turn to the discourse analysis of the national park implementation.
Certainly, deciding on the legal framework for national parkswas an important
act that reflected the dominant discourse of its time. However, as the case
studies will show, the issuance of regulations did not mean an end to the
debate on their major concepts. On the contrary, during implementation the
political struggle surfaced and became less controllable for the Forestry Depart-
ment.
25 Ex art. 3.
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The first park, which I analysed in terms of discourses, was Pulau Seribu
Marine National Park. The political struggle witnessed at the beginning of
the 21st century was above all characterised by a lack of debate.
25.1 GEOGRAPHICAL DATA
The park comprises an area as big as 108.000 ha out of the 600.000 ha of the
entire Pulau Seribu archipelago.1 According to a Governor’s Decree of 1989,
this includes 106 islands.2 78 of these are located in the park area. The distance
from Jakarta Bay to the southern border of the park is 45 km. It takes about
two and a half hours by normal boat and about one hour by speedboat to the
southern border. The distance between the southern and the northern border
of the park is about 39 km. Despite the similar distance it takes more careful
navigation and therefore much more time to reach the northern border from
the southern one. The distance between the eastern and western borders is
approximately 28 km.
25.2 COLONIAL HISTORY: NATURE CONSERVATION AND POVERTY-DISCOURSE
Due to its vicinity to the capital, the Dutch elite already considered the Pulau
Seribu archipelago as a cool place for relaxation and a welcome escape from
the hot and bustling Batavia. They, however, chose especially the islands close
to the northern coast of Java for these purposes. For instance, Governor-General
Camphuijs in 1685 built a two-story house with a hunting reserve on Pulau
Damar (by the Dutch called ‘Edam’),3 which is situated approximately 20 km
north of Tanjung Priok. This island was known as ‘one of the most pleasant
1 Its precise geographical borders are at 05°24’ South Latitude in the north, 106°40’ East
Longitude in the east, 106°25’ East Longitude in the west and 05°40’ in the south (Abdullah
1999, p. 24).
2 Surat KeputusanGubernurKDKI 1227/1989.However, in recent years at least seven islands
have drowned due to erosion (Sumber Daya Alam Kita 2000) and maybe to a rise of the
sea level.
3 A. Shahab, Republika 7 June 2000, ‘Nostalgia: Sewa Pulau’.
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resorts in the world’.4 Another island, Bokor, was reserved in 1921 for science
and recreation as a ‘nature monument’ (see chapter 2). Other islands still, also
situated close to the coast, served various other purposes. For example, Onrust
(En. restlessness), also known as Pulau Kapal (En. ships’ island), from 1615 until
1886 was home to the most important shipyard in the area. Only with the
opening of Tanjung Priok did it lose its importance. In various periods, inclu-
ding the 20th century, this island also served as a prison and a place for quar-
antine for pilgrims to Mecca.5
The colonial government’s perception of the islands further to the north
was a totally different one. Before 1905 they were an unknown territory to
most members of the Dutch ruling elite.6 From that year onward, they began
to be considered a problem for at least two reasons. First, in the course of the
Ethical Policy, the Dutch had found out that the about 900 people living on
Panggang and Kelapa were poor.7 One of the major causes identified was
that the islands were leased to a Chinese man who controlled all trade in the
area.8 He bought all of the island products at low cost and made the people
dependent on him by payments in advance, and by providing the inhabitants
of the islands with rice, clothes and whatever they asked for.9 This situation
began to change when the government withdrew the leasing contract in
1905.10 Trade became more diverse with people from Tanara, Mauk and
Pasilian visiting the islands and inhabitants of the islands visiting Batavia.11
In addition, the government stimulated the establishment of a co-operative12
that, according to Selleger, worked quite well.13
The second reason the colonial government started to perceive the islands
as a problem was that their inhabitants were plagued by various diseases.
Therefore, the government from 1905 on tried to fight smallpox,14 fevers,
tuberculosis and dysentery.15 Furthermore, from now on a number of civil
servants were appointed on the islands and regular visits were paid to the
4 Heuken 2000, p. 301.
5 Heuken 2000, p. 293-299.
6 Selleger 1906, p. 414.
7 The same is true for the about 400 people living on Tidung, Untung Jawa andKelor (Selleger
1906, p. 415). However, these islands are situated outside the present park area so they
do not form the focus of this study.
8 Selleger 1906, p. 425-426, 430.
9 The environment of the islands is not suited for the production of many products, such
as rice, pepper and sugar (Selleger 1906). Another product which –still - needs to be
imported is, of course, petroleum. The demand has only increased since at present all
fishermen use motorboats instead of prauws.
10 This happened on 1 April 1905 by Stb. 44 (19-01-1905).
11 Selleger 1906, p. 426.
12 On Pulau Panggang.
13 Selleger 1906, p. 426.
14 36 people died in 1905 due to the lack of any vaccination (Selleger 1906).
15 Selleger 1906, p. 427-428.
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region in order to converse with the people about their ‘troubles and
wishes’.16 Interestingly, one of the wishes uttered by the island population
already at that timewas to grant exclusionary fishing rights to the local fisher-
men.17 Although Selleger concludes his description with the government’s
intention to meet the population’s wishes as much as possible, it is not clear
how long the newly awakened colonial interest in the region lasted and in
what improvements for the population it resulted. In any case, with regards
to fishing rights no action was taken.
In sum,while the Dutch rulers saw the islands as a place of natural beauty,
they simultaneously perceived them as an area with major problems, such
as poverty and disease. Consequently, they constructed an understanding of
the islands’ inhabitants as victims in need of governmental help.
25.3 OLD AND EARLY NEW ORDER: PEMBANGUNAN-DISCOURSE
After independence, the islands kept their split image. The new elite still liked
to go there for recreation. Among themwas President Soekarnowho sometimes
brought guests. Furthermore, prior to 1968, the Indonesian Armed Forces
expressed their interest in the islands as a strategic site.18 At the same time,
the islands were still seen as a problem, all the more when the first islands
close to Batavia began to show serious signs of erosion.19 As a policy answer,
already in 1962 the government of Jakarta issued a regulation on the extraction
of coral, sand, stones and pebble from the islands, reefs and sea.20 This was
followed by several decrees issued by the Governor of Jakarta between 1969
and 1972. One of them prohibited professional fisheries in the coral gardens
of Pulau Seribu.21 It also forbade the extraction of sand and coral stones from
the area.22 The following decree confirmed this prohibition but also named
16 The new civil servants comprised one native representative of the colonial government
(Du. inlandsch posthouder), one caretaker seconding the neighbourhood head (Du. mandur
oppasser), one police watcher (Du. politie oppasser), five native neighbourhood heads (Du.
inlandsche wijkmeesters), and five navy seamen (Du. matrozen) (Selleger 1906).
17 Selleger 1906, p. 430.
18 Yates 1994, p. 239.
19 These islandswereUbi Besar, Nyamuk Besar, Air Sedang, Air Kecil andDapur, all situated
in the bay of Jakarta (Ongkosongo 1995, p. 6). In the same article Ongkosongo reported
that Bidadari, Cipir, Onrust, Kelor, Air Besar (Ayer), Nyamuk Kecil and Damar Kecil were
already experiencing serious erosion so their loss would have to be expected for the
beginning of the 21st century.
20 PeraturanDaerah Kotapraja Jakarta RayaNo. 7 Tahun 1962 (30-03-62) (Balai TamanNasional
Kepulauan Seribu 1999). Other sources mention the date 22-11-1960, for instance Putu 2000,
p. 18-19.
21 Keputusan Gubernur/Kepala Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta No. 19 Tahun 1970 (6-11-70)
tentang Penutupan Perairan di Sekeliling Taman-taman Karang di Gugusan Kepulauan
Seribu untuk Penangkapan Ikan oleh Nelayan-nelayan sebagai Mata Pencaharian.
22 Nasution 1990, p. 44.
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two locations from where sand and coral stones could be taken.23 Another
decree finally prohibited the use of lift nets (In. alat bagan) in the area.24
These regulations have to be seen in light of a new trend. In the late 1960s
the provincial government, triggered by the pembangunan discourse of the New
Order government, started to perceive the islands as a potential target for
development activities. As a result, some of the islands were leased to private
persons and to tourism operators. A Governor’s Decree ordered the Jakarta
provincial government to form a team for the development of the islands.25
This development, it was ordered should focus on science, society and tour-
ism.26 Consequently, in 1970, 15 islands were allocated for tourism develop-
ment, including Pulau Panjang for the development of an air-strip and Pulau
Genteng Besar for a golf course.27 Thus, protecting the islands against erosion
was mainly a strategy to protect a new development site.
This new perception of the islands as a potential source of tax income for
the regional government, together with the problem of erosion, also had
implications for the positioning of the people living in the area. The inhabitants
of the islandswere no longer solely seen as victims but also as potential threats
to the development of tourism in the area. For instance, those of themworking
as professional fishermenwere increasingly perceived as conducting destructive
behaviour. This was probably due to the fact that from the 1960s onward
cyanide has increasingly been used for fishing purposes in Indonesia. Also,
with regards to sand and stone extraction, local people were blamed. But
apparently the regional government showed some understanding that they
depended on these resources for building their houses. Exceptions to the
regulation on this matter made the regulations more acceptable to the local
people than a general prohibition.
23 SK Gubernur KDKI Jakarta Bd.15/2.43.1970 (22-12-1970) mentions Kel. Kalibaru en Kec.
Koja as exceptions to the general rule (Putu 2000).
24 Keputusan Gubernur/Kepala Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta No. Ea.6/1/36 Tahun 1970
(31-12-70) tentang Larangan Penangkapan Ikan dengan Mempergunakan Alat Bagan di
Lautan/Perairan Dalam Wilayah Daerah Ibukota Jakarta. This decree is still in force and
widely disrespected, especially in the area close to Jakarta.
25 Governor’s Decree (In. Surat Keputusan Gubernur) No. Ib.3/3/10/24/1969 (17-03-1969). The
governor of this period, Ali Sadikin, was reported to have had the vision that the area
should be reserved for tourism development only (personal communication, diving in-
structor, 1 October 2000).
26 Putu 2000.
27 Putu 2000. Governor’s Decree cb.11/20.70 (23-05-1970). The first tourism operator was a
naval commander who established Pulau Seribu Paradise. This company opened the first
resort on Putri Timur, leased 12 former coconut plantations and built an airstrip on Pulau
Panjang in 1974 (Yates 1994, p. 239). In the end, a golf course was built on Bira. ‘To qualify
for this, all mangroves had to be cut. This has resulted in erosion which will continue until
the island will have disappeared.’ (Junaedhie 2000).
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25.4 NATIONAL PARK DEVELOPMENT
A totally new perception began to gain importance for the region in 1974when
international organisations began to pay attention to the archipelago’s potential
for nature conservation. It started with a FAO/UNDP project (see part II), which
investigated the possibility of establishing a marine national park.28 This
project formed the starting point of the Indonesian marine conservation pro-
gram.29 The results were considered promising. Therefore, between 1979 and
1982, WWF together with PHPA undertook a number of preliminary surveys
the results of which formed the basis for their co-authored management plan,
published in January 1982.30 The small archipelago thus suddenly turned
into a spot of natural and scientific value, which could possibly attract many
visitors and necessary protection. It became a spot where the conservation
aspects of the sustainable development discourse as described in part I had
to be institutionalised.
In linewith this, the Indonesian national government announced its inten-
tion to establish a national park in the region in October 1982 at the 3rdWorld
Parks Congress held in Bali. Only three months earlier, the Minister of Agri-
culture had paved the way for this by establishing a marine strict nature
reserve (In. cagar alam laut) in the precise area of the intended national park.31
It is important to note that by doing so the central government for the first
time officially claimed the jurisdiction over the area as all protected areas
resided under the Forestry Department. The legal basis for this was seen in
the ForestryAct of 1967, which provided the national government the authority
to restrict the access to terrestrial strict reserves to scientists.32 From a legal
point of view this situation remained unchanged until 1995, five years after
the enactment of the Biodiversity Conservation Act, in the form of a Forestry
Minister’s decree that formally declared the area a national park.33
28 Nasution 1990, p. 6. FAO had become interested in conservation in the 1960s which was
mirrored in its new section for wildlife and forest recreation. It subsequently ‘promot[ed]
protected area systems in South and Central America as well as in Uganda, Ethiopia, Nepal,
India and Indonesia’ (Holdgate 1999, p. 69).
29 Personal communication with former park director, M. Halim, 1 September 2003.
30 Nasution 1990, p. 6, 44.
31 Surat Keputusan Menteri Pertanian No. 527/Kpts/Um/7/1982 (21-7-82).
32 The act speaks of hutan suaka alam which thus covers all areas classified as forest - but not
necessarily covered by forest (cf. Peluso & Vandergeest 2001). The Forestry Act thus did
in fact not cover marine nature reserves but only terrestrial ones. Only in 1990 did the
Biodiversity Conservation Act lay the legal basis for marine protected areas as well. How-
ever, awaiting this, the Forestry Act served as a guideline.
33 Keputusan Menteri Kehutanan No. 162/Kpts-II/1995 (21-3-95) tentang Perubahan Fungsi
Cagar Alam Laut Kepulauan Seribu yang terletak di Kotamadya daerah Tingkat II Jakarta
Utara, Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, seluas 108.000 ha menjadi Taman Nasional Laut
Kepulauan Seribu.
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As the announcement of the intent to establish a national park and the
rapid de facto start of implementation in 198434 clearly shows, the national
government did not intend to reserve the archipelago in a strict sense. As
discussedmore generally in the previous sections, in Pulau Seribu conservation
of the coral reefs and biodiversity was certainly not the only objective. Rather,
the government made it clear that the area also had to accommodate interests
of tourism development.35 The concept of a national park with zones for
different purposes provided for this. Furthermore, the park was primarily seen
as a role model for other ‘more valuable’ areas in East Indonesia to be devel-
oped as national parks.36 Because of its vicinity to the capital it could also
easily be shown to foreign visitors.
25.4.1 National Park Authority: searching for coalitions with science, other
government agencies and the local population
Even after 1995 the Forestry Department held authority only over the sea and
a small number of the ‘thousand islands’ (In. Pulau Seribu). Therefore, in order
to achieve the conservation objectives, the Forestry Department and its project
leaders (and from 1998 onward the National Park Authority (henceforth BTN)),
had to persuade or convince other actors to act in accordance with the national
park regime regulated by the BCA since 1990. To do so, it employed various
strategies of coalition building. These strategies depended very much on the
individual park directors and other park officials.
25.4.1.1 Strategies for building coalitions with regional agencies
One important strategy of the BTNwas to build coalitions with regional govern-
ment agencies. This also formed the main justification for situating the office
in Jakarta and not on the islands where these agencies held office. After all,
the officials argued, the BTN could not possibly co-operate with other govern-
mental institutions if they were to hold office on the islands. In bustling
Jakarta, the argument ran, everything happened – not on the islands, which
were perceived of as being quite the opposite: remote, far away and quiet (In.
sepi). In practice, in 2000 and 2001, the office now and then initiated meetings
with other agencies, most importantly about the zoning system, and occasional-
ly sent reports to inform other agencies about non-compliance with the rules
that fell under their jurisdiction.37
34 Personal communication, M. Halim, first director of Pulau Seribu, 4 July 2001.
35 Nasution 1990, p. 1.
36 Halim & Djohani p. 8.
37 Personal communication with M, 18 October 2000.
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A basis for a coalition with regional agencies had been created with the
zoning system that had been determined in 1986 on the basis of a number
of surveys.38 It differentiated, first, three core zones which were reserved for
scientific and educational activities, second, a protection zone which additional-
ly allowed for limited recreation and sport activities,39 third, an intensive
use zone for recreation and tourism, fourth, a traditional use zone for the local
community’s ‘social, economic and cultural development’,40 and finally a
buffer zone outside the park area. In theory, this zoning system thus met the
interests of the national and the regional governments, of entrepreneurs and
the local population. However, even after some changes in 1992,41 differences
in perception continued to affect the park implementation in a negative way.
From the perspective of the regional governments, the national park totally
disregarded the fact that the central government in fact had no authority over
the islands, since these were either inhabited, had been leased to individuals
or companies or were reserved for such purposes. In 2001, 26 islands were
leased to individuals.42 According to the tourism agency of North Jakarta,
in 2001 there were officially 12 tourism resorts, three of which had gone
bankrupt, however.43 In the plans, 45 islands were reserved for tourism, so
there were still many possibilities for new resorts.44 To solve this problem
of authority, in 1985 the Forestry Minister and the provincial government
agreed in principle to ‘release’ islands (In.membebaskan tanah) for forestry (read:
conservation) purposes. However, the actual results of this agreement have
38 The zoning system is regulated by Decree Director for national parks and recreational
forests, Surat KeputusanDirektor TamanNasional danHutanWisata 02/VI/TN-2/SK/1986
(19-04-1986). The surveys were undertaken between 1979 and 1982 in collaboration of the
conservation section of the Agricultural Ministry and WWF (Nasution 1990, p. 44 and
personal communication, former project leader Halim, 4 July 2001).
39 These are camping, beach recreation, and sailing (Halim 1989, p. 27).
40 Abdullah 1999, p. 21.
41 Alder et al. 1994, p. 182.
42 Personal communication with official at the Pulau Seribu district’s government’s office in
North-Jakarta, 18 May 2001.
43 Former President Soeharto was among the “owners” of such an island, called Bulat. He
used to invite his friends and visiting heads of state for fishing. When I visited the park
“his” island was abandoned. No longer did military guards keep fishermen and park
rangers at a distance. Next to Soeharto himself, members of his family, friends and close
business relations of the big conglomerates are among the leasers. The islands leased to
individuals or exploited as resorts are Bira Besar, Bira Kecil, Bulat, Bundar, Cina, Genteng
Besar, Genteng Kecil, Pantara (Hantu) Timur, Pantara (Hantu) Barat, Kaliage Besar, Lipan,
Macan, Melinjo, Melintang Besar, Melintang Kecil, Opak Besar, Pemagaran, Perak, Putri
Besar, Putri Kecil, Satu, Sebaru Kecil, Semut Besar, Semut Kecil, Sepa Besar, Tangkeng,
Nyamplung, Tondan Barat, Tondan Tidur, Ayer, Opak Kecil, Kotok Besar, and Kotok Kecil.
44 When inquiring again about how many islands were leased to individuals, the official
claimed not to know. However, “if you are interested in leasing one, just come to my office
and we can discuss the matter. At the moment, there are several available and they are
not expensive. You can lease for five, ten or more years.” (Personal communication, tourism
agency North-Jakarta, 16 May 2001).
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been minimal with only two transferrals.45 In sum, the BTN argued that it
had found a compromise that was easy to accept, but the regional government
rejected this as unrealistic. Negotiations had a minimal result.
25.4.1.2 Counterstrategies
The various regional governmental actors have been unwilling to accept the
new agency and its claim for authority over the region from its very beginning.
One important strategy to remain independent from the BTN has been to ignore
its information and requests for co-operation.46 For instance, according to
the first park director, in the park’s early days the head of the sub-district (In.
camat), to which the islands report, chose to ignore the national park:
‘He did not wish to discuss nature conservation […]. He rather offered the islands
to the rich elite in Jakarta in exchange for some extra income. So, he supported
us only where it was in his own interest and objected whenever he feared for these
additional earnings.’47
In the eyes of the former director, it was personal interests that kept the camat
from co-operating. As a strategy he chose to avoid discussions with the BTN.
The governor of Jakarta province also ignored the park. He continued to
issue regulations concerning the licensing of development activities in the
region and, as Yates observed, ‘repeatedly affirmed [his] “full authority” […]
to legislate within the region’.48
Another strategy of the regional government was to use the conservation
discourse itself, and thus to enter into a discourse coalition. Maybe inspired
by texts produced by the FAO project in the area, the 1981 development plan
of the urban planning office (In. Dinas Tata Kota) alreadymentioned conserva-
tion issues. As this was prior to the announcement of the park in 1982 and
the start of its de facto implementation in 1984, these ideas were thus inte-
grated into the reaction to the national policies. The plan presented a concept
of planning which aimed at, among other things, ‘nature conservation’ and
an ‘ecological balance’49 and translated these aims into a number of concrete
limits to development, including the height of buildings, the general rule that
45 Two islands, both situated in the park’s core zones, have been transferred, i.e. Penjaliran
Barat and Kayu Angin Bira. However, in 2000, rangers told me that the latter island was
in private hands again since the new owner did not feel obliged to respect the oral release
of the island for conservation purposes of his predecessor (personal communication, Jakarta,
29 November 2000). By the way, Putu mentions three more islands (Nyamplung, Hantu
Barat and Hantu Timur) (Putu 2000). However, the former is leased to an individual and
the latter are until present exploited as resorts, see also footnote above.
46 Personal communication with BTN officials, 16 and 18 October 2000.
47 Personal communication, 4 July 2001 and 13 July 2001.
48 Yates 1994, p. 244; for example, Governor’s Decree 1814 of 1989.
49 Tisnawinata 1981, p. 24,27.
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no foreign plants should be introduced to the islands and that the contacts
of human beings with nature should be limited to a minimum.50 The latter
was to be achieved by concentrating the population on a small number of
islands and, surprisingly, by limiting the allocation of islands to tourism. The
text clearly reproduces the anti-human conservation-discourse of its time:
‘Humans and technology are often said to be the enemies of nature. Therefore,
the less humans interact with nature the smaller the chance to destruct nature and
thus the bigger the chance to conserve nature.’51
However, according to the BTN officials, this discourse was not reflected in
the regional government agencies’ practices, which seemed to focus more on
the economic development of the area than on the environment.52 This per-
ception is supported by the local government’s clear intention to develop the
region in terms of tourism, horticulture and even oil mining. In practice, the
regional agencies have, for instance, been frustrating the park authority’s work
by issuing licenses for activities prohibited by the park authority. In one case,
the communications office (In. Dinas Perhubungan) issued a license for the
construction of a pier. This license ignored the prohibition of removing coral
stones without the BTN’s approval. The communications service even failed
to inform the BTN, which led to a conflict between the latter and the holder
of the license.53 In other cases, BTN officials complained that public works
used sand and stones from the archipelago for their own construction projects
in the area, which the agency justified by referring to the public interest. In
cases that public works formally complied with the rules by ordering its
contractor to bring the material from Java, BTN accused it of not controlling
its contractors.54 In addition, the regional government kept leasing islands
to individuals and entrepreneurs. Likewise, in the context of urban planning,
the statements did not mean that the urban planning agency started to co-
operate with the national park by using the same criteria for the spatial
planning of the area. Different agencies had different allocations of the islands
in mind.
In conclusion, the regional government agencies have tried to avoid dis-
cussions, to ignore the BTN and to reproduce the conservation discourse with-
out adopting its practices.
50 Tisnawinata 1981, p. 24-25, 27.
51 Tisnawinata 1981, p. 27.
52 Personal communication with BTN official, 24 October 2000.
53 Personal communication with resort manager, 12 October 2000.
54 Personal communication with rangers, 22 November 2000.
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25.4.1.3 Explanations
From the discourse perspective, the refusal of the regional government agencies
to enter into a coalition with the BTN was logical. They have been resistant
to accepting the position that the new conservation-discourse envisioned for
them, i.e. as morally subordinate to the BTN in the sense of being exploiters
of nature and of having to give up autonomy and authority and to listen to
a new actor instead.
Another explanation is related to the pembangunan discourse and its financ-
ing practices. Because agencies had to compete for money from the national
development budget, co-operating and even sharing information was seen
to weaken one’s potential to raise money. As one official working for the park
authority told me, his own organisation was no exception:
‘In the beginning our boss was very opposed to the idea of sharing information
with other governmental agencies since he was afraid that they would then create
their own projects in our field’.55
The director of the BTN apparently interpreted the fact that regional agencies
adopted the conservation aspects of the sustainable development discourse
in their policies as a strategy to attract money from the development budget
rather than as a reflection of a new thinking. Since it seemed hard for indi-
vidual government institutions to obtain well-funded projects, agencies in
general were very keen to defend their projects against other institutions.
Next to competition for money from the budget, another practice was to
save the allocatedmoney for the agency. As another informant from the Jakarta
Regional Environmental Impact Management Agency (Bapedalda) reported:
‘The first question is always which organisation is going to pay for an activity.
If we only invite people for ameeting onmonitoringwe have to pay for their travel
expenses and their lunch; although other organisations have a budget for monitor-
ing of their own. But if we want something to happen in this field, we have to
pay for it’.56
Thus, trying to have other agencies co-operate cost money.
Apparently that was not only due to the fact that the national development
budget was limited. An additional reason was that the project money raised
by agencies apparently served various purposes other than financing the actual
development activities. Officials at various institutions told me that 30-70%
of the funds ‘disappear’ before reaching their actual destination.Many officials
55 Personal communication with BTN official, 1 November 2000.
56 Personal communication with Bapedalda official, 1 November 2000.
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apparently interpreted development not only as applicable to the country but
at the same time as applicable to their very own micro context.
The preoccupationwithmoney also explains the only exception to the rule
of non-co-operation. It occurred in the course of 2000 and 2001 when the BTN,
together with several local government institutions under the leadership of
the regional planning agency (In. Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah,
abbr. Bappeda), entered discussions about a new zoning system for the area.
One of the issues to be discussed was which of the islands in the park should
be allocated to the housing of the local inhabitants. The BTN proposed an island
that would be suitable in terms of size and water supply57 but at the same
time repudiated this choice with the argument that turtles used to come to
that particular island to lay their eggs. The reaction of the other discussants
was predictable: They wondered how the BTN representative could possibly
place the turtles’ interests above those of the local population, particularly
in times of economic crisis and hardship. The reply of the opposed government
official deserves a full quote:
‘Sure, in the short term, you are right. However, in the long term you are not, all
the more in these times of crisis, because Indonesia is very much dependent on
foreign countries and because many people living abroad care enormously about
the environment. So, suppose we start housing people on that island and a tourist
comes and coincidentally observes that this is at the expense of the turtles, and
suppose that this tourist coincidentally is a member of Greenpeace and reports
this information to his organisation. This could have very bad consequences for
foreign loans for Indonesia. Thus, as long as Indonesia is as dependent on foreign
money as at present – different from, for instance, Malaysia – we need to consider
these issues carefully.’
According to the speaker, the other participants of the meeting reacted in a
positive way to his argument.58 The local government agencies were obviously
ready to accept the positioning of the conservation-discourse when reference
was made to the financial context of pembangunan, and more particularly to
the international environmental lobby and its influence on the Indonesian
budget.
In sum, the regional government agencies only listened to the arguments
of the BTN in favour of conservation practices when these were directly linked
to pembangunan, the discourse that dominated their thoughts and actions.
Constrained by the pembangunan frame they judged everything in terms of
projects and money and the autonomy to spend that money. Thus, just as in
the previous section, not discussing and solving problems was at the heart
of the thinking of most government agencies. This time it was money. This
57 Pulau Sebaru.
58 Personal communication with BTN official, 24 October 2000.
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also explains why the regional agencies used the conservation-discourse in
some of their plans: it was a strategy to raise money. An additional advantage
was that they could silence those in favour of conservation by granting them
formal discourse hegemony without having to fear being forced to effectively
change their behaviour. Here, we see a nice parallel with the most prominent
reasons for enacting the BCA in 1990, including silencing foreign criticism, not
endangering the development relations with other countries and new economic
opportunities.
The behaviour of the regional government agencies vis-à-vis the BTN is
another example of keeping up appearances (see also chapter 21). It is
characterised by, among other things, using a substantive discourse, such as
the conservation elements of the sustainable development discourse, as a façade
behind which an actor is working to achieve objectives different from those
of the discourse he uses. This behaviour will form a red thread through this
chapter.
25.4.1.4 Strategies for building coalitions with the island population
In the beginning, the strategy to build a coalition with the local population
apparently worked: some informants were positive about the first years of
the park. They described the first park director as dedicated to solving prob-
lems in an acceptable way. According to respondents, he was often present
in the area and worked hard to achieve the conservation goals. More import-
antly, he tried to make these acceptable for the local population. For instance,
in the case of his own scientific specialisation of hawksbill turtle conservation
he strove to buy their eggs at market price. This created an alternative for the
local collectors of the eggs. Likewise, the park director agreedwith the popula-
tion orally on a spot where they could extract sand and stones from the sea
for their personal construction needs.59
Reading this through the analyst’s glasses, those people speaking in favour
of this park director appreciated how he treated them: not as damaging actors
who needed to be stopped from destroying nature. Instead, he approached
them as actors entitled to have needs and to a respectful treatment. In addition,
he earned their respect through his hard and professional working attitude.
This mutual respect made him and his discourse acceptable to them.
In 2000 and 2001, the BTN’s discourse still showed a high dedication to
establishing a coalition with the local population. Examples include the earlier
mentioned quest for applicable research, but also the claim that attracting
tourists to the region was to the advantage of the local population:
59 Personal communication with fishermen, Pulau Pramuka and Pulau Panggang, 26 November
2000.
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‘In the short term, the benefit of more tourists for the park may not be visible. But
in the long term, the park will profit since the local population will profit and will
join us in safeguarding the park.’60
This quote reflects the discourse of the Forestry Department in 1990. Tourists
– and thus ‘development’ – are presented as a possibility for the local popula-
tion to create income. Once the local people have benefited they will auto-
matically support the park in return. In fact, all the words BTN officials used
to describe their strategies of coalition building with the population reflected
the 1990 discourse, including ‘development of the people’ (In. pengembangan
masyarakat), ‘help’ (In.membantu), and ‘raise awareness’ (In.menyadarkan). All
of them defined the relation between the BTN and the population in a hierar-
chical way. The concept of ‘participation’, finally, described as the key to the
success of the park,61 was interpreted as having the village heads have a say
before making a decision. Thus again – just as in 1990 and in 1999 at the
Rakornas – participationwas limited to granting some select people the possi-
bility to provide input without including them in the actual decision-making.
In line with the dominant concept of raising awareness, the BTN translated
its search for a coalition with the local people into education measures. One
of the most dedicated people at the office believed education to be a key to
all the problems in the park.
‘I once read that there are three ways to reach your goals, first, with the gun,
second, persuasion with a gun behind your back, and third, persuasion combined
with education. I agree with the author that only the third method can change a
situation.’62
Most people at the office interpreted education quite narrowly. Each year the
BTN organised a few project-based activities,63 limited to raising awareness
about the need of conservation and information about creating alternative
sources of income. They took various forms, ranging from the production and
distribution of information material to the organisation of meetings with certain
target groups or informal talks with individuals. The target groups for educa-
tion measures included local fishermen, youth, entrepreneurs, tourists and
the population of the islands as a whole. In addition to these project-based
education activities, the BTN had a very outdated slide-show about themarine
natural resources in the park and an information centre with a badly main-
tained permanent exhibition at its disposal.
60 Personal communication with BTN official, 18 October 2000.
61 Personal communication with BTN official, 24 October 2000.
62 Personal communication with BTN official, 24 October 2000.
63 According to the year reports from 1989 to 2000, the number of these activities varied from
two in 1998/1999 to thirteen in 1988/1989.
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Apparently, the approach chosenwas not effective. In 2000, many officials
at the BTN office expressed frustration about the people living on the islands
accusing them of ‘not being willing to internalise what they had been taught’.
They complained that most fishermen, especially in the case of awareness
activities, only acted as if they listened to their stories and agreed with them,
when the next thing they did was to continue with illegal fishing practices.
The park director put it like this:
‘There are four groups of people on the islands, first, those that listen and act
accordingly to what they have learned, second, those who listen and do nothing
with their new knowledge, third, those who pretend to listen, and fourth, those
who don’t listen at all.’64
There seemed to be a consensus at the BTN office that the first group was the
smallest one. By describing the behaviour of people in the park in terms of
keeping up appearances, the director positioned them as the ones responsible
for the park’s failure to achieve its objectives. This simultaneously exculpated
him and his colleagues. Describing the island population as unwilling and
oppositional enabled actors at the BTN office to complain about them without
obliging them to change their own behaviour or strategies.
This attitude of blaming others and avoiding responsibility was quite a
prominent ‘escape hatch’ (see chapter 1) at the BTN office. Another BTN official,
for example, admitted to being happy when one or two percent of the
brochures they produced and distributed were actually read: ‘The rest ends
up as something to sit on, we know that, but, after all, we can’t force people
to read them.’65 This quote reflects not only an honest admission of the in-
effectiveness of one of the BTN’s activities but also a certain acceptance of it.
The same official admitted that he had no clue what was donewith the posters
showing protected marine natural resources they sent to various agencies
(among them the Police), organisations and schools. ‘That is their responsibil-
ity,’ he added.66 Evidently, these kinds of projects stopped abruptly after
sending off the material. No attention was paid to how the posters and
brochures were received, as this was not seen as part of the job.
In practice, the BTN in 2000 thus approached coalition building with the
population through educational activitieswithout providing for the possibility
to exchange opinions and discuss problems and solutions. Park residents
longed for another approach, as the following section will show.
64 Personal communication, 8 December 2000.
65 Personal communication with BTN official, 18 October 2000.
66 Personal communication with BTN official, 18 October 2000; original emphasis.
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25.4.1.5 Counterarguments
The park population produced three main arguments in its struggle against
the BTN and the government as a whole: first, that the park needed to provide
for realistic alternatives; second, that the government policies should aim for
equality; and third, that the government needed to perform in a more pro-
fessional way.
The first two arguments were built on stories about lacking space and
opportunities for local people. Those who admitted to have heard of the park
only associated it with restrictions and prohibitions. They experienced the park
not so much as a conservation area but more as a restricted area. Likewise, they
described the meaning of the term ‘conservation’ not as protection, preservation
and sustainable use (In. perlindungan, pelestarian, pemanfaatan secara lestari) or
as a chance to earn their living in the tourism sector, as the BCA and other
official policy documents did, but as ‘the prohibition to extract certain marine
natural resources’ (In. larangan pengambilan beberapa jenis biota maupun sumber-
daya perairan lain), ‘the prohibition to enter the national park area’ (In. larangan
memasuki kawasan Taman Nasional), or ‘the prohibition to use cyanide’ (In.
larangan pemakaian potasium).67
People also rejected the park because it criminalised important aspects of
their lives. At the start of the de facto implementation about 3000 people68
lived on islands within the park area. Many of them who worked in 2000,
i.e. 32 %, earned their living as fishermen.69 But this , as in many other cases
in Indonesia, conflicted with the general idea of a national park as an un-
inhabited area. They had been living in Pulau Seribu for a long time already.
The first inhabitants moved there from Tangerang and Banten, probably during
the reign of the Banten sultanate.70 After them, people from South Sulawesi
(Bugis andMandar), Kalimantan, Riau, Palembang, Lampung, Sumbawa and
all parts of Java and Madura followed.71 Selleger notes that in 1905 two
islands within the present park boundaries were permanently inhabited:
Panggang and Kelapa. In addition, fishermen ‘now and then’ stayed temporar-
67 Gugus Analisis 1990.
68 Personal communication with the park’s first director M. Halim, 1 September 2003.
69 24%worked as civil servants, military personnel, traders, labourers orwere self-employed.
43% of the population were not working due to age or unemployment (Fauzi & Buchary
2002, p. 172).
70 This sultanate was founded in the early 16th century when the Majapahit Empire had
collapsed. The sultans claimed to descend from the Prophet Muhammad. It became a
powerful sea-trade based state which even brought parts of Sumatra and Borneo under
its control. In 1682 the Dutch East India Company brought it under its suzerainty, and in
1832 it was annexed to the Netherlands East Indies.
71 Selleger 1906, p. 416. The Bugis people that I spoke to estimated that their ancestors had
been living there for at least 100, but probably 150 –200 years.
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ily on about fifteen other islands.72 But the zoning system with its biological
foundations did not take these facts into consideration and departed just like
the BCA from the idea that the park area was or should be uninhabited.
Next to this criminalisation, the park limited possibilities to freely settle
on neighbouring islands when the population pressure became too strong.
This was not only due to the zoning system of the park, as the provincial
government played a role here as well. For instance, in 1987 it moved people
living on Kotok, Bira and Genteng to Panggang, Pramuka and Harapan
(Kelapa 2). The former islands had been leased to individuals who also paid
compensation to the people concerned.73 At present the estimated 10.000
people living in the park are concentrated on six islands.74 This has led to
‘very inhumane’ (In. sangat kurang manusiawi) conditions on, among others,
Panggang and Kelapa islands.75
Many of the islanders complained that the BTN did not offer realistic
alternatives for restrictions. They contested the BTN’s narrow definition of
education, arguing in favour of specialised education and coaching instead.76
Most people described seaweed cultivation, which was introduced and pro-
moted as a sustainable alternative to blast and cyanide fishing, as an additional
income more than as a real alternative. One respondent explained this as
follows:
‘We sell 1 kg of seaweed for IDR 425 [about US $ 0,05]. On a 12 meter field the yield
is about 30 kg in three months. So everybody that plants seaweed does so for an
additional income, since you can’t live off it.’77
To make seaweed cultivation a real alternative they thought the BTN should
either fix the price for seaweed, so that the cultivators did not need to negotiate
with the traders, or at least supervise the local population in selling the new
products.78 Thus, more than for simple education the local people dreamed
72 These were according to him Kotok Besar, Genteng Besar, Genteng Kecil, Macan, Putri
Besar, Putri Kecil, Malintang Besar, Malintang Kecil, Cina 2, Semut, Balinjo, Sepak Besar,
Sepak Kecil, Patandan and Rakit Tiyang (Selleger 1906, p. 415-416).
73 Personal communication with M. Halim, 1 September 2003.
74 These are Panggang, Pramuka, Kelapa, Harapan, Kelapa II and Sebira.
75 Ongkosongo 1995, p. 6. Pulau Panggang in particular is very much overpopulated. The
provincial government recently entered into a discussion with, among others, the park
authority aboutwhich islandswould be suitable for resettlement (Personal communication
with BTN official, 24 October 2000).
76 Some islanders were not only concerned about economic alternatives but also about the
low self-esteem of most islanders and saw a role for the government to coach swimmers
and rowers in the area.
77 Personal communication with island resident, 2 November 2000.
78 A similar argument about the ineffectiveness of such projects was made by a consultant
working for the regional development planning agency (Bappeda): ‘There are so many
different projects intending to, for instance, stimulate the local economy! Everything is tried
out but nothing is ever really finished. There is no continuity whatsoever. Projects of this
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of amediating agency between them and the traders, whowere able to dictate
unacceptably low prices because they held monopolies and as a result had
made the fishermen dependent on them because of the lack of any credit
facilities.
In addition, they wondered why there was only a general high school (In.
SekolahMenengah Umum, abbr. SMU) on one of the islands instead of one where
students could learn essential knowledge for life in a marine environment,
including ecologically sound fishing technologies. That the BTN did not think
about these solutions was understandable from the dominant pembangunan
frame of thewhole bureaucracy. After all, doing sowould havemeant rowing
in the water of the Fisheries or Education Service. The only thing the BTN could
have done was to initiate a joint project.
Apart from the introduction of seaweed the BTN also claimed to have
created an alternative for the local population in tourism, as more tourists
would lead to more employment for the islanders. However, the BTN officials
did in fact what themembers of Parliament had done in 1990: they formulated
an objective and a hope rather than developing a strategy to actually achieve
this objective. Consequently, according to the islanders, the possibility of
working at the resorts was almost non-existent. Although most of the island
high school students dreamt of working there in the future, only a small
percentage of them succeeded. Resort managers generally claimed that they
needed employeeswith a specialised hotel education, whichwas only available
at mainland Java and thus expensive. Therefore, some islanders longed for
a hotel school on one of the islands. However, the BTN did not put any effort
into promoting such a school nor did it try to mediate between possible
employees and resort managers.
In addition, the local respondents complained that although many fisher-
men would have preferred alternative, less dangerous jobs in the region, a
more regular income and a higher status,79 there was no opportunity for them
to offer their services to tourists. The resort personnel chased them off and
even constrained them in their normal work whenever they fished close to
the resorts, arguing that they disturbed the guests. Likewise, a respondent
stated that there was no room for souvenir sale-activities such as on Bali, for
resort owners tried to prevent any contacts between the islanders and tourists.
Since the BTN did not mediate between the fishermen and the resort managers
various respondents concluded that pembangunan was highly discriminatory
kind never last long enough to ensure the necessary continuity. The maximum length of
a government project is about three months. After such a short time a baby cannot walk
on its own! The result is that nothing ever gets the chance to root. So, most of the projects
are just a waste of money’ (Personal communication, 22 November 2000).
79 Cf. Fauzi & Buchary 2002, p. 176. Fishing was dangerous due to the rough climate. Strong
winds regularly prevented boats frommooring at or leaving the islands. Furthermore, the
fishermen’s income was very much dependent on the price traders were willing to pay.
In general, this lay very much below the price at which the fish was sold in Jakarta.
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and that the lack of any real alternatives forced the fishermen to continuewith
prohibited activities even though they knew about their destructiveness.
In addition to arguing in favour of real alternatives, the local people also
argued for more equality in the context of law and development in a similar
way to people during the public consultation process described in part III.
A number of respondents accused the BTN of representing the whole govern-
ment and applying the park rules in a discriminatory way. According to them,
the BTN visibly treated entrepreneurs and visitors differently from fishermen.
They claimed, for example, that visitors were not withheld from diving in the
core zones.80 Likewise, resort owners were never given sanctions when viola-
ting the park rules and not stopped from restricting them in their search for
income. A resort owner confirmed that to her knowledge
‘no resort had ever been sanctioned, although on many islands there is no nature
left. […] If you act against the rules or without licenses they could close your resort
and force you to bring everything back the original state …. Or, [laughing] until
you paid some money.’81
Local respondents also argued for a more equal distribution of the benefits
of pembangunan. Many islanders perceived the islands as a very desolate place
(In. sepi sekali), cut off from its political and administrative centre in Jakarta
and left behind by progress and economic development (In. tertinggal). Striking
were the lack of a safe, regular and cheap transportation between the islands
and the mainland and the fact that electricity was only available between 6
p.m. and 9 or 10 p.m. Even then it often broke down. In 2000 there were no
newspapers, very few telephones, and only one computer, which nobody knew
how to use and which had broken down. In addition, people often had to
travel to Jakarta for governmental services as, apparently, officials refused
to spend much time at their agencies’ branch office on the islands. An addi-
tional financial burdenwas that ‘we have to pay for services that are subsidised
and thus free of charge in the rest of north Jakarta, such as street lights.’82
This the islanders perceived as all the more unfair considering that the region
generated a lot of income through tourism, oil and fisheries. On the whole
they suspected that government officials regarded the region as desolate and
backward and its inhabitants as not important enough to offer a better service
and to develop it. Their feeling of dependence on this government lacking
interest in them increased due to the fact that they had no representative in
the provincial, let alone the national, parliament.83
80 Indeed, when I stated my wish to go diving in one of them none of the tourism operators
ever even mentioned the existence of the park. All of them were more than ready to take
me there and thus – theoretically – to risk being caught by rangers.
81 Personal communication, 12 October 2000.
82 Personal communication with island resident, 26 November 2000.
83 Personal communication with island resident, 26 November 2000.
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However, equality was not only interpreted as sharing in the material
benefits of development but also as genuine participation. Many island
residents seemed to have given up on the government because they were
frustrated about the lack of opportunities to actively participate in thinking
and deciding about policy. They had adopted an attitude of ‘apathy’:
‘People don’t think anymore. They are of the opinion that the fact that the govern-
ment dumps complete concepts on the islands deprives them of the chance to think
for themselves. So, they perceive any government activity as “none of their
business”, since people elsewhere have created them in their thoughts. Everybody
adopts an attitude of indifference (In. masa bodoh).’84
The same argument in favour of more public participation was also at the heart
of one of the few discussions that went further than an exchange comments.
When Rias Rasyid, in 2000 Minister for Regional Autonomy, presented the
idea to transform the sub-district of Pulau Seribu into a district, soon dis-
cussions started about who should be working for the future district govern-
ment. Local residents demanded that aminimum of 50% of the approximately
90 future officials should originate from the islands. When the provincial
national governments rejected this on the basis of a lack of the appropriate
education the islanders responded
‘ok, if we are all so stupid, who is responsible for that in the first place? – After
that they became tongue-tied and, in the end, apologised. However, it is a fact that
they try to parachute officials of the social and information ministries here.’85
The islanders in this case thus openly refused to accept the government’s
education argument and countered by laying the responsibility for this lacking
ability to fulfil job requirements on the shoulders of the government. The
islanders agreed that things could only change for the better if the government
started in time to educate them for these jobs. If this did not happen they
feared another group of ‘traveller officials’ (In. pejabat turis), referring to all
the officials who used to stay on the islands for a few hours only.86 Their
counter-discourse was about opportunities for islanders to genuinely parti-
cipate. To strengthen their argument theywent on disqualifying non-islanders
by arguing that these had proven not to be island-fit; islanders, on the other
hand, needed to participate in the administration of the islands since they had
no motivation to flee and a proven interest in acting on behalf of the islands
and their population.
84 Personal communication with island resident, 28 November 2000.
85 Personal communication with island resident, 28 November 2000.
86 The remark of the head of the sub-district cited by an island resident demonstrated this
well: ‘The camat once told me that the first question of every official visiting the islands
was “when will we head back?”!’
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The third argument the islanders made concerned the implementation of
the national park policy. Islanders refused the park as a whole for its in-
effectiveness which they explained in terms of a lacking professionalism of
the bureaucracy caused by either an inability to achieve the declared objectives
or a lacking intention to do so, or both.
The local residents tended to interpret the fact that most of the time all
the boats were in the harbour as the laziness of the rangers. In general, they
described the park authority’s employees as ‘seekingmoneywithoutworking’
(In. cari gaji buta), ‘filling time until it is pay-day’ (In.mengisi/menghabisi waktu)
and ‘lazy’ (In. malas). Others described them as ‘corrupt, just as officials of
other institutions’ (In. korup seperti pejabat yang lain).87 Some of the rangers
but also Jakarta-basedmarine officers, in 2001, demanded amonthly payment
of IDR 25.000 from cyanide users for not reporting them.88 As a consequence,
local people argued in favour of making only one organisation responsible
for patrols: ‘The most expensive situation occurs when they conduct a joint
patrol. Then people have to pay three institutions.’89
In addition, some respondents doubted that the rangers cared for the region
and wondered whether they had ‘the will and the incentive to protect the
region effectively’. After all, otherwise the protection of the coral would have
had to profit from the increase in rangers from 5 (in the 1980s) to 61 (in 2000).
They also openly doubted their ‘capacity to protect the region effectively’ and
were ready to ‘advise’ (In. memberi masukan) the park authority’.90 One piece
of advice was to introduce targets and performance based evaluation. Further-
more, more control by an agency’s director might help improve the situation.91
With regards to the awareness programmes respondents said that the BTN
had still not succeeded in explaining the rationale for the restrictions it laid
upon the population: ‘Most people knowwhich activities are prohibited in the
park, but they don’t know why.’92 In the opinion of this informant, govern-
ment officials spoke a language that was not understood by the island popula-
tion: they ‘talk law’ (In. pakai bahasa hukum).93 In fact, this was a similar com-
plaint some of the BTN officials had expressed about natural scientists.
87 Personal communication with island residents, 28 November 2000.
88 Personal communication, NGO Bogor Palung, 9 July 2001.
89 Personal communication with NGO Bogor Palung citing island residents, 9 July 2001. The
joint patrol is conducted by the park authority in co-operation with theMarine (In.Angkatan
Laut) and the Jakarta Police (In. Polda Metro Jaya).
90 Rapid assessment Pulau Panggang by Bogor Palung, 25 June 2001.
91 Personal communication with island resident, 27 November 2000.
92 Similarly, interviews in Wakatobi Marine National Park (by Julian Clifton) revealed that
most of the people there were aware of which species were protected, but that they often
could not see why.
93 Similarly, interviews in Wakatobi Marine National Park (by Julian Clifton) revealed that
most of the people there were aware of which species were protected, but that they often
could not see why.
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Even more exemplary were complaints that the BTN officials even failed
to communicatewell with the ‘conservation cadre’ (In. kader konservasi), a group
of young local people interested in conservation. Participants complained that
the officials seemed to see their meetings as purely an exercise in fulfilling
formal requirements:
‘Every time there is such an activity people attend but mainly because they are
paid for their attendance. After the meeting nothing changes. There is no stimulus
to put anything that we have learned into practice. For example, we don’t get any
homework for the next time. Every time they tell us the same things and every
time we get a new certificate. There is no progress, although many participants
had already attended a couple of thesemeetings. So the participants come, sit down,
listen, collect the money and leave.’
By reproducing the formula of ‘5D’94 the respondent drew a parallel between
the relationship of the national parliament and the New Order government.
This demonstrated on the one hand the perceived powerlessness of the attend-
ees and on the other hand the uselessness of the whole exercise, which, in the
opinion of this respondent, were not intended to achieve conservation object-
ives but served to corrupt money: ‘after all, it is a project…!’95 Consequently,
the desired effect of the activity on the participants did not determine the
design of the activity but rather the desire to keep the work load at a mini-
mum. As a result, respondents described the park either as ‘a waste of money’
or ‘a pure attempt to keep up appearances without the intention to really
achieve something.’ All activities were said to ‘aim only at making money,
as governmental development projects in general’.
Another type of unprofessionalism related to the argument of inequality
was observed at the resorts:
‘In the beginning they recruited their staff from there, indeed. But after two years
it began to be contaminated. In the kitchen, there were suddenly only Sundanese,
in other segments there were only Balinese to be found. The hotel-educated people
took care of getting their younger brothers, sisters etc. into the company.’
This speaker thus suggested that the high educational requirements for work-
ing at the resorts, an outstanding practice designed to achieve professionalism,
after a while had started to become a façade for nepotism.
In sum, islanders rejected the park policy for its discriminatory approach
and its ineffectiveness and accused the government officials of keeping up
appearances to achieve objectives other than those declared.
94 Datang, duduk, dengarkan, diam, duit, compare for chapter 18.
95 Personal communication with island resident, 26 November 2000; original emphasis.
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25.4.1.6 Counterstrategies
The threemost frequently adopted strategies by the islanders belonged to what
Scott has labelled ‘weapons of the weak’.96 Island residents chose to play the
uninformed, to passively attend meetings and to shift the responsibility to
others. They opted to avoid conflicts and to keep up appearances.
The first strategy was exemplified in a study in 1990 by the NGO Gugus
Analisis among Pulau Seribu residents and fishermen in two Jakarta harbours
in which the majority of the respondents claimed to never have received any
information about the park.97
The second strategywas to attend activities organised by the BTN formoney
without really listening or entering into a debate with the park officials about
the chosen approach. The attendees acted as if they were open to the BTN’s
arguments but subsequently did not change their behaviour in any way.
The third strategy was to accept part of the BTN’s story about destructive
behaviour that needed to be stopped but to then deny responsibility for it:
‘Here, all fishermen know that we need the coral. Those who use bombs are
fishermen from Sumatra and Indramayu [Java].’98
The remaining two strategies were more confrontational but rarely used.
Local people openly showed to not believe the BTN officials when they demon-
strated, for instance, alternative techniques.99 Similarly, a few fishermen
denied that cyanide had destructive effects on fish and the marine environ-
ment. These residents thus attempted to discredit the BTN by telling a story
of a BTN lying to the people.
The last strategy was to enter into a real debate with the BTN or other
government agencies. In fact, this happened only once during the field
research, i.e. when the Minister for Regional Autonomy proposed to fill
vacancies in the district administrationwith officials from two national depart-
ments in Jakarta.
Interestingly, themajority of the islanders thus accused the BTN of keeping
up appearances while they adopted similar behaviour. Positioning the BTN,
or the bureaucracy as a whole, as unwilling served to exculpate them just like
when BTN officials positioned park residents as unwilling. However, by remain-
ing silent the islanders helped to reproduce those practices of the pembangunan
discourse they had condemned and that had enabled the officials to position
96 Scott 1985.
97 The two harbours were Muara Angke and Muara Baru. Interestingly, within Pulau Seribu
more women (62,5 %) than men (13,7%) said they received information. In the Jakarta
harbours 21,3 % of the male respondents had heard of it and no women at all (Gugus
Analisis 1990). The research used quantitative as well as qualitative methods. The report
does not mention how many people were interviewed and whether they had to respond
to multiple choice or open questions.
98 Personal communication with island resident, 27 November 2000.
99 Personal communication with BTN official, 16 October 2000.
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them as disrespectful, unwilling to learn and not co-operative – not exactly
the people they wanted to help – and to proceed as usual.
What made the chosen attitude understandable but at the same time
problematic was that the people generally expected the government to help
them to master their life and, even more, that they were entitled to this help.
This together with the fact that they did not differentiate between the various
government agencies active in the region but perceived the government as
a whole to be responsible for their ownmarginalization resulted in a paradox:
people in the Pulau Seribu region, on the one hand, thought that the govern-
ment should solve all their problems and, on the other hand, had no faith in
its capability to do so.
25.4.1.7 Organising support
Next to the strategies to establish coalitions in favour of conservation described
above, the BTN also attempted to organise scientific and bureaucratic support.
National policymakers often hired natural scientists to assist them in
designing zoning systems and writing management plans. As a result, the
policies for Indonesia’s protected areas have been focusing mainly on bio-
diversity conservation. This focus continued to dominate Indonesia’s conserva-
tion policies even after the announcement of the first national parks, which
were officially intended to accommodate various development objectives.100
A 1999 information brochure101 on Pulau Seribu demonstrates how: natural
science is used to legitimise the park, just as the national policymakers at the
Forestry Department used it more generally to legitimise protected areas.
However, in 2000 at least one critical official at the BTN thought that many
natural scientists had been neglecting the social reality of humans living in
protected areas, as they were often ‘too specialised’:
‘At a seminar biologists can tell us precisely how fast a piece of coral grows per
minute. But they cannot tell us how much profit it can yield for the people and
that is what I am interested in.’102
The discourse natural scientists used, one could say, was, in his eyes, too
disciplinary. The discursive structures they accepted in their debates were
100 Nasution 1990, p. 1.
101 Abdullah 1999, p. 20.
102 Personal communication with BTN official, 24 October 2000. Of course, there have been
estimations of the economic value of coral reefs for states as a whole. A WRI report titled
“Reefs at Risk: Southeast Asia” of 2002 estimated, for example, that the reefs in Indonesia
had an economic value of US $ 1,6 billion (UNEP Coral Reef Unit 2002). For another attempt
to determine the economic value of the Indonesian reefs see Cesar 1996. However, such
reports do not provide any information for individual people who depend economically
on coral reefs.
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profoundly different fromwhat he would have liked them to take into account.
He felt the gap between the various frames underlying the story of sustainable
development and looked for a bridge between the natural scientist conserva-
tion-discourse and the livelihood-discourse that would have enabled him to
find partners among the population. For more relevant support from scientists,
he informed all kinds of researchers about the park and discussed his critical
evaluations. In research on the coral reefs in the park, conducted together with
the Bandung based ITB and other universities, he kept pleading for the adop-
tion of a more interdisciplinary approach.
The BTN also attempted to raise financial, administrative and political
support from the Forestry Department. However, in 2000, officials working
at the BTN suggested that this was very hard. The Nature Conservation
Directorate regularly organised technical meetings with the park directors and
some other staff from the implementation units. These meetings officially
served as an opportunity to report and discuss problems occurring in the field,
but were organised in a top-downway. Only the breaks in the agenda created
an opportunity to discuss specific problems or to ‘lobby’ the director
general.103
In sum, it seems fair to say that the BTN’s attempts to build coalitions with
regional agencies and the population and organise support from natural
scientists and the Forestry Departmentwere not successful.With the exception
of the first director, the BTN officials in many cases did not try to initiate a
debate with other actors to communicate their own arguments and listen to
those of others. Other actors were also reluctant to enter into a debate as this
could have forced them to find a compromise and give up some of their
practices.
25.4.2 Rangers: struggling at various fronts
In 2000, there were 61 rangers working in the park. They formed a very
heterogeneous group in terms of their educational background. The increasing
presence of university graduates made the less educated rangers nervous.
Another determining factor for behaviour and strategies was their origin: only
a few rangers (about ten percent) were islanders; most came from other parts
of Indonesia.
A small number of rangers appeared dedicated to convincing park users
of the need for conservation. Within the BTN they fought for a more pro-
fessional implementation.
103 Personal communication with BTN official, 18 October 2000.
Chapter 25 329
25.4.2.1 Convincing target groups of the need for conservation: strategies and
counter-strategies
In 2000, all rangers were based on Pramuka Island. To enforce park rules they
focused on local residents and outsiders working in Pulau Seribu.
Most rangers coming from elsewhere had little contact with the island
population. Local residents ignored them and their requests to refrain from
prohibited activities, usually with reference to poverty. By contrast, the rangers
saw the problem differently, describing the locals as ‘poor managers’ who
wasted their money instead of saving it for bad times.104 Nonetheless, they
agreed to look for acceptable alternatives to the profitable illegal fishing
practices, although realising that locals were only willing to try new technol-
ogies after they had seen others applying them successfully.
Occasionally, depending on the availability of funds for petrol, the rangers
would go on a tour around the park. They happily accepted my offer to fund
an extra-budgetary patrol, which gave me the chance to witness how they
addressed those who violated the BCA rules. Of course, my presence in some
of these cases influenced these conversations, but they convincingly demon-
strated the rangers’ relative lack of power.
In one case, the rangers addressed the leader of a large construction project
on one of the islands. From a distance, we had already seen large coral walls
in the sea to protect the island from erosion. Next to the pier there was a sea-
aquariumwith one huge turtle (In. penyu sisik) and about ten (still small) giant
shells (In. kima raksasa). Supplies of sand were piled up for the construction
of bungalows. Asked by the rangers for a licence, the project leader claimed
his boss was in charge of licenses, followed by this conversation:
‘Ranger: Did you use sea sand for the construction?
Project leader: No, this is sand from the island. You can still see the hole in the
ground.
R:What are you going to fill up this hole with, if not with sand from the sea? Don’t
you try to fool us. – Besides, what is the dredging machine for?
PL: That is only here to be repaired. They are just checking whether it works again.
R: And what about the coral walls in front of the island?
PL: Yes, those we built to protect the island against erosion.
R: The walls will hinder the turtles in coming to the island to lay their eggs. Besides,
with the west wind there is now erosion but when the wind turns the sand will
return to the island. – We will read to you some articles from the BCA now. [They
read the articles on sanctions for dredging, removing coral from the sea and keeping
animals from the sea in capture.]
PL: Could you give me the text of the law so I can further study it?
104 This resembled the colonial perception as described in Selleger 1906.
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R: No, we have read it to you so you know the text.105 Who captured the turtle
and shells?
PL: I don’t know. [One of the rangers started filling in some forms to report the
offences.]
R: By the way, does ranger X often come here? And do you happen to know
whether payments have been made to the Forestry Department?
PL: I don’t know.’
Then the rangers loaded the turtle and shells into their boat, told the project
leader that the coral was placed under the authority of the Forestry Department
and that he better not dare build another coral wall. It was clear to all actors
in this scene that these threats were not backed by anything and that the
project leader would continue his work as soon as the rangers left.
This conversation illustrates the above-mentioned strategies of playing the
uninformed and shifting the responsibility to others. The project leader claimed
to know nothing about the BCA, referring the rangers to his boss in Jakarta.
Often people in the field would also claim to have no direct access to their
boss but to middlemen only. These, they said, were either residing in Jakarta
or on another island. Consequently, the rangers had no way to address the
person responsible for the illegal activities. In addition, they did not have the
equipment to contact their office in Jakarta to take over such cases for an
immediate follow-up:
‘we can’t contact our office or the police to report cases or to ask for assistance
and nobody can reach us to inform us about illegal activities. Furthermore, when
something happens to us, we don’t have the equipment to call for help.’106
This lack of back-up by the office obviously weakened the rangers in the field.
The conversation also shows another strategy used often, i.e. to make up
stories – in this case to explain the presence of machines that were clearly
intended to dredge sand from the sea.
The rangers, at first, solely used conservation arguments to convince the
project leader to stop his activities. This could also have been followed by
signals that they were willing to negotiate about payments. In this case, they
did not but instead inquired about the unprofessional behaviour of some of
their colleagues.
In front of another island, we caught aman dredging sand from the bottom
of the sea to enlarge the island. The rangers asked theman to stop his activities
since they were against the park rules, which he refused. To reinforce their
argument they suddenly pointed at me and said:
105 They refused since they only had one booklet containing the BCA themselves.
106 Personal communication, 21 November 2000.
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‘This woman came here from Europe to examine the performance of the national
park. There are many people in foreign countries who care much about nature
conservation.’
Apart from feeling somewhat embarrassed, I realised this again was a strategy
to convince others to accept the conservation rules: considering that people
in Indonesia in general do not care much about conservation, perhaps the
argument that people in other, developed countries didwouldwork. However,
instead of feeling intimidated or respectful and stopping his activities theman
just turned away from them and subsequently only addressed me in his
defence. He even invited me to have a look at what he was doing and used
arguments of the environmental discourse: that the older wall around the
island was built from coral stones; that this wall needed to be replaced; that
they did so with a muchmore environmentally friendly concrete wall, drilling
perpendicularly into the ground. The rangers quickly interrupted him, stating
that I held no authority but acted as an observer. So, the man turned to them
again with a new argument that stopping all activities until his boss had
contacted the park’s office and the park authority had made a final decision
about a permit for these dredging activities would make it difficult for him
to ‘fill his stomach’. The rangers appeared susceptible to this argument of
livelihood that they also used in certain contexts for themselves. They left the
island expressing their understanding for the man who thus had won this
argument.
These cases showed a number of interesting things. The rangers had two
main objectives – conservation and professionalism. However, theywere either
not able or not willing to pursue these at all costs. In the first case they were
rather powerless due to a lack of back-up. In the second case, they lost the
debate because their opponent was good at switching from one discourse to
another depending on whom he was addressing. He showed an awareness
of environmental considerations and pointed out the uncertainty and conflict-
ing interests inherent in the environmental discourse and the lack of clear
criteria for weighing these. However, he was also aware of the fact that a
license was compulsory for sand dredging. To still win the argument, he
resorted to the story of livelihood, which appealed to the rangers.
The main counter-strategies thus differed from case to case, from denial
to entering into a debate about the national park policy.
25.4.2.2 Convincing rangers and other officials of the need for professional imple-
mentation
Some of the rangers stayed on the islands regularly and were dedicated to
their work, despite very unsatisfactory working conditions.107 They were
107 See for detailed descriptions Arnscheidt 2001 and Arnscheidt 2005.
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convinced that they had to use the opportunities created by Reformasi to change
old practices. To this end they chose a confrontational strategy, which earned
them the name ‘provocative team’ (In. tim provokator).
They identified a lack of professionalism among island rangers and the
majority of the BTN personnel as the main implementation problem. In their
eyes, they were preoccupied with personal interests and keeping up appear-
ances rather than striving for effectively implementing the park policy.
When island rangerswere notwithin hearing distance the group of critical
– outside – rangers argued that family ties should not outweigh conservation
needs. The island-rangers, including non-islanders married to island women,
knew everything about living in a marine environment, perceived the islands
as their home and were evidently integrated into the local society. This often
resulted in dilemmas for themwhen relational considerations conflicted with
their tasks as rangers. In practice, family pressure always prevailed. For
instance, arresting an uncle for blast fishing was just not done. Likewise,
reporting the illegal behaviour of someone else could result in long-term
conflicts between two families.
That family concerns overruled professional duties created a serious prob-
lem for the national park authorities. They knew that including islanders
within their ranks would increase their legitimacy among the population.
Therefore, the critical rangers acknowledged that the park authorities should
employmore islanders, to about 50%, but should also try to prevent collusion
by appointing non-islanders to control the local population. But the critical
rangers did not see any way to change the present situation and did not enter
into a debate about priorities and professionalismwith island rangers. Instead,
in the vicinity of island rangers they adopted the discourse of overriding family
duties.
The critical rangers also accused rangers originating from other places of
setting wrong priorities and lacking professionalism.
Those rangers often preferred staying in Jakarta, and paid – if any – only
short visits to the islands. They justified their behaviour in two ways. First,
some of them claimed not to feel at ease on the islands, since they were not
used to the marine environment and therefore felt dependent on the help of
the islanders in case of an emergency. They claimed that they would perform
their tasks properly if they were placed in a terrestrial environment. Second,
they stated that it was no use staying longer on the islands because, due to
the fact that four of the five boats needed to be repaired and that there was
almost nomoney for petrol, they could not do anything there. Here, they used
the technical implementation aspect of the pembangunan discourse, claiming
that they would perform their tasks properly if only they were enabled to do
so.
The critical rangers accused them of hidden objectives. In their opinion,
those rangers preferred Jakarta, first, since life on the islands wasmore difficult
and less luxurious than in Jakarta; and second, because Jakarta offered many
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more opportunities than the islands to search for additional jobs to increase
one’s income. It could be profitable to spend a lot of time at the Jakarta office
since it was there that the office staff decided who should participate in a
project and thus receive additional income.
They also sharply criticised the park director and directly confronted him
at the office, accusing him of inertia, setting the wrong priorities and keeping
up appearances. He took no action against the frequent absence ofmost rangers
from the islands, they said, and he refused to follow up reports on illegal
activities in the park. In addition, they argued, he himself should come to the
field more often and ‘manage’ them:
‘Our boss comes to the field only once or twice a year. And when he comes here
he never advises us about how to deal with the problems here although he is
regularly sent tomanagement courses, about things such as securing national parks.’
They contrasted his governance-at-a-distance approach to the first park
director. He had also had an office in Jakarta but spent most of his time on
the islands, together with the rangers and in close contact with the local
population. The result of the more distant approach, they argued, was a lack
of respect for the park and its rules: ‘What the local people see is that we do
nothing, just sit here and do nothing, so how can we expect them to respect
us?’108 Directing all energy to the Forestry Department and regional agencies
to their office in Jakarta rather than to the field was, in their opinion, wrong.
The director’s lack of professionalismwas, according to the critical rangers,
also reflected in most of the park’s projects, which did not appear to be
intended to serve effective conservation:
‘There is no money for performing our major tasks, i.e. patrolling the area, for
example for petrol; instead, most of the money is allocated [by the director] to
activities aiming at the maintenance of boats, houses etc. and the inventory of the
marine resources.’
One case made them extremely angry: a project worth seven million Rupiah
(1,000 US$) to paint four poles the director had placed to indicate the borders
of the park. This was a ‘waste of money’ since the poles were of no practical
use. Moreover, they said, anyone could have predicted the lamps on the poles
would be stolen which happened only two months after the installation.
According to the rangers, this project involved five people who each received
a salary of about two million Rupiahs. More money was needed for material,
petrol and the like, while the project had generated at least three million
Rupiahs for those in control of the budget. The mechanism that allowed the
corrupt use of money was a form that did not require the rangers to report
108 Personal communication with rangers, 21 November 2000.
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their project salary. This enabled the project leader, probably in co-operation
with some other high-ranking official at the office, to fill in a higher amount
than actually paid. As the project was implemented before the rangers came
to be known as provocateurs, one of them had been appointed to participate.
However, he declined, saying that the director should appoint ‘someonemore
experienced’ instead. Although this refusal was framed in a non-confrontational
way, the director took it as a sign of disobedience: in a letter he downgraded
the ranger from his leading position to that of an ordinary ranger, without
providing reasons.
Other evidence for the unprofessional attitude of their boss, according to
the rangers, was his usual response that there was no money to perform their
tasks. Indeed, the budget only provided money for the follow-up on six cases
of non-compliance.109 But the rangers claimed that the six ‘planned’ and re-
ported cases had been faked. As a result, they no longer trusted him.Moreover,
they had learned from the Forestry Department’s budgetary section that in
fact some additional money for extra-budgetary enforcement activities was
available. In addition, the rangers argued that the director should allocate the
money differently. According to them it was, for instance, a pure waste of
money to have 61 rangers: ‘Give me ten good and well-equipped rangers and
we will live up to what one can expect from professional rangers.’110
The rangers had also proposed concrete actions to effectively implement
the park policy, including finding out how the poison fishing worked. One
ranger claimed that the poisonwas deposited on the boats before the fishermen
left the harbour. He told the director that he only needed to find out where
the poison originated from, but the latter refused to authorise this investiga-
tion.111
This behaviour by director and other colleagues was seen by the rangers
to be part of a broader phenomenon:
‘In Indonesia, there are institutions (‘lembaga, badan dan balai’) created for every-
thing. But those in charge never think in advance about what it takes to have them
work properly. As a result many of them are just another formality. For instance,
we also have a P.O. Box for complaints about work, superiors etc. But we only
have it because “you ought to have something like that!” not really in order to
deal with the complaints.’112
However, they saw that Reformasi created some opportunities for change.
Whereas it used to be an unwritten rule to discuss complaints always and
solely with the direct superior, presently, higher officials appeared willing
to receive them – even if they were still surprised when someone actually
109 Obviously based on administrative considerations rather than the real situation.
110 Personal communication with ranger, 23 November 2000.
111 Personal communication with ranger, 23 November 2000.
112 Personal communication with ranger, 22 November 2000.
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knocked on their door. Nonetheless, the rangers observed, having higher
officials receive one was much easier with good contacts than without. The
rangers were in a favourable position in this respect, because some of them
had worked at the Ministry in the past.
The confrontational and critical strategy of this group did not change the
director’s behaviour, however. On the contrary, it resulted in unofficial sanc-
tions for disloyalty: they were no longer involved in projects and excluded
from training programmes.113 The rangers also reported that the director
tried to intimidate them, for example, by withholding their yearly assessment
reports.When they complained about his lack of action in the event of corrupt
colleagues, his simple answer was ‘I am the boss.’ A ranger pushing for better
working conditions he called ‘too idealistic’. Clearly, two different discourses
clashed here. The park director stressed the importance of hierarchy within
his organisation, afraid to lose authority by listening too much to his rangers’
criticism. The rangers argued that ‘a boss should be happy with smart sub-
ordinates, since they can save him a lot of work and time.’
In addition to openly criticising their director and searching for support
at the Forestry Department, the ‘provocative team’ tried to actively convince
new rangers to join forceswith them. One of them, in reaction to being accused
by the park director of being ‘too idealistic’, said:
‘I was so happy about his remark and thanked him for it. I said that it meant that
I was not yet contaminated (In. terkontaminasi). But I am also wondering how long
I can stay this way. Now I am still young... Whenever a new ranger starts working
with us I try to pass on my principles to him. So, when later on I get the same
as the others I hope that some of the young rangers can take over my present role.’
However, only a few of the non-island rangers were attracted to the arguments
made by these oppositional rangers. Themajority continued framing the world
in pembangunan terms and producing formalist behaviour. Neither did island
rangers, in general, join the ‘professionalism group’. Only one of them chose
to stay neutral.
The metaphor of a disease and people being either ‘well’ or ‘sick’ kept
returning during various conversations with the critical rangers and the local
residents on the islands. However, the rangers never attempted to build a
coalition with the local population, not realising that there was much agree-
ment between them. Instead, they directed all their energy towards the bureau-
cracy. This was also reflected in their open demonstration of disrespect on
ArchipelagoDay (In.Hari Nusantara) in 2000, when high-level representatives
113 The latter they were critical of, too. They argued that people attended training only to raise
their status and not to do anything with what they had learned. The actual practice of
promoting people who had had training to a position where they were no longer in the
position to use their new knowledge supported their argument.
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of the newMarine Departmentmade a short visit to Pramuka Island. Consider-
ing this ‘another waste of money’, the rangers refused to ‘line up in front of
our office in our neatly ironed uniforms as we would have done in former
times.’114 Instead, they stood openly washing their clothes in front of the
visitors.
In short, in 2000 the park suffered much resistance, both from outside and
inside. The regional government, entrepreneurs and the local population
mainly ignored the park. They contested the park’s interpretation of pem-
bangunan-conservation, which they perceived as a restriction of their freedom
without realistic alternatives. Some critical rangers and the local population
fought for a more professional implementation which they experienced as
dominated by pembangunan practices and keeping up appearances behaviour
to achieve personal rather than public objectives. This did not lead to any clear
coalition, however. In addition to the dominance of pembangunan, patrimonial-
ism remained a dominant discourse. Even for the critical rangers, Reformasi
and professionalism did not mean fully replacing patrimonialism. But in the
context of island rangers and the local population they criticised the importance
of personal relations as ‘unprofessional’. When seeking the support of higher
echelon officials at the Forestry Department they uncritically reproduced and
thus strengthened patrimonialism arguments and practices.115
25.5 CHANGES INTRODUCED BY NEW DIRECTORS IN 2001 AND 2003
In linewith the regular circulation policy of state officials the director of Pulau
Seribu Marine National Park was replaced in 2001, followed by another new
director in 2003. Both introduced new strategies and approaches in the park’s
implementation, as explained to me during my stays on the islands and in
Jakarta in 2001 and 2005. While in 2001 the dominant discourse was still one
of pembangunan conservation as defined in the BCA, in 2005 the project-culture
had givenway tomore co-operation and a new discourse of nature production,
transforming the park into amodel for others. However, despite less criminalis-
ing strategies towards the population, the majority of the local residents
continued to reject the park.
When I visited the office in May 2001, a fresh wind was blowing and the
officials appeared much less frustrated. The communication equipment that
connected them with the islands and boats had been repaired and the office
had been reorganised. Furthermore, the rangers had already patrolled the area
twice in co-operationwith the police. Apart from these enforcement activities,
there had been a joint discussionwith the local fisheries agency about ‘environ-
mentally sound fishing methods’.
114 Personal communication with ranger, 23 November 2000.
115 Cf. Znoj 2004.
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Apparently, professionalism had gained some ground. The new director
told me that his approach was one of introspection. His starting point had
been to discuss with his colleagues what and how the national park and the
BTN should be. To make conservation work, they all needed to be ‘obsessed’
by conservation as their common goal. And, as ‘conservation people’, they
themselves needed first to understand conservation. This required more
‘professionalism’ within their organisation. To becomemore effective they also
had to increase their financial budget. ‘Until now, our planning has been too
oriented toward the budgeting process,’ he said, ‘instead of the other way
around. So, we should look for non-governmental financing as well.’
With regard to regional agencies the director claimed that ‘only two’ were
still causing problems: themining agency, which refused to bemore restrictive
in issuing licenses for sand mining within the park, and public works. The
latter institution supported the park, the director said, ‘but its employees are
too focused on their private gain, so they ignore us.’ As ignorance and a
preoccupation with personal objectives had also been the complaints about
these agencies in the past, little seemed to have changed in this regard.
Likewise, the relationship between the BTN and the island population had
not improved significantly. When the new director had taken office in 2001,
the representatives of the island population tried to use a new strategy of co-
operation. According to the director,
‘the vice village head told me that most people know about the national park and
that they approve of it since otherwise nothing would be left of the coral. Then
he came with a list of what kind of [financial] help they wanted from us.’116
In other words, they defined partnership in terms of reciprocity, offering their
support in exchange for money.117
To this the director reactedwith shock: ‘This is certainly impossible. Appar-
ently, they don’t understand how the governmentworks and that every agency
has its own tasks and responsibilities.’
Indeed,many islanders did not differentiate between the various governmental
agencies, instead conceptualising them as a single entity. The director’s reaction
reflected the pembangunan discourse, not only conceptualising the government
as fragmented into agencies with their own projects but also positioning the
government officials as smart and others as in need of education. In the end,
his encounter with the population did not lead to more public support for
the park.
116 Personal communication, 11 May 2001.
117 In fact, we see here a similaritywith the ‘spiritualist’ discourse discussed in chapter 7. There,
people had a ‘contract’ with the spirits and ancestors living in a certain area about respecting
taboos in exchange for well-being.
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Paradoxically, when it concerned responsibility, the new director did
emphasise partnership and co-operation. In line with the BCA, it was not the
park authority alone that was responsible for the national park and its natural
resources, but all governmental institutions in the area together with the
people. The park authority was only to be understood as the ‘leading agency’
or as a ‘facilitator’, responsible for bringing the park to the others’ attention.
He conceptualised the partnership with and participation of the locals in
the same way government officials had at the 1999 Rakornas:
‘It is very important that they participate. Then we won’t need more rangers. I
can get a certain amount of money from the Forestry Department for each parti-
cipant to provide them with information.’118
Local people were to be educated and directed by the BTN to assist the rangers
and to be involved in the new zoning process for the islands: ‘All governmental
agencies of north Jakarta, NGOs, students, universities and the park authority
are participating in this process.’119 However, further inquiries revealed that
no NGO was participating yet, and that the people were only represented by
the head of the sub-district and the village heads. Apparently the director
realised himself that this list of participants sounded a bit disappointing so
he rushed to add:
‘It is only logical that the whole population cannot participate, isn’t it?! […] It costs
far too much to always invite many people; just think about the costs for travel
and lunch!’120
He thus justified the fact that participation was still practiced as it used to
be under theNewOrder by referring to the pembangunan discourse, intending
it as convincing evidence that there was no other possibility – although the
same director had in another context mentioned his experience in Kerinci
National Park of raising money from NGOs for organising certain activities.
In sum, the new director took some measures to make the BTN a more
professional organisation. But he continued his predecessor’s approach toward
the park residents.
Four years later, it had become more professional. The park director that
had been appointed in 2003 had turned the park from a failure into a bustling
business and a model for other parks by radically changing the policy object-
ives from nature conservation to nature production. He appearedmuchmore
self-confident in relation to the Forestry Department than his predecessors.
On the one hand he expressed his understanding for national policymakers’
118 Personal communication, 11 May 2001.
119 Personal communication, 11 May 2001.
120 Personal communication, 11 May 2001.
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difficulties in changing the national policies, but on the other hand, he had
decided that it was better to solve the park’s problems on his own than to
depend on the Ministry. Self-confidently, he explained that ‘nowadays, we
can do whatever we like (In. kita mau apa, terserah) and we try to stand auto-
nomously (In. mengusahakan mandiri).’121 He explained that the BTN had
become ‘obstinate’ (Ja. bandel), turning around the definition of conservation
of the BCA:
‘now we no longer put protection and preservation first but use (In. pemanfaatan).
We strive for use that can result in protection and preservation.’122
The BTN had initiated a project in which 20 investors paid 20 groups of fisher-
men to cultivate corals that after a minimum of one year could be exported
for the aquariummarket. The difference with similar projects in, for instance,
Bali was that the coral to be exported was not taken from nature but was
produced.123 In this sense, the park had become a model for others and was
even supported by the ForestryDepartment, which, not surprisingly, had been
opposed to the idea of exploitation in the beginning. The director was hopeful
that the fishermen could produce the coral autonomously once the cultivated
coral had reached export size. The role of the BTN would then be reduced to
taking samples; presently it would also mediate problems between fishermen
and investors and look for new investors if needed.
Attracted by this new approach natural scientists frequently visited the
park to experiment with coral cultivation. Likewise, the Marine and Fisheries
Department and other institutions frequently approached the parkwith ques-
tions. To satisfy this demand, the BTN had started to organise trainings. As
a result, its lodgingwas fully booked, withmany guests also asking for diving
courses and excursions. In fact, this had changed the rangers into diving guides
and provided tourism entrepreneurs with a flourishing business.
Apparently, due to the departure from the strict conservation discourse,
the regional government and the BTN seemed to have moved closer to a real
partnership: in 2005, the district government for the first time doubled the
BTN’s budget of IDR 1,1 billion (about US$ 111.000) and the park director judged
many of its activities in accordance with the park’s objectives.
The new wind blowing through the park also seemed to have replaced
the formerly dominant pembangunan practice of planning isolated projects:
121 Personal communication, 7 July 2005.
122 Personal communication, 7 July 2005.
123 Stage F0 was taken from nature. This coral was to produce a new generation, the F1 stage.
This was to produce another generation, the F2 stage, which was to be exported. In July
2005, the process had not come further than the F1 stage but the park director was hopeful
that F2 would be reached by end of the year. Some rangers did not share his optimism
but remained rather sceptical about the promises made. They claimed to have seen that
the coral did not grow as fast as promised.
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‘Nowadays nobody asks any longer for projects first, we immediately start to co-
operate: universities, the district government, NGOs…wework first and then agree
on an MOU.’124
The director had also introduced some changes within the park authority.
Contrary to his predecessors who had stressed personal loyalty and an
obsession with conservation respectively, he introduced a new approach that
focused on discipline and military skills to bring his rangers into ‘a good
physical and moral shape’ (In. fisik dan moralitas tinggi). The routine meetings
every two weeks were changed accordingly. Before receiving their money on
‘pay day’ in Jakarta, the rangers had to run twice around the national monu-
ment in the heat of early afternoon. Since the director ranwith themhe rejected
their frequent complaints about asking toomuch of them. The secondmeeting
on Pramuka Island was partly filled with sports, military exercises and dis-
cipline. The other part was reserved for discussing problems, questions and
strategies – the supervision the critical rangers had asked for in 2000. In
addition, the director used sanctions and rewards (e.g. diving courses) to
increase the rangers’ motivation and discipline. In his view the rangers’ dis-
cipline was still insufficient, which he thought resulted from their bad financial
situation. Therefore hewas already thinking of expanding the coral cultivation
programme to include them.
Except for their financial situation and their monthly obligation to ‘run
for their money’, most rangers seemed happier than in 2000. Many of their
complaints had been listened to: they had receivedmore and better equipment
– although there was still only one boat which could be used – they hadmuch
to do and their boss spent more time in the field and was truly interested in
making the park work.
Logically, the ‘provocative team’ seemed to have fallen apart. Only one
ranger claimed to have kept striving actively for his ideals. In his view most
had stayed the same in the park. He suspected the director disliked him
because of his critical attitude, as he had been placed at the most distant post
and was never rotated to others. He had repaired an old boat and saved some
money for fuel by trading vegetables on Java so that he could travel more
freely. The others seemed to have become too busy with their new tasks in
the park and seemed satisfied to some extent with the changes initiated by
the new directors.
Despite the new focus on nature production, the BTNwas alsomore serious
about enforcement. Rangers were placed in resorts to help safeguard the sea
in their vicinity. Six times a month a BTN boat patrolled the park to replace
the rangers in the field with those who had been at home for two weeks.
124 Personal communication, 7 July 2005. I could verify this claim for the co-operation between
the BTN and one NGO. Holding also true for the co-operation with other government
agencies would mean a revolution.
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In addition to enforcement and nature production the director hoped to
protect the parkwith a non-confrontational strategy towards the local residents
which he explained as follows:
‘Whatwe taught people in the pastwere only prohibitions.However, conservation
is and always will be opposed to interests of exploitation, and the number of us
conservationists is relatively small. Therefore we need to operate strategically, softly
and elegantly (In. halus dan cantik). We cannot just like that accuse people of acting
wrongfully (In. menyalahkan orang).’125
Where the BTN in the past had tried to set up a conservation cadre, one of the
‘elegant’ strategies the new director referred towas a public healthmovement
called ‘Mahatma’126 on Panggang Island. Members of his staff were teaching
local people. Through this activity, without any direct link with conservation,
the director hoped to win the hearts of the local people and to create a channel
to influence them later to act in their daily lives in accordance with the BTN’s
objectives.
However, although obviously hoping for a positive spin off as soon as the
coral cultivation proved successful, the director was far from sure that his new
approach would be effective. He noted that, except for the local population,
much had changed and kept repeating that ‘it is not easy to turn a king [a
fisherman] into a servant [cultivator].’
Indeed, respondents did not see the park anymore positively than before.
In their perception, park development still meant building new empty govern-
ment offices and residences for officials. Likewise, they still described the
rangers as corrupt and lazy ‘although their salaries had been raised to IDR
1,5 million [about US$ 150] a month’, not knowing that this was only true for
those officials working for the new district’s government and that the rangers
only earned about half of this.
The suspicions about high salaries and lacking professionalism continued
to be fed by the fact that most rangers rarely left their post to interact with
the island population. The island population had accepted only the last ‘pro-
vocative’ ranger as one of them, asking him, whenever he passed, whether
they could offer him some free food.
Apparently some islanders had hoped formore economic benefit from the
park and vented their dissatisfaction by demolishing a BTN boat. According
to the last ‘provocative’ ranger they were angry because the director had
bought a new boat in Banten instead of in Pulau Seribu, where it would have
been cheaper, of better quality, and good for the island economy. The director
contested this story by saying that the boat from Banten had been cheaper
and better than boats from the islands, that it had been destroyed in an
125 Personal communication, 7 July 2005.
126 Gymnastic based on yoga and focusing on breathing techniques.
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accident and that maybe afterwards some people had additionally attacked
it in the harbour.
In sum, in 2005 the BTN translated conservation into nature production.
This resulted in a coalition between the BTN, regional government, natural
scientists, entrepreneurs and a small part of the population. The new model
function of the park also resulted in improvements for the rangers. Those not
benefiting from these reforms still rejected the park.
25.6 CONCLUSIONS
In line with the BCA’s discourse of pembangunan conservation, in 2000 the BTN
in Pulau Seribu Marine National Park chose education as the main strategy
to convince local people of the need of conservation.Most officials interpreted
education in a hierarchical way as one-way communication, defining their
own responsibility for the result narrowly. The main strategy for convincing
regional agencies of the need for the parkwas to inform them of the park rules
and remind them of their responsibility to respect and even enforce those rules.
Again, one-way communication and a narrow definition of its own responsibil-
ity characterised the BTN’s approach.
In reaction, both the park policy and its implementation were contested.
Regional government agencies argued that the national park policy was
unrealistic and ignored existing claims on and uses of the area. In addition,
they were afraid of a new competitor for government funds, in particular
because before the establishment of the park they themselves had adopted
the pembangunan conservation discourse for their own policies and plans. Local
residents mainly experienced conservation as restricting them in their lives
and criminalising their daily activities, without providing for realistic altern-
atives. In addition, they complained about the discriminatory and un-
professional implementation of the policy. They argued in favour of better
schools with a specialised curriculum, more participation in policy- and
decision-making, and realistic opportunities to directly benefit from conserva-
tion, thus in terms of a ‘development for all’ and equality discourse. Some
of the rangers also criticised the park authorities for keeping up appearances
in order to achieve personal rather than public conservation objectives. Their
argument for other priorities and better management could be summarised
as a plea for more professionalism.
Most opponents of the park adopted a strategy of ignoring and playing
the uninformed. For both the regional government agencies and local residents
this meant not paying attention to the BTN’s rules and presence. When invited
by the BTN they attended meetings but in most cases only paid lip-service to
its conservation arguments. The regional government agencies only accepted
these arguments when they were linked to the financial aspects of pembangu-
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nan, while local residents would only go alongwhen they were treated respect-
fully and when they had faith in the alternatives promoted by the BTN.
In their struggle against what they perceived to be a discriminatory and
incapable government preoccupied with personal interests, many of the local
people remained passive, using the samemethods of keeping up appearances.
Not surprisingly, this strategy failed to achieve any change, since it reproduced
what they disliked. On the other hand, it provided themwith some space and
legitimacy to behave as they wanted. Only a small section of the local people
and some of the rangers and BTN employees adopted more active strategies,
such as searching for a powerful counter-discourse, positioning the BTN and
the whole government as incapable and unfair, and starting a debate about
problems and solutions.
In 2001 when the first new director took office, he addressed many of the
internal criticisms and management issues but hardly changed the subject
positioning of the local people. Moreover he rejected attempts of the local
population to negotiate a contract.
Two years later the next director chose a radical change, re-interpreting
conservation as nature-production. By choosing a more gentle approach that
no longer laid an emphasis on raising awareness but primarily aimed at using
nature for the economic benefit of the park residents, possibly resulting in
conservation, he moved closer to the discourse of most islanders and rangers.
Still, the islanders kept distrusting the park and the government as a whole.

26 Kutai National Park
Kutai, the second park analysed in this study, was situated a great distance
from Jakarta. The struggle unfolding there was characterised by provocation.
While in Pulau Seribu the national park in the end seemed to have been
successful in forming a coalition with the regional government and a small
part of the population, attempts to build a similar coalition in the resource
rich area of Kutai National Park failed. Quite on the contrary, in this case, the
regional government togetherwith old and new residents built a firm coalition
around ‘development’ and ‘regional autonomy’ that was far more powerful
than coalitions between the park authorities, NGOs, and neighbouring enter-
prises in support of ‘nature conservation’. In addition, the success of contesting
Kutai National Park was not only more fierce but also more visible than in
Pulau Seribu, as logged forest is more eye-catching than destroyed coral reef.
Consequently, soon after the beginning of Reformasi, Kutai came to be seen
as a ‘lost case’.
26.1 GEOGRAPHIC DATA AND HISTORY
Kutai is a terrestrial national park. It is situated in the Indonesian province
East Kalimantan, to the north of the provincial capital Samarinda. The park
stretches from the city of Bontang and the logging concession area in the
south1 to the new East Kutai district capital Sangatta in the north, and from
the coast of the Makassar Street in the east to three logging concessions2 in
the west. In the north the Sangatta River forms its natural border. In the east,
the coast does the same. The south andwest borders are artificial. On themap
they appear as straight lines drawnwith a ruler. In the forest no border stones
can be found.
The official information leaflet concerning the park reflects the same pem-
bangunan conservation discourse as in the case of Pulau Seribu, mentioning
the park’s biodiversity as a reservoir for genetic material, its possibilities for
research and education and its potential for eco-tourism.3 Although in the
past, especially in 1982 and 1997, much of the area has fallen victim to large
1 PT Surya Hutani Jaya.
2 PT Porodisa, PT Roda Mas, and PT Kiani Lestari.
3 Soehartono 2001.
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fires,4 it is still protected because it is the only lowland forest of its kind. The
flora can be subdivided into coastalmangroves, swamps, lowland forests, ulin,
meranti and kapur forest, and mixed dipterocarpaceae forest. The fauna
consists of a variety of primates such as orang utan, wild carnifores, reptiles,
game and hundreds of species of birds.
The park was gazetted parallel to Pulau Seribu. Its history as a reserved
area started in 1934 when the colonial government determined an area of
2.000.000 ha as a ‘natuurmonument’.5 This decision was reinforced in 1936
when the government of the king of Kutai issued a decree of its own about
the same area.6
In 1957 a long row of reductions of the park area began, reducing the park
to 306.000 ha, probably for the increasingly important timber production. The
Minister of Agriculture of that time changed its status to ‘wildlife reserve’,
which made logging inside the park boundaries possible until its status was
changed to ‘national park’ in 1982. From 1968 onwards, the area began to be
exploited by the logging industry. According to Purwanto, inhabitants remem-
ber this time as the ‘logging flood’ (In. banjir kap). From 1970 until 1973 a
Logging Concession within the park area was exploited by PT Kayu Mas
Timber.7
In 1971, when the NewOrder regime had firmly established pembangunan
as its major ideology, and while sustainable development had already begun
to gain some ground in Indonesia, the mining industry entered the scene as
well. Pertamina, the Indonesian state oil company, acquired a license to explore
the park area and to build a number of facilities, including an airport, houses
for its employees and a golf course. The Minister of Agriculture issued the
license after requesting advice from its local agency. As a result Pertamina
would help guard the reserve and rehabilitate areas no longer needed.8 Perta-
minawas thus positioned as a trustworthy actor, supporting nature conserva-
tion.Mining explorations were presented asmore important and less destruct-
ive than swidden cultivation.Moreover, the sameminister reduced the park’s
surface again, this time to 200.000 ha.
The 1970s saw a gigantic industrial boom in the area, which has changed
it enormously. In addition to the logging companies, the park became sur-
rounded by big companies interested in oil exploration and production, and
gas exploitation.9 The municipality of Bontang has grown from a fishing
4 These destroyed 89.000 ha of the park area, which in 2000 were still in the process of
recovery (Kompas 13 October 2000, ‘Tragedi Kehancuran Hutan Kaltim’).
5 Besluit No. 3843/AZ, 7 May 1934.
6 SK Pemerintahan Raja Kutai (ZB) No. 80/ZZ-ZB.1936, 10 July 1936.
7 Purwanto 2005, p. 9.
8 Personal communication with A, 20 February 2001.
9 The coalmining companies have been PT KPC and PT Indominco Mandiri. Pertamina has
exploited oil and PT Badak NGL Co gas.
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village with 7000 inhabitants into a large industrial town of 80.000 people.10
Tomake that growth possible, Kutai National Park has been reduced twomore
times, in 1991 and 1997,11 to 198.604 ha.
The industrial boom also had its effects on the already existing settlements
within the park boundaries. Where at first shifted cultivators of the Basap,
Dayak Punan and Kutai tribes12 had lived, from the 1920s onward Bugis
settlers who fled their home increasingly arrived in the park area searching
economic welfare and security.13 A map from 1991 shows six settlements,
all situated at the eastern coast and mostly populated with Bugis people.14
To change the park’s reality to the ideal of an uninhabited natural area,
the national, provincial and regional governments in 1995 relocated the people
living within the park boundaries to other areas. This was favoured to an
enclave and the expected problems of controlling the size of its population.15
However, the governor of East Kalimantan in fact did not support this
solution and by 1996 had already issued a decree giving an official status to
four of the settlements in the park.16 Indeed, in 2001 most forced migrants
had already returned to their old homes.17
Neither did the Department of Home Affairs feel obliged to respect the
park as an uninhabited area. The administrative borders of the four official
villages that it helped to determine stretch much further into the park than
the actual settlements. In the words of the head of the East Kutai Planning
Agency,
‘if these were to be taken as the basis for an enclave the park would be finished.
Thewhole of Indonesia is divided into provinces, districts, sub-districts and villages.
Nothing is left. The Department of Home Affairs did this, although strictly speak-
10 Vayda & Sahur 1996, p. 1.
11 SK Menhut 4435/Kpts-XX/1991 and SK Menhut 1997.
12 Vayda & Sahur 1996, p. 36; Purwanto 2005, p. 9.
13 There were four waves of migration from Sulawesi, in the 1920s, the 1950s, 1960s andmid-
1970s respectively. Many of those migrating in the 1950s and 1960s fled the military and
economic uproar in South Sulawesi in this period, and those arriving in themid-1970s tried
to benefit from the area’s economic development (Vayda & Sahur 1996, p. 8-9, 27, 36). See
for a more detailed description of the migration process (Purwanto 2005).
14 Teluk Pandan, Kandolo, Selimpus, Teluk Kaba, Sangkimah and Kampung Baru (Vayda
& Sahur 1996, p. 2). Other sourcesmention seven: Sangatta Lama, Sangkimah, Teluk Pandan,
Singageweh, Kanimbungan, Sidrap and Kandolo (Kompas 1 November 2000, ‘”Enclave”
16.086 Warga di Kawasan TN Kutai’).
15 Vayda & Sahur 1996, p. 1.
16 SK Gubernur 140/SK.406.A/1996. Initially the decree legalised only three villages. More
recently, however, one of themwas split into two so that there are now four official villages
in the park: Sangatta Lama, Sangkimah, Teluk Pandan and Singageweh.
17 However, as Vayda and Sahur argue, the success of the relocation differed from village
to village.
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ing, it should not have legalised these villages since their territory is under the
jurisdiction of the Forestry Department’.18
From the Forestry Department’s perspective this was an obvious provocation
but, apparently, it lacked the power to act against it. The fact that Pertamina
was still active in the park further diminished the credibility of the govern-
ment’s intention to conserve the area.19
On top of this, since 1991, to accommodate the further industrial develop-
ment of East Kalimantan, a road has cut through the park from Bontang to
Sangatta. Having been asphalted in 1998, it has spawned many settlements,
which expand every day.
Thus, before the struggle (themain topic of this chapter) started, the area’s
conservation had already been severely contended by area reductions, licenses
for economic activities within the park, road construction and the legalisation
of – officially – illegal settlements.
After the enactment of the Regional Autonomy Act in 1999, a new actor
entered the arena: the regional government of the newly established East Kutai
District. In 2001, its capital, Sangatta, looked like a settlement during the gold
rush periods in the USA. It consisted of one big road whose quality was so
bad that each of the frequently passing busses filledwithmineworkers caused
a gigantic, breath-taking cloud of dust to whirl around. As a shopkeeper put
it:
‘When Sangatta still formed part of the Kutai District, the government never came
here. It was a free, un-ruled area. Those with money took a piece of land and did
whatever they liked. Only now is there a government in this area.’20
To assure itself of popular support this very government attempted to position
itself as serious about developing a prosperous new district and listening to
the people’s demands. The national park area played an important role in this,
as the following section will show.
26.3 NEW COALITION AGAINST THE PARK
After the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, and especially after the enactment
of the Regional Autonomy Act in 1999 (a catalyst for the past frustrations of
the provincial and regional government as well as the people in the area), the
national park became highly contested. A new coalition between the new
district’s government and old and new settlers emerged. The regional govern-
18 Personal communication with B, 23 February 2001.
19 Personal communication with former park director, 26 February 2001.
20 Personal communication, 21 February 2001.
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ment struggled to gain authority over the park area and the settlers for benefits
from pembangunan in the park area. The evolving struggle between this coali-
tion and the park authority concerned two issues: how to interpret Reformasi
and how to make sense of the park.
A rapid escalation occurredwhen the district government invitedmigrants
from other regions as part of its grant plans for establishing a 500.000 ha
coconut palm oil plantation in Salingkurang, to the north of the national park.
However, while waiting for the plantation project to start, the migrants who
followed the invitation had to look for other sources of work. Encouraged by
the interim district head and investors, whowere reported to offer IDR 500.000
(about US $ 50) to everyonewho planted 2 hawith bananas in the park, in 2000
more than 13.000 people, mainly from East Kutai District and South Sulawesi,
moved into the park. Some of them engaged in illegal logging, while others
developed banana plantations, vegetable gardens, corn fields and fish ponds.
To the right and to the left of the 65 km long Bontang-Sangatta road all
trees, especially the precious ulin, were cut, turning it into a ‘roadwith a view’.
Themangroves at the coastline were logged as well and replaced by fishponds.
According to the former head of the park authority, in the beginning of the
year 2000 13.862 ha had been logged, in June 16.000 ha and in September
26.000 ha. For this purpose, 118 small paths (In. jalan tikus) had been estab-
lished that cut 15 to 35 kms into the park’s core zone.21 A 2005 estimate was
that only 50.000-60.000 ha of the forest remained.22
Everywhere along the road, in the mangrove forest area and even in front
of the BTN posts, wooden sticks in the ground indicated the new self-made
borders for the chosen plots.23 Some were even advertised for sale. Likewise,
new houses were built along the road, including one in front of a rangers’
post.
To justify these activities, people started to tell stories about new rules:
‘Fruit and vegetables used to be very expensive here since most people work for
the big companies and thus not as farmers. Also it was prohibited to plant bananas
in the national park. Now this has changed, that is all I know.’24
Such stories were also used in confrontations with the park authority, which
was furious about this invasion and tried to convince the settlers that they
21 The logging was mainly financed by so-called ‘cukongs’, rich entrepreneurs operating in
the background. They finance the chain saws and pay the truck drivers who bring the logs
out of the park. Likewise, some of the neighbouring HPHs or their contractors were
suspected to be involved in the core-zone logging.
22 Obidzinski & Andrianto 2005, p. 80.
23 According to the then vice district head, it was not surprising that people were settling
there. ‘It is very easy to build a garden there. This in contrast to other areas where there
is no road to transport your yield’ (personal communication, 22 February 2001).
24 Personal communication with local resident, Sangatta, 21 February 2001.
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ought to respect the park rules. But they did this without any success since
the new residents just talked back. According to the acting park director, the
people
‘interpret Reformasi completely wrong! They think that it means that there are no
more prohibitions. So, when rangers tell them that they are not allowed to build
gardens in the park, they say that that is not true.’25
However, the opposition against the park stretched further than public dis-
obedience and positioning the BTN as a liar. People started to attack the park
authority. Various ranger posts and park signs were demolished while other
of their properties, including radio communication devices and solar cells,
were stolen.26 According to a ranger,
‘nobody takes us serious anymore. When people see our uniform they certainly
no longer run away as they would have in former times. When they see a police
uniform they still do. We no longer enjoy any authority.’27
Settlers even waved at rangers when conducting illegal activities in the park.
The roles had changed: ‘Before the Reformasi people were afraid of the rangers,
now it is the other way around’.28 This quote nicely summarises the park’s
history and the recent developments. The researchers who in 1995 studied
the possibility of resettling the people living in the park reported that there
wasmuch ‘distrust of outsiders (generally regarded as “agents” of the park)’.29
This was the result of arrests of park residents for illegal tree cutting.30
Residents felt that rangers ‘bullied them around’31 and operated in a very
‘wild’ (In. ganas) and ‘frightening’ (In. mengerikan) way.32
They concluded that the national Forestry Department primarily cared for
animals and plants because it did not want people to live inside the park (even
though they had been there before the park had even been established).33
Moreover, they associated the park with foreign researchers who seemed to
25 Personal communication, 20 February, 2001.
26 Personal communication with D, 23 February 2001 and C, 26 February 2001. This is what
McMullan and Perrier coined ‘social or a type of borderline crime’ which was among
commoners ‘regarded as normative or at least as justifiable on quasi-legal grounds’
(McMullan & Perrier 2002, p. 704).
27 Personal communication, 23 February 2001.
28 Personal communication, 20 February, 2001.
29 Vayda & Sahur 1996, p. 3.
30 Vayda & Sahur 1996, p. 4.
31 Personal communication, 21 February 2001.
32 Purwanto 2005, p. 10.
33 Purwanto 2005, p. 11. Purwanto also mentions that some people living inside the park saw
the park as a place to protect threatened animals. He does not quantify these statements
but it may be guessed, considering what was happening from the late 1990s onward, that
this did not influence the practices of many people who were living in the park.
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own the place and with big business that was favoured by a discriminatory
national government.
This last complaint they voiced at a public consultationmeeting organised
about the proposed NRM Act (see also chapter 22). Participants said problems
in the area had started because the Forestry Department did not give people
the space to ‘yield the results of the area or to participate in its management’
while at the same time, entrepreneurs were allowed to become active in the
area, against the interests of the local population:
‘All of them managed the natural resources that surrounded us, but what did the
decades of their presence bring the people? Very little compared to the amounts
of natural riches they drained.’34
As a remedy, they argued for participation, which they interpreted as sharing
in the profit of a region.
Among the rangers, the hostile attitude among the population in and
around the park created a general feeling of unease. Many of them asked to
be transferred to other offices. However, only few of these requests were
honoured.35
The most radical conclusion about the situation was drawn by the Kutai
National Park Director, Tonny Soehartono. He resigned on 20 January 2001
after 18 years with the Forest Service, of which only 16 months were spent
in Kutai. He was probably the first Indonesian in his position to voluntarily
quit his job. The feeling that he had failed and had lost any pleasure in his
work contributed as much to his decision as the feeling that people around
him increasingly ‘pitied’ him. He had begun full of enthusiasm and confidence,
building on his long working experience.
Soehartono organised three different support groups for the park, which
were to advise and support him, but the promulgation of the Regional Auto-
nomyAct followed by the establishment of the new district East Kutai proved
a serious setback.36 Moreover, ‘the spirit of Reformasi got out of control with
all the people demanding unlimited freedom.’ These two changes increased
the pressure on the park. Soehartono could not convince other state actors
to defend the park with a strict law enforcement campaign. The governor and
the police refused to send the forces he had asked for. Likewise, the NGOs that
had formerly supported him were now more concerned about human rights
than about nature:
34 Participant public consultation in Teluk Pandan (Suwarno, et al. [n.y.], p. 102).
35 Personal communication with ranger, 23 February 2001.
36 This new district with the capital Sangatta was established through Act 47 of 1999. Its
surface is 35.747,5 km2 and has 151.823 residents who live in 11 sub-districts and 102
villages.
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‘They were afraid I was willing to sacrifice human rights to protect the park. But
I did not propose anything like that. I was just trying to enforce the law and thus
to protect the park.’37
Even the regional government used the human rights argument, positioning
the park director as representative of the NewOrder approach of using force.
The park director’s frustration about this lack of support increased when
none of the national or international NGOs responded to his plea to exert
pressure on the provincial or district government: ‘There is no such thing as
genuine support for conservation in other countries. All these organisations
have their own interests.’
In fact, the EuropeanWildlife Preservation Coalition (EWPC) had confined
itself to urging the park authorities to take action and to threaten with lobbying
for sanctions if ‘the government’ failed to end the destruction taking
place.38Apparently, they were not ready to take a more nuanced stand or
organise a campaign for Kutai National Park. In the park director’s eyes, it
was clear that the international conservationist NGOs considered Kutai to be
a ‘lost cause’ that could not be used to their own (fund- and image-raising)
advantage. The fact that the area was populated with migrants instead of
indigenous communities also contributed to this reluctance.
As a result, the park authority felt increasingly isolated. The local govern-
ment of East Kutai had engaged in a coalition with the people living in and
entering the park, while the NGOs and the provincial government were not
willing to support a strict enforcement campaign. International NGOs failed
to respond to pleas to adopt the park as an area of international concern. The
last option the park director could think of was to ask the surrounding com-
panies for support, but this strategy failed as well. British Petroleum, for
instance, a major shareholder of KPC was ‘not too sure’ whether the threat to
withdraw investments would convince the local government to change their
approach towards the park. They certainly were not going to take any chances.
Even the increasing attention for the park’s situation in the media did not
help, according to Soehartono:
‘Apparently, everybodywas just too busywith other things. TheMinister was busy
with the President in Jakarta and the district’s head was busy with his re-
election.’39
37 In support of this, one of the park rangers reported that his director was absolutely civilian
(In. sipil murni) and opposed to any ideas of letting them carryweapons. He therefore hoped
that the following director would be someone with an army or police background so that
they could defend themselves and the park better although he was aware that carrying
weapons would evoke aggression (personal communication, 23 February 2001). His com-
ments made clear that he really feared for the rangers’ personal security.
38 Http://dte.gn.apc.org/45Kut.htm.
39 Personal communication, 26 February 2001.
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A particular problem was the Forestry Department’s reluctance to exert any
pressure for fear of being associatedwith theNewOrder. The official response
from theMinistry was that conservation now needed ‘to come from the people
themselves’.40 There was also a ‘new insight’ that conservation was not only
about nature but also about people and rights:
‘A problem of PKA [the nature conservation directorate] is that it mainly employs
people with a forestry background. These are very much oriented towards produc-
tion.Wewould needmore sociologists, anthropologists, officials that are specialised
more in dealing with people. Or lawyers.’41
The Ministry thus claimed to lack the knowledge of how to deal with such
a problem. The director for conservation came to Kutai twice, but reportedly
only flew around the park in a helicopter to get an impression of the
situation.42
The lack of support for the BTN made it easy for the district government
(led by its new head Awang Farouk) to start attacking the park director, by
positioning itself as fighting for the welfare of the people. Farouk directly
challenged the park director, claiming that he could not possibly enforce the
law in his district. Subsequently, he organised a large meeting to inform the
people living in East Kutai about this action and to ask them about their
wishes. He further challenged the park director by demanding land for agri-
culture and settlements in the eastern part of the park: ‘Tell your Minister!’
Soehartono quoted him.
Two rangers added their observation of the district head sullying their
name (In. menjelekkan) in public:
‘He did not know that we were there since we were not wearing uniforms. He
said that we did not do anything to save the park and that we just let everything
happen in front of our eyes. – That is just not done! That someone of the public
service talks like this about other public servants!’43
The administration in this case no longer stood together, but competed with
negative reference to the other’s performance. In the eyes of the rangers,
Awang Farouk, despite his environmentalist reputation (In. memiliki reputasi
sebagai orang lingkungan),44 was certainly not fighting for the sake of the park:
40 Personal communicationwith former director conservation areas, Lukito Daryadi, Jakarta,
9 May 2001.
41 Personal communication, Lukito Daryadi, Jakarta, 9 May 2001.
42 Personal communication with B, 23 February 2001.
43 Personal communication, 23 February 2001.
44 He was the former head of the East Kalimantan Bapedalda.
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‘He declared that he is now fighting for “his people”. […] He is looking for a
solution that will please all sides. Look alone at his plans for the airport in the park
[…]. And he even proposed to wait for the corn yield in the park before taking
any action whatsoever’.45
Farouk thus presented the BTN as ‘pro-environment’, but himself as ‘pro-
people’. These statements were certainly intended to support his candidacy
in the upcoming district head elections of 2001, in which the park became an
item of importance. The following paragraphs will elaborate this issue.
26.4 NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE PARK’S FUTURE
The actors negotiating about the park proceeded from opposing points. The
head of the BTN was in search of a consensus, whereas the district head aimed
for a polarisation. In a closed meeting with Awang Farouk Tonny Soehartono
presented two alternative solutions to the problem that thousands of hectares
of the park area had already been logged. The first one, which he preferred,
was to try to live in harmony with the people who already lived in the park.
They could discuss their needs, for example, how much wood they required
for their houses. Sales of wood, on the other hand, would be excluded from
such discussions. The second solution would be to cut a piece of land out of
the park, which would create strict borders instead of harmony. ‘Then people
will guard the border all the time, watching what is happening at the other
side and whether anyone will cross the border.’ In the end, the plan of an
enclave was frustrated several times by leaks from different actors. When the
possibility of an enclave was discussed at a meeting with the BTN, NGOs,
community representatives (In. tokoh masyarakat) and regional government
agencies, a community representative concluded that the residents could log
and cultivate the envisaged area and informed them of this. According to the
park director, one community representative was even caught bringing 100
people into the park for logging purposes, justifying this action with his
knowledge of the future spatial planning. Subsequently, the parties agreed
on a plan to attribute 4.700 ha to the community. According to the park
director, the Forestry Department had already confidentially promised to agree.
‘When this leaked out people in the park started to demand more and more,
finally about 10.700 ha!’ As a result, in the end the deal was cancelled.
Leaks of information also caused the park director’s next proposal to fail.
This was to cut the eastern part out of the park with a 1 km green belt to the
Bontang-Sangatta road, but only if the district head would make plans for
the implementation, before announcing the matter to the public. Awang Farouk
agreed, but almost immediately publicly announced that 15.000 ha were to
45 Personal communication, 23 February, 2001.
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be cut out of the park. As a result even more people invaded the park. When
the park director accused him of breaking his promise, Faroul responded that
he needed to ‘communicate with his people’, again positioning himself as the
people’s representative. In fact, the head of the regional planning agency
(Bappeda) of East Kutai told another story, i.e. that Tonny Soehartono had
agreed with the district government’s 15.000 ha plan, but that the Forestry
Department had blocked it and therefore the population now ‘hated’ the
park.46 Both parties thus accused the other of unfair play.
TheMinistry indeed disapproved of the 15.000 ha proposal, since it feared
a snowball-effect:
‘They are in charge of all the Indonesian national parks and everywhere there are
the same problems as here. Just have a look at Tanjung Putih. So, if they had agreed
to release a part of the park, other claims in other parks would have followed.
Therefore, they proposed to enclave the villages in Kutai National Park and the
regional government accepted it.’47
In the end, the parties thus agreed on enclaves, in spite of a consensus on their
limits as a solution to the problem. People in the regional government, the
park authority and the Forestry Department acknowledged that it was the
‘best solution out of the worst’ (In. yang terbaik dari yang terburuk) only meant
for the short-term. The population would likely keep growing, which would
inevitably lead to future demands for land, more infrastructure and the op-
portunity to further develop the villages economically. Finally, an enclave
would make the region more attractive to new migrants rather than solving
any of the problems of encroachment or illegal logging. However, the only
‘real’ alternative to save the park according to the acting director,48 i.e. to
remove all people from the park and transmigrate them to other places, had
already proven in the past to be ineffective.
This consensus on its disadvantages partly explains why the implementa-
tion of the enclave plan took such a long time. Actors regularly accused their
opponents to deliberately frustrate this process. The district government
blamed the Forestry Department for not sending enough money. In fact, the
Ministry sent IDR 100 million November 2000, claiming that when the first
results had become visible theMinistry would send some IDR 243millionmore
for the implementation. The employees of the national park authority accused
the regional government of being concerned only with the re-election of the
district head and with developing the area – for instance, through providing
46 Personal communication, 23 February 2001.
47 Personal communication with the acting park director, 20 February 2001.
48 Personal communication, 20 February 2001.
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money for cacao plantations in the park. They also suspected regional officials
to be profiting personally from the illegal logging activities (In. ikut main).49
District government officials themselves suggested that an additional motive
for their inaction was the conviction that the park management should be
transferred to the district level anyway. In an interview the vice district head,
he said that it was actually very simple to control the 10 000 people in the
park. In his view further developments would prove that the central govern-
ment was incapable of managing the park. This was primarily a political
strategy to scapegoat the central government as the regional government had
no real intention to take over the park management. If that had been the case
it would have taken Soehartono’s proposal to officially request the Forestry
Department to place the park under the former’s more seriously. In Soehar-
tono’s opinion, this could have taken the form of a pilot project until the
necessary adaptations to the official regulations would have been made.50
This was an interesting move which could be interpreted in two ways: first,
that the director invited the district head to play with open cards and enter
into an open debate with the Jakarta authorities; second, that he signalled his
readiness to enter into a partnership with the regional government. However,
this strategy failed since the district head did not go along.
The district government’s predominant development frame also showed
in its resistance to consider alternative proposals aimed at reducing outside
pressure on the park – such as moving the capital of the East Kutai district
to Sangkulirang or MaWahau.51 Its plans for the region focused on the park’s
potential for future development, including the small Pertamina airstrip in
the park that was to be developed into an airport of regional importance. This
could serve a future tourism centre at the coast in the eastern part of the park.
As the then vice district head put it:
‘The beach there is beautiful. We need to build hotels there. Then people canmake
ecotourism trips into the forest. We need to make clear to the people that we can
earn money with the forest since there are many people in other countries who
like to spend their vacation there.’52
In these plans, Sangatta was seen as the district’s capital because of its direct
vicinity to the park and its development potential.
Instead of discussing what could save the park in its present state, the
regional government tried to silence its critics by claiming to be paralysed
by two opposing kinds of arguments: strictly enforcing the park rules would
make people call for more attention for human rights and doing nothingwould
49 Personal communication with A, 20 February 2001, and with G, 23 February 2001.
50 Kompas 13 October 2000,’Tragedi Kehancuran Hutan Kaltim’.
51 Among others the Forum of Concerned Forestry Scholars at the Mulawarman University
in Samarinda promoted this plan.
52 Personal communication, 22 February 2001.
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make critics demand more environmental protection.53 The experience of
Tonny Soehartono discussed above indeed suggests that therewas some truth
in this claim.
The result of this delay and the uncertainties involved was that public
perceptions of the plan for an enclave developed their own dynamics. People
in the field began to assume that they could get an official certificate for land
under their control.54 This accelerated the process of parcellation. It also raised
public doubts about how committed certain political actors were to preserve
the park.
Another problem that occurred during the preparatory process was that
the people’s representatives tended to perceive all ideas that were discussed
as decisions.55 Apparently, the preliminary character of the content of these
meetings was either not clearly communicated or was misunderstood on
purpose. They wanted decisions out of fear of being left behind, as indicated
by a quote of a prominent resident of Teluk Pandan, one of the four legalised
villages in the park:
‘If there comes no clarity about the boundaries in 2001, Teluk Pandan will be left
behind [In. tertinggal] since we then will not be able to realise the development
budget of IDR 1 billion. This will mean that the regional autonomy will not have
had any meaning for Teluk Pandan’.56
However, this did not accelerate the process of implementation.
In the analysis so far I have not dealt with the municipality of Bontang,
which borders the park in the south. Although there were similar problems
as in the north, they were less serious and the regional government seemed
to be less determined to provoke the park authority. Its appreciation of the
forest’s importance for the region seemed also to markedly differ from the
East Kutai government’s. As an official of Bontang municipality put it:
‘We are aware of the fact that the forest is important for us, for example, as pro-
tection against floods and for our drinking water. That is not because of inter-
national pressure but we are aware of this ourselves. Wewould also like to replant
[in the park] but preferably with plants which are useful for the population.’57
The discourse in this quote clearly differs from the one in East Kutai. East
Kutai’s vice district head advocated a development, or at the most a pem-
bangunan conservation approach, using the international community’s interest
53 Personal communication with the vice district head, 22 February 2001 and the head of
Bappeda, 23 February 2001.
54 Kompas 13 October 2000, ‘Tragedi Kehancuran Hutan Kaltim’.
55 Kompas 13 October 2000, ‘Tragedi Kehancuran Hutan Kaltim’.
56 Recorded by NGO Bikal, cited in newsgroup Karib Kutai, message 381, 31 January 2001.
57 Personal communication with I, 21 February 2001.
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in preserving forests for recreational purposes and the opportunities this could
create for the regional economy.58 Developmental rather than ecological con-
siderations ruled hismind. The official in Bontang, on the other hand, referred
to the direct ecological importance of the forest for the regional population,
but challenged the international conservationist discourse. Instead of pleading
for preserving ‘pristine’ nature he argued for prevention of erosion and secur-
ing drinking water supplies with an agriculturally relevant soil cover. In fact,
this shows the continuity of the old debate between foresters on the one hand
and agricultural experts on the other (see chapter 10).
26.5 CONCLUSIONS
As we have seen in this chapter, the BTN of Kutai National Park had formed
a coalition with entrepreneurs and NGOs. In the end, this coalition did not
prove stable enough to counter the attacks of the emerging coalition between
the government of the new district of East Kutai and settlers in the park. The
pro-park coalition did not agree about the appropriate instruments to save
the park from further destruction. The partners in the coalition against the
park, on the other hand, shared a strong desire for more autonomy.
While they referred to the discourses of Reformasi and regional autonomy,
they attacked the park and its representatives in words and action as symbols
of the central government’s authority. Important stories were that old rules
no longer applied, people were free to do what they liked, new development
projects emerged, the resource-rich park had turned into an open and thus
useful area for all people interested, and the regional government was quite
the opposite of the BTN: caring about people instead of animals and plants.
In the debate that developed various actors produced competing arguments.
BTN produced the well-known arguments of preserving biodiversity to keep
open the possibilities of a genetic reservoir in combination with research,
education and eco-tourism. The municipality of Bontang acknowledged the
need for preserving nature as a protection against erosion, but contested that
keeping nature in its original form was the appropriate solution. Instead, it
favoured a more agricultural use that would directly benefit the population.
Representatives of the regional government pleaded for a far-reaching form
of pembangunan conservation: developing the park into a tourism project with
a part of the forest maintained as attraction. Finally, settlers, entrepreneurs,
investors and parts of the regional government, argued in favour of developing
the entire park with unlimited logging, planting, and constructing. Settlers
within the park combined this argument with ‘participation’, which they
58 His later proposal to relocate the national park, made as district head in 2003, confirms
this (Republika Online 21 August 2003, ‘Pemindahan Taman Nasional Kutai Makin Men-
gancam Kelestariannya’).
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interpreted as the possibility to directly benefit from development. Regional
government officials combined it with ‘regional autonomy’, an argument for
authority either combined with the desire to also benefit from development,
to make conservation more effective, or both.
Within the context of implementation, the regional government argued
in the well-known pembangunan manner that it needed money from the
Forestry Department. It moreover claimed to be paralysed by the two com-
peting discourses of human rights and environmental protection. The Forestry
Department countered that the regional government first needed to start with
and account for the money it had already received, while the BTN argued that
it needed to commit itself to the plan and respect the law.
The BTN’s strategies to achieve its goal of saving the park were coalition
forming, planning, strict law enforcement and building a consensus. These
strategies were countered by alternative coalition forming and conscious
attempts to hinder the realisation of these goals and discredit the BTN and the
Forestry Department, and further polarise the situation. Both settlers and
regional government officials denied the need for conservation. Another way
to position the BTN as lying and untrustworthywas to refer to and demonstrate
its incapability. This coalition successfully positioned the BTN as anti-social.
A final and likewise effective strategy was to create a new situation that was
difficult to reverse, such as leaking information and inviting new settlers.
Both the BTN and the Forestry Department tried to prevent further escala-
tion by staying calm and trying to build a consensus. In addition, the Forestry
Department tried to limit its loss of jurisdiction – also in other national parks –
by agreeing to the establishment of an enclave in Kutai. What it did not do,
understandable, was enter the debate and defend the conservation discourse
against the regional autonomy. Considering the lack of support from other
actors that would have been a battle with a predictable outcome.

27 Donor parks
Conventional parks, such as Pulau Seribu and Kutai, do not receive much
attention in the literature. Most scholars are interested in the experiments
taking place in donor parks. Donor money increases both the attention to
trends in the international conservationist discourse and their acceptability
for certain groups of actors.
In their quest for more effective national parks, international donor agencies
have been experimenting with alternative conservation arrangements. These
include entering into a coalitionwith indigenous or other local peoples through
funding, conservation agreements, and co-management schemes with regional
governments and entrepreneurs.
The literature makes clear that these alternatives do not guarantee an
effective national park policy. The thematic analysis in this section shows that
various actors enter into a discourse coalition with conservationists, but that
such coalitions often turn out to be fragile. The main reason is that actors do
not change their objectives for the sake of such a coalition. After a coalition
partner has achieved a strategic goal or if another partner tries to impose a
specific interpretation of a certain concept on him he decides to withdraw,
as happened in Siberut National Park,1 Lore Lindu National Park,2 Komodo
National Park3 and Bunaken Marine National Park.4
27.1 COALITIONS WITH INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES
In the early 1990s international conservationists entered into a coalition with
the indigenous rights’ advocates, which has opened up new possibilities for
indigenous communities. They have increasingly promoted themselves as
‘living in harmony with their environment’ and as holders of traditional
knowledge serving biodiversity conservation. Research on Siberut has shown
that this strategy enabled local elites to financially profit from their partnership
1 See, for instance, Eindhoven 2007, Persoon 2001, Persoon 2002, Persoon 2003.
2 See, for instance, the work of Acciaioli 2002, Li 1996, Li 2000. See also Wittmer & Birner
2005, Sangaji 2001, and Radar Sulteng 3 June 2002, ‘Pengamanan TamanNasional Sebaiknya
Gunakan Pendekatan Adat’.
3 See, for example, Afiff & Lowe 2005, Borchers 2002, Borchers 2005.
4 See, for example, Erdman, et al. 2004, Lowe 2003.
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with international agencies sponsoring conservation.5 Local NGOs such as
Yasumi (Yayasan Suku Mentawai) and Yayasan Citra Mandiri have become
prominent partners of donors such as the ADB, UNESCO, the German Embassy
and the Rainforest Foundation Norway.6 Some of these NGOs have been
founded solely for the purpose of becoming a partner for these donors,7
claiming to represent indigenous communities and their interests. However,
the increasing involvement of NGO activists in local politics combined with
accusations of and gossip about misallocation of donor-funds for personal
political campaigns have reduced their credibility.8
This discourse coalition has had both positive and negative effects on the
local population of theMentawai islands. It has enabled certain groups to raise
money by appropriating the discourse through labelling existing practices and
knowledge in its terms.9 However, themoney is granted on the basis of certain
conditions such as that it is used for preserving biodiversity.10 This limits
the future options for any community using this discourse and depending
on the associated funds. Another positive effect is that it has been an incentive
for indigenous communities to organise themselves.11 As such organisation
most likely takes place along the lines defined by the discourse and not
necessarily those of a local community as a whole, a negative effect is that
it will potentially lead to new tensions at the local level.12 This has even been
the case on Siberut, a rather ethnically homogeneous island13 where the local
government is no longer run by Minangkabau but by a local elite. However,
this elite increasingly adopts the old New Order discourse on isolated com-
munities arguing that tribal people can only be involved in politics if they
abandon their forest-based lifestyle.14 This suggests, first, that the new power-
holders are aware that once in power discourses other than the one that
elevated them to their current position are more useful to them. Second, it
proves that it is always dangerous to think, speak and write about ‘the local
people’. On Siberut, some have changed their lifestyle while others have not;
some value the forest for its logging potential, while others value it in terms
of subsistence and spiritual support; and finally some have influence and some
do not.
5 Eindhoven 2007, p. 75.
6 Eindhoven 2007, p. 75-76, Persoon 1998, p. 296.
7 Persoon 2002, p. 33.
8 Eindhoven 2007, p. 77.
9 Persoon 2002, p. 36. Li also makes the point that communities often ‘form themselves or
strengthen their formation as communities as they engage with state-institutions, procedures
and personnel’ (Li 2002, p. 11).
10 Persoon 1998, p. 285.
11 Persoon 2002, p. 36.
12 Persoon 2002, p. 36-37.
13 The population consists mainly of about 25000 Mentawaians. In addition, there are small
minorities of Javanese, Batak and Minangkabau people (Persoon 2003, p. 254).
14 Eindhoven 2007, p. 88.
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Next to this heterogeneity of the local or indigenous people who advocate
themselves or are advocated as ‘the’ alternative for conventional conservation
efforts the question is whether their customs are indeed sustainable. As
McCarthy has shown for the Sama Dua region in Aceh, the ‘village regimes
were first and foremost neither concerned with nor organised to ensure en-
vironmental outcomes’.15 Likewise, communities who promote themselves
as custodians of nature may turn out to be exploiting nature as soon as they
are in power, as in the case of Siberut. This seems to be the price
conservationists have to pay for using indigenous communities to their own
ends without paying much attention to what they want themselves.
Siberut is very similar to other national parks in its having a strong local
opposition against the national park,16 which argues that responsibility for
and access to the natural resources should be handed over to local actors since
the national authorities have proven incapable of performing that task effective-
ly.17 Local actors use the regional autonomy discourse (sometimes combined
with the Reformasi discourse) to strengthen their case. At present this seems
to have become more persuasive than the indigenous people discourse com-
bined with nature conservation.18
27.2 FORMALISING PARTNERSHIPS: CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS
In some national parks a trend towards formalising the partnership between
conservationists and local, often indigenous communities exists. The underlying
theory is that not pure enforcement but negotiation is the way toward more
effective conservation. However, recommendations based on this theory differ
widely, ranging from co-management (see the following section) to an open
dialogue.19 All of them, however, plead for formally negotiated agreements.
15 McCarthy 2005.
16 Persoon 2002, p. 34.
17 See, for instance, Radar Sulteng 3 June 2002, ‘Pengamanan Taman Nasional Sebaiknya
Gunakan Pendekantan Adat’.
18 Comparable to these coalitionswith indigenous communities on the basis of their assumed
traditional cultural guardianship for nature, are pro-conservation coalitions with local -
and thus not necessarily indigenous - communities in exchange for rural development
through so-called integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs). As there is
no literature specifically dealing with the argumentation of non-indigenous local communi-
ties against or in favour of these projects, they are not discussed here in detail. It suffices
to say that, according to the literature, this approach has not been very successful either,
satisfying neither the conservation nor the development objective (Wells 1999, MacKinnon
& Wardojo 2001). Major flaws have been a lacking attention for issues of equity and
sustainability and a poor threat identification (Hughes & Flintan 2001, p. 8-11).
19 The most outspoken in this latter sense are Brechin et al.. They promote a social justice
agenda which includes self-determination, self-representation and equal participation
(Brechin et al. 2002, p. 58 citing Taylor).
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One park where the so-called conservation agreements have become very
popular is Lore Lindu National Park,20 with almost one hundred concluded.
Their popularity among the communities living in or close to the park can
be explained by how the agreements position them.Once they have negotiated
and signed such an agreement they are ‘custodian’ of the environment rather
than ‘destroyer’, ‘encroacher’ or the like. This helps to stop accusations of the
park management and recognises that these communities and the BTN have
similar interests.21 In addition, they reportedly increase livelihood security
and improve the relation between communities and the park management.22
In Lore Lindu, most of the early agreements of this kind have been estab-
lished between NGOs and customary institutions, for instance customary
councils (In. Lembaga Adat).23 Alternatively, the international organisation
CARE, whichworks for poverty reduction through development programmes,
has focused on agreements with formal village governments. Its conservation
agreements have been an ‘accompanying measure to its development pro-
gram.’24 In themeantime, CARE has transferred its involvement in conservation
agreements to a local NGO called Yambata that, however, aims for authority
without conservation obligations.25 Likewise, in 2004 the ADB started to fund
conservation agreements in the Central Sulawesi IntegratedAreaDevelopment
and Conservation Project (CSIADCP),26 mainly with adat communities. Another
international NGO, The Nature Conservancy, has opted for a third strategy.
It has established special conservation institutions (In. Lembaga Konservasi Desa,
abbr. LKD) with participants from adat and formal village structures, and thus
has been the only actor to not assume the community involved is a homo-
geneous entity.27 Acciaioli has described the 2005 ‘conservation agreement
20 Purnomo mentions Manupeu-Tanadaru on Sumba and Sangihe Island in North Sulawesi
as other examples (Purnomo 2005, p. 7-8). The USAID financed Natural Resources Manage-
ment Program (NRM) has co-operatedwith the Forestry Service to develop this instrument
in the framework of Integrated Conservation andDevelopment Programs (ICDPs). Accord-
ing to a discussion paper such agreements were necessary because ‘communities do not
or do not yet fully understand the aim of conservation areas in their area, suspect that they
will experience a financial loss because of this conservation area, and because themanagers
[of the conservation areas] are not or not yet familiar with the situation and aspiration of
the communities.’ (Manullang 1998, p. 4).
21 Mappatoba & Birner 2004, p. 23.
22 Purnomo 2005, p. 7.
23 Acciaioli 2005, p. 18. One example is the agreement between the Katu people and the Lore
Lindu National Park Authority of 1999, which for the first time recognizes the adat rights
of the Katu people within the park area and simultaneously obliges them to sustainably
exploit their land (Kompas 23 August 1999, ‘Masyarakat Robo Behoa Jadi Bagian TNLL’,
Sangaji 2000, p. 19). This exploitation needs to be done in consultation with the park
management (Mappatoba & Birner 2004, p. 23).
24 Mappatoba & Birner 2004, p. 26-27.
25 Acciaioli 2005, p. 18.
26 Acciaioli 2005, p. 18-20.
27 Acciaioli 2005, p. 21.
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with the society of the Lindu plain’ as the most sophisticated one so far: more
than the earlier agreements it tries to balance the ‘respect for the rights of the
societies in the vicinity of the parkwith the control andmanagement of natural
resources’.28 This is underlined by the inclusion of non-conservation issues
such as human rights and agrarian-related laws and regulations. However,
the most important difference with the earlier agreements is that the 2005
agreement specifies institutions for its implementation.29
Potential constraints include the persistence of a community agenda that
may be more focused on gaining resources and rights than on conservation.
Another problem is enforcement. In Lore Lindu, for instance, adat communities
have followed their own objective of securing hegemony over migrants in the
area30 with the help of the LKD and the fact that dispute settlement and the
adjudication and sanctioning of violations have been handed to the adat
council. Although they emphasize that all people in the region are now con-
sidered as Lindu and that they all need to work together to secure a constant
water supply, they simultaneously refer to their adat, ‘the wisdom of the
indigenous customary council and its members’ noble ancestors’ and the need
for the adat councils to keep an eye on all settlers.31 At first sight this may
not appear problematic, in particular because it seems that the migrants are
the ones who log the area unsustainably, but it may easily lead to social
tensions between these different groups.32 Furthermore, Acciaioli notes that
the samemembers of the LKD in front of a purely indigenous audience openly
questioned the role and even the existence of the national park and claimed
that it would be better if the indigenous community reclaimed its territory.
As in other regions, such groups claim that they would be better custodians
of the environment.33 In other words, this formalisation of a partnership may
easily fall apart as soon as the local partner feels strong enough tomore openly
strive for its own hegemony, using an environmental argument.
That the conservation agreements are not enforceable is a serious problem
as well. According to a TNC staff,
‘they have no clout, no power. Everybody is happy about them but in practice they
do not reduce the logging. You just cannot enforce them. If a road is built through
28 Acciaioli 2005, p. 20-27.
29 Many tasks were to be performed by the LKD, including the communication between the
park management and society, the socialisation of the agreement, participatory planning
with the Park Management, and the supervision and evaluation of the implementation
(Acciaioli 2005, p. 21-22).
30 Cf. Mappatoba & Birner 2004, p. 23
31 Acciaioli 2005, p. 25-26.
32 These future conflicts are not dependent on these agreements of course, but the agreements
help to strengthen the power base of one of the groups.
33 Acciaioli 2005, p. 27.
366 Donor parks
a conservation area, the loggerswill follow, so these agreements do not work either.
They are also too small, too local.’34
Since the agreements have no clear legal status they are not linked to the
enforcement agencies of the state. So, in practice, theymay increase the compli-
ance among the signatories, but they cannot prevent outsiders from violation.
Of course, the adat council may try to adjudicate offenders as Mappatoba has
described for one village.35 Yet, it is more than doubtful whether adat councils
would also succeed in arresting professional loggers backed by the state
enforcement agencies or politicians.
In sum, discourse coalitions with indigenous groups so far have been fragile
and enabling only for some local groups with the potential of leading to new
local conflicts. Attempts to institutionalise such coalitions in formal agreements
have not been effective due to their exclusive character, their lack of a legal
status, and the persistence of other objectives.Whereas the indigenous peoples
have also been striving for autonomy from the central government, their
struggle has been different than the one for regional autonomy and
democratisation, which will be discussed in the following section.
27.3 THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN CONSERVATIONISTS AND REGIONAL AUTONOMISTS
ABOUT THE MEANING OF CO-MANAGEMENT
This second coalition conservationists have entered into has been one with
regional governments and entrepreneurs, reflected in several co-management
schemes, which in 2004 became possible through a Ministerial Regulation.36
KomodoNational Park (abbr. KNP) and BunakenMarine National Park (abbr.
BMNP) are the two most often cited Indonesian examples. In Komodo, a US
based NGO, TheNature Conservancy (TNC), has become an actor of importance.
In Bunaken, the USAID financed NRM programme is the main foreign actor.
The project description of the co-management initiative in KNP and the
Ministerial Regulation of Co-Management of 2004, which began development
in 2001 by the Forestry Department, NRM, and TNC,37 clearly represent the
conservation discourse. Both state the improvement of the effectiveness of the
conservation areas as the overall objective. According to the Komodo project
description, the development objective of the project is to
34 Personal communication, 2 June 2005.
35 Mappatoba & Birner 2004, p. 23.
36 Peraturan Menteri Kehutanan No.P.19/Menhut-II/2004 ‘Pengelolaan Kolaboratif’, enacted
19 October 2004.
37 At later stages, other NGOs including the Wildlife Conservation Society, WWF Indonesia,
Birdlife Indonesia and various governmental agencies also participatedmore or less actively
in the process.
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‘ensure effective long-term management of Komodo National Park (KNP) by: (a)
improving the effectiveness of park management through the adoption of a
collaborative management approach, involving all stakeholder groups, including
the Park authority (PHKA), local government, a joint venture between an inter-
national NGO (The Nature Conservancy) and a local tourism company, PT Jaytasha
PutrindoUtama (JPU), andwith additional input from local communities, government
agencies and private sector organizations; […].’38
In this project, co-management has been intended as an instrument to achieve
effective park management. Although acknowledging that a shared under-
standing of ‘effective management’ and ‘conservation’ is something to hope
for rather than to be assumed,39 the ministerial regulation indeed states that
conservation is the point of departure. There is thus a fundamental difference
between co-management40and community-based natural resources manage-
ment (abbr. CBNRM). Co-management is a ‘compromise’ between governmental
and community control over natural resources.41
This is important for the question of who is allowed to participate in the
co-management scheme. Art. 1.4 states that ‘the parties’ to this regulation are
‘all parties that have an interest in and care for the conservation effort […] among
others agencies of the central and regional governments, NGOs, central and regional
state enterprises, Indonesian enterprises, international individuals or foreign
societies, scientific institutions’.
This may include local community groups, individuals from Indonesia and
other countries, local, national and international conservation NGOs.42 Art.
4 (5) adds as criteria that those who want to participate need to be
‘(a) representatives of parties with an interest [In. berkepentingan] or that care [In.
peduli] for the conservation of the reserve or conservation area’ and need ‘(b) to
have the attention [In. perhatian], the wish [In. keinginan] and the capacity [In.
kemampuan] to support the management of the reserve or conservation area.’
This is problematic because the regulation does not state who is to decide about
who fulfils these criteria, nor does it provide for a dispute resolution mechan-
38 Singleton et al. 2002, p. 3, emphasis added.
39 For instance, art. 3 states that ‘The aim of these guidelines for co-management of nature
reserves and conservation areas is to achieve a shared vision, mission and strategic steps
in supporting, strengthening and improving themanagement of reserves and conservation
areas in accordance with their physical, social and cultural condition and the local aspira-
tions.’
40 Also referred to as participatory, collaborative, joint, mixed, multi-party or round-table
management (Borrini-Feyerabend, et al. 2000b, p. 1).
41 NRM/EPIQ 2002, p. 10.
42 Ex art. 4 (3).
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ism. It is likely that the Forestry Department decides these matters, which
results in a scheme which is very top-down and not necessarily democratic,
despite the regular mentioning of the need for consensus (art. 1.6, 5, 6 (1)),
mutual respect and trust (art. 4(1)), and collaboration (for instance art. 6 (4)).
As it is applied in Komodo and Bunaken43 the regulation limits participation
to granting participants the space to reach conclusions and objectives that have
been defined by the Department and donors in advance.
Conservationists never intended co-management to be a fully democratic
process, involving all stakeholders in the decision-making process. On the
contrary, for them co-management has been an instrument for conservation
only. Co-management did not change their objectives, just as conservation
did not change the indigenous peoples’ agenda (see above). TNC and compar-
able actors in other parks are convinced that their science-based belief in the
merits of conservation is correct but they do not dare enter an open debate,
justifying this either by referring to the political and economic structures or,
as government officials in Indonesia, by referring to the low education level
of the local people and their ‘irrational’ way of thinking.
As a result, in Komodo PHKA, the local government, TNC and JPU thus
defined themselves as the main stakeholders. The role of local communities,
government agencies and private sector organizations has been limited to
giving ‘additional input’. From the perspective of PHKA and TNC this was both
understandable and desirable. PHKA remained the most powerful actor. TNC
and the other ‘ stakeholders’ entered into an official, legal agreement with PHKA
about their respective rights and duties. The other actors, however, were only
allowed to play a supporting part.
Not surprisingly, thismet resistance. The local population’s discoursewas
muchmore about autonomy and democracy than PHKA’s and TNC’s. Although
TNC has taken much pride in its co-management scheme, other actors have
criticised it as top-down and ‘denying local communities full participation
in the scheme in practice’.44 Participation would be limited to consultation
instead of a ‘dialogue to elaborate on different values and perceptions’.45 That
many people have not been satisfied with the co-management scheme and
the overall presence of TNC in Komodo can be seen in the popular resistance
against the park.46
As a TNC staff member involved in the project from the beginning observed,
there had indeed been no consensus on the official version of co-management:
43 Cf. Lowe 2003.
44 Borchers 2005, p. 2.
45 Borchers 2005, p. 8-10.
46 Afiff & Lowe 2005, Borchers 2005,WorkingGroupConservation for People 2008. Interesting
is the shift NGO Walhi has made from an environmental discourse to one exclusively
focusing on human rights issues.
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‘The local population thinks that co-management means that they can participate
in all decision-making. Their expectations, fed by the local leaders and the local
government, are just too high! The central government thinks that co-management
means that others can give input but that the government remains in charge of
everything and that they need not delegate anything. And NGOs finally interpret
co-management as a kind of outsourcing, in which parties sign a contract and
everybody complies with the contract.’47
This quote suggests that the ideas of different actors were dominated by
different discourses: Reformasi, pembangunan and ‘Free Market’. Thus, PHKA
representatives, such as former director for the protected areas of Ramono,
justified the decision to collaborate with TNC with the central government’s
lack of funds for effective park management.48 TNC, by contrast, takes the
following view: ‘The best improvement so far is that the government finally
admitted that they can’t do it [manage the parks effectively] by themselves.’49
This sentence echoes the free market-discourse: firms need to focus on their
core-business andwhatever is outside should be outsourced to firms specialised
in this part of business. That the Forestry Department decided to let TNC play
an important role in Komodo50 was thus, from this viewpoint, only rational.
Local communities, or at least those NGOs and authors presenting them-
selves as speaking on their behalf, did not accept this dominant interpretation
of co-management, demanding a stronger voice in the scheme, real alternatives
for their daily fishing activities, and a more equal treatment with other actors.
After all, as argued by Borchers, the ecological impact of the increase of
tourism in the area which is needed to finance the park, suggests ‘double
standards’: the fishing of shellfish and marine invertebrates is condemned as
destructive and thus prohibited while tourism is conceptualised as non-de-
structive and thus sustainable.51
According to another critic, at the root of the problem is that
‘the government and TNC ignore the rights of the local population as owners of
the natural resources. Neither the government nor TNC ever sat together with the
local population to discuss how they could manage the park together.’52
This author contests the claim of the national government to own the area
and thus the power to decide what is to be done with its natural resources
and how. In the same newspaper article, the author, who identified himself
47 Personal communication, 2 June 2005.
48 Bali Post 6 June 2002, ‘Taman Nasional Komodo. Sebuah Warisan Dunia’.
49 Personal communication, 2 June 2005.
50 Including in implementation. Thiswas the differencewhichwouldmake this collaboration
more effective than the one in the Leuser National Park, according to TNC staff Jos Pet
(Minutes of meeting 2002).
51 Borchers 2002.
52 Stirman, Y.A., Sinar Harapan 2003, ‘Desentralisasi Pengelolaan Taman Nasional Komodo’.
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as originating from the region (In. putra daerah) and as a postgraduate student
of environmental sciences at the University of Indonesia, rejected the concept
of co-management for failing to accommodate the interests of local com-
munities and for not being in accordance with the ‘regional autonomy spirit’.
In Bunaken, like in Komodo, the interventions of the NRM programme have
had some community elements, including ‘active involvement in resource
management’, but they have primarily aimed at ‘strengthening the legal and
administrative basis for the park’.53 The official evaluation of the first phase
of the programme found that the community involvement was a failure.54
Although many local actors are in favour of halting illegal fishing practices,
they reject the enforcement approach in its present form55 because of the
position attributed to them by the discourse underlying this approach. Another
reason is that they are – as in Komodo – not necessarily the ones to benefit
from the privatisation of nature.56 The project leaders blamed the community
for trying to give the ‘right’ answers, and their own narrow definition of
stakeholders.57 That the project design itself had not created the framework
for a more satisfactory participation was not considered.58 Lowe convincingly
describes how the fishermen were positioned as the major threat to the park
and its potential income from tourism. Those who dared to contest the con-
servation objectives weremoreover openly positioned as striving for their ‘self
interest’, as ‘irrational’ and as ‘in need of pre-socialization’.59
In sum, in both Komodo and Bunaken all actors tended to interpret ‘co-
management’ in a very specific way. The co-management schemes did not
provide for debating the need for or form of conservation, nor for mechanisms
to resolve conflicts or disputes.60 Above all they enabled donor agencies, the
Forestry Department, regional governments and tourism operators to achieve
their objectives while other local stakeholders felt disadvantaged.
27.4 CONCLUSION
The examples of donor-funded national parks dealt with in this chapter show
that donor agencies have found stories that enabled them to form discourse
coalitions with indigenous groups, NGOs, regional governments and tourism
operators. However, in principle these stories – ‘indigenous people are custo-
dians of nature’ and ‘co-management’ – are unspecific. Therefore the struggle
53 Lowe 2003.
54 Lowe 2003.
55 Lowe 2003.
56 For a more positive view see Leisher et al. 2007, p. 16-20.
57 Lowe 2003.
58 Lowe 2003.
59 Lowe 2003.
60 Cf. Christie 2004, p. 19-20.
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for their precise meaning (and thus the dominant discourse) continues. Indi-
genous communities try to specify the first story in a way excluding other
local sub-groups and donor agencies try to specify the second story in a way
excluding park residents. Social scientists have generally paid little if any
attention to conservation successes of these arrangements but argued that they
disregard the needs of local sub-groups and residents and bear the potential
of new social conflicts. So far, there have nomechanisms been created to decide
the struggle in a more inclusive way acceptable to all stakeholders.

28 Conclusions part IV
As actors involved in conservation policy- and lawmaking have failed to focus
on resolving problems, and thus to create good conditions for substantive
effectiveness, the struggle about definitions of problems and solutions has
continued in the national parks. This has seriously obstructed the implementa-
tion of the national park policy. Many problems dominating the implementa-
tion had been mentioned before the enactment of the BCA in 1990 but they
had not been thoroughly discussed, let alone satisfactorily resolved. The act
therefore inevitably had to fall short in effectively regulating nature conserva-
tion. In all cases, the national park authorities in the ‘conventional parks’ Pulau
Seribu and Kutai, but also in the ‘donor parks’ Komodo, Bunaken, Lore Lindu
and Siberut, had problems getting support from, above all, residents and other
users of the parks, regional offices of other sectoral departments and regional
government agencies for the national park policy. Resistance has been omni-
present as even in the form of ‘pembangunan-conservation’ the conservation
approach meant closing areas for most actors and because those struggling
for conservationwere in theminority. Apart from that, the act apparently also
failed to ensure the support for conservation from the implementing govern-
ment agencies themselves as the Pulau Seribu case illustrates.
28.1 STORIES, ARGUMENTS AND STRATEGIES USED TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE,
CONSENSUS AND COALITIONS
The most remarkable observation in Pulau Seribu was that during the field
research in 2000 and 2001 a struggle was taking place over the meaning of
‘good implementation’. Only a small group of critical rangers and one official
at the office actively tried to create support for conservation. Part of their
efforts was directed towards their own organisation and colleagues. They
attempted to transform the park authority from the inside into a more pro-
fessional and effective organisation. The official at the office tried to form
coalitions with scientists and officials from other state agencies in order to
break the taboo on self-chosen isolation to protect an agency’s autonomy and
funding possibilities. The critical rangers tried to form a consensus within the
park authority on the need for more professionalism, which included better
equipment and a more dedicated working ethos. They defined the lack of
professionalism within the BTN and other government agencies as a major
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problem for the park’s effectiveness and actively fought against formalist
practices of keeping up appearances. To some extent this progressiveminority
was successful. Some scientists and officials from other agencies were willing
to co-operate. And after a change in leadership the rangers realised some of
their goals. In 2000 and 2001, however, colleagues either ignored them or
actively tried to discourage them as a way to criticise the implementation,
positioning them as disobedient and guilty of poor performance.
More generally, in the contacts of national park authorities with their target
groups, in 2000 and 2001, physical pressure or ‘the gun’ had lost its importance
as a strategy to convince actors of the need to complywith conservation rules,
since the post-Soeharto governments had embraced democracy and human
rights, and put this into practice to a certain extent. Thus, strategies to build
a consensus and live together in harmony, such as education and the forming
of partnerships and coalitions, and even institutionalising these in agreements
and co-management schemes, were now seen as the way to successful imple-
mentation.
In all cases studied in this research, some officials at the national park
authority – and in the donor-funded parks also donor agencies – attempted
to find a common story about conservation that was in everybody’s interest
in order to raise support from other actors. In some cases they specified this
interest as economic welfare or protection against natural disasters. In Pulau
Seribu, Bunaken and Komodo, those promoting the national park used argu-
ments of a constant fish supply and developing ecotourism (and thus employ-
ment) to convince the local residents. In Bunaken and Komodo, donor agencies
also used the story of ‘co-management’ to persuade regional governments and
entrepreneurs to support the park. In Pulau Seribu the BTN tried to convince
the regional government agencies in Pulau Seribu by referring to international
conservationists and their influence on the national budget. An interesting
transformation of the story of conservation being in the public interest was
introduced by the director that took office in Pulau Seribu in 2003 in the form
of ‘nature production’ for the sake of economic welfare. In terrestrial parks
the main arguments in favour of conservation were related to the future
potential of biodiversity, a constant water supply and protection against
erosion. In Siberut and Lore Lindu the story on which a coalition was built
was one of ‘indigenous communities being the appropriate custodians of
nature’. Only a few actorsmentioned the importance of prioritizing organised
environmental crime andmonitoring government agencies and tourism enter-
prises. Those who did failed to gain the necessary support from other more
powerful actors.
Reference to the law, the BCA, was also attempted as a strategy to make
actors refrain from nature destruction. However, this met with little success
as there was no backup or follow-upwhatsoever, and other actors could easily
counter with strategies of playing the uninformed or denying stories about
negative environmental consequences of, for instance, fishing with poison.
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In other cases, donors in particular tried to use legal agreements tomake actors
feel responsible for conservation, at the same time realising their limitations.
Occasionally actors also embarked on strategies to build trust. The first
director of Pulau Seribu did so by creating personal relations and working
in a dedicatedway, thus showing the ‘seriousness of government’. The director
that took office in 2003 tried to win the hearts of the island residents through
sports and a new approachmuch closer to the residents’ discourse of develop-
ment. Likewise, the critical rangers tried to press their own director and
colleagues to work in a more professional way to earn the respect of the local
residents. One could also regard strategies of donor agencies in conjunction
with the Forestry Department to share authority, responsibilities and benefits
in co-management schemes and Integrated Conservation and Development
Programmes (ICDPs) as attempts to build trust. However, these mainly targeted
certain exclusive groups, usually the regional government, some entrepreneurs
and certain indigenous communities. This led to jealousy and distrust among
other actors.
28.2 STORIES AND ARGUMENTS USED TO OPPOSE THE NATIONAL PARK POLICY
AND IMPLEMENTATION
In all parks many actors have contested the national park policy and its
implementation. Actors opposing the park policy focused their criticism on
the concept of conservation, on issues of equality – who should benefit from
natural resources – and power – who should decide about policy. Those
criticising the implementation of the national park policy argued, above all,
for a more professional state.
Especially in Kutai (chapter 26), the concept of conservationwas contested.
All arguments opposed the park in its present form and argued for more
benefit for the local population. But they were based on different discourses.
One neighbouring municipality acknowledge the need for conservation for
protection against erosion rather than for biodiversity conservation. As did
the many planters and farmers in the colonial period (chapter 10), it preferred
agricultural use of the area to achieve this objective since this would directly
benefit the population. Another argument in favour of a far-reaching form
of pembangunan conservation was used by elements of the government of the
new district East Kutai. It pleaded for developing the park into a tourism
project with a part of the forest maintained as attraction. But the most radical
argument was produced by settlers, entrepreneurs, investors and other parts
of the regional government. They argued in favour of developing the entire
park with unlimited logging, planting, and constructing.
Also, actors arguing in favour of more equality did not contest the un-
specific idea of ‘sustainable development’ but more the Forestry Department’s
specific and exclusionary interpretation of ‘pembangunan-conservation’. In many
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cases, residents perceived national parks as exclusively granting economic
benefits from resources to selected groups: in Pulau Seribu, Komodo and
Bunaken to tourism entrepreneurs, in Kutai to the state oil company Pertamina.
This perception was not limited to the national park policy, but was part of
a wider resentment against discriminatory state policies which denied poor
people benefits from the state’s and selected privileged groups’ economic
development and which people more and more equated with pembangunan.
Remembering the 1990 parliamentary debates (chapter 18), we need not be
surprised about opposition of this kind. MPs had asked questions about the
economic situation of people living in or close to designated conservation areas,
andwondered how to proceed with existing concessions in these areas – even
if not framing their fear of ineffectiveness in terms of equity. TheMinister had
answered these questions either with ‘we should bring development to them’
or with silence.
In Pulau Seribu (chapter 25) residents used several arguments against the
national park policy. One questioned the focus on conservation and favoured
more development in the region, which was perceived as backwards (In.
tertinggal). Another one was not opposed to conservation but questioned the
sense of realism of the policy. Actors using this argument aimed for realistic
alternatives to the restrictions the national park policy meant for them, which
in their opinion ought to take the form of a different educational system and
support from the BTN against traders and tourism operators. Regional govern-
ment agencies, on the other hand, argued that sustainable development needed
to pay attention to people rather than to turtles. Only when a park official
argued that this created money for the country’s development were they
willing to accept conservation.
The struggle against conservation and for equality reflects a vehement
struggle for power. Actors who had been in an area before it was designated
as a national park feared a loss of freedom and for competition, and tried to
defend their power. Others who entered the area in 1999 openly attacked the
park authority to claim power.
In Pulau Seribu, both local residents and regional government agencies
rejected the parks as symbols of the extended authority of the central state.
Regional offices from other sectoral departments also saw the park authorities
as claiming power for the Forestry Department and as competitors for money
from the development budget. Local residents perceived the national park
policy as above all restricting them in their freedom. Therefore, some of them,
especially in Pulau Seribu, argued for more participation in decision-making
as the central government’s attitude to ‘dump ready concepts’ deprived them
of the ‘chance to think for themselves’.
In Kutai, a new district was formed in 1999. Its government’s regional
autonomy and development frame was directly opposed to the frame behind
the centrally led conservation areas. The district government therefore argued
in favour of delegating the power over the park area to itself. In the donor
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parks, groups of actors falling outside the co-management schemes in particular
remained critical of what was in their eyes an exclusive and discriminatory
distribution of authority. Others openly demanded regional authority over
the park.
The arguments for another distribution of power remind us of the 1990
parliamentary debate concerning the concept of ‘participation’ that in the end
was defined as being directed by the central government (chapter 18). How-
ever, in this discussion nobody anticipated that regional offices of other sectoral
departments or regional government agencies would oppose conservation
areas, as this did not form part of the frame of a harmonious government
dedicated to nation building and the national economic development. More-
over, in 1990 nobody could have predicted the decentralisation that occurred
in 1999 and the accompanying strong discourse for regional autonomy.
In addition to contesting the national park policy, just like the critical
rangers (see above) local residents in Pulau Seribu also criticised its imple-
mentation. This criticism was not only aimed at the park authority, but also
at the government as a whole. Apparently, many residents doubted the govern-
ment’s sincerity regarding conservation, as evidenced by the ‘laziness’ of many
officials and their preoccupation with personal interest. In 1990, the ‘serious-
ness’ of the government had been discussed in Parliament, but at that time
the major concern had been to convince other countries of it. Thoughts about
convincing the Indonesian population had been on the mind of a few MPs but
these had been wiped away by the Minister who demanded a focus on what
was going well in the policy implementation instead (chapter 18).
In addition, just as respondents in the public consultation about the NRM
bill did (chapter 22), local residents complained about the discriminatory
implementation of the national park policy, which spared those who had
already benefited most from the park: tourism entrepreneurs and visitors. The
same story made local residents in Kutai (chapter 26) argue in favour of more
participation – which they interpreted as sharing in the profits of economic
exploitation of the park area.
28.3 STRATEGIES TO COUNTER THE NATIONAL PARK POLICY AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION
Those whom the national park authorities tried to convince of the need for
conservation either started to use stories belonging to the conservation dis-
course and thus entered into a discourse coalition with the BTNs or fought the
national parks with various strategies.
In some cases, such as in Siberut and Lore Lindu, local actors effectively
used ‘conservation’ to attractmoney and increase their influence. They received
donor funding, status and exclusive access to resources in exchange for enter-
ing into conservation agreements. Likewise, entrepreneurs and regional govern-
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ments in co-management schemes used a coalitionwith the BTN to gain power.
In others cases it was also a strategy to silence criticism and reject power
claims, as in the case of regional government agencies in Pulau Seribu. Entering
into a discourse coalitionwith the BTN in no case automaticallymeant abandon-
ing the original and often opposite objectives. In the end, most of these actors
did not enter into a discourse coalition to support the cause of conservation
but to maintain or gain power.
Many other actors chose to ignore the parks and their rules, play the
uninformed and keep up the appearance of being open to the BTN’s arguments
by attending its activities without ever entering into a debate about the
agency’s conservation story.
A more active strategy was to deny or counter stories and arguments put
forward by park authorities. In Pulau Seribu, fishermen denied that poison
fishing was harmful or that they used harmful fishingmethods. In an attempt
to counter conservation arguments actors in several parks used the notions
of Reformasi and malperformance of the government, the incompatibility of
conservation and human rights, regional autonomy and decentralisation,
participation and development. In Kutai, for instance, migrants responded
to rangers’ demands to respect the park boundaries by arguing that due to
Reformasi and decentralisation the old rules no longer applied. Every attempt
or request that the BTN enforce the park rules was countered with reference
to human rights. In Komodo and Kutai, actors referred to regional autonomy
to argue for passing on the authority over the national park to local actors.
In Pulau Seribu and Kutai, various actors referred to development and parti-
cipation in order to drawmore benefit from the resources in the area and their
role in decision-making. Especially in Pulau Seribu, the more active strategies
also included alternative proposals to improve the park’s effectiveness.
The East Kutai government tried to discredit the BTN to increase its own
power by referring to the BTN’s incompetence and positioning it as taking the
side of the nature and not the people. Likewise, residents in Pulau Seribu
described rangers and other park officials as ‘lazy’ and primarily concerned
with their personal interest.
Finally, the most physical strategies, including demolishing BTN property,
were used in Kutai,.
28.4 A SENSE OF POWERLESSNESS
Just as the quote from Ramono at the beginning of this implementation section
(chapter 24) illustrates, most officials working for the Forestry Department
and the parks appeared powerless in the face of the strategies used by their
opponents. Except for a few rangers and BTN officials who actively searched
for alternatives, they refused to take responsibility for the ineffectiveness of
their agency’s strategies. Most of them reacted in a somewhat indignant
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manner, accusing people of a lack of discipline, respect and the will to listen
and believe the BTN. Significantly, they had begun to realise and openly
acknowledge that conservationwas contested. Still, theywere reluctant to enter
into a real debate about the merits and desirability of conservation with other
actors, positioning themmostly as lacking the right knowledge. Donor agencies
behaved much the same. Apparently, they were not used to and afraid of
having to counter the powerful discourses used by their opponents.
On the whole, the actors opposing the national parks appeared to bemore
influential than those promoting them, primarily because conservation was
not attractive to most actors. This limited the space for development, the idea
that had been dominating the minds of most people for decades and that
provided much more space for them and that was therefore more acceptable
than conservation. Only where ‘conservation’ enabled actors to achieve other
objectives, where it was linked to foreign aid and budgetary security, or where
it was transformed into something very similar to development, were they
willing to – albeit in some cases only temporarily – reproduce it.
In addition, after the fall of the authoritarianNewOrder and the beginning
of Reformasi, the Forestry Department and its national park authorities did
not succeed in turning the national park policy into something new. On the
contrary, it remained a symbol for more general characteristics of the New
Order state – with characteristics such as top-down, centralised decision-
making, pressure and violence, discrimination and exclusion, and a lack of
professionalism.
Actual attempts to reformpolicy and implementationwere often frustrated,
which discouraged those involved to continue their struggle. In many parks,
opponents used the discourses of regional autonomy and Reformasi to position
all officials as not acting in the interest of the local people but rather in the
interest of plants and animals and that of the central government and selected
beneficiaries.
In sum, the national park policy and its implementation was heavily
contested in Indonesia at the beginning of this millennium. There was little
support for it – a fact which Reformasi and the new space it created for ideo-
logical conflict made clear.

Part V
Conclusion

29 Introduction
Indonesia likes to portray itself as one of the three countries in the world with
the richest biodiversity, which it is determined to protect. However, travelling
through Indonesian national parks at the beginning of thismillennium, reading
through academic literature and following the news on them produced a –
by no means new – picture of many reserved areas that do not deserve the
name ‘protected’.
The present study of the Indonesian nature conservation policy, law, and
practice has shown that at the beginning of Reformasi support for nature
conservation was marginal in Indonesia. It has helped to make sense of
national parks as a political struggle demonstrating on the one hand an inter-
nally divided state holding sway over resources and park residents, and on
the other hand an increasing readiness and dedication to struggle for a new
balance of power among both state and societal actors. This book has aimed
to create a framework for critically following and evaluating the ongoing
debate.
The fact that Reformasi has created space for the struggle to surface creates
hope. People now actually dare to voice their different interests, and struggle
for improvement of their situation. However, in the end, this struggle can only
contribute to an increased autonomy of Indonesian society to find, problematise
and possibly change its own way of treating nature if that same Indonesian
society succeeds in defining new structures for political decision-making.
The present analysis was guided by the following questions:
1 Which dominant discourses can be reconstructed from policies and laws
in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Indonesia on the human treat-
ment of nature?
2 How, i.e. with which stories, arguments and strategies, do relevant actors
involved in themaking and implementation of nature conservation policy
and law in Indonesia struggle for discourse hegemony?
3 Which discursive structures constrain or enable actors in their struggle
for discourse hegemony?
4 How does the struggle for discourse hegemony affect policy and law,
policy- and lawmaking and implementation?
The following paragraphs will answer these questions.

30 A history of dominant nature and
conservation discourses in Indonesia
Present-day statements that Indonesian communities have practiced conserva-
tion for a long time are misleading. Actors making such statements apply a
new word to past practices with a different background. While the basic
instruments for regulating man-nature relations – prohibitions of access and
reservation – have remained the same throughout time, the ideas underlying
the policies, rules and practices in the field of nature conservation have
changed. Most importantly, the idea that extinction of species and other
changes of the natural environment can be problematic and therefore should
be prevented has emerged only after the arrival of the VOC.
Man-nature relations in pre-colonial Indonesia were dominated by two
discourses. The first one was the spiritualist discourse (chapter 7), which was
based on a general trust in the benevolence of spirits inhabiting the natural
world. These spirits would take care of human needs as long as humans
treated them and the rules they had agreed on together with respect. The
second discourse dominating the period of the early Hindu influenced states
was the subjugate-and-rule discourse (chapter 8). This discourse was even less
about conserving nature than its predecessor. Its main ideawas that theHindu
gods would take good care of humans if they subjugated and restyled nature
into something new and based on a divine bright and ordered model. Still,
also under the dominance of this discourse nature was ‘reserved’. But it
belonged to the king who in return had to take care of his followers.
In the VOC and colonial period three new – this time scientific – discourses
on man-nature relations gained dominance in the Indonesian archipelago.
‘Rational forestry’ (chapter 9), was the first discourse based on the idea of a
potential man-made crisis that needed to be prevented: the end of timber
supply. The discourse rationalised nature, reducing it to those parts of direct
economic use, and aimed at improving its productivity. The second scientific
discourse, ‘protection against disaster’ (chapter 10), did not become as
dominant. It was the first discourse prohibiting any economic exploitation of
certain reserved areas. It was concerned with another potential man-made
crisis, i.e. droughts and floods caused by logging the so-called ‘jungle woods’.
‘Nature-protection’ (chapter 11), finally, was the third scientific discourse
concerning man-nature relations in this period. It, too, remained contested.
Its main idea was to reserve nature against any exploitation for the sake of
scientific research and moral improvement and relaxation.
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After Independence the Indonesian state soon continued the colonial
policies based on the three scientific discourses, although there existed a strong
‘social justice’ counter-discourse in favour of opening the existing reserves
for the common people (chapter 12). The first newdiscourse dominatingman-
nature relationswas introduced by theNewOrder government: development
or, in Indonesian, pembangunan (chapter 13). In this discourse nature was, as
in the rational forestry discourse, conceptualised as a supplier of resources.
It was reduced to a means to finance development. Interestingly, just like the
subjugate-and-rule discourse, pembangunan attributed no value to nature in
its present form but rather aimed for a new, man-made, better-ordered and
more productive nature. Contrary to the rational forestry discourse pemban-
gunan was not concerned with sustainability. This changed from the 1970s
onwardwhen ‘sustainable development’ (chapters 14 and 15) came to dominate
all Indonesian policies and laws. However, being very unspecific, sustainable
development has provided a shelter for development, ecological conservation
and human rights arguments. Until its fall the New Order government has
interpreted it as sustaining pembangunan, placing development at the top of
the other two elements. With the beginning of Reformasi (chapter 15) the
contestation of this definition became visible.
To conclude, despite some similarities the various discourses used to
regulate access to and to reserve and protect certain parts of nature differed
substantially, above all in their conceptualisation of nature. This ranged from
a spiritual world with its own rules, as a pure resource supplier that humans
need to take care of or even improve, to a place for scientific research, re-
creation and moral improvement. When trying to understand the struggles
taking place from 1990 until 2005 for and against nature conservation it is
important to realise that it shows that those struggling for nature conservation
were divided already among themselves. However, differences in
conceptualisation were not problematised in this period. On the contrary,
nature conservation or the various Indonesian terms often used as equivalents
(konservasi, pengawetan, pelestarian alam, pengelolaan lingkungan hidup, pengelolaan
sumber daya alam etc.) served as a common story to hide such differences and
to create support.
31 Actors and their struggles from 1990 until
2005: stories, arguments and strategies
Just like the historical analysis of the discourses dominating policy and law,
the three cases of law- and policymaking, two cases of implementation anal-
ysed in conventional national parks and four cases of implementation in donor-
funded parks analysed in this book illustrate how divided those struggling
for nature conservationwere. Apart from that they show that ‘conservationists’
were strongly opposed by those struggling for the hegemony of other – more
powerful – discourses.
The first case dealt with lawmaking under the New Order (chapter 18).
When the Forestry Department in 1990 proposed a Biodiversity Conservation
Bill (later enacted as Law No. 5 of 1990) to Parliament, a struggle took place
between the Forestry Department and a small number of critical legislators,
most notably from the PDI. Embedding its bill in the framework of the
sustainable development discourse the bill reflected a clear attempt to keep
pembangunan the dominant discourse. This did not only mean an emphasis
on the superiority of the objective of economic development above conservation
and human rights but also on the central leadership in the development
process. Few legislators wanted or dared to question this definition of
sustainable development. They struggled for more attention to conservation
and human rights in the Indonesian development process, but without much
success.
Important strategies of the Forestry Department in their struggle for dis-
course hegemony were creating the impression of a consensus and down-
playing differences, using a powerful counter-discourse, and ignoring and
discouraging criticism. Throughout the parliamentary debates the Minister
tried to create the impression of an overall consensus, using keywords as
‘harmony’, ‘family atmosphere’ and Pancasila. Inmany other cases, theMinister
just did not answer questions or misinterpreted them to avoid debate. Fre-
quently, the Minister also discouraged criticism and praised the more docile
attitude of, for example, Golkar legislators. When PDI tried to argue in favour
of conservation in the whole of Indonesia, and thus against conservation
limited to specific areas, the Forestry Department defended its draft with a
strong counter argument in favour of ‘conservation not for the sake of con-
servation but in the interest of the people’. This successfully closed the debate
on the scope of conservation. After all it signalled that the Department dis-
approved of the international conservation discourse, which it perceived as
too concerned about plants and animals and not concerned enough about
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people. In addition it made clear that arguing in a different way would mean
not acting in the interest of the people. Likewise, when PPP and PDI pleaded
for participation in the sense of an active role for the people in conservation,
the Forestry Department opposed this with a definition of participation in
terms of responsibility and obligations and as not more than mobilisation.
The second case (chapter 21) concerned a policymaking meeting at the
beginning of Reformasi. In 1999 the Ministry for the Environment organised
the so-called co-ordinationmeeting (Rakornas) of about 250 participants from
NGOs, universities, regional environmental impact management agencies, the
Ministry and the national environmental impact management agency and
sectoral departments. At the meeting itself only a few critical NGO represent-
atives fought for a new type of development with less economic growth and
for meaningful policymaking (not defined any further). Apart from that, the
meeting was characterised by a strong consensus. Nearly all participants agreed
on the need for more attention to be paid to the environment, especially from
the sectoral departments and the regional governments whowith the enactment
of Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy had received more authority
in the field of environmental management. Their struggle was directed against
regional autonomy and ‘ego-sectoralism’, the allegation that sectoral depart-
ments only thought of their own interests rather than those of the ‘public’.
They believed the solution to these problems wasmore power for theMinistry
for the Environment to force others to paymore attention to the environment.
Importantly, existing differences in opinion about the ‘real’ scapegoat and in
the interpretation of concepts were not explored or debated.
The third case (chapter 22) dealt with the attempt of a coalition of environ-
mental NGOs, academics, the Ministry for the Environment, and the National
Planning Board (Bappenas) to prepare a radically new Natural Resources
Management Act. Themain story behind this bill was again ‘ego-sectoralism’.
With this bill, the coalition struggled for more attention to the environment
within sustainable development and to delegate natural resources management
to adat communities and other stakeholders. They did so with the stories about
environmental destruction caused by sectoral departments and regional govern-
ment we know from the Rakornas. What was new was an equal story that
ego-sectoralism and regional autonomywere also responsible for human rights
violations against adat communities. One of the main strategies of the coalition
was to create the impression of a consensus on these actually contested issues.
This strategy failed.
Their main opponents were the sectoral department of Forestry and of
Mining and Energy who successfully struggled to keep pembangunan dominant.
Using this very discourse, together with legal arguments, was their main
strategy. The Department for Mining and Energy, for instance, argued that
the act would negatively influence investments and that the stories told about
problems of adat communitieswere exaggerated. Furthermore, they questioned
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the legal mandate and the need for a new act and argued that each sector
should – as usual – revise the existing regulations instead.
The first implementation case (chapter 25) analysed the situation in Pulau
Seribu Marine National Park at the beginning of Reformasi. There, different
types of struggles were going on between different actors. In general, the park
authority tried to build support for conservation among regional government
agencies and park residents. They did so with arguments for biodiversity
conservation and stories about alternative sources of income and tourism
development. However, their educational and enforcement strategies failed.
Those regional agencies and residents who began to reproduce the new dis-
course did so mainly to attract money for conservation projects, to silence
criticismwith keeping up appearances and proceeding as usual. Many others
chose to play the uninformed and ignore the park. Some responded to the
call for conservation with powerful counter-discourses, including livelihood,
and ‘development for all’. Some were not so much opposed to conservation
but struggled for a more participatory, realistic and facilitating policy that
would, for instance, help them to successfully find alternative employment.
Considering their concrete proposals for policy improvement they proved that
letting local residents participate in policymaking could contribute to sub-
stantive effectiveness indeed.
During the field research a few rangers in the park and one official at the
Jakarta office identified as the main problem the more general attitude of
keeping up appearances of a well-functioning organisation while lacking
commitment to the public interest and thewillingness to co-operate with other
government agencies. While the park director in 2000 rejected arguments for
a more professional organisation as not appropriate, the director who took
office in 2003 partly agreed with them and reformed the park authority. He
also embarked on an interesting new strategy to gain support for conservation
among park residents. He transformed conservation into ‘nature production’,
which changed the park into something more attractive for residents: a pro-
duction site of coral for aquariums. By doing so, he, one could say, improved
the productivity of nature – a familiar idea of the rational forestry and also
pembangunan discourse (see above). In addition, he listened to the arguments
of rangers and residents and tried to accommodate them.
The second implementation case dealt with Kutai National Park (chap-
ter 26). The situation there was less obscure than in Pulau Seribu as there were
twomain actors trying to build coalitions: the park director, who actively tried
to find support for the park among entrepreneurs, residents, other government
agencies and NGOs, and the head of the in 1999 established East Kutai district
who actively encouragedmigration into and economic exploitation of the park
to support his struggle for regional autonomy and development. This case
illustrates that a decade after the parliamentary debates on the BCA the debate
about sustainable development continued in national parks and that those
opposing conservation were not ready to fight by democratic means. Officials
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of the district government, settlers and park residents argued for more develop-
ment and less conservation. One neighbouringmunicipality produced a slightly
different argument, i.e. in favour of less biodiversity conservation but more
protection against erosion by opening the national park to agriculture (cf.
similar arguments in the colonial time described in chapter 10). Then, compar-
able to Pulau Seribu, park residents also pleaded against discrimination and
for more people to benefit from development, i.e. for distributing the benefits
of development more equally. The strategies of physical attacks, public dis-
crediting and non-compliance with agreements chosen by opponents of the
park reflected a lack of appreciation for democracy and debate.
The analysis of the struggles in the donor-funded parks Siberut, Lore Lindu,
Komodo and Bunaken differs from the previous ones in that it is mainly based
on secondary sources. Chapter 27 describes three main strategies of donors,
i.e. discourse coalitions around common stories, conservation agreementswith
adat communities, and co-management. All three appeared problematic. The
discourse coalition around stories about adat communities as the appropriate
custodians of nature, after some time, turned out to be fragile. The discourse
of the NGOs increasingly transformed into one trying for regional autonomy.
Legal agreements on the other hand were perceived as too weak and socially
exclusive. Co-management schemes finally were the most contested in the
parks, mostly with arguments for a more inclusive definition of participation
and for more regional autonomy. The chapter also shows that the socio-
scientific literature criticises donor agencies for their narrow conceptualisation
of participation, their disregard of local needs and their potential to create
new social conflicts.
In sum, the cases illustrate that not many actors struggled for nature
conservation. Some of them did so only for strategic reasons. On the other
hand, opposing nature conservation was definitely not a matter of a lack of
knowledge but rather a conscious choice to pursue different values. The most
important struggles concerned whether and what kind of development, con-
servation or human rights protection should dominate sustainable develop-
ment, whether the central or the regional government or adat communities
should be the dominant actor in natural resources management, and what
was required for ‘good implementation’. In policy- and lawmaking conserva-
tion was successfully countered with pembangunan and in national parks with
regional autonomy, development or equal development or human rights
discourses.
32 Enabling and constraining effects of
pembangunan structures
From 1990 until 2005 the strong structures of the pembangunan discourse have
dominated Indonesian policy- and lawmaking and implementation in the field
of nature conservation. Even where the structures had become weaker, the
behaviour of many actors still reflected a persistent, unconscious acceptance
of some of the old structures.
In the 1990 case, pembangunan structures helped the Minister to close
debates and ignore criticism. The structures included the following: first, that
legislators should not question the leading role of the central government in
policy- and lawmaking and implementation. This implied a prohibition to
criticise government practices. Second, that development (economic growth)
and stability were the two most important policy objectives. Third, that
specified concepts, such as development and public interest, were not to be
debated. Fourth, that one should not insist on answers, or make demands or
compromises. Such structures allowed the Minister to avoid answering ques-
tions, to fob legislators off with promises where guarantees had been
demanded, to get awaywithmisinterpreting questions, to postpone decisions
and press for a fast enactment at the expense of the quality of the lawmaking
process. Obviously, these structureswere above all disadvantageous for those
legislators who disagreed with the Forestry Minister.
A general change with the beginning of Reformasi was that the structures
that prohibited blaming the government or discussing an issue had become
much weaker. Reformasi thus created a new space for criticism of policy, law
and practice. This enabled all participants of the Rakornas to talkmore openly
about their grievances, which they readily did. It also enabled all participants
to blame government actors, something pembangunan had prohibited. In fact,
blaming sectoral department and regional governments had become a new
structure, it seemed. Government officials that would have normally blamed
‘the people’ would lose their credibility at these meeting, as would those who
did not argue in favour of more attention to the environment. In addition,
new words had become popular, such as Reformasi, regional autonomy and
ego-sectoralism.
What stayed the sameweremainly pembangunan practices.Most important-
ly, the format of debates had remained the same. The guiding concept for this
formatwas ‘giving input’ (In.masukan) without any obligation for theMinistry
to define criteria for accepting or rejecting such input. Actors accepted this
without complaints and exchanged comments rather than engaging in in-depth
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debates about concepts or other critical issues. Likewise, just like legislators
in 1990, participants in 1999 did not insist on answers, as for instance when
arguing for more details on the implementation in the proposed action plans.
They did not use the space Reformasi had created to introduce new practices.
A few years later, in the case of the Natural Resources Management Bill,
which showed many similarities with the Rakornas, another shift occurred.
The sectoral departmentsmade clear that theywere no longerwilling to accept
being scapegoated and thus openly countered the structure of the discourse
dominating the bill (of defining delegation of power to adat communities) as
an important way to improve environmental protection. Eventually, countering
this with pembangunan arguments was an important step. It forced the coalition
to reformulate the bill and paved the way for introducing a new but familiar
concept in the bill – ‘co-ordination’ -, which NGOs perceived as a mere instru-
ment to keep up the appearance of a well-functioning state but without any
substantive meaning.
In 2000 and 2001, also in Pulau Seribu and Kutai, pembangunan structures
played a role, although the situation in the two parks differed. In Pulau Seribu
similar structures as those described for policy- and lawmaking still dominated
the situation. These included that park officials were the ones to listen to
(during education activities) and to obey (when enforcing the law). Neither
they nor rangers and other officials working for the park authority were
allowed to criticise policy, law or implementation. For the park personnel that
meant above all not criticising their superiors. Many residents accepted the
passive role the BCA and the pembangunan structures had attributed to them.
Others kept up the appearance of accepting them while ignoring the park.
Others again openly contested the pembangunan rules and increasingly pro-
duced counter-discourses. The rangers were also divided. Some accepted the
structures, others acted as if not attending work and searching additional
income instead. Few others openly produced critical counter-discourses in
favour of more professionalism. While avoiding direct contact with residents
the park director in any case did not accept counter-discourses from his staff.
He, for instance, sanctioned one critical ranger with demotion. His successors
partly accepted the rangers’ and residents’ criticism and started to reform the
agency and its approach.
In Kutai, the park authority had no choice but to listen to its main com-
petitor, the head of East Kutai district. He profited from Reformasi’s structures
allowing criticism of the central government, and from the structures of the
human rights and the pembangunan discourses which did not allow denying
people access to nature, arguing that this would mean valuing nature above
people. Eventually the struggle led to negotiations between the park director
and the district head about an enclave in the park. Determinant in these
negotiations was that the district head kept up the appearance to go along
the path of democratic debate, compromise and honouring agreements while
in practice leaking information to his supporters and tolerating their physical
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attacks of the park infrastructure. The park director, on the other hand, had
no means to force his opponent to stick to the rules of the game.
In general, most debates that took place in the various cases can be
qualified as debates free of obligations. Although some structures of pem-
bangunan weakened with the beginning of Reformasi, many actors in favour
of substantive reforms did not know how to effectively use the new freedom.
In general, pembangunan structures and the persistence of related practices were
advantageous for actors not willing to pay more attention to counter-dis-
courses.

33 Effects on nature conservation policy, law,
and practice
At least three characteristics of the struggles for discourse hegemony described
in this book affected nature conservation policy and law and the implementa-
tion in a fundamental way.
First, the debates were not structured by a discourse on problem solving
but by the pembangunan discourse. The format of debates in policy- and
lawmaking was to make comments without the possibility of insisting on
relevant answers or the criteria for allowing influence in decision-making or
not. Even when the pembangunan structures became weaker many actors did
not develop an alternative – Reformasi – model that went beyond the demand
for more, unspecified, participation. As a result, many actors insufficiently
debated contested concepts and issues and inadequately challenged draft
policies and bills. In the case of the Natural Resources Management Bill they
insufficiently countered arguments. It is, for instance, surprising that the
coalition did not try to counter legal arguments against their bill with a debate
on the rule of law. However, although the coalition claimed to strive for a
radical change and more than in the other cases put elements of the rule of
law on the agenda – including the attempt to curb unjust state power and
create an instrument to guarantee human rights of the second and third
generation through, among other things, the formulation of legal and moral
principles – the concept itself played no role at all and the coalition accepted
that their opponents interpreted the rule of law in terms of sticking to the
existing laws and procedures. In the end, the BCA and the draft environmental
paragraph for the GBHN 1999 reflected their drafters’ discourse with an em-
phasis on political rather than substantive effectiveness (see also chapter 4
and 20), and the Natural Resources Management Bill was watered down and
put on hold.
Another effect of the lack of debate on themechanism for problem solving
was that the outcomes of the policy- and lawmaking processes were also free
of obligations. To start with, they lacked details for the implementation, which
granted discretion to government or the leading agency and thus a lot of space
to proceed as usual with discrimination and inertia in the implementation.
Then, they lacked obligations to translate all discourses reproduced in a policy
or law into practice, which enabled the government to use policies and laws
to silence criticism and proceed as usual. Finally, they lacked control mechan-
isms for the implementation. Bureaucrats had, for example, only to account
for howmuch of their budgets they had spent and not what they had achieved
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with themoney. As a result, policies and laws lacked substantive effectiveness.
Consequently some critics regarded them as unimportant and without any
force. Others suspected, notably, that law was mainly used as a political
resource, for instance to silence criticism or to gain control over an area’s
resources. In reaction, they tried to get ahold of other legal resources to justify
their own access to the same area, as in the case of Kutai. This use as a political
resource made law useful to actors and simultaneously undermined its author-
ity because it created distrust in and disrespect for the rule of law.
The second characteristic of the struggle for discourse hegemony in policy-
and lawmaking and implementation was the attitude of keeping up the appear-
ance of a well-functioning state. In Pulau Seribu, for instance, many officials
from the park authority appeared insufficiently interested in making conserva-
tion work. They planned and organised activities without interest in their
effects and produced ritualised reports and evaluations without relevant
information. Behind this façade, critics suspected, they were preoccupied with
raising budgetary money for ‘projects’ and for themselves or their allies.
Likewise, for many actors policy- and lawmaking seemed to be about planning
and producing policies and laws as a ‘development project’ (In. proyek). How-
ever, not only state actors but also certain NGOs (e.g. in Siberut) and local
residents (in Pulau Seribu) adopted an attitude of keeping up appearances
of being good conservationists or good citizens, giving what donors or the
government requested from them. The persistent attitude of keeping up appear-
ances among various actors and of not calling them to account for it made
it possible for many actors to escape responsibility. Above all, this created
mutual distrust and disrespect among citizens, NGOs, and state officials, which
even persisted when policies and practices were improved, as Pulau Seribu
has shown.
In sum, a discourse on problem solving and on calling each other to
account could possibly help to improve policy- and lawmaking and imple-
mentation in the field of nature conservation in Indonesia. However, even with
better structures for the political struggle and calling actors to account in
policy- and lawmaking and implementation it will take time for actors find
trust in each other.
34 An alternative agenda
So far, NGOs and donors have sought alternatives for persuasion and strict
enforcement in nature conservation strategies in a redistribution of power.
Co-management schemes and the plea for delegating natural resourcesmanage-
ment to local or adat communities are examples for this strategy. Due to their
exclusiveness these are problematic, however, as the cases in chapter 27 have
demonstrated. Creating new power structures outside the existing state
structures without creating new structures for the political struggle will not
solve but only displace problems.
Thus, the political struggle about nature conservation could benefit from
a discourse providing specific new structures for this struggle. Earlier in this
conclusion I defined some possible principles to improve debates, including
that actors should be obliged to produce well-considered arguments, listen
and react in a satisfactory way to the arguments of opponents, and aim for
convincing others or reaching a compromise. Such principles could help to
keep the debate going.
We could derive another principle from the problem-solvingmethodology
developed by Seidman and Seidman (chapter 4) who have argued that actors
involved in lawmaking should justify in a report why they chose a certain
approach and solution. Departing from there we could formulate a principle
of justification needed as a structure to account with well-considered arguments
for political choices.
In addition, an obligation to apply objective criteria for weighing interests
in policy- and lawmaking and implementation could be another helpful
structure. After all, the building blocks of sustainable development – develop-
ment, conservation and human rights – represent different legitimate values
in their own right. Acknowledging conflicts of interest and values as natural
and finding ways to weigh them could help to keep the debate open. For
national parks this could mean creating deliberate bodies representing all
stakeholders and possessing the authority to solve conflicts of interests.1 Legal
1 See the literature on multi-stakeholder approaches (Hemmati 2002, Borrini-Feyerabend,
et al. 2000a, Hämäläinen, et al. 2001); see also for a more general theory Habermas 1981
and the literature on deliberative democracy, for instance, Gutmann & Thompson 2004
and Gundersen 2000.
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theory about the criteria used in judicial weighing of interests could serve here
as a source for inspiration.2
Apart from finding and agreeing on such structures it would be necessary
to train teachers and students in these structures and in debating techniques.
One such technique would be how to create compelling, evidence-based
arguments that aim for problem-solving à la Seidman and Seidman: through
formulating hypotheses based on questions about the empirical reality, system-
atically examining these hypotheses, and proposing solutions based on
evidence. Another technique would have to focus onways to force opponents
to do the same. This is related to the second agenda: calling others to account.
To make processes more transparent and controllable for the public it
would be wise to make as much information about political decision-making
as possible accessible to the public. Research reports for new legislation and
the parliamentary minutes could be published on the internet and meetings
of deliberative bodies for national parks should be open. Training teachers
and students in discourse analysis would help interested people to monitor
the political debate and to expose behaviour of those not interested in problem-
solving and to call them to account.
2 See, for instance, Stoter 2000.
Epilogue
After the debates in 1990 two important developments regarding nature
conservation policy and law have taken place. One is related to the process
of lawmaking: in 2004 a new act on lawmaking was enacted.1 This act, among
others, provides a more extended role for regional parliaments and society
as a whole. Art. 53, for instance, stipulates that ‘the people have the right to
give oral or written input during the preparation and parliamentary debates
of a bill or proposed regional regulation’ without, however, guaranteeing that
the government will take this input into consideration. This is unfortunate
as it still leaves the government awide discretion instead of specifying criteria
for assessing and accepting such input.
The second development is related to the BCA itself. The Forestry Depart-
ment has started thinking about revising the act. According to a December
2006 draft of the academic background paper for this revision there are several
reasons for this. First, the BCA does not regulate the protection of unprotected
species enough. This implies a possible broadening of the concept of conserva-
tion. However, it still does not go as far as PDI demanded in 1990, i.e. to
broaden the concept to the whole area of Indonesia instead of limiting it to
specified reserves. Second, the paper acknowledges the need for regulating
the distribution of the benefits of geneticmaterial, which is a reaction to recent
developments of so-called biopiracy where multinational and foreign enter-
prises try to get ahold of patents for geneticmaterial discovered in developing
countries. Next regarding this new interpretation of conservation, the paper
pleads for redefining public participation to include a more active role of the
broader public and to even let the public benefit from natural resources. A
third issue addressed is the ineffectiveness of law enforcement. The appropriate
way suggested is to increase sanctions rather than to analyse the causes of
this ineffectiveness. Finally, there is renewed attention to financial issues as
the draft paper states that the act should increase the state income from natural
resources exploitation and regulate the reinvestment of this income in conserva-
tion activities.2
It is good to see that the Forestry Department takes an interest in revising
the BCA. However, it remains to be seen what will be changed. In addition,
1 Act No. 10 of 2004.
2 Academic draft on revising Act No. 5 of 1990.
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future analysis will have to make clear to what extent the new lawmaking
practices will provide for realising any far-reaching redefinitions of contested
concepts. In this context, it will be very interesting to analyse which storiess,
arguments and strategies the Minister will use and how much space he will
give to the MPs to influence the final result.3 Most importantly, it remains to
be seen whether the lawmaking discourse will have changed in such a way
that the MPswill be interested in and feel powerful enough to put theweighing
of interests on the agenda, insist on answers and strive for mechanisms to
ensure an act aiming for more substantive effectiveness of nature conservation
in Indonesia.
3 Cf. observations by the Centre for Indonesian Law and Policy Studies (Pusat Studi Hukum
dan Kebijakan Indonesia, abbr. PSHK) that there is a general increase in public debates
but that the government still dominates the lawmaking process (PSHK 2007).
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
‘Discussiëren’ over natuurbehoud: beleid, recht en praktijk in Indonesië - een
discours analyse van verleden en heden
Dit proefschrift gaat over de politieke strijd die in Indonesië gevoerd wordt
over natuurbehoudbeleid en -recht, over hoe dit beleid en recht tot stand
komen en uitgevoerd worden. Door middel van een analyse van welke dis-
coursen de verschillende processen van beleidsvorming, wetgeving en imple-
mentatie en hun resultaten domineren onderzoekt deze studie hoe deze politie-
ke strijd het falen van het nationale parkenbeleid kan verklaren. Verklaringen
worden gesignaleerd in zowel processen van beleidsvorming en wetgeving
als in het proces van implementatie.
In deel I constateer ik dat de nationale parken in Indonesië er aan het begin
van dit millennium slecht in slaagden de biodiversiteit te beschermen. De
steeds terugkerende verklaringen van verschillende soorten actoren hiervoor
hebben mij aangezet tot een discours analyse. Daarin begrijp en analyseer ik
nationale parken, beleidvormingsvergaderingen en het parlement als arena’s
voor een politieke strijd, waarin actoren hun definitie van het probleem en
de oplossingsrichting proberen dominant te maken. Met een viertal vragen
heb ik getracht inzicht te verkrijgen in deze strijd: Welk discours heeft door
de tijd heen het beleid en de regels voor de menselijke omgang met natuur
gedomineerd?Hoe proberen actoren hun discours dominant temaken?Welke
discursieve structuren ondersteunen of belemmeren hen daarbij? En welk effect
heeft de strijd op beleidsvorming, wetgeving, uitvoering en de resultaten van
deze processen? Naast deze inleiding positioneer ik dit boek tussen andere
academische studies en bespreek ik het theoretische kader dat ik in dit boek
gebruikt heb. Hierbij is het vooral van belang dat ik discours opvat als iets
dat door denkkaders, verhalen, argumenten en praktijken gemarkeerd wordt
en dus niet alleen in woorden maar ook in daden weerspiegeld wordt.
Na de inleiding en bespreking van het theoretische kader betoog ik in deel
II aan de hand van een historische analyse dat regels voor de omgang van
mensen met natuur in de Indonesische archipel door de tijd heen weliswaar
vaak op elkaar lijken maar toch zeven verschillende discoursen reflecteren.
Alleen de koloniale discoursen en een bepaalde vorm van het duurzame
ontwikkelingsdiscours zijn gebaseerd op de idee dat natuur in een crisis
verkeert. De idee dat natuur behouden dient te worden in haar ‘oorspronkelij-
ke’ (in de praktijk vaak de huidige) staat is alleen terug te vinden in het
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romantische natuurbeschermingsdiscours dat wetenschappers vanaf het begin
van de 19e eeuw begonnen te propageren. De andere discoursen zijn of geba-
seerd op de idee dat er altijd weer iets in de plaats zal komen voor een soort
dat uitsterft, zoals het spirituele discours, of dat het juist aan de mens is om
de natuur te ‘verbeteren’, zoals het onderwerp-en-heers-, het rationele bos-
bouw-, en het Indonesische ontwikkelingsdiscours pembangunan.
De discoursen zijn, zo betoog ik verder, met betrekking tot toegang tot
natuur in het belang geweest van verschillende actoren. Het prekoloniale
spirituele discours heeft voor lokale gemeenschappen de mogelijkheid ge-
creëerd om natuur te claimen en de toegang voor niet-leden te reguleren. Het
onderwerp-en-heers-discours heeft er voornamelijk toe gediend om demacht
van de heersers van de eerste Hindoestaten ten opzichte van de bestaande
lokale gemeenschappen te legitimeren. Het rationele bosbouw-, bescherming
tegen natuurlijke catastrofes-, en natuurbeschermingsdiscours heeft de koloniale
Dienst voor het Boschwezen en wetenschappers de mogelijkheid gegeven
natuur te claimen en voor andere actoren af te sluiten. Dezelfde mogelijkheid
hebben de discoursen van ontwikkeling en duurzame ontwikkeling later voor
het Indonesische Bosbouwministerie gecreëerd. De politieke strijd over natuur-
behoudbeleid is met andere woorden ook altijd een geweest over wie natuur
mocht claimen en de toegang tot natuur mocht reguleren. Pogingen om de
macht over natuur te grijpen zijn vaak hand in hand gegaanmet de introductie
van een nieuw discours.
In deel III staat een analyse van drie casussen van beleidsvorming en
wetgeving centraal. Hier onderzoek ik niet alleen welke discoursen deze
processen gedomineerd hebbenmaar ook hoe actoren getracht hebben ervoor
te zorgen dat hun discours ging winnen van dat van hun opponenten, welke
discursieve structuren hen daarbij wel of niet hebben geholpen en hoe de
politieke strijd de resultaten van deze processen beïnvloed heeft.
De eerste gevalstudie betreft de parlementaire discussies over de Indone-
sische Natuurbeschermingswet in 1990. De verhalen en argumenten die door
de Minister en de verschillende fracties in vragen en antwoorden naar voren
werden gebracht laten vooral het structurerende effect van het Indonesische
ontwikkelingsdiscours zien. Verhalen en argumenten gerelateerd aan pemban-
gunan dienden daarbij vooral om debatten over onderwerpen en concepten
die voor meerdere interpretaties vatbaar waren te voorkomen of te sluiten.
Daarnaast waren er ongeschreven regels behorend bij dit discours die ervoor
zorgden dat parlementsleden niet insisteerden op antwoorden van deMinister.
Aangezien ook de kritische parlementsleden van de democratische en islamiti-
sche fracties het pembangunan discours gebruikten om hun doelen te bereiken
kon de Minister hen gemakkelijk buiten gevecht zetten. De wet waarin dit
proces heeft geresulteerd legt dan ook de basis voor een centralistisch en
autoritair natuurbehoudregime met een hoog symbolisch karakter dat geen
garanties biedt voor materiële effectiviteit doch met de introductie van natio-
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nale parken demogelijkheid creëert voor (beperkte) economische ontwikkeling
in natuurgebieden.
Aan de hand van de tweede gevalstudie, een grote driedaagse coördinatie-
bijeenkomst georganiseerd door het Milieuministerie, betoog ik dat pemban-
gunan ook in 1999, kort na de val van het Soeharto regime, nog steeds het
debat over natuurbehoud heeft gestructureerd. Weliswaar heeft het nieuwe
Reformasi discours ervoor gezorgd dat er meer ruimte voor het naar voren
brengen van verschillende ideologieën kwam en was er een consensus dat
er meer aandacht voor het milieu diende te komen. Echter de manier waarop
gedebatteerd is, met veel ruimte voor inbreng van andere departementen en
weinig ruimte voor diepgang, en de weinig transparante manier waarop het
Milieuministerie inbreng van de deelnemers wel of niet heeft gehonoreerd
in het einddocument, weerspiegelden nog steeds pembangunan praktijken. Het
Milieuministerie toonde zich geen voorstander van vergaande hervormingen.
Actoren die wel voor bijvoorbeeld meer burgerparticipatie in het beleidsproces
of voor minder economische groei pleitten, hebben niet geïnsisteerd op hun
afwijkende verhalen en argumenten en geen diepgaand debat afgedwongen.
De bijeenkomst resulteerde dan ook in een document zonder verrassingen.
Zelfs de coalitie van NGO’s, Milieuministerie, en het Nationale Ontwikke-
lingsplanbureau is met haar post-2000 voorstel van een wet betreffende het
beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen uiteindelijk tegen de voortdurende domi-
nantie van het pembangunan discours aangelopen, zo betoog ik verder. Het
wetsvoorstel beoogde voornamelijk een herverdeling vanmacht van de secto-
rale departementen naar lokale gemeenschappen met als doel betere milieu-
bescherming. In de interdepartementale besprekingen zijn echter deMinisteries
voor Bosbouw en voor Mijnbouw en Energie er in geslaagd om het proces
te stoppen met verwijzing naar de negatieve gevolgen voor investeringen die
deze wet zou hebben en juridische argumenten tegen de invoering van een
kaderwet die sectoren tot hervormingen zou verplichten. Ook in dit geval is
er niet gedebatteerd maar zijn er voornamelijk commentaren uitgewisseld.
Slechts een enkele keer probeerde een lid van de coalitie een gezamenlijk
verhaal te lancerenmet als doel de oppositie voor het wetsvoorstel te winnen.
Deze pogingen leverden echter niet het gewenste resultaat op.
In deel IV onderzoek ik de uitvoering van het nationale parkenbeleid. Ook
hier buig ikmij weer over de vragenwelke discoursen deze processen gedomi-
neerd hebben, hoe actoren voor de dominantie van hun discours hebben
gestreden, welke discursieve structuren hen daarbij wel of niet geholpen
hebben en hoe de politieke strijd de resultaten van deze processen beïnvloed
heeft. Ik betoog hier dat ook in de nationale parken geen open debat over
beleid en uitvoering gevoerd werd.
De eerste gevalstudie - Pulau Seribu - laat bij zowel veel overheidsdienaren
als doelgroepen van het beleid vooral praktijken van ‘de schone schijn hoog-
houden’ van een consensus over het te voeren beleid zien. Slechts weinig
actoren hebben ervoor gekozen om openlijk voor verandering te strijden. Het
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parkbeheer positioneerde zich in 2000 vooral als een instantie die in een
eenrichtingscommunicatie bewoners, gebruikers en andere overheidsinstanties
op hun verantwoordelijkheid voor het behoud van het koraal moest wijzen,
zonder echter zelf verantwoordelijkheid te willen dragen voor het resultaat
van deze aanpak. Regionale overheden gingenweliswaar een discourscoalitie
aanmet het parkbeheer maar hun praktijken lieten zien dat zij dit voornamelijk
deden om hun autonomie te behouden. Ook veel bewoners hielden de schijn
hoog dat zij volgzame burgers waren terwijl zij eigenlijk het beleid en zijn
uitvoering afkeurden en de parkregels ignoreerden. Slechts een kleine groep
bewoners en kritische boswachters uitten openlijk kritiek. Zij richtten zich in
het bijzonder tegen praktijken van het parkbeheer (en andere instanties) van
‘de schone schijn ophouden’ van een professionele enmet het publieke belang
begane overheid. Bewoners richtten zich verder tegen het centralistische,
onrealistische en discriminerende karakter van het beleid. Opmerkelijk was
dat deze kritiek in sommige opzichten effect heeft gehad. De directeuren die
in 2003 en in 2005 in het park aantraden hebben zowel getracht het parkbeheer
te professionaliseren als een realistischer natuurbehoudbeleid te creëren.
In Kutai, zo betoog ik verder, was er wel sprake van een open strijd. Het
parkbeheer probeerde een coalitie te smedenmet omringende bedrijven, NGO’s
en bewoners, maar werd verrast door de in 1999 doorgevoerde decentralisatie.
Op dat moment begon een nieuw geschapen district grenzend aan het nationale
park onder het momvan ‘ontwikkeling’, ‘regionale autonomie’ en ‘mensenrech-
tenbescherming’ het park te claimen. Het parkbeheer verloor de strijd doordat
zijn tegenstanders het park als symbool van een centralistisch autoritair regime
wisten te positioneren. Daarnaast voerden zij geen democratisch debat maar
creëerden telkens een nieuwe werkelijkheid door onder meer migranten uit
te nodigen zich in het park te vestigen..
Ook in de donorgefinancierde parken Siberut, Lore Lindu, Komodo en
Bunaken, werd geen open debat gevoerd over het nationale parkenbeleid.
Donoren, inheemse groepen, NGO’s, regionale overheden en ondernemers
vormden daar discours coalities rond twee verhalen: ‘inheemse groepen zijn
goede natuurbewakers’ en ‘co-management’. Onder demantel van deze twee
verhalen die actoren ogenschijnlijk in staat stelden om tegenovergestelde
belangen te verzoenen, streden zij echter verder om de precieze invulling
ervan. Door hun exclusieve interpretatie hebben zij andere actoren weten af
te sluiten van hun toegang tot natuur en hulpbronnen wat tot nieuwe sociale
conflicten kan leiden.
In deel V trek ik tenslotte algemene conclusies uit het onderzoek. Centraal
staat hierbij dat het debat over natuurbehoud voor een groot deel nog steeds
gestructureerdwordt door de autoritaire nadruk op consensus en dat Reformasi
tijdens de onderzoeksperiode nog geen bevredigend alternatief hiervoor had
opgeleverd. Ik betoog daarom dat de politieke ontwikkeling in Indonesië
gebaat zou zijn bij het openlijk erkennen van het bestaan van verschillende
belangen en bij het ontwikkelen en implementeren van nieuwe regels voor
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de politieke strijd. Deze zouden erop gericht moeten zijn dat debatten hun
vrijblijvendheid verliezen en gericht worden op het wegen van belangen,
oplossen van problemen en elkaar tot verantwoording roepen, en dat actoren
met verschillende belangen met elkaar in gesprek blijven.
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Appendix
Discourse analysis as approach: retrospection
and self-reflection
In socio-legal studies, discourse analysis in the form chosen in this study is
a new approach. It has been adopted to gain a better understanding of the
forces in favour of and against nature conservation in policy and law, policy-
and lawmaking and implementation in past and present Indonesia and to link
the findings about forces in these contexts to each other.
Another strength of discourse analysis has proven to be its potential to
help make debates more transparent. Discourse analysis could help to force
participants in a debate to take responsibility by exposing actors trying to
escape responsibility and not practicing what they preach.
The chosen approach had implications. It has been necessary to neglect
the advice to limit discourse analyses to situations and texts with a limited,
well-demarcated body of data. It is true, there is a clear tension between trying
to cover as many actors as possible and their arguments and strategies in a
political struggle throughout history and keeping the data-load workable.
However, without doing so, many of the valuable results would have been
missed. The results of this study go beyond participating in the debate about
what part of sustainable development to focus on and link the policy debate
to the one on governance and rule of law. In a country where powerful dis-
courses have structured policy- and lawmaking and implementation to the
sole advantage of an elite, exclusively focusing on policy discourses means
ignoring a huge part of reality hidden behind the façade of techno-legal
structures, and insufficiently challenging the game designed and defended
by those in power. By addressing the policy discourse and the discourses
structuring policy- and lawmaking and implementation, the present study
wants to contribute not only to the field of nature conservation but also to
the field of Indonesian law, administration and politics in general.
One question that remains is how to justify my selection of discourses.1
Recallingwhat has been said about frames, the problem becomesmore appar-
ent. How am I to construct or reconstruct frames in a neutral way? After all,
no one person is free of frames.2 My main frame has been the one of a dis-
course analyst which made me interpret, conceptualise and categorise what
1 Cf. Jaworski & Coupland 1999, p. 36.
2 Schön & Rein 1994, p. 36; Burman 2003, p. 3.
440 Discourse analysis as approach: retrospection and self-reflection
I see in a particular way, and which made me present it in this book in the
form of a particular story with accompanying arguments.3
Looking at the conclusions I draw from this study a clear bias becomes
apparent: a bias for democracy and accountability, as I tend to define author-
itarian structures and the attitude of keeping up appearances as major prob-
lems. Another initial bias has been one for conservation. Later, I opened my
mind to other frames. During this process I discovered that what I valuemore
than conservationism is the fact that I am free: free to choose for a conserva-
tionist way of life or not, and free of fear and distrust.
A final bias I discovered was one for a scientific kind of rationality. How
many times did I have to remindmyself that policy, policymaking and imple-
mentation did not necessarily need to be about content? Deep down in my
head I kept assuming that all the actors I studied shared some of my own
frames of policy and law, policy- and lawmaking and implementation and
that they just like me looked at policy and law as defining the best way to
solve a problem. How long did it take me to realise that defining the problem
and solution were highly contested and that many actors therefore could well
be driven by some other rationality?
3 Compare for Stonewho noted that ‘[a]nalysis is itself a creature of politics; it is strategically
crafted argument, designed to create ambiguities and paradoxes and to resolve them in
a particular direction’ Stone 2002 (1988), p. 8.
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